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Lebanese memory is punctuated by significant moments, but rare are those that truly constituted a turning point in the country's history like the March 14, 2005 demonstration. That day, it was not merely a massive demonstration in the heart of Beirut, but a rare moment when Lebanese united around a common idea: the restoration of the state. This moment occurred after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, a crime that not only shook Lebanon but also disrupted the course of its political life. The assassination of a figure of Hariri's stature was not a mere security incident, but a true political earthquake that revealed the extent of the crisis Lebanon was experiencing, under the security and political yoke of Damascus since the end of the civil war. But what many had not anticipated at the time was that grief and anger would transform into a popular uprising of such magnitude. On March 14, 2005, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese flooded Martyrs' Square in one of the largest demonstrations in the region's history, demanding truth and justice, and above all, the restoration of national sovereignty. The world called this moment the Cedar Revolution, but the Lebanese who lived it know that it was much more than a simple « revolution ». It was a moment of collective awakening: the state was not a lost cause and tutelage was not eternal. The End of the Era of Tutelage The scene in Martyrs' Square was not merely a human gathering. It was a clear declaration that an entire chapter of Lebanon's history was coming to an end. After three decades of Syrian influence in Lebanon, Damascus faced double pressure: unprecedented Lebanese popular pressure and international pressure that materialized with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, demanding the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. In April 2005, Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon, ending a military presence that had begun in 1976. For many Lebanese, this was perceived as a second independence. But Lebanon's history is rarely linear. Incomplete Sovereignty It quickly became evident that the withdrawal of the Syrian army did not signify the end of the Lebanese crisis. Direct military tutelage had ended, but the issue of weapons outside state control remained. Lebanon then entered a new phase of political conflict, the central question of which was: who holds the power to wage war and make peace in Lebanon? During these years, the growing role of Hezbollah became predominant, as it possessed a military arsenal independent of the Lebanese state. Over time, this arsenal became a major point of political division in the country. The March 14 Forces believed that the construction of the state could not be complete as long as weapons existed outside its institutions, while Hezbollah considered its weapons an integral part of the « resistance ». Lebanon thus engaged in a prolonged political struggle around the very concept of sovereignty. From Hope to Collapse If the Lebanese were to recall the scene in Martyrs' Square in 2005, they would find it difficult to reconcile that moment of hope with the current reality. Nearly twenty years later, Lebanon seems to have moved further and further away from the dream of a state that the demonstrators were then demanding. Today, the state is weak, its institutions are almost paralyzed, its economy has collapsed, and its population is emigrating in unprecedented numbers. As for the decision of sovereignty, which was at the heart of the March 14 uprising, it remains a subject of internal and regional conflict. Recent years have shown that Lebanon's problem lies not only in occupation or direct tutelage, but also in the very inability of the political system to build a capable state. Political sectarianism, power-sharing by quotas, and the presence of weapons outside state control have repeatedly hindered the state-building project that the Lebanese people dreamed of in 2005. What Remains of March 14? Some claim that March 14 has disappeared as a political alliance. This is largely true. The alliance that bore this name gradually weakened, its forces dispersed, and some of its members made political compromises that undermined its initial message. But March 14 was not just a political alliance. It was an idea. The idea that Lebanon should be a sovereign, free, and independent state. The idea that the decision to wage war and peace should belong exclusively to legitimate institutions. And the idea that Lebanon cannot function as a normal state if it remains a theater of regional conflicts. These ideas have not disappeared. They may have lost some of their political influence, but they remain present in the consciousness of a large part of the Lebanese population who still believe that establishing a functional state is the only solution to Lebanon's chronic crisis. An Unfinished Moment The fundamental problem of the March 14 movement perhaps lay in the fact that, despite its historical importance, it failed to transform into a sustainable political project capable of rebuilding the state. The alliance that led this movement had to face immense challenges: political assassinations, internal divisions, and regional wars that directly affected Lebanon. Nevertheless, March 14, 2005 remains a pivotal moment in modern Lebanese history. It proved that Lebanese are capable of overcoming fear when they feel their country threatened and of creating a unifying national momentum, transcending traditional divisions. A Memory for the Future Today, as the anniversary of March 14 is commemorated, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese may not take to the streets as they did twenty years ago. But the questions raised that day remain acutely relevant: Can Lebanon become a normal state again? Can the decision of war and peace rest solely with the state? Can the Lebanese one day gather again around a unifying national project? The commemoration of March 14 may not provide answers to these questions, but it reminds Lebanese of a fundamental truth: a moment of national unity is possible. It happened once, in Martyrs' Square. And nothing prevents it from happening again.

And what about forgiveness when the offenders know perfectly well and consciously what they are doing? What about leniency towards those who don't give a damn about the country, others, or even their own? In the name of Khamenei and the Islamic Republic, Hezbollah launches rockets at the country that annihilated its supreme leader in a single strike. The supposed leader of Hezbollah, Naim Kassem, the one in hiding, launches 'Karbalaean' wars, battles named after Quranic verses, thus honoring its original name, 'the Islamic resistance in Lebanon'. And meanwhile, it's death, destruction, panic, chaos. Forgive them? It is beyond the powers of Christ himself. Moreover, it is not Hezbollah alone that is to blame, it is the entire system, all the politicians, deputies, and ministers who are officially their allies, who defend them out of dhimmitude or self-interest. It's also the others, those who harangue the crowds and claim to be against the militia, but who, at the first opportunity, warmly greet each other, while their supporters clash on social media or even on the ground. Henceforth, the equation is very simple, Manichaean: either with, or against. There is no longer any room for a gray area. The Iranian militia declared war on Lebanon by launching its missiles against Israel, that state led by a madman who owes its freedom only to war. It is high time to face reality: this militia has nothing Lebanese about it and does not represent the true Lebanese Shiites. And when one wages war against a country from which one originates, in the name of another, that is certainly not called resistance, but treason….

Hezbollah, you probably had something to prove! By launching a "salvo of missiles and a swarm of drones" towards Israel in the early hours of Monday, March 2, you certainly had something in mind. To this day, the consequences are incalculable: more than seven hundred dead, ruthless eradication of entire neighborhoods, nearly nine hundred thousand displaced from their homes, including more than 150,000 who found refuge only in the precariousness and promiscuity of collective shelters! Why didn't you keep a low profile? You could not have shown such immaturity when you knew that the Hebrew state's retaliation would be disproportionate. In your capacity as a "self-proclaimed resistance movement," you were not big enough to measure yourself against the IDF, especially since you had been decapitated on September 17 by the "pagers." What then was the purpose of your act of provocation? Your pathetic fireworks could not reverse the course of the situation, especially since the missiles fired from Iran had proven ineffective and insufficient and had provided proof of the vulnerability of a clerical regime on the ropes. It will be alleged that your decision of March 2, a date to remember, was not yours and that it was dictated more by Iranian offices than by strictly Lebanese interests. It will also be argued that you could not stand idly by when the Supreme Leader was shot down and Iran was daily torn apart with impunity. Let us therefore admit your subjection to the big brothers of Qom, Isfahan, and Tehran and confess, in passing, that it does not honor a purportedly Lebanese "resistance." The useless sacrifice and the victorious defeat Hezbollah, you have, in short, "entered the furnace" and you have dragged your people into it, while the ayatollahs' regime had already lost its splendor and was already living on borrowed time. It was said that your vengeful action was pure madness, a headlong rush, and above all, suicide. But was it not rather a sterile sacrifice? You could not absorb the loss of the Supreme Leader without shedding blood. You would have seemed ungrateful, the Iranian regime having invested so much in your structuring and military training. Lacking an adequate lethal arsenal and unable to cause casualties (or so few) in Israel, you would cause them in your own community. Insane and criminal proof of fratellanza, this brotherhood of arms that governs suspicious causes! An anthropologist had already warned us against useless sacrifice which can easily take the form of self-immolation (1). Suicidal, your armed intervention certainly protected your "fantasized communal identity," but at the expense of the real survival of your confessional group. Look closely at the conditions in which the displaced people from the South and Dahiyé survive, scattered as they are throughout the national territory. Consider well what you have done to them! Yet, despite their daily miseries, their attachment to you is unshakeable and unwavering (2). This is because they operate in an eschatological domain, that of "victorious defeat." And as an illustration, the spectacle of your affiliates who, in denial of their reality, maintain that you are triumphant while you are in full rout. Hezbollah, you offered the Shiite social body to a media lynching to respond "always ready" to your mentors and benefactors from the Iranian highlands. Would you, by a reversal of priorities, have made your own people the scapegoat? This political reason's bewilderment can only be explained as the mirror of an archaic mentality, or at least the expression of a hypnotic state. And the rest is of the same ilk! Faced with this distortion of common sense, what to say except: "So much misery for so little glory"! 1-Paul Dumouchel, The Useless Sacrifice. Essay on Political Violence, Paris, Flammarion, 2001. 2- Except perhaps when they express themselves stealthily.

Fears of a military conflict between Iran and the axis formed by Israel and the United States getting bogged down are being confirmed as developments on the ground accelerate and political and military confrontation between Tehran and Washington intensifies. On the fourteenth day of the war raging since February 28, Washington and Tel Aviv insist on their determination to annihilate the military capabilities of Tehran, which is reacting by expanding the scope of its attacks, just hours after the bellicose televised message from the new Iranian Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who was nevertheless injured in the violent strike that killed his father, Ali Khamenei. Diplomacy still seems to have no place in this tug-of-war whose outcome remains uncertain. For the first time since the beginning of the conflict, French targets in the region are being targeted by Iran. Yet, traditionally, Paris maintains cordial relations with the Islamic Republic, while remaining critical on certain issues. It would be interesting to note that the attack was not carried out directly by Tehran, unlike the one that targeted a British base in Cyprus on March 2. The missiles, launched by Iran, had been intercepted by Israel, according to British Defense Minister, John Healy. An occult pro-Iranian group calling itself Ashab el-Kahf thus claimed, on Friday, the nocturnal drone attack against a French base in Erbil, Iraq, where one French soldier was killed and at least five others were wounded. According to this group, it is a reaction to the deployment of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the Gulf. An initiative that French President, Emmanuel Macron, had taken “for defensive purposes.” Ashab el-Kahf also announced its intention to target all French interests in the region and not only in Iraq. The attack on the French base should not, however, be solely attributed to a response to the deployment of the Charles de Gaulle. Iran is primarily seeking to send a message to President Macron, who had sharply criticized it last week, calling Ali Khamenei, the former Supreme Leader killed by Israeli-American strikes, a “butcher.” Emmanuel Macron had also attacked Hezbollah, blaming it for dragging Lebanon into a war that does not concern it. Thus, at a time when Washington and Tel Aviv continue to insist on their determination to annihilate Tehran's military capabilities, the Mullahs' regime strives to show that it maintains them and that it still has the ability to increase pressure on its “enemies” by intensifying its missile and drone attacks and by continuing to block the Strait of Hormuz, much to the chagrin of the United States. Hours after the threats from the new Iranian Supreme Leader, who promised to plunge the region into chaos, Iranian attacks intensified against American bases in Saudi Arabia, where 56 drones were intercepted overnight from Thursday to Friday, according to Riyadh, in the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, where a missile directly hit a residential building. Turkey also announced that NATO intercepted an Iranian missile fired in its direction in the eastern Mediterranean basin. In Israel, military officials, quoted by media, however, said they had observed a decrease in the frequency of Iranian missile and drone attacks, particularly against Israeli territory. However, it remains under fire from Hezbollah attacks, which launched several volleys against northern Israel overnight from Thursday to Friday and then again on Friday, further plunging Lebanon into a spiral of violence that it remains unable to curb. In retaliation, Israel did not content itself with bombing the sectors and villages where the pro-Iranian formation is located or carrying out targeted assassinations, as in Nabaa, north of Beirut, on Friday morning, but undertook to execute its threat to strike Lebanese civilian infrastructure. First targets: two bridges at the Litani in South Lebanon, one of which connects the districts of Tyre, Nabatiyeh, Bint Jbeil and Zahrani and is therefore of strategic importance. Meanwhile, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres began an official visit to Lebanon. In the current circumstances, this is a mere formality, as the UN has no leverage or room for maneuver to end the ongoing conflict, or intervene to extricate Lebanon from the threat that Hezbollah poses to the country's long-term security. In a message on his social network, Truth Social, President Trump reaffirmed that Tehran is on the verge of capitulation. “We are totally destroying the terrorist regime of Iran, militarily, economically and otherwise.” “The Iranian navy is gone, their air force is no more, missiles, drones and everything else are decimated, and their leaders have been wiped off the face of the earth,” he added. Donald Trump repeated this same message during a virtual meeting of G7 leaders. According to the Axios website, he would have evoked a very close defeat. Hours earlier, Mojtaba Khamenei, despite being injured in the strike that killed his father, Ali Khamenei, affirmed that there was no question for Iran of “bending.”

In contemporary geopolitics, there are few points on the map capable of altering the course of the world economy in a matter of moments. The Strait of Hormuz is among the most consequential of them. This narrow maritime passage, separating Iran from the Sultanate of Oman, forms the vital artery through which oil and gas are exported from the Gulf to the rest of the world. Any military tension in the region — particularly given the persistent escalation between Iran and Israel — places this strait at the very heart of the international equation. This is no longer merely a regional dispute or a limited military confrontation. What is at stake is the potential destabilization of one of the main pillars of the global economy. The Strait's Place in the Global Economic Order Roughly one-fifth of the world's oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz each day, along with a substantial share of liquefied natural gas. Major industrial powers in Asia — China, Japan, South Korea — depend primarily on energy flowing from the Gulf through this corridor. As a result, even the threat of closing the strait, or merely constraining navigation within it, is enough to send shockwaves through global markets. The international economy, for all its magnitude, remains extraordinarily vulnerable to any threat against energy supplies. The Strait as a Geopolitical Weapon Iran has long played the Hormuz card in its confrontations with the West. Each time political pressure or economic sanctions intensify, threats to close the strait or disrupt shipping resurface with predictable regularity. Yet this card has never been easy to play. A full closure of the strait would mean a direct confrontation with international powers, foremost among them the United States, which regards freedom of navigation there as an integral component of its strategic security. The real danger, however, lies not necessarily in a total blockade, but in an indirect constriction of maritime traffic: threatening commercial vessels, targeting oil tankers, laying naval mines, staging limited military escalations in the Gulf. Such measures would not formally close the strait but would suffice to throw shipping into confusion and drive up transport and insurance costs dramatically. The Iranian-Israeli Conflict and the Multiplication of Fronts In recent years, the conflict between Iran and Israel has evolved into a multi-front confrontation stretching from Syria to the Red Sea and Iraq. As military tensions mount, the Gulf itself has become part of the picture. A broad Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear or military installations could push Tehran to respond through a range of instruments, including pressure on navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. In such a scenario, the aim would not necessarily be to bring global trade to a halt, but to send a strategic message: any war against Iran will extract its price from world markets. The World Economy Confronting an Energy Shock Should navigation in the strait be curtailed, the first shock would be felt in oil markets, which respond swiftly to geopolitical risk and could see prices spike sharply within days. Rising energy costs would in turn set off a chain of economic repercussions: higher transport and freight costs, soaring prices for essential goods, accelerating inflation across most countries, a slowdown in global economic growth. In a world that has not fully recovered from successive economic crises, a new energy shock could produce consequences both deep and long-lasting. Wider Regional Ramifications The tensions at Hormuz would not be contained within the bounds of global economics; they would spread to the political stability of the region itself. The Gulf states, whose livelihoods depend on energy exports through this passage, would find themselves in an acutely precarious position — caught between the imperative to protect their trade and the peril of being drawn into a wider regional conflict. A significant military escalation could also trigger a redrawing of the security map of the Middle East, with the possibility of the confrontation spreading to other fronts. Lebanon at the Eye of the Regional Storm For Lebanon, any major escalation between Iran and Israel would be felt on its own territory. Lebanon occupies one of the most sensitive positions in this conflict, given the role of Hezbollah, Iran's most prominent regional ally. When the confrontation flared across the region, Lebanon found itself facing one of two scenarios: either sliding into an open military front with Israel, or entering a prolonged period of intense political and security pressure stemming from regional tensions. In either case, the Lebanese economy — already exhausted — stands among the most exposed, whether through rising energy prices or through the disruption of regional trade. Between Deterrence and Detonation Despite all these risks, most parties are well aware that a full disruption of the Strait of Hormuz could unleash consequences that would be difficult to contain. This is why the threats have remained, for the most part, within the realm of political deterrence rather than practical execution. Yet history shows that major crises often begin with minor incidents or miscalculations between adversaries. And in a region as volatile as the Gulf, a single incident at sea can be enough to trigger a chain of reactions that no one can control. The Strait of Hormuz thus remains one of the most sensitive nodes in the international system. It is not merely a maritime corridor for oil transit — it is a geopolitical nexus where the interests of great powers intersect with the conflicts of the Middle East. As tensions between Iran and Israel continue to mount, the probability grows that this strait will become a card of strategic pressure in a confrontation that already transcends the region's boundaries. And in a world that depends so heavily on the flow of energy from the Gulf, any disruption of this vital artery could be enough to trigger a global economic earthquake. Ultimately, the Strait of Hormuz reminds us of a simple truth: in the contemporary international order, a narrow passage on the map may hold the fate of the entire world's economy in its grasp.

The sheer number of rockets recently fired from Lebanese territory toward Israel speaks to several things at once. Chief among them is this: unlike the Lebanese authorities, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has not wasted a moment since the ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel was reached. That was on November 23, 2024, under the government of President Najib Mikati. President Nabih Berri had played a pivotal role in brokering the agreement, which reflected the Party’s urgent need, at that juncture, to halt the fighting at any cost. It has become abundantly clear that Israel exploited the ceasefire to assert its freedom to continue its campaign against Hezbollah, while the Revolutionary Guard used the same agreement to consolidate its presence in Lebanon and prepare for the coming phase of confrontation between Iran on one side and America and Israel on the other. Yes, the Revolutionary Guard did not waste its time. It resumed its activities in Lebanon through whatever remained of Hezbollah. The fruits of the Guard’s success in this endeavor became visible in the period following the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, approximately two weeks ago. The consequence of that assassination was Lebanon’s total enlistment into the war Iran is waging against the United States and Israel. How did Lebanon enter this war? What responsibility does the Lebanese state bear for it? This is the overriding question of this moment, as we witness an Israeli expansion of occupation and an intensification of airstrikes, increasingly precise and targeted, across Lebanese territory — reaching now into the heart of Beirut itself. What is strangest of all is that Hezbollah, as an independent entity, no longer truly exists in Lebanon. Or rather: the Party exists whenever the needs of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard require it to. Those with insider knowledge of the Party relate that an officer of the Guard ordered Hezbollah fighters to launch rockets from Lebanese soil toward Israel. In doing so, the Iranian officer effectively declared the reopening of the South Lebanon front. All of this occurred against the will of the Lebanese state — including President of the Republic Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam — and against the wishes of the Lebanese majority. Naim Qassem was unaware of the specifics of what had happened. He learned of the rocket fire from television — much as Mojtaba Khamenei learned through the same medium that the Guard had selected him as Supreme Leader. Mojtaba used the occasion of his first speech since his appointment to announce that he had “heard of his appointment on television.” The irony is compounded by the fact that someone had to read the speech in his absence — the new Supreme Leader apparently being incapacitated by wounds he sustained… and perhaps by more than wounds alone. The meaning of everything that has unfolded, whether in Lebanon or in Iran itself, seems to be twofold: the Guard holds ultimate decision-making authority in both countries, and it has found no better front for itself in Lebanon than Hezbollah. There is no longer any doubt that the Party — which was never anything other than a brigade of the Revolutionary Guard with Lebanese personnel — has become a Lebanese sectarian militia operating under the command of Iranian officers. Between the ignorance of Lebanese officialdom, at every level, of what is being wrought on Lebanese soil and in the region — particularly regarding the deeper meaning of the transformation in Syria — and the latest developments embodied in the new Israeli military offensive, it is impossible to ignore that Lebanon is living through a moment of historical consequence. The problem is that official Lebanon failed to grasp that time was not working in its favor. Time has caught up with Lebanon. It is clear that the opportunities afforded since the agreement of November 23, 2024 will not come again. There is no awareness of the plain reality that Joseph Aoun could never have become President of the Republic without Hezbollah’s defeat in the “Gaza solidarity war.” Had the Party still been standing — had it and its former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah survived — it would have clung to its candidate Sleiman Frangieh, who was supposed to occupy the presidency. The Party had been insistent that its candidate hold the presidency, just as it had imposed Michel Aoun in October 2016, shepherding him and his son-in-law Gebran Bassil all the way to Baabda Palace. They were brought to the presidency so that the institution might serve Iran and its expansionist project — hostile to everything Arab in the region — nothing more. What has passed has passed. What can Lebanon do now that the Islamic Republic has managed, through the Revolutionary Guard, to reopen the South Lebanon front? Can the errors of the near past — a near past that is only a year and a few months old — be avoided? The answer is that there is no alternative to confronting the reality: the country has become, like Iran itself, subject to the authority of the Revolutionary Guard. How does one confront an authority that expresses, in a different but no less total form, Iran’s complete hegemony over Lebanon? A Lebanese response is needed. And no response of any substance will be possible without breaking through the wall of fear surrounding Hezbollah — a party that barely exists anymore, save as an instrument wholly controlled by the Revolutionary Guard. Once again: the Guard has not wasted its time since the autumn of 2024, when Lebanon concluded its ceasefire with Israel. It has reinforced its position in the country — a fact confirmed by the volume of rockets launched toward Israel. Lebanon will pay a steep price for those launches, and a steeper price still for having failed to understand that time was not on its side, that every word spoken about disarming Hezbollah is worthless without concrete action on the ground. Action was needed — regardless of the cost, and without fear of threats of civil war or similar specters that, when scrutinized, hold no purchase on reality.