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While some Beirut residents continued on Friday, April 10, to inspect the sectors severely hit on Wednesday by Israeli aviation, as part of a surprise attack against Hezbollah cadres based in various neighborhoods of the capital, air raids continued in the South against several villages in the southern part of the country. One of these raids killed 12 people (State Security agents) in Nabatiyeh. But in the absence of major developments in military operations, it is the direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, scheduled for early next week in Washington, that are currently focusing the attention of local diplomatic and political circles. Information available on Friday indicated that a preliminary meeting will be held on Tuesday at the office of Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, between Lebanon's ambassador to Washington, Nada Hamadé Moawad, and Israel's ambassador, Yechiel Leiter. This three-way discussion will most likely define the general framework or the broad outlines of the agenda for Lebanese-Israeli talks in the military, security, political, and bilateral relations spheres, with a view to peace between the two countries. Lebanon is expected to soon form ad-hoc committees that will be responsible for conducting bilateral talks with Israeli negotiators in the various areas of common interest. It should be noted in this context that Hezbollah has declared its opposition to any direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. On Friday afternoon, a few dozen supporters of the pro-Iranian party organized rallies in Zokak el-Blatt, Hamra, and in the city center, particularly in the Grand Serail area, to denounce the government's position regarding talks with Israel, obviously forgetting that Hezbollah had negotiated, indirectly, with Israel in the mid-1990s (which led to the April Arrangements), not to mention the talks initiated in 2021-2022 by the pro-Iranian party with Israel, through the American envoy Amos Hochstein (also a former Israeli army officer) with a view to demarcating the maritime borders between Lebanon and Israel. Hezbollah supporters who took to the streets on Friday afternoon are undoubtedly too young to know, moreover, that during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, the Iranian mullahs' regime had resorted to... Israel to procure weapons and ammunition to confront Saddam Hussein's army, which at the time caused the famous Iran-Contra affair. It would also be good to recall the (direct) negotiations undertaken between Lebanon and Israel in 1983, following the 1982 war ("Operation Peace for Galilee"). Lebanese and Israeli negotiators then met, face to face, alternately in Khalde and in the Israeli city of Netanya. A strategic issue Beyond the populist outbidding initiated by Hezbollah, it must be noted in the current context that the stakes of direct negotiations with Israel are highly strategic for Lebanon. This issue was clearly defined on Thursday, during the Council of Ministers, by President Joseph Aoun, who bluntly stressed that "only Lebanon negotiates for itself, and no one can negotiate on behalf of Lebanon." The allusion to the Islamic Republic is obvious, inasmuch as the Iranian power insists that Lebanon be included in the ceasefire concluded between Tehran and Washington. Clearly, this would mean that Iran would have, in this case, arrogated to itself the right to monopolize the Lebanese card in its talks with the Trump Administration. By thus embarking on the path of direct negotiations with Israel, President Aoun and the Salam government reaffirm their determination to completely dissociate Lebanon's case from Iranian maneuvers, which would amount to tearing the Lebanese card from the hands of the Islamic Republic. This dissociation is vital for the Lebanese authorities to ensure a settlement of disputes with the Hebrew state. In the mid-1990s, it is recalled in this regard, direct negotiations took place in Washington between Lebanon and Israel but they did not lead to the desired results because Beirut had linked its approval of an agreement with Tel Aviv to the success of Israel's talks with the Syrian regime, which had then refrained from signing with the Israeli government, which had torpedoed the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. The Salam government is thus clearly seeking to dissociate Lebanon's case from the Iranian file so as not to repeat the unfortunate precedent of the destabilizing concomitance of the Lebanese and Syrian components at the time. This dissociation is all the more fundamental for Lebanon today as the Revolutionary Guards do not seem particularly enthusiastic about concluding an agreement with the United States, as indicated by their position on the Strait of Hormuz. "From now on, we will decide which liners will be allowed to cross the strait," the Pasdaran affirmed on Friday. A small phrase which, if it materializes, risks torpedoing the Islamabad talks, scheduled to open on Saturday.

The announcement of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, with American participation, in Washington, amounts to no more than a first step along a long road that will pave the way for a definitive separation between the Iranian and Lebanese trajectories. It should likewise open the path, at least in principle, to a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel modelled on the Egyptian-Israeli treaty of 1979 and the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement of 1984. What is now at stake is Lebanon's capacity to recover its autonomous decision-making and to dissociate it from Iranian tutelage, much as it once managed to sever the unity of path with Syria under the successive reigns of Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad. Both had wielded the slogan of "unity of path and destiny" with Lebanon as a bargaining chip in their dealings with Washington, and as a tool for perpetuating the state of neither-war-nor-peace that has so long defined the Middle East. Will 2026 be the year in which the Cairo Agreement is finally buried? That accord, signed in 1969, lies at the very root of the Lebanese tragedy. It seems to have taken fifty-seven years of wars fought among Lebanese and wars fought by others on Lebanese soil for the country to rid itself, at long last, of that agreement and its lasting consequences. What remains established, at least for now, is that Lebanon is firmly resolved, under the stewardship of President of the Republic Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, to reject any Iranian attempt to negotiate on its behalf. Lebanon is indeed seeking, through their efforts, to achieve a provisional ceasefire along the lines of the agreement that the "Islamic Republic" has reached with the United States; yet it is equally unwilling to find itself absorbed into the American-Iranian negotiations, which seem destined to fail, all the more so if Tehran clings to demands that admit of no realistic satisfaction. Nothing compels Lebanon to go on paying the price for the ventures of an Iranian regime that has spared no effort to reduce it to one of its colonies. Tehran had even come, at a certain point, to regard Beirut as an Arab capital under its direct grip and as its window onto the Mediterranean, while South Lebanon had itself turned, in a similarly telling phase, into a mere post box between the "Islamic Republic" on the one hand and the Hebrew state on the other. The time has long come to put an end to a farce that has gone on far too long. The unity of path between Lebanon and Iran is merely the counterpart of what the unity of path between Lebanon and Syria once was. The "Islamic Republic" clings to Lebanon as though it were the last card remaining to it in the region, even as it retains its grip on Iraq and on a portion of Yemen, where the Houthis now find themselves in a deepening predicament, dependent as they are on a Gulf Arab state to pay the salaries of civil servants in the territories they still control, including Sanaa. Lebanon's move testifies to a remarkable political acumen, even if the first session of direct negotiations with Israel, expected shortly, will be largely ceremonial in character. It is worth noting that Israel's agreement to hold this session came twenty-four hours after the strikes it had carried out against various sites across Beirut, a way of asserting that it remains capable of intervening inside Lebanon and that it holds the reins of political decision in the country. Has Lebanon grasped the Israeli message, which means above all that the Hebrew state is determined to see through the destruction of Hezbollah to its conclusion, and that it contemplates no withdrawal from South Lebanon in the absence of a prior peace agreement? The fundamental question, however, refuses to go away, for if the "Islamic Republic's" negotiations with the American "Great Satan" are permissible, on what grounds would Lebanon's negotiations with the Israeli "Lesser Satan" be deemed forbidden? Lebanon has at last chosen to serve its own interests rather than those of Iran, in whose service Hezbollah had committed all its resources, faithfully obeying the orders and directives of the Revolutionary Guards. Lebanon now knows full well the party’s arsenal means the perpetuation of the occupation, its deepening and its entrenchment, and that this arsenal represents a source of weakness rather than of strength, in any form whatsoever. There is no doubt that Lebanon is waging a momentous battle, one whose stakes are no less severe than those of the struggle to emerge from Syrian tutelage in 2005, following the assassination of Rafic Hariri and his companions on the fourteenth of February of that year. What may help Lebanon in this battle is that the majority of Lebanese have now come to understand that arms mean the perpetuation of Israeli occupation, and that the only path to ending it lies in direct negotiations with Israel, negotiations that have become unavoidable. Is Lebanon worth less than Egypt or Jordan? Lebanon has no remaining option but direct negotiation, for which it must prepare by assembling a delegation as broadly representative as possible of the active political forces, including those that carry genuine Shia weight. The Shia community has interests entirely at odds with those of Iran and Hezbollah, since it stands to gain everything from an end to the Israeli occupation, from the return of displaced inhabitants to their devastated villages, and from the reconstruction of those villages, rather than seeing the displaced transformed into a time bomb at the national level, and most acutely within Beirut itself. What may finally help Lebanon advance decisively in its negotiations with Israel is Iran's loss of its Syrian card. Now that Syria has rid itself of the Alawite regime, it no longer serves as a pressure tool against official Lebanon or against the Lebanese people. This will undoubtedly help the country shake off Iranian domination, so that Lebanon may be Lebanon and Iran may be Iran, and so that the farce known as "unity of fronts" and the "axis of resistance" may at last come to its end.

Lebanon can no longer afford the luxury of ambiguities. In a context of generalized collapse — economic, institutional, and social on the one hand, and of merciless war on our country — one truth imposes itself with absolute urgency: there can be no recovery, nor any affirmation of the state's role, without the full and complete restoration of its authority. On this essential point, a major step forward has already been taken: the clear decision to affirm the illegality of Hezbollah's military formation and to concentrate arms in the hands of the legitimate armed forces. This decision is just. It is necessary. It is vital. But today, it remains insufficiently implemented. Between decision and execution: a dangerous gap Lebanon suffers less from a deficit of texts or positions than from a deficit of execution. Too often, sovereign decisions are taken… then left in abeyance, hollowed of their substance by inaction, by compromises, or by fear of confrontation. In this context, Hezbollah's maintenance of an autonomous military capability, in direct contradiction with this decision of the State, constitutes a frontal challenge to national authority. This is not merely an institutional anomaly: it is a calling into question of the very principle of sovereignty. Faced with this, ambiguity is no longer an option. Nor is wait-and-see. The requirement of firmness What is now expected of Lebanon's political authorities is clear: to translate the decision into deeds. With method, with responsibility, but above all with firmness. This is not about escalation, nor about posturing. It is a sovereign imperative. Any prolonged complacency will only deepen internal fractures and expose the country further to regional turbulence. The Lebanese Armed Forces must be placed at the center of this dynamic. They possess national legitimacy and the trust of a broad segment of the population. But they must be given the political and operational means to fully assume their role. Moving beyond fear The true obstacle today is not the absence of solutions. It is the fear of implementing them. Fear of tensions. Fear of reactions. Fear of the short-term political cost. But Lebanon's recent history teaches us one thing: the cost of inaction is always higher than the cost of courage. Every retreat of the State has been paid for by a lasting weakening of its institutions and a deterioration in the living conditions of its citizens. It is time to reverse this logic. A call for civic mobilization In this decisive phase, responsibility does not rest with leaders alone. It also falls upon society as a whole. A popular movement, peaceful but determined, must emerge to support the effective implementation of the State's decisions. Not against any part of the Lebanese people, but in favor of a fundamental principle: a single state, a single authority, a single legitimate armed force. This support is essential to give decision-makers the courage to act, and to politically isolate any form of refusal to comply with national legality. The hour of truth Lebanon stands at a crossroads. Either the sovereign decisions remain declarations without a tomorrow, and the country continues its slow erosion. Or they are at last implemented with the determination that the gravity of the situation demands, and a prospect of recovery becomes possible once more. The choice is there. It is clear. Decreeing is no longer enough. We must act.

For the first time, China is throwing its full international political weight behind Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, in order to set the stage for American-Iranian negotiations capable of producing a workable solution on the basis of a ceasefire — not an end to the war, as Iran had demanded. The effort appears to have succeeded, with Islamabad beginning yesterday to host both delegations in the same hotel. This shift in the mediation initiative reflects Beijing's capacity to exert direct influence over Iranian decision-making, and at the same time reveals the convergence of its strategic position with that of the four countries around a shared objective: ending the war without toppling the regime in Tehran and without allowing violence to spiral toward extremities that no actor would be able to control. Without the Chinese counterweight, however, the four countries would be unable to secure Iran's presence at the negotiating table or to provide the guarantees necessary for its success. This observation points in turn to the nature of the balances prevailing in the Middle East among the regional powers — Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey — balances that are neither decisive nor sufficiently structured to generate a Middle Eastern solution independent of Washington first, and then of China, Russia and the European Union. This is precisely what might be described as “geopolitical fluidity”: a configuration that allows the field to produce new facts bearing on the regional and international equation as a whole, and that also permits an adjustment of the priorities that Washington, as the dominant pole, intends to assert, Washington, which has projected its military power from the Far East into the region in order to preserve a status it is not prepared to relinquish, even at the cost of an open-ended war. The Tail Wagging the Dog In an interview with CNN on 3 April, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal described the conflict as “Netanyahu’s war,” designed, in his view, to divert attention from the Israeli Prime Minister’s domestic conduct in Gaza and the occupied West Bank, before invoking the image of the tail wagging the dog to suggest that it is Netanyahu who has dragged the American president into this battle, and not the reverse. The metaphor is harsh, and it points to a deep dysfunction within the American political establishment, for such a situation runs counter to the logic one would expect of a state like the United States when it wages war in the Middle East, that heart of the old world now said to be new. After the remarks of the seasoned Saudi prince, long versed in security and political affairs, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statement to the New York Times on 8 April described Netanyahu as “a skilled salesman, adept at evasion,” who had “deceived the administration once again” by dangling the prospect of regime change in Tehran rather than a strategy of containment. At the same time, the Israeli press revealed that the State Department, the CIA and the Pentagon’s senior commanders had not endorsed Netanyahu’s assessments or the Mossad’s reports, which led to the well-known resignations and dismissals, and further heightened the political confusion increasingly visible in presidential statements. It was thus that the White House’s definitive policy ended up entrusting the conduct of the negotiations in Karachi to Vice President J.D. Vance, the very man known for his principled opposition to the war. One can therefore readily understand that Prince Turki al-Faisal should have sounded this political alarm, seeking to draw attention to the gravity of what was unfolding in Washington and to the singular role Netanyahu had arrogated to himself. He was also sending a firm signal regarding the steadfastness of the Kingdom’s official orientations, which had not in the least abandoned its strategy of producing a solution grounded in a balance of interests, in response to Netanyahu’s hegemonic ambitions over the region. Now that Netanyahu has been sidelined by Trump, it is worth tracing this shift in priorities at the top of the American hierarchy back, first and foremost, to the personality of President Trump, then to the distribution of powers within the American political system, and finally to the balance of forces driving this state through its vast political, military and security institutions — which makes political decision-making the complex product of internal balances at every level. It is in this way that the question of negotiations was settled by a return to the policy of containing the Iranian regime. The Insolence of an Ambassador It was from Kuwait City that the Iranian ambassador there, Mohammad Toutounji, made himself known to the wider public through his statement to AFP on 7 April, calling for every possible effort “to avert the catastrophe,” on the grounds that Tehran would respond to external threats with measures affecting “the security and stability of the Gulf states.” This rhetoric echoes the insolence of the same ambassador who, in Beirut, had never been accredited and had nonetheless refused to leave the country, despite the formal decision of the Lebanese authorities. This is a well-established practice in Iran’s militia diplomacy, consisting in covering the supreme leadership’s retreat from its initial maximum positions while maintaining a dual language — one directed at the American administration, another at the Iranian people and the peoples of the region. The documents submitted to the White House revealed an unofficial face kept carefully out of sight. Had Tehran truly held firm and refused to meet the essential demands set out in the American document, the United States Vice President would not have traveled to meet the speaker of the Iranian parliament, especially given that the war has exhausted the regime’s overall capacities, leaving it with only a portion of its missile and drone stockpile, along with a few million loyalists capable of fighting the Iranian people whenever they take to the streets in protest. Black Wednesday The mediators’ success dealt a stinging blow to Netanyahu, now sidelined by Trump, who decided in accordance with American interests first and foremost, without even consulting his Israeli interlocutor this time, merely informing him after the fact. It is this precise moment that I believe pushed the Israeli leadership to unleash its fury on the city of Beirut, venting its political frustration in a criminal day partaking of the “war of extermination in Gaza.” Without the Lebanese state’s position, the Israeli leadership at its three levels — political, military and security — would have sought to shift the war from its previous mode to the Gaza model of extermination. This is why the fate of the negotiations in Pakistan, whether they succeed or fail, matters less for Lebanon than the success of its endeavor to separate its existential cause from the “arenas” dossier, as Tehran invariably prefers to frame it. What is at stake now is the battle of direct negotiations with Israel for Lebanon’s salvation and deliverance, through a comprehensive vision of what the Lebanese state must be and of how to end this war on the basis of a victory for sovereignty and a guarantee of security for the people and a dignified life. When that day comes, we will be able to say that the inaugural address and the ministerial statement served as the midwife that brought the new Republic into the world, as its people wish it to be and are prepared to accept it.

For a resounding victory, it was anything but! Donald Trump, wary of getting drawn into the Persian Gulf, found a way out by scaling back his ambitions. No more talk of changing the regime of wilayat al-faqih, nor of putting a definitive end to Iran’s nuclear program (1). With the Islamabad Agreement of April 7, he will have to settle for a consolation prize: the reopening of communication routes and free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz “in coordination with the Iranian armed forces.” Does that make it a victory for the ayatollahs? Certainly not! Javad Zarif and Foreign Affairs While Iran has shown resilience, its forces are nevertheless exhausted and its country drained. Moreover, its negotiators in Islamabad seem ready to abandon their Lebanese proxy to its fate. Tehran will not formally admit this, but Javad Zarif hinted as much in an article in Foreign Affairs (2). The former Iranian foreign minister used the opportunity of an academic contribution (?) to propose a roadmap to end the raging regional conflict: he advocated reciprocal concessions between the belligerents, de-escalation, and diplomatic normalization. In exchange for the lifting of U.S. sanctions and the ban on the sale of its hydrocarbons, Iran would drastically reduce its uranium enrichment program, which would moreover be placed under international supervision, etc. With regional security ensured, the Persian Gulf would become a zone of prosperity and fruitful exchange. In this idyllic vision of the future, exporting the Islamic Revolution would no longer be on the agenda. This explains why there is no mention of our Mediterranean Middle East, let alone the Palestinian cause or the Al-Aqsa Mosque! Still, it is curious that Javad Zarif does not tell us what fate he intends for Hezbollah. Does he plan to sacrifice it as a pawn on the political chessboard? (3) “Eternal Darkness” and the Islamabad Agreement The plan proposed by Zarif suggests that Iran should be allowed to claim a strategic victory, so that it does not lose face and can enter negotiations with the “Great Satan.” And indeed, that is what happened: no sooner had the ceasefire been declared than Hezbollah—not just Iran—claimed to be “on the brink of a great historic victory.” Nevertheless, the Iranian-backed militia called on displaced residents from the South, Dahieh, and the Bekaa “to show patience, to stand firm,” and not to return to their homes until it gave the green light. And rightly so, since the said ceasefire, which supposedly enshrined Iran’s victory, hardly concerned the Lebanese theater of operations. Lebanon was not meant to benefit from the cessation of hostilities. Indeed, on April 8, Eyal Zamir, the Israeli Chief of Staff, declared: “We will continue to strike the terrorist Hezbollah and exploit every opportunity… Strikes will continue as part of Operation ‘Eternal Darkness.’” So to those of our fellow citizens who proclaimed victory too soon, we say: do not be mistaken about Benjamin Netanyahu’s intentions. As far as his northern border is concerned, he has opted for full-scale escalation. And he reminds us of this constantly through repeated strikes, as if to say: “I am not bound by the Islamabad Agreement.” And to add: “Lebanese, you serve as human shields for Hezbollah!” Postscript At a time when official Lebanon is preparing to launch peace negotiations in Washington with the State of Israel, one can expect a dirty trick from the Islamic Republic. Facing the possible loss of its proxy—the Party of God—it will seek to bypass the government and will not hesitate to inflame civil conflict among the Lebanese if doing so serves its interests. With nothing left to lose, Hezbollah would once again be used to sow chaos! 1 – It should be noted that the Farsi version of the ceasefire agreement stipulates the continuation of uranium enrichment within the framework of Iran’s nuclear program. This addition does not appear in the original version circulating in English among diplomats and journalists. And this is not the only discrepancy between the two versions. 2 – Javad Zarif, “How Iran Should End the War: A Deal Tehran Could Take,” Foreign Affairs, April 2026. For failing to take national interests into account, this article immediately earned its author a reprimand from the Iranian authorities. 3 – Likewise, Iranian threats to withdraw from the agreement following the “Black Wednesday” carnage would be purely symbolic—a smokescreen and a subterfuge to mask their real intentions.

Ten minutes were enough for Beirut and the other regions to endure the most ferocious Israeli attacks they had ever witnessed. The toll was hundreds dead and thousands wounded. All of this came to pass after the conclusion of the opaque agreement between America and Iran on a ceasefire. Israel, led by a Netanyahu unwilling to accept any agreement that would return him to the difficult domestic reality of Israeli politics, sought to convey to all parties that Iran's declaration of including Lebanon in that agreement was null and void. Iran repudiates it verbally, while continuing on its side to observe the agreement. As for Hezbollah, dispersed across every corner of the country and intermingled with the civilian population, it declared its adherence to the ceasefire and has, until now, refrained from retaliating against Israel beyond a handful of rockets fired at Kiryat Shmoneh. Lebanon is officially an arena open to violation, with the consent of that very government which then decreed a period of national mourning for the victims. As for the Lebanese people, it is on its government and its officials that they have decreed their own mourning. Those who live inside a war are not asked to understand, but only to bear witness and to remain human as far as possible. That is what I shall do. We are not an arena. We are not a land open to the settling of scores, nor a map on which others trace their lines of fire according to their own interests. We are human beings, with names, homes, children, and a memory already burdened with enough wars that we did not choose. And yet, every time, the same role is reimposed on us, that of serving as the arena and the corridor, the messenger and the front line, the permanent victim. We are bombed so that some power can send its signals, destroyed while others negotiate elsewhere, killed because we had the misfortune of being born in this part of the world. We refuse all of this. We refuse to take part in a war in which we have no say, no stake, and no power to bring it to an end. We refuse to be reduced to a mere card in the hands of any axis, and to be summoned to die in silence beneath grand slogans that neither feed our children nor protect our homes. We refuse to be vassals, whether of Iran or of anyone else. We refuse to have our land, our lives, and our future governed by decisions that come from beyond our borders, under the banner of a theocratic state that sees in us nothing but an extension of its influence and a shield for its protection. We refuse to have an entire society taken hostage and plunged into battles that exceed both its capacities and its will, only to be asked afterward to celebrate the sacrifice. What sacrifice could that be, one that its own authors did not choose, and what resistance could that be, one imposed on people by force? Just as we refuse to be lectured about Israel, its perfidy and its brutality, we equally and simultaneously refuse Israel's own barbaric practices; we refuse that it remain above all accountability, and that a state founded on force and occupation continue to threaten us, bomb us, and destroy our cities, justifying each of these acts in the name of security. What security could that be, built on the ruins of others? Had the Palestinians ever obtained their rights, had justice ever existed in this region, neither Iran nor anyone else would have been able to exploit that gaping breach to blackmail us, and we would never have found ourselves on the front line of others' wars. We are the victims of two lethal equations, one being that of an occupation deaf to the rights of others, and the other that of an instrumentalisation which sees in us nothing but a tool. Caught between the two, we are ground to dust. But despite all of this, we proclaim today that enough is enough. Enough of being used, enough of being taken hostage, enough of being killed in the name of causes whose management serves none of our interests. We want a genuine state, not the shadow of another, powerless to exercise its own authority, but a state that makes sovereign decisions on war and peace rather than having them imposed upon it. We want a single army, a single decision, an indivisible sovereignty. These words may seem futile against the roar of warplanes, the rain of rockets, and the chaos of blood and mutilated bodies. But the word is, in truth, the most powerful weapon we possess. For war begins when human beings are stripped of their voice, and ends, sooner or later, when they recover it. We are not an arena. We are not numbers. We are not cannon foder. We are human beings… We simply want to live.