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Massive explosion caused by an Israeli strike near the town of Al-Mansouri in southern Lebanon. (AFP)
Weekly essentials
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By LevantTime .
Published Sep 6, 2026 - 23:27
While the United States had appeared to be relying solely on economic warfare against Iran, the US military abruptly carried out strikes on Iranian territory on Tuesday in retaliation for attacks targeting oil tankers, setting off a spiral of violence over the course of the week. In Lebanon, Israel released several civilians held in its prisons, while its army seized the strategic Ali el-Taher hill and continued its heavy strikes in the area it controls in the south of the country. The week from August 31 to September 6 was marked by a sharp acceleration of events in the Middle East, after the previous one had seemed defined by relative stagnation. On the Iranian front, the US military carried out targeted strikes inside Iranian territory as early as Tuesday evening, the first in nearly a month. This screen grab, made on September 6, 2026 from undated video footage released the same day by US Central Command, shows what CENTCOM says is one of the Iranian oil tankers it destroyed in response to attempted missile attacks on naval vessels. (CENTCOM via AFP) However, the relatively limited pace of the strikes suggests that the US administration has opted for an escalation that remains controlled, while continuing its blockade and economic pressure on Tehran. Even so, tensions continued to rise throughout the week. Explosions were heard on Saturday on the highly strategic island of Kharg, through which most of Iran’s oil exports pass. US President Donald Trump, for his part, threatened to strike the Kuh-e Kolang nuclear site — “Pickaxe Mountain” in Persian — a heavily fortified facility located deep underground, not far from Natanz, Iran’s main uranium-enrichment site. Earlier in the week, he had enshrined the “tanker for tanker” equation, pledging to target an Iranian vessel every time the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struck an oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. That is precisely what the US military did on Saturday, setting two Iranian vessels ablaze. Politically, Donald Trump further hardened his tone toward Tehran. After saying in an interview that talks had been permanently frozen “because an agreement with them is not worth the paper it is written on,” he said on Saturday that the “conflict” with Iran was not a “war,” but “something ordinary” for the United States. A way of rattling the Iranians while at the same time reassuring the US public ahead of the midterm elections. A port, along with storage facilities and warehouses, was damaged following a US military strike carried out on September 6, 2026 in Iran’s southern Hormozgan province, which borders the Strait of Hormuz. (AFP) At the same time, the US news outlet Axios published a report on Saturday suggesting that the United States is already looking beyond this conflict, which began on February 28. Citing US officials and other informed sources, the outlet said the Trump administration is developing a broader strategy for the post-war Middle East. According to the report, it would be based on creating a regional alignment aimed at containing Iran, bringing an end to the regional fallout from Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attacks in Gaza, and expanding the circle of normalization between Israel and countries in the region. The threat against Kuh-e Kolang, which brings the Iranian nuclear issue back to the fore, echoes an announcement by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which said on September 1 that Iran had still not reopened its sites to inspectors following the strikes of May 2025. It should be recalled that despite the scale of the Israeli-American offensive against Iranian sites, it is almost certain that the stockpile of enriched uranium remains intact and has been moved to a safe location by the Iranian authorities, which remain committed to what they consider their right to develop a nuclear program. Following the IAEA announcement, the United States, together with France, Britain and Germany, said they intended to submit a resolution to the UN Security Council condemning Iran’s failure to comply with its non-proliferation commitments. This display of unity stands in contrast to the chill that has prevailed between Washington and its European allies since the beginning of the conflict. For their part, the Iranians appear to be responding to the upheaval in much the same way as before: by striking neighboring countries, notably Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, without directly targeting Israel. Heavy strikes in southern Lebanon On the Lebanese front, Israel is intensifying its destruction operations in villages in the south, even using explosive barrels in some cases. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun urged Washington and the international community to “put an end” to Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory, which killed seven people on Sunday against the backdrop of a fragile truce. The strikes hit several localities in the Nabatiyeh region. Twenty people were also wounded, including children, according to the Health Ministry. One strike also destroyed the former Ghandour hospital, which had been out of service for years. Release of detainees and capture of Ali el-Taher But the major event of the week in the south was the Israeli capture of the strategic Ali el-Taher hill in the Nabatiyeh region. The site served as a major Hezbollah headquarters, consisting of an extensive network of tunnels from which fighters from the Shiite party operated, along with, according to some reports, Iranian fighters. On Thursday evening, the Israelis announced that they had taken control of the complex. On Sunday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said that tunnels still had to be blown up. This military “success” may not have come as a surprise after weeks of bombardment, but Hezbollah’s reaction was more unexpected. After long insisting that it would refuse to give up this strategic hill — as had the Iranians, who had also threatened to intervene — the Shiite party ultimately sought to play down the significance of the development through its media outlets and allied networks, without officially confirming the loss of the site, which it had refused to preserve by handing it over to the Lebanese army. The other major surprise of the week was Israel’s release of five Lebanese and Syrian civilians held in its prisons. The move came following a visit to Tel Aviv by US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa. According to the Israeli prime minister’s office, Thursday’s announcement “follows efforts by Israel and Lebanon to locate and repatriate the remains of leaders of the Jewish community who had been abducted and killed in Lebanon” between 1984 and 1986. Here too, Hezbollah’s reaction raises questions. While describing the move as positive but insufficient, the party once again turned on the Lebanese authorities, accusing them of “submission to the enemy” and holding them “responsible” for the disaster in the south. It even warned them against “internal conflicts.” Could the party’s military setbacks push it to turn increasingly toward the domestic front? Finally, the Israeli army made an important statement on Sunday, saying it was considering reducing its occupation zone in southern Lebanon, moving from the current “yellow zone” to a “grey zone.” Such a development would, according to this assessment, reflect a reduced threat from Hezbollah. The measure has not yet been approved by Israel’s political leadership. Yemen and Palestine The week was also particularly tense in Yemen, where clashes between Houthi rebels and government forces continued to intensify, culminating in an especially deadly Saturday in which more than 60 people were killed in a single day, bringing the death toll since Thursday to around 200. The Houthi offensive is aimed in particular at taking control of areas bordering the Bab el-Mandeb passage, which would give this Iranian ally additional leverage over another major strategic chokepoint after the Strait of Hormuz. In Palestine, particularly troubling comments by Israel Katz on Gaza marked the week. He claimed, without providing evidence, that most of the territory’s residents wanted to leave, stressing that Israel was “ready for such an evacuation” on a mass scale. A sign that the ordeal of Gaza’s residents may be far from over. Finally, it is worth noting that the IAEA announced on September 1 that facilities discovered in Deir el-Zor, Syria, indicate that Bashar al-Assad’s former regime had secretly been preparing an advanced nuclear program that could have led to the production of an atomic weapon with the help of North Korean experts.
Homage
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By Michel Hajji Georgiou - Published Sep 6, 2026 - 13:31
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The Argentine player, who brought his international career to an end on August 31, 2026, was nothing less than a magician of the stadiums. His journey, made of wonders, falls and redemption, may tell us something about our undiminished need for enchantment in a world that nevertheless claims to have rid itself of it. Announced a few weeks after the 2026 World Cup final lost to Spain, Lionel Messi’s international retirement inevitably stirred an emotion for which it is difficult to find many equivalents in the recent history of football. One would probably have to go back to Maradona, or perhaps to Cruyff or Pelé, to recover that sense that, with the retirement of a player, something disappears that extends far beyond the sport itself, as though a certain way of inhabiting football, perhaps even of believing in it, were also coming to an end. Far from the glacis of reason Enough of the endless statistics and the unbearable, tedious and sterile quarrels over “who is the greatest of all time.” The author of these lines has never been a fanatic of the round ball, nor, for that matter, of vertical rankings or hierarchies of merit in general, and consequently appreciates the talent of each player with the same sense of wonder as an eleven-year-old child. Besides, this particularly contemporary obsession with numbers ruins all the pleasure of the spectacle. And with good reason: the approach that consists in adding up goals, assists, Ballons d’Or, Champions Leagues, Copa América titles, World Cups… can only be reductive. On another register, it is not entirely unrelated to German-American philosopher Eric Voegelin’s critique of the modern Gnostic temptation: that of a form of knowledge convinced that it can imprison reality within a system and abolish whatever resists it. Records are probably one indicator of Lionel Messi’s genius. Yet so many other great players who made stadiums and hearts tremble, without achieving half of what he did, nevertheless remain eternal in our memories. What made them truly singular lies elsewhere, far from the glacis of reason. Something else was at work around them. Something belonging to a certain profound sense of transcendence that understanding can never fully grasp. This has been true of Lionel Messi for more than twenty years, since the day when, under the gaze of the “icon” Diego Maradona, he made his first appearance, in June 2006, on the World Cup stage in the colors of the Albiceleste against Serbia and Montenegro. That ineffable element that constitutes Messi’s genius, as it does that of others, may indeed touch upon one of modernity’s strangest paradoxes: the persistence of magic in a world that has constructed itself precisely against it. The disenchanted world Max Weber used the expression “disenchantment of the world” to describe the slow process by which Western modernity gradually subjected existence to rationalization, calculation, predictability and causal explanation. The world was no longer supposed to be traversed by obscure powers, signs, supernatural interventions or invisible wills; it was, at least in principle, to become intelligible. Unfortunately, modern sport, and more broadly the modern world inherited from globalization, fits perfectly within this dynamic. Today’s football, and not football alone, is probably one of the most quantified objects imaginable. The slightest gesture is measured, and everything is carefully calculated and modeled. From mathematics to artificial intelligence, raw talent now depends more on science than on enchantment. What is human in its spontaneous, even wild, relationship with the invisible that springs from the heart is disappearing before our eyes, in favor of the squaring of the VAR circle. It is, in a sense, the murder of sport in the name of greater rigor and fairness… even though the euthanasia of this share of sublime spontaneity ultimately produces glaring injustices of its own. One need only revisit some of the controversial decisions of the 2026 World Cup to see it. Paradox of paradoxes, Lionel Messi was himself, at the outset, a child of this technical modernity, to which he certainly owes part of his exceptional career. His body, too small by expected standards, was corrected through hormone treatment. Identified very early, his talent was taken in hand by an institution that organized his training, nutrition, physical development and integration into an already globalized sporting machine. Nothing, in appearance, could have been further removed from the old heroic narrative. At first sight, the story seems closer to dystopias in the vein of Gattaca than to myths and messianic narratives. And yet the old narrative did indeed return, and with an almost embarrassing insistence. Since the beginning of his career, Lionel Messi has been placed under the microscope. But the more people labored to explain and demystify him, the less they succeeded in entirely dissipating the impression produced by some of his gestures. The man simply cannot be circumscribed and reduced to an accumulation of data. At an age when most great players retreat into the shadows, he continues to surprise. To astonish, even, by bringing to sport that element of the senseless which escapes the quasi-robotic hypersystematization of the world. It is probably there that one must seek this elsewhere that characterizes Messi. In the survival of magic at a time when even the spaces that once allowed the positive expression of a humanity made of flesh and blood are gradually being “disciplined” by the hypnotic attraction of a new puritanical Gnosis in the name of modernity. The Messiah made by the machine Although he emerged, in a sense, from the machinery of the Matrix, Lionel Messi constitutes in himself a challenge to this ready-to-wear model. A kind of alter ego of Neo from The Matrix, thrown into a simulation governed by parameters that claim to calculate everything. The Argentine’s destiny gradually took on, almost despite himself, the form of a messianic narrative. The pun on his name would be too easy had it not been ceaselessly revived by his own story: that of the fragile child whose body seemed intent on denying him the fulfillment to which his talent destined him. Then that of exile at a very young age to Barcelona, adoption by a foreign city, an almost unreal ascent, worldwide recognition, followed by this strange difficulty in being recognized by his own… For a long time, Argentina maintained a relationship of hainamoration with its prodigal child. His results, his talent, his brilliance mattered little… he still had to answer one merciless question: why wasn’t he Maradona? The comparison was admittedly inevitable, but it was also profoundly unfair. Everything separated the two men in their way of being in the world. Maradona carried Argentina with everything in it that was passionate, contradictory, excessive and theatrical. He spoke, provoked, fought, fell, returned, mingled football with his private life, his anger, his political commitments… all the way to his own destruction. His very body seemed to become one of the places where the contradictions of his country were played out. Maradona was the very incarnation of what the world expected from football: a rebellious soul, sometimes pushing the game to the point of immorality, but within a kind of footballing gigantomachy. Maradona was epic. And, above all, he had placed his country at the summit of world football in 1986. Messi offered none of that. He was silent, at times almost absent from the story others were constructing around him, an absence long interpreted as a flaw. Almost erased, devoid of personality. That, moreover, was what the two giants Maradona and Pelé reproached him for: a lack of leadership, being too smooth. A kind of miracle test-tube baby of the stadiums. The boy from Rosario was also criticized for not singing the anthem loudly enough, for not being Argentine enough, for having been “manufactured” by Barcelona, and then, naturally, for failing to win with the national team what he won almost continuously with his club. The unfulfilled prophecy The dramatic loss to Germany in the 2014 World Cup final, followed by the Copa América finals of 2015 and 2016, had gradually transformed that suspicion into an accusation. When he missed his penalty against Chile in 2016 and subsequently announced that he was leaving the national team, he was nevertheless already one of the greatest players in football history. Yet his story remained strangely unfinished. The sense of incompletion had little to do with his honors. It concerned instead that quasi-archaic necessity continually imposed upon modern heroes: to bring their initiatory journey to completion. In Argentina’s colors, Messi shone, then fell heavily. But he did not rise again. He did not fulfill the prophecy. And, in the eyes of his people, this reinforced the sense of hainamoration: a fallen god remains a god, after all. But with the added burden of what his worshippers regard as an intolerable substratum of humanity and, therefore, something perfectly detestable: his flaws, his weaknesses. Argentines loved Maradona despite his spectacular downfall and his fallible humanity. But that was because he had “earned” the right to such a downfall, because it had somehow become acceptable after Mexico 1986. Messi, by contrast, did not yet have the right to fall, because he had not yet reached the summit. No, the prophecy had not been fulfilled. It was even becoming a caricature. So Messi returned. But he still had to wait for his redemption. It took the 2021 Copa América at the Maracanã for this relationship of suspicion, expectation and disappointment with his public and his people truly to begin changing. And above all it took the 2022 World Cup for the story to acquire that almost excessively perfect form that no one would have dared write without appearing to indulge in a screenwriter’s contrivance. Strangely, Maradona had died in 2020. It was as though a kind of oppressive national curse had been lifted. At the same time, the Argentine people needed a substitute father figure, and the pressure was thereby only redoubled. But perhaps mixed with a little tenderness this time? What happened in Qatar in 2022 is all the more interesting because Messi himself appeared slightly different. He protested more, answered provocations, lost his temper, spoke with a violence of which few had thought him capable, and even let slip that now famous “¿Qué mirás, bobo?” at the Dutch, to Argentina’s amusement. Buenos Aires finally discovered, belatedly, what it had always expected from him. A little Maradona in a great deal of Messi. But Messi did not become Maradona. And perhaps that was precisely where the true reconciliation occurred: Argentina stopped asking him to be. From 2022 onward, Messi no longer needed to embody another model of national genius. For his country too, he could finally become what he had already been everywhere else: Messi. Simply. The final act of the prophecy Granted, the triumph of 2022 could have constituted a perfect ending. But, as with Maradona, the final act of heroic prophecy is the fall. No one really expected anything extraordinary from Messi anymore in 2026. At 39, he was widely regarded as one of the “tired heroes.” The fall from the Capitol had come with the bitter episode of his departure from FC Barcelona and his misadventure at PSG. He was now playing only in the American league, in Miami’s colors… on the periphery of the footballing world, in the distant lands of soccer. And the new generation was already there, ready to send its ancestors off to Bicêtre. Yet this 2026 World Cup, which seemed destined to be nothing more than an epilogue, turned into one last sensational blaze of glory. Argentina reached the final once again, with Messi, at 39, restored as its “historic leader” and its recourse in decisive moments, achieving something not unlike what Roberto Baggio had done for Italy in 1994, at… 27: a perpetual deus ex machina. Baggio failed at the gates of triumph against Brazil after practically carrying Italy all the way to Pasadena. His penalty, sent over the crossbar, would leave behind one of the cruelest images in World Cup history: a man standing motionless, head bowed, hands on his hips, while Brazil celebrated its victory. The man who had “died standing.” The Italian imp never knew apotheosis. Yet this symbolic death, far from erasing his tournament, eventually became part of his legend. History was kinder to Messi, despite a campaign of hatred directed at him, mixed with accusations of cheating and favoritism, against a backdrop of controversial refereeing decisions and acts of unsporting conduct by his team, just as it had once been with Maradona. Kinder still, in fact. A final in a sixth World Cup on the verge of retirement, capped by an outstanding individual performance? That is precisely where the magic of the Messi phenomenon lies, and where it defies reason and its avalanche of statistics. Genius cannot be imprisoned within a sum of parameters and variables. Even optimal physical condition cannot by itself explain what the entire world witnessed. And what does it matter if his story reminds us that the hero, however mythical, cannot abolish the sinister influence of Saturn. The re-enchantment of the world For beyond the prophecy fulfilled, from ascent to fall, with its share of happiness and misfortune, the Argentine offered the world one final lap that belongs to art, if not to a form of Homeric poetry. With Lionel Messi’s withdrawal from the international stage, a little of the world’s magic disappears… until another providential hero returns to enchant the stadiums. For more than twenty years, Messi embodied the coexistence of two worlds we had thought incompatible: that of the extreme rationalization of modern sport and that, far older, of the hero, the sign, expectation and enchantment. When Messi leaves, something of this contradiction suddenly becomes visible. Other prodigies have already emerged, but perhaps, at the very moment when one of its last great representatives leaves the stage, we discover just how much we continue to need transcendence. The modern world has therefore probably not abolished enchantment. It has merely displaced it. For ninety minutes at a time, this man called Lionel Messi, who embodied it on football pitches, now leaves after having accomplished everything. And even more.
Analyze

Have We Become Stupider?

Or Are We Experiencing a Transformation in the Structure of Knowledge?
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By Mona Fayad - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 20:01
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The question “Has the world become stupider?” frequently returns in contemporary debates about digital media, search engines, and social networks. On the surface, it seems simple. Yet behind it lies a deeper issue concerning the very nature of knowledge: how it is produced, how it is transmitted, and how it is consumed. Perhaps “Have we become stupider?” is not the most accurate question. A better one might be: Is knowledge still being transmitted in a way that allows it to be understood and made productive? Do most readers still go back to the original texts? Or do they turn instead to summaries and to what is said about those texts through material circulating among readers? One key to understanding this phenomenon lies in the work of British psychologist Frederic Bartlett, who conducted a series of experiments in the 1930s on what he called “serial reproduction.” In these experiments, one person would be asked to hear a story and then retell it to someone else, who would in turn retell it to a third person, and so on. The results were striking: with each new transmission, the story was not conveyed as it had originally been told, but was reformulated. Some details were omitted, others were exaggerated, and still others were replaced by elements that better suited the recipient’s background, experience, and culture. By the time the chain had passed through enough people, the original story had become something entirely different. This simple model reveals a fundamental truth: memory is not a neutral container, but a mechanism of reconstruction. When knowledge passes through multiple intermediaries, it is not “preserved” but “reproduced.” Here we begin to see the resemblance to our contemporary world, and with it the fear that we may be becoming stupider. In the age of digital media, knowledge no longer travels through oral transmission, but through chains of mediation: an article is summarized, then quoted, then reposted as a short post, before being further reduced to a sentence or a headline. In this context, we might borrow a metaphor that appeared in a journalistic text: a library whose books are gradually replaced by summaries, then by summaries of summaries, until the reader is left facing layer upon layer of reduction. We might call this the “raccoon chain”: the raccoon does not read the original, but rummages through what remains of it. It is worth clarifying that the choice of the “raccoon” is not arbitrary. The metaphor symbolically condenses a cognitive condition that is becoming increasingly entrenched. This animal, which lives on the fringes of cities and rummages through garbage bins, does not produce its own food but feeds on the leftovers of what others have produced. Despite its practical intelligence and its ability to pry things apart, pick through them, and seize what is useful, it does not understand what lies before it. It treats things simply as material available for immediate use. This is what knowledge begins to look like in an age of serial reduction: texts are shortened, then shortened again, until all that remains are scraps of meaning, rearranged and circulated without any genuine connection to their source. At that point, we have not merely moved away from the original. We have entered a new phase in the production of information or knowledge, in which the cognitive actor is no longer a reader or a thinker, but a collector of fragments of meaning who redistributes them in forms designed for rapid consumption. “Raccoon culture,” then, is not merely a description of superficiality. It is an accurate description of the degradation of the knowledge chain itself: from creation to summary, from understanding to formal processing, from ideas to something resembling only their faded trace. Yet this phenomenon cannot be understood apart from the technological structure that governs it. Here Marshall McLuhan becomes relevant, with his famous formulation: “The medium is the message.” The problem lies not only in content, but also in the form through which that content is transmitted. Contemporary digital media do not simply convey information. They reshape it according to the logic of speed, condensation, and fragmentation. Long texts become unsuitable for consumption, while an idea becomes acceptable only if it can be compressed into a few shareable lines. This transformation produces a striking paradox: we live in a time when access to knowledge is no longer difficult. It is excessively easy. And with that excessive ease comes what might be called a “cognitive illusion”: reading a brief passage or a quick summary can be enough to make a person feel that they have grasped an idea. Yet this feeling of possession is not necessarily accompanied by deep understanding, or by the ability to reconstruct or critique that knowledge. This is where we encounter what might be called the “semi-educated”: people who possess the signs of knowledge but not its structure, its vocabulary but not its internal logic. The problem becomes even more complex when viewed through the lens of attention. Instead of remaining in a state of sustained concentration, as in traditional reading or prolonged reflection, the mind now exists under continuous informational bombardment: notifications, clips, headlines, and successive waves of content. This does not merely fragment attention. It reshapes it according to a logic of constant jumping between short units of meaning, rather than the gradual and cumulative construction of an idea. I am reminded here of a joke that we used to tell and that was widely circulated during the days of popular demonstrations. It vividly illustrates the process of reduction and reshaping of content. After the occupation of Palestine, many popular demonstrations took to the streets chanting, “Down with the Balfour Declaration!” The joke was that by the end of the demonstration, the slogan had become, in Arabic, “Let one fall from above,” a completely different phrase that retained something of the original slogan’s rhythm and sound. This image may help bring us closer to what happens in everyday language when knowledge is transformed into short messages that are collectively repeated. A demonstration begins with a precise political slogan. Through repetition, collective immersion, and sonic rhythm, it gradually turns into a completely different formula. The new version may preserve the rhythm and emotional charge of the original, while losing its meaning and original significance. What remains is no longer the meaning, but the emotional energy of the phrase. Here, in another form, we encounter what Bartlett observed: what matters is not merely what was said, but how it was retold and how it was reinterpreted within a changing social context. If we bring these strands together, we might say that what we are experiencing today is not so much a “collapse of intelligence” as a transformation in the conditions under which intelligence operates. The human mind has not changed radically, but the environment in which it functions has changed profoundly: from an environment that allowed slow accumulation to one that imposes the rapid and fragmented reproduction of knowledge. This transformation creates a permanent tension between two kinds of thinking: reflective thought, which requires time, and rapid thought, which demands an immediate response. Seen in this light, the question “Have we become stupider?” is partly misleading. It may be more accurate to say that we are increasingly exposed to conditions that make deep thinking less stable, or less possible, and knowledge more vulnerable to fragmentation and recycling. As for stupidity, if the term can be used, it may not be a quality of the mind at all, but rather a side effect and a characteristic of the cultural structure that has emerged. It is a technology that reshapes our relationship with the world. Thus, rather than seeing this as a decline in human capacities, we might understand it as a transformation in the “knowledge environment”: an environment in which it has become easy to know something, but harder to truly understand it in depth.
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The Shia Question
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Lebanese Centre for Research and Studies
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A “Shia question” has now forcefully emerged within Arab reality — a reality that is not isolated from its regional environment or from the policies of the major powers. Some argue that the “Shia question” reveals, in certain of its manifestations and circumstances, a weakening or a wavering of Arab Shia loyalty toward their national states, owing to an Iranian centralism that seeks to extend its influence throughout the Arab region by exploiting existing vulnerabilities and creating new ones in the foundations of those states. Those Shia targeted by this accusation respond collectively, arguing that their movements in their respective countries arise either from the raising of grievances and a demand for political and social justice — Iraq and the Gulf countries being cases in point — or from a commitment alongside their compatriots to the duty of resisting Israeli aggression, as in Lebanon and Palestine. The “Shia question” intensified in the wake of America’s war on Iran in March 2026, reaching the threshold of a reawakening of old demons and stoking atmospheres of sectarianism and doctrinal fanaticism, and total rejection of the Other. This rejection is further fed by the conduct of certain groups such as Hezbollah and its involvement in killings perpetrated in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere — to say nothing of Iran’s bombardment and targeting of Arab capitals in the Gulf throughout the ongoing war. Lebanon, by virtue of its diversity, holds a distinct advantage in contributing to the correction of a distortion that has now spread across the Arab world. This diversity constitutes Lebanon’s contribution to the enrichment of human civilization — a necessary contribution in this era of history, when humanity is traversing a painful labor, and an existential question insistently arises: how can we live together, different and equal? For the way out of this crisis does not consist merely in awaiting the outcome of the Iran-America war, nor in Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, nor in reliance on balance-of-power politics. Addressing the “Shia question” requires a cultural foundation built on accepting the Other as they are. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was a “Christian question”: rather than separating from the Other, the Maronites chose Greater Lebanon, built on the living together. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the “Shia question” resurfaces in Lebanon. What, then, is the choice of its elites, its thinkers, and its leaders?

Lebanon: Squaring the Circle?
By
Michel Hajji Georgiou
Published

While American and Iranian negotiators step back from the negotiating table, Hezbollah circles, despite the manifest contradictions within their directorate, are delighting in hurling wholesale accusations of treason at Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam. The timing of these attacks is not fortuitous. It is not without revealing a panic that one strives to conceal beneath the habitual garb of resistance rhetoric. For the first time since the 1990s, the Lebanese card has slipped from Hezbollah's grasp—and, by extension, from Tehran's. Which is not good news for the Hezb. Certainly, it retains the capacity to ignite hostilities in the country's streets, but it is increasingly isolated. In 2006, after 14 March 2005, it had resorted to a war, then to a coup de force to offset this handicap. But we are no longer in 2005, and this time the Hezb would be taking a risk by becoming mired in internal conflict. The result will be to plunge Lebanon into violence. The pacifist logic of 14 March has disappeared, and, unfortunately, the party will collide with grave tensions. Perhaps it is even seeking this. But no one ever emerges victorious from such a game with fire. The rupture between the Lebanese and Iranian dimensions explains the dual attack the State is suffering today in Beirut. On one side, the intemperate reaction of a militia determined to reclaim through internal destabilisation what it has lost on the political terrain. Time always plays in Hezbollah's and Iran's favour: the more bellicose Israel shows itself, the more the legitimacy of the «resistance» is reinforced, and the more the «rightness» of its recapture of power in Beirut seems founded in the eyes of its supporters. On the other side, the Israeli trap, which exploits this work of undermining to weaken the State further on the eve of Tuesday's negotiations. Tel Aviv wants neither a State too weak, nor a State too cohesive. The current division suits it perfectly. Attacks on the executive are manna from heaven. Hezbollah, once again, proves particularly cooperative in Israel's strategy of torpedoing the Lebanese State. It is necessary, however, to call things by their name. The recent deadly strike on Beirut, which left more than three hundred victims, illustrates with a brutality that needs no commentary what we call the dual responsibility. Two equally murderous logics, two equally inhuman fundamentalisms: the Israeli one, which strikes without warning, without regard for civilian lives, invoking a pseudo «precision of fire» that belongs to the domain of war propaganda; and the militia one, for which martyrdom is a promotion, war a reason for living, and civilian death one more political argument. This disease has a name: martyropathy. And that Hezbollah hides among civilians who are unaware that their next-door neighbour is a target, that no one has sounded their opinion on the war into which they are enrolled against their will—this is what this «resistance» has, at bottom, always been: a cohabitation imposed by force, that one still dares to call protection. Ideologues will retort that the Lebanese State is weak, that the army is weak, and that all this is the fault of the international community. That is true, in part. But what these ideologues refuse to admit is that the weakening of the State was also the work of the Assad regime, then of Hezbollah itself—without forgetting corruption and the jirga-style loyalties of the internal fiefdoms. Hezbollah magnified its power under the Assad regime, of which it was the protégé, before Aounism handed it definitively the keys of the Lebanese State. And if the Assad regime governed Lebanon, it was under Israeli and American patronage, within the logic of the minority alliance, to break the Sunni Arab world and destroy the Palestinian cause. Palestine quasi-annihilated, Hamas and its patrons having lent it the scythe, Israel decided to cut Iran down to its proper size. Moreover, if one does not negotiate with a super-powerful enemy... what is the point of the concept of negotiations? Of diplomacy? Should everything be settled by arms? And then what? That is the great powers' game of fools. The boundaries between friend and enemy are fluid and shift constantly. The great principles and boastful ideologies? Rubbish. In this war as in all wars, the partisans of each side are nothing but cannon fodder. A cohabitation between two logics—one for which war is an art and the other which simply wishes to live in peace, build a State, raise children without living in fear that a missile might suddenly fall on their head—is impossible. Not that one must yield to essentialist impulses or a project of separation. The problem is not sectarian. Hezbollah is more than a militia: it is a state of mind. What to do, then? Lebanon is necessarily a country of measure. No excess can have a positive repercussion on the domestic scene. This does not argue for the rickety compromises that have presided over the country's destiny since 1969, to the point of draining it of substance. This argues for a consensus encompassing all parties, without that consensus being made at the expense of republican values. As much as Hezbollah is a cancer gnawing at Lebanon for forty years, humiliating its supporters, and with them a wounded Shia community, would be a colossal, monstrous error. There is in Lebanon at this moment too much hatred and too steep an ascent towards the extremes. Far more than Lebanon could bear. And extremes are Tehran's and Tel Aviv's favourite dish. Since time immemorial, warmongering invites external interference and the logic of mutual support for the mimetic reinforcement of supremacy. On the eve of Tuesday's negotiations, the Lebanese State should urgently call for an internal peace conference, inviting all parties to agree on a document similar to the Baabda Declaration of 2012 under the presidency of Michel Sleiman, by which Lebanon committed itself to neutrality and to withdrawal from the axes of regional tension, officially dissociating itself from any external conflict. Whoever refused to respond to the invitation would find themselves de facto marginalised and outside national legitimacy; those who participated would recognise, by their very presence, the legitimate authority of the Lebanese State, far from the political islands of which we have been witnesses until now. This is the means of containing both traps at once: the insurrectional one from Hezbollah, and the subversive one from Israel. This document could also respond to the question of how to approach the negotiations, by proposing a return to the tacit restraint line established following the 1949 armistice agreements, which delimited the zones of military engagement between Lebanon and Israel and allowed for a precarious but real form of coexistence, before militia logic shattered it definitively. The Lebanese State should also take advantage of the political weakening of Tehran and Hezbollah, consequent upon the failure of the Iranian-American negotiations, to gather the forces that have had enough of seeing their country mortgaged since the 1970s by the logic of capitulations and the millet system. This trans-communautarian politico-popular rally is fundamental, today more than it has ever been. We must today defend the Lebanese State against the insidious assault of the dual enemy. The real battle is the one that aims to bring it down. And the State, whatever its numerous imperfections and errors, constitutes the centre that unites the Lebanese. It is also the only guarantee of peace. Of internal peace, before anything else. A majority of us is conscious of our responsibilities in the catastrophe ravaging this country. Many have drawn the lessons and wish to found a State built on common life, liberty, peace and the respect of individuals and groups, in pluralism and the right to difference. We have suffered too much. All the world's wars have been waged here. All of them. We pay the price of our errors and seek only to take our destiny in our own hands. But others, too, must finally assume theirs—and this can only happen through a dynamic similar to that of 14 March 2005: a conjunction of international efforts and a transversal popular movement oriented towards the reconquest by the Lebanese State of its sovereign authority, and a definitive refusal of violence in the name of positive neutrality. Lebanon finds itself now caught in the squaring of the circle. But this can finally change. Yes, we can.

Between Surprise Negotiations and Surprise Attacks, a Week Full of Twists and Turns

Between April 5 and 12, the past week has been particularly rich in events in the Middle East. It concluded on Sunday, April 12, at dawn, with the announcement of the failure of negotiations between the United States and Iran in Islamabad, while mid-week, Israel gave its approval for direct negotiations with Lebanon, scheduled for Tuesday, April 14, in Washington. On April 8, the Israeli air force launched a massive attack – about a hundred raids in 10 minutes – against Hezbollah leaders and positions in several districts of Beirut, as well as in the Beqaa and South Lebanon. April 5 had been primarily marked by statements made by President Donald Trump, who had issued serious threats against the Iranian regime, ordering it to end the obstacles it placed in the way of free maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump had given Iran an ultimatum that expired on Tuesday evening, April 7. While everything indicated, during the weekend of April 4-5, that escalation was hardly avoidable, the surprise came a few hours before the end of the ultimatum. A two-week truce was proclaimed, and negotiations were set for Saturday, April 11, in Islamabad, with a view to a settlement between the United States and Iran, focusing notably on the Strait of Hormuz. The offensive launched by the Americans and Israelis against the Iranian regime thus took another turn. In Iran, the cannons fell silent momentarily, even if the strait was only partially reopened. Both parties, Iranians and Americans alike, were quick to declare their camp's 'victory'. The Iranian regime boasts of a tactical victory against its two powerful enemies, based on the fact that its regime survived despite the blows received. As for Donald Trump, he multiplied 'posts' on his social network Truth Social, essentially stating that 'the regime has changed', that the new figures are more pragmatic and 'reasonable', and that the United States and its Israeli ally inflicted an overwhelming military defeat on Iran, its army and its infrastructure, bringing it to the negotiating table with the will to conclude a deal. Irreconcilable views The belligerents met on Saturday 11 for negotiations in Pakistan (the mediator), in Islamabad, with two contradictory working documents, 15 points for the United States and 10 clauses for Iran, with irreconcilable views. Indeed, on Sunday morning (Levant time), US Vice President J.D. Vance left Islamabad announcing the failure of negotiations, asserting to have made a 'final and best possible offer' to the Iranians (AFP). He regretted, before his return to Washington, 'the absence of a firm promise' to abandon the Iranian nuclear program. Iran, for its part, lambasted the American 'unreasonable demands', before its diplomatic spokesperson, Esmail Baqai, admitted that 'no one expected' an agreement after a single session. Nevertheless, the door to dialogue would not be entirely closed, as a senior official of Pakistani diplomacy was quick to clarify. According to some reports, the agreement stumbled on two points: the Iranian regime's desire to control the Strait of Hormuz and an Iranian commitment to stop uranium enrichment. For their part, the United States refused to unfreeze Iranian funds and grant Iran control of Hormuz. This strait, let us recall, is a natural maritime passage and therefore not subject to the control of riparian countries. In any event, the American delegation left Islamabad, leaving its Iranian interlocutors with a document outlining the conditions that Iran should accept to reach an agreement. The US delegation was led by US Vice President J.D. Vance, a man who had expressed reservations about the war against the Iranian regime, accompanied by US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The Iranian delegation included Mohammad Ghalibaf, Speaker of Parliament and former general of the Revolutionary Guards, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. The April 8 attack In Lebanon, the past week was mainly marked by the vast aerial attack launched by about fifty planes on Wednesday, April 8, in the early afternoon, against a hundred Hezbollah cadres and positions hidden in several districts of the capital as well as in Baalbek, Hermel, Saida, and other regions of South Lebanon. According to the version given by the Israeli army, an online meeting had been organized between officials and cadres of the Shiite party to prepare a militia coup in Beirut with the aim of overthrowing the government of Nawaf Salam, in which Hezbollah is a strong minority. Still according to Israeli sources, the intelligence services of the Hebrew state had been informed of this large online meeting, and the Israeli Services managed to target all participating cadres, directly or by their presence, in the meeting across different regions by interfering with the frequency and computer identity of the online links. This 'cyber' attack (by 'virtual' means) lasted 10 minutes in Beirut and other regions to precisely hit the numerous targets. Given the element of surprise and the peak hour at which the raids were launched (around 2 p.m.), this bombing caused numerous civilian casualties. The toll amounted to no less than 180 killed among Hezbollah cadres and nearly 200 killed among civilians, not counting the considerable material damage in certain districts of the capital. Since this bloody episode, the Israeli military operation against the capital and its suburbs has significantly decreased in intensity - apparently under American pressure to give negotiations with Iran a chance, as that country had protested against the non-inclusion of Lebanon in the ceasefire with the USA without reacting to protect its ally (Hezbollah) or jeopardizing its meeting in Islamabad. Fighting continues in the South, especially around critical points, such as the town of Bint Jbeil, which the Israeli army was seeking to completely control on Sunday. At the end of this week, eyes were focused on the preparations for the first session of direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, scheduled for Tuesday, April 14, in Washington, as well as the situation in the Strait of Hormuz where President Trump decided on Sunday to impose a naval blockade to continue demining operations, in which some European countries, including Great Britain and Germany, could participate.

The Aberrant Attitude of the Ministers of Health and Labor

During the last Council of Ministers, last Thursday, it was enough for Nawaf Salam to mention the demilitarization of the capital for the Ministers of Health and Labor (representing Hezbollah) to step up and oppose it. Irony and aberration. The irony is that the ministerial portfolios granted to Hezbollah are those directly concerned by the dramatic consequences of a war: strikes indeed cause market stagnation and an increase in the number of injured and dead. The aberration is that ministers of a government refuse to allow the State to have full sovereignty, at a minimum , in its capital, and prefer the rule of chaos and paramilitary groups to that of public institutions. There is nothing surprising in this attitude, from the moment these ministers belong to a politico-militia movement that denies the very idea of a Lebanese nation. The most striking example is that of this 'teacher' who explains the symbols of the Hezbollah flag to young children who have fled the South, right on the sidewalk of Beirut, while their houses are still burning. The absence of civic-mindedness, cultural division, adherence to a religious doctrine... all these elements today push a part of the Lebanese to align themselves with the precepts of a foreign country, in this case the Islamic Republic of Iran. The worst is that this attitude, which consists of wanting to deconstruct legal institutions and eradicate the notion of a sovereign State, is not exclusive to one religious community: while it is true that a majority of Shiites are still affiliated with Hezbollah, there are also Sunnis, Christians, and Druze who think similarly, out of cowardice or self-interest, or even conviction. And that is precisely where the shoe pinches. And due to the inability of the highest hierarchy of the State to truly implement the promised and promulgated decisions, whether out of complacency (or even fear) for the president, complicity for the speaker of parliament, or lack of means concerning the prime minister, the schism among Lebanese is widening. Thus, the sad truth emerges: our country is not a message of living together but at best a mosaic, where all the pieces insult and monitor each other, supported by a cracked veneer. Therefore, today, discussing a possible peace with Israel is utopian, because beyond the internal fractures, we must clearly name the forces that perpetuate them. Hezbollah and its political allies, by clinging to a militia logic and regional alignment, impose on Lebanon an agenda that transcends national interest and prevents any consolidation of a sovereign State. By maintaining a duality of power, between official institutions and a parallel force, as well as by sustaining schizophrenia in the exercise of power, due to the competition among its summits, they render any lasting stability, and by extension any credible peace, illusory. No agreement with the outside can hold when internally certain actors continue to prioritize confrontation, not as a right to opposition, but an armed confrontation that is the very foundation of their political existence....

When Activists Exploit Easter for Propaganda Purposes

Disinformation and the distortion of historical facts clearly have no limits for certain circles. On the occasion of Catholic Easter, last April 5, a Hezbollah official, Hassan Dorr, published the following message on X (formerly Twitter): https://x.com/HasanDorr/status/2040735419952718037?s=20   « At the call of O Holy Mary: The « Resistance » sends its greetings to our Christian brothers on the occasion of #Easter by targeting the « Stella Maris » base, belonging to the murderers of Jesus Christ (peace be upon him), in occupied #Palestine » . The Hezbollah activist accompanied his message with a video of the operation. According to the visual elements displayed on screen, the video appears to be a recording of a live broadcast from Al-Mayadeen, a pan-Arab satellite news channel aligned with Hezbollah, with a banner indicating: «Images of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon». The video of the operation also bears the logo of «Hezbollah's media war apparatus» . While Mr. Dorr linked the operation to Easter Sunday, Hezbollah's television channel, Al-Manar, had published the following on its English-language website on March 31, 2026, at 8:59 PM Beirut time: «The Islamic Resistance targeted the Stella Maris base (a strategic maritime surveillance and control base along Israel's northern coast) at 8:00 PM on Tuesday, March 31, 2026, with a volley of advanced rockets: Communiqué No. 22.» (Diplomatic translation) Furthermore, the full video of the operation to which DORR refers on X can be found at the following address, dated March 31, 2026: https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2040856427963494574?s=20 , and on the Al-Manar website: https://www.almanartv.com.lb/article/724772/ , still marked with the date of March 31, 2026. This shows that the operation had no connection to Easter, except in Dorr's staging, which instrumentalizes Christian celebrations to fuel religious tensions between Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Decryption Dorr revives the ancient and discredited allegation of deicide attributed to the Jews. This thesis argues that the Jewish people bear collective responsibility for the death of Jesus, including through the generations that followed his crucifixion. However, the Catholic Church has rejected the accusation of deicide since the Council of Trent in the mid-16th century. In the catechism resulting from this council, the Catholic Church taught that sinful humanity as a whole bore responsibility for the death of Jesus, with Christians having a particular responsibility in this regard. During the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), Pope Paul VI promulgated the Nostra Aetate declaration, which rejected the idea of collective and transgenerational Jewish guilt in the crucifixion of Jesus. The declaration specified that «what was committed during his Passion cannot be imputed indiscriminately to all Jews then living, nor to Jews of our time.» Pope Benedict XVI also rejected the accusation of deicide against Jews in his book Jesus of Nazareth, published in 2011, emphasizing that it had no scriptural basis. In summary, the Council of Trent extended responsibility to sinful humanity as a whole, Vatican II explicitly rejected any collective Jewish guilt, and contemporary Catholic and Christian sources commonly present the accusation of deicide as an antisemitic or anti-Jewish trope based on collective guilt, while recently warning against its use during Holy Week. Manipulation Dorr's manipulative message has several dimensions Firstly, it is an unfounded allegation, dismissed liturgically by Christian authorities. Secondly, it instrumentalizes the Crucifixion, a fundamental commemoration of Christianity. His statement seeks to fuel religious tensions among some Christians, who would then be inclined to support Hezbollah's actions against Israel (understood here as Jews) in order to «avenge the death of Jesus,» even though «vengeance» goes against the most basic Christian teachings. This attempt to rally trans-confessional support for the Hezbollah camp allows propagandists to argue that Hezbollah's actions serve all of Lebanon, with a support base that extends beyond the Shiite community alone. A community that has, moreover, ended up joining other Lebanese denominations in publicly and loudly denouncing and rejecting Hezbollah's actions. Today, Shiite dissent has reached its highest level ever observed, due to the displacement of Shiite populations and the destruction of their homes caused by Hezbollah's military activities and Israeli retaliations. By presenting Hezbollah, a group defining itself as an Islamic resistance, as the muscle that strikes Jews to bring justice to Christians and Jesus himself, Dorr involves both Islam and Muslims in religious wars. Thirdly, and most importantly, Dorr misses the point: Easter is the passage from death to life; it is a celebration of resurrection, of eternal life. Dorr's inflammatory message arrives three days, five centuries, and two thousand years late, and it is erroneous.

Islamabad Talks: American and Iranian Experts Work on Points of Divergence

Marathon day for American and Iranian negotiators and experts, Saturday, in Islamabad. Arriving Friday evening in the Pakistani capital, the two delegations immediately began, each on its own side, informal discussions with high-ranking Pakistani officials who reportedly exchanged messages between the two parties to pave the way for formal, face-to-face negotiations, which began Saturday in the early afternoon. Late in the evening, the two delegations completed two successive working sessions and announced a suspension of work that was to continue on Saturday night (which, in this type of situation, opens the way for discussions away from the spotlight) or on Sunday. Very little information filtered through about the content of the negotiations, apart from the fact that the talks are focused on points of detail and points of divergence, hence the presence of many experts within each delegation. The principal positions of each party on the major contentious issues are known and have been the subject of long discussions in the past, during several dialogue sessions, without a common ground being found. Saturday's meetings therefore went beyond the principal positions and focused rather on points of detail, which undeniably represent the most important part of the negotiations, and which actually determine the success or failure of the negotiations. Disagreements over the Strait of Hormuz Late in the evening, Iranian sources indicated that the problem of the Strait of Hormuz constitutes “one of the main points of divergence during the Islamabad talks”, which implicitly indicates the existence of other subjects of disagreement between the two parties. Earlier in the day, the Financial Times had specified that negotiators had reached “an impasse over the Strait of Hormuz”. The Iranian regime, it is noted in this context, always insists on having direct control over the strait. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps also published a communiqué at the end of the week, stating that “from now on, we will decide which ships can use the Strait of Hormuz”. A position rejected by both the United States and European countries and which is, moreover, in flagrant violation of the Montego Bay Convention (see Jean-Patrick Dayras' article on this subject). US Navy clears the strait It should be noted in this context that, late on Saturday, President Donald Trump indicated that US military ships were clearing the Strait of Hormuz of Iranian mines, specifying that this operation is being carried out to “serve countries around the world, including China, Japan, South Korea, France, Germany, and several other countries”. “They do not have the courage, or the will, to do it themselves,” noted the American president. Earlier in the day, the news site Axios had indicated that US warships had crossed the Strait of Hormuz without any coordination with Iranian authorities, making a round trip to better demonstrate that they controlled the situation in that area. The head of the White House had indicated in this context that the American navy had destroyed the 28 Iranian minelaying vessels. “The Iranian navy and air force have been destroyed, as has their anti-aircraft defense,” emphasized President Trump. In any event, the Strait of Hormuz issue was one of the main subjects examined during these Islamabad negotiations, especially since it is a new point of conflict that did not arise during previous meetings. It should be noted that the official talks on Saturday took place in the presence, on the American side, of Vice President JD Vance, and special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, as well as, on the Iranian side, the Speaker of Parliament, Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, and the head of diplomacy Abbas Araghchi. The first working meeting was held after a tête-à-tête between Vice President Vance and Mr. Ghalibaf in the presence of a high-ranking Pakistani official. The face-to-face negotiations, in the presence of the head of the Pakistani army, were preceded by bilateral consultations between the American delegation and the Pakistani leaders, on the one hand, and between the Iranian delegates and the Pakistani officials, on the other. It should be noted that before their departure from Tehran, the Iranian negotiators had set two preconditions for starting their mission in Islamabad: the establishment of a ceasefire in Lebanon and the unblocking of Iranian assets frozen by the United States. Neither of these two conditions was met, but the Iranian delegates nevertheless began talks with the American delegation, despite the fact that Israeli raids continued in South Lebanon. In Lebanon… While American and Iranian negotiators were working in Islamabad on the points of divergence between the two parties, the Israeli air force continued its raids against Hezbollah positions and infrastructure in South Lebanon. The IDF thus indicated that it had carried out no less than 200 raids in twenty-four hours. However, the Hebrew State committed, at the request of the Americans, not to launch attacks against Hezbollah in Beirut until next Tuesday, the date of the first direct negotiation session between Lebanon and Israel. The decision to engage in these face-to-face bilateral talks between Lebanese and Israeli delegates provoked the ire of the Iranian camp. The advisor to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic thus stigmatized the attitude of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on this plan, even going so far as to utter barely veiled threats, warning of “security disturbances” (in Lebanon…) if the government went ahead with its decision to engage in direct negotiations with Israel. A high-ranking Hezbollah official echoed this, predicting “a popular tsunami that will overthrow the government to protest the plan for talks with Israel”. Salam postpones his visit to Washington On Saturday afternoon, persistent rumors reported Hezbollah's desire to organize a demonstration in Beirut and storm the Grand Serail to overthrow the government and torpedo negotiations with the Hebrew State. However, the army command was to publish, on Saturday in the early afternoon, a communiqué with a particularly firm tone, affirming that the army would intervene forcefully to prevent any attack on security and civil peace and to deal with any aggression against public and private buildings. Acting on its word, the army deployed significant regular units in the capital's neighborhoods, establishing identity checkpoints and carrying out motorized patrols. Faced with this imposing deployment of troops, Hezbollah was to retreat and published in the evening, jointly with the Amal movement, a communiqué calling on its supporters to refrain from organizing demonstrations in the capital. However, the intense tension that prevailed on this front during the day led the Prime Minister to postpone the visit he was to make early next week to Washington to examine with American leaders the course of events on the Lebanese scene.