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A militiaman visibly happy after Hezbollah took control of West Beirut. (AFP)
Strategia
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By Khalil Helou
Published Sep 7, 2026 - 13:10
This series of articles offers a deeper understanding of the current situation in light of the past, steering clear of impassioned, ideological or romanticized narratives that miss the mark on reality. Our approach aims to leave it to the reader to draw the appropriate conclusions. The previous fourteen installments retraced the events surrounding Hezbollah's rise to power, its armed conflicts with Israel and its dominance over Lebanon, from the Taif Agreement to the Doha Agreement. May 2008, the mountain after Beirut. On May 7, 2008, Hezbollah and its allies (the Amal Movement and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, SSNP) forcibly took over the offices of Saad Hariri's Future Movement in Beirut, along with much of the capital's Sunni neighborhoods, which formed the popular base of the March 14 coalition. The Future Movement's positions quickly fell into the hands of the attackers, as the army had largely stayed out of the clashes, and political mediation efforts didn't have time to halt the operation. The army's commander-in-chief faced a dilemma: on one hand, he knew that a forceful intervention by troops in an urban setting would come at a heavy cost in both civilian and military lives, not to mention the material damage; on the other, he had to contend with the frustration of officers, especially Sunni ones, who watched as the neighborhoods of their loved ones were left without the army's protection. The headquarters of Future TV ransacked in Beirut. (AFP) The military's top brass still had fresh memories of the Battle of Nahr al-Bared, which had pitted the army against the terrorist group Fatah al-Islam a year earlier, claiming the lives of 170 soldiers over 105 days of fighting in a far less urban and evacuated combat zone spanning barely one square kilometer. A battle in densely populated Beirut would have come at an unbearable human cost, would have spread across the entire Lebanese territory, and would have dragged on endlessly, with Hezbollah enjoying wide-open logistical supply lines from Syria. However, the army did get the chance to deploy in force between Hezbollah and Future Movement supporters on Mazraa Street, forcibly blocking any militia movement from crossing the street in either direction and preventing an attack on Tariq al-Jdideh, a Future Movement stronghold. Troops also set up security perimeters around the government palace, where Prime Minister Fouad Siniora was staying, and around the residence of Walid Jumblatt, a leading figure in the March 14 coalition. Shiite militiamen near Hamra Street: the one handling an RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launcher is wearing an Internal Security Forces uniform… (AFP) These measures, combined with behind-the-scenes contacts from Gulf capitals, helped dissuade Hezbollah from attacking the government palace. Still, the Shiite party set its sights on controlling the Druze stronghold of Mount Lebanon. Tensions boiled over on May 9 when Hezbollah militants kidnapped municipal police officers in Aley, triggering a counterattack from the Druze Progressive Socialist Party's (PSP) militia. Fighting quickly spread to Choueifat, Aley, Souk el-Gharb and Baissour. Both sides brought heavy weapons into play, and PSP fighters dug into the old fortifications and trenches left over from the civil war, managing to halt Hezbollah's advance. Hezbollah tried but failed to seize Hill 888, overlooking Beirut airport and situated between Aley and Souk el-Gharb. It did, however, manage to take the old fortress of Niha, in the Chouf, in order to secure a direct logistical route linking the Bekaa to South Lebanon without having to go through the coastal road. Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt (foreground, center) and Information Minister Ghazi al-Aridi (center left) take part in a rally in the Druze village of Baysour, in Mount Lebanon, the day after roadblocks were lifted in the capital, bringing an end to a week of deadly violence. (AFP) On Sunday, May 11, Hezbollah tried unsuccessfully to attack Barouk and Choueifat, a failed assault that cost the lives of 36 of its fighters, including the commander of the attacking force in Choueifat. That same day, the army deployed in the town and ordered both sides to withdraw. The PSP then handed over its positions to the troops, and Hezbollah pulled out along with its dead and wounded. Politicians allied with Hezbollah tried, through both indirect and direct means, to delay the army's deployment in Choueifat, but to no avail. Their goal was to buy Hezbollah time to regroup, relaunch its offensive, and secure a victory in the town. However, the officer in charge of the mission flatly refused, sparing the town further destruction and easing pressure on the surrounding villages of Kfarchima, Wadi Chahrour, and Bsaba. On the door of this apartment in Choueifat, militiamen left a message that couldn't have been clearer... (AFP) That same day, Hezbollah spread completely baseless rumors claiming that Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces (LF) were preparing to attack the Rabieh residence of Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun, as well as Shiite villages in the Jbeil district. These rumors were meant to spread the armed conflict into Christian areas by dragging the FPM and the LF into it. Military intelligence services stepped in, however, and put an end to the rumors. The army-people-resistance triad The Future Movement and its allies in the March 14 coalition were forced to the negotiating table after their defeat on May 7, 2008. Qatar stepped in as mediator and sponsored the Doha Agreement (May 2008), a compromise that largely favored Hezbollah and its allies. The agreement led to the election of army commander-in-chief General Michel Sleiman as President of the Republic, ending a six-month presidential vacuum, since neither of the two candidates from the March 8 and March 14 alliances could secure a sufficient majority in Parliament. Fouad Siniora was reappointed prime minister, and with Qatar's direct involvement, he formed a national unity government. Yet this government was doomed from the outset to gridlock on major decisions, since it included 16 ministers from the March 14 parliamentary majority and 11 from the March 8 opposition—among them Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, and the FPM—giving the latter a “blocking third.” This government's ministerial statement enshrined the formula of the “army, people, resistance” triad. This formula had first taken shape under Emile Lahoud and Hassan Nasrallah. In a speech before the UN General Assembly on September 21, 2006, just after the July war between Hezbollah and Israel, Lahoud stated verbatim: “… this (Israeli) barbarity has not weakened my people, nor shaken their determination to resist, nor affected their attachment to the state, the army, and the national resistance …” Back in the 1990s, as army commander-in-chief, he already stressed in his speeches the unbreakable bond between regular soldiers, ordinary citizens, and the resistance against Israel. Hassan Nasrallah, for his part, argued in numerous speeches after the 33-day war that Lebanon had only been able to withstand Israel thanks to the spontaneous coordination between the army and fighters, backed by popular support.
Weekly essentials
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By LevantTime . - Published Sep 6, 2026 - 23:27
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Massive explosion caused by an Israeli strike near the town of Al-Mansouri in southern Lebanon. (AFP)
While the United States had appeared to be relying solely on economic warfare against Iran, the US military abruptly carried out strikes on Iranian territory on Tuesday in retaliation for attacks targeting oil tankers, setting off a spiral of violence over the course of the week. In Lebanon, Israel released several civilians held in its prisons, while its army seized the strategic Ali el-Taher hill and continued its heavy strikes in the area it controls in the south of the country. The week from August 31 to September 6 was marked by a sharp acceleration of events in the Middle East, after the previous one had seemed defined by relative stagnation. On the Iranian front, the US military carried out targeted strikes inside Iranian territory as early as Tuesday evening, the first in nearly a month. This screen grab, made on September 6, 2026 from undated video footage released the same day by US Central Command, shows what CENTCOM says is one of the Iranian oil tankers it destroyed in response to attempted missile attacks on naval vessels. (CENTCOM via AFP) However, the relatively limited pace of the strikes suggests that the US administration has opted for an escalation that remains controlled, while continuing its blockade and economic pressure on Tehran. Even so, tensions continued to rise throughout the week. Explosions were heard on Saturday on the highly strategic island of Kharg, through which most of Iran’s oil exports pass. US President Donald Trump, for his part, threatened to strike the Kuh-e Kolang nuclear site — “Pickaxe Mountain” in Persian — a heavily fortified facility located deep underground, not far from Natanz, Iran’s main uranium-enrichment site. Earlier in the week, he had enshrined the “tanker for tanker” equation, pledging to target an Iranian vessel every time the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struck an oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. That is precisely what the US military did on Saturday, setting two Iranian vessels ablaze. Politically, Donald Trump further hardened his tone toward Tehran. After saying in an interview that talks had been permanently frozen “because an agreement with them is not worth the paper it is written on,” he said on Saturday that the “conflict” with Iran was not a “war,” but “something ordinary” for the United States. A way of rattling the Iranians while at the same time reassuring the US public ahead of the midterm elections. A port, along with storage facilities and warehouses, was damaged following a US military strike carried out on September 6, 2026 in Iran’s southern Hormozgan province, which borders the Strait of Hormuz. (AFP) At the same time, the US news outlet Axios published a report on Saturday suggesting that the United States is already looking beyond this conflict, which began on February 28. Citing US officials and other informed sources, the outlet said the Trump administration is developing a broader strategy for the post-war Middle East. According to the report, it would be based on creating a regional alignment aimed at containing Iran, bringing an end to the regional fallout from Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attacks in Gaza, and expanding the circle of normalization between Israel and countries in the region. The threat against Kuh-e Kolang, which brings the Iranian nuclear issue back to the fore, echoes an announcement by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which said on September 1 that Iran had still not reopened its sites to inspectors following the strikes of May 2025. It should be recalled that despite the scale of the Israeli-American offensive against Iranian sites, it is almost certain that the stockpile of enriched uranium remains intact and has been moved to a safe location by the Iranian authorities, which remain committed to what they consider their right to develop a nuclear program. Following the IAEA announcement, the United States, together with France, Britain and Germany, said they intended to submit a resolution to the UN Security Council condemning Iran’s failure to comply with its non-proliferation commitments. This display of unity stands in contrast to the chill that has prevailed between Washington and its European allies since the beginning of the conflict. For their part, the Iranians appear to be responding to the upheaval in much the same way as before: by striking neighboring countries, notably Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, without directly targeting Israel. Heavy strikes in southern Lebanon On the Lebanese front, Israel is intensifying its destruction operations in villages in the south, even using explosive barrels in some cases. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun urged Washington and the international community to “put an end” to Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory, which killed seven people on Sunday against the backdrop of a fragile truce. The strikes hit several localities in the Nabatiyeh region. Twenty people were also wounded, including children, according to the Health Ministry. One strike also destroyed the former Ghandour hospital, which had been out of service for years. Release of detainees and capture of Ali el-Taher But the major event of the week in the south was the Israeli capture of the strategic Ali el-Taher hill in the Nabatiyeh region. The site served as a major Hezbollah headquarters, consisting of an extensive network of tunnels from which fighters from the Shiite party operated, along with, according to some reports, Iranian fighters. On Thursday evening, the Israelis announced that they had taken control of the complex. On Sunday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said that tunnels still had to be blown up. This military “success” may not have come as a surprise after weeks of bombardment, but Hezbollah’s reaction was more unexpected. After long insisting that it would refuse to give up this strategic hill — as had the Iranians, who had also threatened to intervene — the Shiite party ultimately sought to play down the significance of the development through its media outlets and allied networks, without officially confirming the loss of the site, which it had refused to preserve by handing it over to the Lebanese army. The other major surprise of the week was Israel’s release of five Lebanese and Syrian civilians held in its prisons. The move came following a visit to Tel Aviv by US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa. According to the Israeli prime minister’s office, Thursday’s announcement “follows efforts by Israel and Lebanon to locate and repatriate the remains of leaders of the Jewish community who had been abducted and killed in Lebanon” between 1984 and 1986. Here too, Hezbollah’s reaction raises questions. While describing the move as positive but insufficient, the party once again turned on the Lebanese authorities, accusing them of “submission to the enemy” and holding them “responsible” for the disaster in the south. It even warned them against “internal conflicts.” Could the party’s military setbacks push it to turn increasingly toward the domestic front? Finally, the Israeli army made an important statement on Sunday, saying it was considering reducing its occupation zone in southern Lebanon, moving from the current “yellow zone” to a “grey zone.” Such a development would, according to this assessment, reflect a reduced threat from Hezbollah. The measure has not yet been approved by Israel’s political leadership. Yemen and Palestine The week was also particularly tense in Yemen, where clashes between Houthi rebels and government forces continued to intensify, culminating in an especially deadly Saturday in which more than 60 people were killed in a single day, bringing the death toll since Thursday to around 200. The Houthi offensive is aimed in particular at taking control of areas bordering the Bab el-Mandeb passage, which would give this Iranian ally additional leverage over another major strategic chokepoint after the Strait of Hormuz. In Palestine, particularly troubling comments by Israel Katz on Gaza marked the week. He claimed, without providing evidence, that most of the territory’s residents wanted to leave, stressing that Israel was “ready for such an evacuation” on a mass scale. A sign that the ordeal of Gaza’s residents may be far from over. Finally, it is worth noting that the IAEA announced on September 1 that facilities discovered in Deir el-Zor, Syria, indicate that Bashar al-Assad’s former regime had secretly been preparing an advanced nuclear program that could have led to the production of an atomic weapon with the help of North Korean experts.
Homage
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By Michel Hajji Georgiou - Published Sep 6, 2026 - 13:31
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The Argentine player, who brought his international career to an end on August 31, 2026, was nothing less than a magician of the stadiums. His journey, made of wonders, falls and redemption, may tell us something about our undiminished need for enchantment in a world that nevertheless claims to have rid itself of it. Announced a few weeks after the 2026 World Cup final lost to Spain, Lionel Messi’s international retirement inevitably stirred an emotion for which it is difficult to find many equivalents in the recent history of football. One would probably have to go back to Maradona, or perhaps to Cruyff or Pelé, to recover that sense that, with the retirement of a player, something disappears that extends far beyond the sport itself, as though a certain way of inhabiting football, perhaps even of believing in it, were also coming to an end. Far from the glacis of reason Enough of the endless statistics and the unbearable, tedious and sterile quarrels over “who is the greatest of all time.” The author of these lines has never been a fanatic of the round ball, nor, for that matter, of vertical rankings or hierarchies of merit in general, and consequently appreciates the talent of each player with the same sense of wonder as an eleven-year-old child. Besides, this particularly contemporary obsession with numbers ruins all the pleasure of the spectacle. And with good reason: the approach that consists in adding up goals, assists, Ballons d’Or, Champions Leagues, Copa América titles, World Cups… can only be reductive. On another register, it is not entirely unrelated to German-American philosopher Eric Voegelin’s critique of the modern Gnostic temptation: that of a form of knowledge convinced that it can imprison reality within a system and abolish whatever resists it. Records are probably one indicator of Lionel Messi’s genius. Yet so many other great players who made stadiums and hearts tremble, without achieving half of what he did, nevertheless remain eternal in our memories. What made them truly singular lies elsewhere, far from the glacis of reason. Something else was at work around them. Something belonging to a certain profound sense of transcendence that understanding can never fully grasp. This has been true of Lionel Messi for more than twenty years, since the day when, under the gaze of the “icon” Diego Maradona, he made his first appearance, in June 2006, on the World Cup stage in the colors of the Albiceleste against Serbia and Montenegro. That ineffable element that constitutes Messi’s genius, as it does that of others, may indeed touch upon one of modernity’s strangest paradoxes: the persistence of magic in a world that has constructed itself precisely against it. The disenchanted world Max Weber used the expression “disenchantment of the world” to describe the slow process by which Western modernity gradually subjected existence to rationalization, calculation, predictability and causal explanation. The world was no longer supposed to be traversed by obscure powers, signs, supernatural interventions or invisible wills; it was, at least in principle, to become intelligible. Unfortunately, modern sport, and more broadly the modern world inherited from globalization, fits perfectly within this dynamic. Today’s football, and not football alone, is probably one of the most quantified objects imaginable. The slightest gesture is measured, and everything is carefully calculated and modeled. From mathematics to artificial intelligence, raw talent now depends more on science than on enchantment. What is human in its spontaneous, even wild, relationship with the invisible that springs from the heart is disappearing before our eyes, in favor of the squaring of the VAR circle. It is, in a sense, the murder of sport in the name of greater rigor and fairness… even though the euthanasia of this share of sublime spontaneity ultimately produces glaring injustices of its own. One need only revisit some of the controversial decisions of the 2026 World Cup to see it. Paradox of paradoxes, Lionel Messi was himself, at the outset, a child of this technical modernity, to which he certainly owes part of his exceptional career. His body, too small by expected standards, was corrected through hormone treatment. Identified very early, his talent was taken in hand by an institution that organized his training, nutrition, physical development and integration into an already globalized sporting machine. Nothing, in appearance, could have been further removed from the old heroic narrative. At first sight, the story seems closer to dystopias in the vein of Gattaca than to myths and messianic narratives. And yet the old narrative did indeed return, and with an almost embarrassing insistence. Since the beginning of his career, Lionel Messi has been placed under the microscope. But the more people labored to explain and demystify him, the less they succeeded in entirely dissipating the impression produced by some of his gestures. The man simply cannot be circumscribed and reduced to an accumulation of data. At an age when most great players retreat into the shadows, he continues to surprise. To astonish, even, by bringing to sport that element of the senseless which escapes the quasi-robotic hypersystematization of the world. It is probably there that one must seek this elsewhere that characterizes Messi. In the survival of magic at a time when even the spaces that once allowed the positive expression of a humanity made of flesh and blood are gradually being “disciplined” by the hypnotic attraction of a new puritanical Gnosis in the name of modernity. The Messiah made by the machine Although he emerged, in a sense, from the machinery of the Matrix, Lionel Messi constitutes in himself a challenge to this ready-to-wear model. A kind of alter ego of Neo from The Matrix, thrown into a simulation governed by parameters that claim to calculate everything. The Argentine’s destiny gradually took on, almost despite himself, the form of a messianic narrative. The pun on his name would be too easy had it not been ceaselessly revived by his own story: that of the fragile child whose body seemed intent on denying him the fulfillment to which his talent destined him. Then that of exile at a very young age to Barcelona, adoption by a foreign city, an almost unreal ascent, worldwide recognition, followed by this strange difficulty in being recognized by his own… For a long time, Argentina maintained a relationship of hainamoration with its prodigal child. His results, his talent, his brilliance mattered little… he still had to answer one merciless question: why wasn’t he Maradona? The comparison was admittedly inevitable, but it was also profoundly unfair. Everything separated the two men in their way of being in the world. Maradona carried Argentina with everything in it that was passionate, contradictory, excessive and theatrical. He spoke, provoked, fought, fell, returned, mingled football with his private life, his anger, his political commitments… all the way to his own destruction. His very body seemed to become one of the places where the contradictions of his country were played out. Maradona was the very incarnation of what the world expected from football: a rebellious soul, sometimes pushing the game to the point of immorality, but within a kind of footballing gigantomachy. Maradona was epic. And, above all, he had placed his country at the summit of world football in 1986. Messi offered none of that. He was silent, at times almost absent from the story others were constructing around him, an absence long interpreted as a flaw. Almost erased, devoid of personality. That, moreover, was what the two giants Maradona and Pelé reproached him for: a lack of leadership, being too smooth. A kind of miracle test-tube baby of the stadiums. The boy from Rosario was also criticized for not singing the anthem loudly enough, for not being Argentine enough, for having been “manufactured” by Barcelona, and then, naturally, for failing to win with the national team what he won almost continuously with his club. The unfulfilled prophecy The dramatic loss to Germany in the 2014 World Cup final, followed by the Copa América finals of 2015 and 2016, had gradually transformed that suspicion into an accusation. When he missed his penalty against Chile in 2016 and subsequently announced that he was leaving the national team, he was nevertheless already one of the greatest players in football history. Yet his story remained strangely unfinished. The sense of incompletion had little to do with his honors. It concerned instead that quasi-archaic necessity continually imposed upon modern heroes: to bring their initiatory journey to completion. In Argentina’s colors, Messi shone, then fell heavily. But he did not rise again. He did not fulfill the prophecy. And, in the eyes of his people, this reinforced the sense of hainamoration: a fallen god remains a god, after all. But with the added burden of what his worshippers regard as an intolerable substratum of humanity and, therefore, something perfectly detestable: his flaws, his weaknesses. Argentines loved Maradona despite his spectacular downfall and his fallible humanity. But that was because he had “earned” the right to such a downfall, because it had somehow become acceptable after Mexico 1986. Messi, by contrast, did not yet have the right to fall, because he had not yet reached the summit. No, the prophecy had not been fulfilled. It was even becoming a caricature. So Messi returned. But he still had to wait for his redemption. It took the 2021 Copa América at the Maracanã for this relationship of suspicion, expectation and disappointment with his public and his people truly to begin changing. And above all it took the 2022 World Cup for the story to acquire that almost excessively perfect form that no one would have dared write without appearing to indulge in a screenwriter’s contrivance. Strangely, Maradona had died in 2020. It was as though a kind of oppressive national curse had been lifted. At the same time, the Argentine people needed a substitute father figure, and the pressure was thereby only redoubled. But perhaps mixed with a little tenderness this time? What happened in Qatar in 2022 is all the more interesting because Messi himself appeared slightly different. He protested more, answered provocations, lost his temper, spoke with a violence of which few had thought him capable, and even let slip that now famous “¿Qué mirás, bobo?” at the Dutch, to Argentina’s amusement. Buenos Aires finally discovered, belatedly, what it had always expected from him. A little Maradona in a great deal of Messi. But Messi did not become Maradona. And perhaps that was precisely where the true reconciliation occurred: Argentina stopped asking him to be. From 2022 onward, Messi no longer needed to embody another model of national genius. For his country too, he could finally become what he had already been everywhere else: Messi. Simply. The final act of the prophecy Granted, the triumph of 2022 could have constituted a perfect ending. But, as with Maradona, the final act of heroic prophecy is the fall. No one really expected anything extraordinary from Messi anymore in 2026. At 39, he was widely regarded as one of the “tired heroes.” The fall from the Capitol had come with the bitter episode of his departure from FC Barcelona and his misadventure at PSG. He was now playing only in the American league, in Miami’s colors… on the periphery of the footballing world, in the distant lands of soccer. And the new generation was already there, ready to send its ancestors off to Bicêtre. Yet this 2026 World Cup, which seemed destined to be nothing more than an epilogue, turned into one last sensational blaze of glory. Argentina reached the final once again, with Messi, at 39, restored as its “historic leader” and its recourse in decisive moments, achieving something not unlike what Roberto Baggio had done for Italy in 1994, at… 27: a perpetual deus ex machina. Baggio failed at the gates of triumph against Brazil after practically carrying Italy all the way to Pasadena. His penalty, sent over the crossbar, would leave behind one of the cruelest images in World Cup history: a man standing motionless, head bowed, hands on his hips, while Brazil celebrated its victory. The man who had “died standing.” The Italian imp never knew apotheosis. Yet this symbolic death, far from erasing his tournament, eventually became part of his legend. History was kinder to Messi, despite a campaign of hatred directed at him, mixed with accusations of cheating and favoritism, against a backdrop of controversial refereeing decisions and acts of unsporting conduct by his team, just as it had once been with Maradona. Kinder still, in fact. A final in a sixth World Cup on the verge of retirement, capped by an outstanding individual performance? That is precisely where the magic of the Messi phenomenon lies, and where it defies reason and its avalanche of statistics. Genius cannot be imprisoned within a sum of parameters and variables. Even optimal physical condition cannot by itself explain what the entire world witnessed. And what does it matter if his story reminds us that the hero, however mythical, cannot abolish the sinister influence of Saturn. The re-enchantment of the world For beyond the prophecy fulfilled, from ascent to fall, with its share of happiness and misfortune, the Argentine offered the world one final lap that belongs to art, if not to a form of Homeric poetry. With Lionel Messi’s withdrawal from the international stage, a little of the world’s magic disappears… until another providential hero returns to enchant the stadiums. For more than twenty years, Messi embodied the coexistence of two worlds we had thought incompatible: that of the extreme rationalization of modern sport and that, far older, of the hero, the sign, expectation and enchantment. When Messi leaves, something of this contradiction suddenly becomes visible. Other prodigies have already emerged, but perhaps, at the very moment when one of its last great representatives leaves the stage, we discover just how much we continue to need transcendence. The modern world has therefore probably not abolished enchantment. It has merely displaced it. For ninety minutes at a time, this man called Lionel Messi, who embodied it on football pitches, now leaves after having accomplished everything. And even more.
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Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

In a forthcoming series of articles, we intend to shed light on the current situation through the lens of history, steering clear of impassioned, ideological, or romanticized narratives that overlook the realities on the ground. Our aim is to give readers the tools to draw their own conclusions. In this context, it is high time to seriously challenge the sterile rhetoric of “resistance” – not with counter-rhetoric, but through a deeper approach that champions the rule of law, which can only be built on sovereignty. To understand the present, few things are as revealing as revisiting contemporary history, which continues to shape collective memory. The wars between Israel and Hezbollah deserve a closer look – beginning with the first conflict in 1993, along with the key events that preceded it, not to mention Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon on 25 May 2000, and the preceding and subsequent events, including the wars of 1996, 2006, 2023–2024, and 2026. Thirty-three years of conflict may seem chaotic at first glance, but in reality, they follow a clear pattern, orchestrated behind the scenes by the Mullahs in Tehran. Events continue to unfold within a complex tableau, where local, regional, and international interests intersect. As an international actor, the United States – an unrivaled global power since 1990 – has long also played a regional role, for better or worse, exerting influence across nearly every country in the region except Iran, while maintaining military bases throughout the Arab world. The interests of Washington, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Riyadh, and Tehran intersect, converge, diverge, pull apart, and clash in constant flux, while Lebanon’s singular interest – its sovereignty, denied for more than 50 years, and the subsequent rebuilding of its state institutions – remains unfulfilled. Numerous non-state actors in Lebanon, notably Hezbollah, Hamas, and other illegal armed groups, as well as Lebanese parties allied with Hezbollah, often supported or tolerated by one regional power or another, have played major roles over the past decades, obstructing Lebanon’s path to sovereignty. Opportunities to reclaim that sovereignty, which have emerged repeatedly over the years, have been consistently thwarted by local decision-makers – by incompetence, narrow self-interest, cowardice, greed, or divided loyalties. Hezbollah’s Three Agendas Hezbollah continues to pursue three parallel agendas. The first, regional, centers on meddling in Arab countries to destabilize them in Iran’s favor – particularly Iraq, along Iran’s western border – with the aim of preventing the rise of an any new leader in the mold of Saddam Hussein, a nightmare for Tehran’s Mullahs. The second, focused on Israel, relies on a rhetoric of resistance – used to support a local agenda that is ultimately Hezbollah’s hegemony over Lebanon. Its supporters, driven by a religious ideology beyond debate, are convinced they are carrying out a divine mission, modeled on Iran, where a state exists in name but key decisions are made by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a state within a state with extensive social, economic, security, and military ramifications. The Lebanese model envisioned by the pro-Iranian party is a façade state, handling day-to-day and ceremonial affairs, while Hezbollah operates both within and outside the state, with its militia and political, cultural, and social institutions. In practice, it is Hezbollah that makes strategic decisions and projects them onto Parliament and the government. For its supporters, the party thus embodies sovereignty, provides social and security guarantees, and, above all, advances their ideological ambitions. This issue is at the heart of current events, yet the “divine” party’s four-decade trajectory, which has led to today’s situation, deserves careful scrutiny, especially for the generations of Lebanese born under its hegemony. For them, Hezbollah is part of everyday life, and for some, coexistence with the party’s arms in the name of a resistance that has dragged on for 44 years seems acceptable. In this context, certain figures are particularly instructive: The war that ended with the Treaty of Westphalia lasted 30 years (1618–1648); World War I, four years; World War II, six years; the First Indochina War (France vs. Viet Minh), nine years; the Vietnam War (United States vs. North Vietnam), ten years; and the Arab-Israeli conflict (excluding Palestine), 25 years. It is clear that for the past 44 years, Hezbollah has drawn its legitimacy only in the shadow of a state of belligerency. Accordingly, it has little incentive to end its conflicts with Israel. It is now evident that only the Lebanese themselves can resolve their issues, by ending the state of war with the Israeli state, without necessarily negotiating a formal peace treaty. Six Arab countries have already taken this path ahead of Beirut. Lebanon could achieve the same, with the support of these Arab states and other friend nations. The Taif Agreement To revisit recent history, the starting point must be the Taif Agreement, signed on 22 October 1989 in Saudi Arabia with American endorsement. Its aim was to end the fifteen years of successive wars in Lebanon. The two final conflicts that hastened the signing and forceful implementation of the agreement were among the most devastating: the Lebanese–Syrian “War of Liberation” and the intra-Lebanese “War of Elimination.” These wars threatened to divide the Arab states and undermine a complex regional stabilization process desired by Washington and Riyadh following the conclusion of the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran. Implementation of the agreement, stalled for months, became a priority for its sponsors after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. For all regional and international players, it was essential to halt the ongoing wars in Lebanon after the agreement’s signing. Consequently, the international and Arab community gave the green light to Baathist Syria to impose stability in Lebanon by military means, in exchange for its alignment with the Arab–international coalition against Iraq aimed at liberating Kuwait. On 13 October 1990, Damascus forces thus invaded Baabda Palace and the Ministry of National Defense, both controlled by the Lebanese military government headed by General Michel Aoun. A few months later, in early 1991, Iraqi troops were expelled from Kuwait, and parts of Iraq were occupied by the anti-Saddam coalition. The outcome was the weakening of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the subsequent rise of Iran and its ally Hezbollah. This period marked the beginning of the wars waged by Hezbollah against Israel – and vice versa – before and after Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon on 24 May 2000. This period witnessed a global upheaval, marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the weakening of the USSR and its regional allies, including Iraq and Syria, followed by Syria’s rapprochement with the United States, which granted it greater freedom of action in Lebanon. In addition, the Gulf countries, allied with the United States – which had become unrivaled on the international stage – aligned themselves with Assad’s Syria and gave Iran room to maneuver its confrontation with Saddam’s Iraq. This fundamentally altered reality was misread by General Aoun’s military government at the time, culminating in the disaster of 13 October 1990. (to be continued)

Lebanon-Israel negotiations: another 'historic' moment in Washington

«Historic». The word was found in almost all speeches delivered Thursday evening (overnight in Lebanon) in Washington, on the sidelines of the second round of direct talks between Lebanon and Israel, under American patronage. These talks were held this time at the White House and no longer at the State Department, and what's more, in the presence of the American president himself, Donald Trump, which gave a whole new dimension to the event. Lebanon was once again represented by its ambassador Nada Moawad. In addition to Israel's ambassador to Washington, Yechiel Leiter, several American politicians were present: Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa (of Lebanese origin), US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee. The main demands conveyed by the Lebanese ambassador, as expected, were the extension of the 60-day ceasefire, the cessation of house demolitions, and the end of Israeli aggressions in the south of the country. It was Donald Trump himself who announced the extension of the ceasefire on his social network Truth Social , writing that the new deadline is «THREE WEEKS», in capital letters to emphasize that it is an achievement. Three weeks then (instead of the expected 60 days), starting from Sunday, which should have been the deadline for the ceasefire that came into effect on April 16 at midnight. Statements were particularly enthusiastic after the meeting, ranging from JD Vance's «major historic moment» to Marco Rubio's comments on «two countries that want to be at peace». Michel Issa thanked Donald Trump for «a historic moment that brings two countries closer that have never been side by side». The same for Nada Moawad who thanked Donald Trump for making this event «a historic moment» by his presence, hoping that with his support, Lebanon could regain its greatness. Accusations against Hezbollah were not lacking, particularly from Mike Huckabee, for whom the problem «is not Lebanon, not Israel, but Hezbollah». Marco Rubio insisted that Lebanon and Israel are «both victims of the same terrorist organization». Donald Trump himself promised that the United States would continue to «protect Lebanon against Hezbollah», assuring that the Iranian sponsor should stop financing its proxy in Lebanon. The novelty, Thursday evening, is that the American president announced that the cessation of this financing (Iranian to Hezbollah) is an «essential» condition in the conclusion of an agreement on the other negotiating table, that between Iran and the United States. Beyond this new round of negotiations, Donald Trump again showed optimism about the conclusion of an agreement between Lebanon and Israel «as early as this year». He mentioned the need for a meeting between Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House «in the coming weeks», an eventuality that the former continues to rule out for obvious reasons linked to internal Lebanese dissensions and the abuses committed by the Israeli army in Lebanese territory, as well as the uncertainty about the outcome of these negotiations, many believing that such a meeting should take place after a possible agreement and not beforehand. On the ground in South Lebanon, fighting continues at the same pace despite the ceasefire and its extension, as if the two belligerents were unconcerned by peace efforts. The night from Thursday to Friday and the day of Friday were particularly agitated and deadly in the South. While Israel continues its systematic demolition of houses in villages and its bombings, Hezbollah intensified its operations against northern Israel and troop gatherings in the South, making it a point of honor to multiply communiqués on its operations at the same time as the negotiations it rejects were taking place in Washington. The rhetoric has not calmed down either, as Hezbollah bloc leader Mohammad Raad called on the state to withdraw from negotiations that, according to him, only serve to cover Israeli aggressions, while MP Ali Fayad from the same bloc decreed that the ceasefire is meaningless given continuous Israeli aggressions. Aoun at the European summit in Cyprus The other political news this Friday is the participation of the Lebanese president in the European summit taking place in Cyprus. A summit that also brings together other Arab leaders, notably Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, Syrian President Ahmad el-Chareh, alongside the leaders of the Twenty-Seven. The explosive situation in Lebanon and negotiations with Israel were on the agenda. A notable statement was that of Kaja Kallas, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, who mentioned a discussion about the possibility of deploying European forces when the mission of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) ends in December 2026, believing that the Lebanese army would need support to disarm Hezbollah and extend its sovereignty over the country. The President of the European Council, for his part, promised «support for Lebanon with a view to disarming Hezbollah». President Aoun's discussions included French President Emmanuel Macron and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. He declared that «Lebanon is negotiating on its own behalf» and «refuses to be a card in anyone's hands». He added that the country «is at a crossroads and the choices it will make will impact regional stability». Joseph Aoun also considered that «this stage is not just a test, it is also an opportunity». In other words, he reaffirmed the negotiation process and the state's monopoly on weapons, receiving clear support for his approach. Araghchi in Pakistan Regarding negotiations between the United States and Iran, which have been blocked since Wednesday when President Trump extended the ceasefire indefinitely, the development this Friday was the announcement of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's visit to Islamabad. In the afternoon, Pakistan announced that a new American delegation was expected the same day. However, shortly after, a Pakistani official told the Saudi channel al-Hadath that «Araghchi specified that his trip to Islamabad has the sole objective of talks with his Pakistani counterparts, not negotiations with the American side». Pakistani officials nevertheless expect a «breakthrough» in negotiations following this visit, according to the same channel. However, a return to the negotiating table remains more uncertain than ever. Meanwhile, tension remains palpable on the ground and the sounds of war are heard. According to Axios, Iran has reportedly planted additional mines in the Strait of Hormuz. US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth warned that the United States «still has its hand on the trigger». Another sign of a possible escalation is the deployment of more than 4,000 American soldiers to the region, according to the Washington Post. What scenario should be expected in the near future? An escalation or a still improbable deal? Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, for his part, has no doubt: he declared Friday that Israel is awaiting the American green light for a new attack against Iran, which would be «decisive».

Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (3)

In a series of articles, we aim to shed light on the current situation in light of the past, moving beyond impassioned, ideological, or romanticized rhetoric that misses the mark and leaves the reader to draw their own conclusions. In this context, it is high time to seriously counter the sterile rhetoric of resistance, not with counter-rhetoric, but with an in-depth approach that champions the rule of law, which can only be built upon sovereignty. The first two articles presented a reinterpretation of the events surrounding Hezbollah's rise to power, from the Taif Agreement through Operation "Settling of Accounts" and the "July Agreement" (1993), up to the eve of its second war with Israel. Stage 3: Hezbollah's Guerrilla War Against Oslo and Madrid For three years following Operation "Settling of Accounts" (July 1993), the implementation of the Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel progressed only sluggishly, catalyzed by Washington, which maintained its strategy at all costs to contain the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in order to prevent it from derailing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, while simultaneously seeking to advance rapprochement efforts between Tel Aviv and Damascus. Furthermore, Washington and Tel Aviv openly discussed the imminent possibility of Israeli-Lebanese negotiations, in light of news from Lebanon indicating that the Syrian Ba'athist army had launched a campaign of repression against Hezbollah. Later, this news turned out to be disinformation orchestrated by the Iranians, with the complicity of Hafez al-Assad. To lend credibility to its deceptions, Tehran leaked information suggesting that Iran would now deliver military aid to Hezbollah through channels other than Syria, implying that Syria was willing to reduce tensions in southern Lebanon. To further convince observers of Syria's good intentions, the Iranians did indeed send a shipment of weapons, which was intercepted in Turkey, much to Ankara's dismay. In reality, the Syrians were playing two contradictory cards: on the one hand, the card of peace, which allowed them to manipulate Washington, and on the other hand, the card of the failure of the peace negotiations. The Americans, having believed that the Syrians had chosen peace, were convinced that their pressure on Tel Aviv and Damascus had borne fruit… when in fact, this was not the case. Hafez al-Assad was actually preparing for the failure of the Oslo and Madrid processes, drawing ever closer to Iran and meeting secretly with Saddam Hussein, who was under American sanctions. Taking advantage of the American strategy of appeasement and convinced of the limits of Washington's pressure, Assad and Tehran advanced their interests in Lebanon, especially by supporting, arming, and strengthening Hezbollah. Between 1993 and 1996, Hezbollah waged a war of attrition against the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and the Israeli army, using rockets, missiles, and explosive roadside bombs. The SLA and the IDF, for their part, retaliated with artillery and air power. The belligerents tried to spare civilians in accordance with the "July 1993 Agreement," but to no avail. In each clash, the United States intervened swiftly and acted as mediator, preventing Israel from escalating its reprisals beyond a critical point. By early 1996, the Israeli death toll was rising. Since the end of Operation "Settling Accounts," and due to Hezbollah's advanced tactics, 210 Israeli soldiers and 110 SLA soldiers had been killed; in addition, between 60 and 80 Lebanese civilians had fallen inside and outside the "security zone," killed by random strikes or explosives. For its part, Hezbollah lost 200 fighters, including operatives assassinated, others captured, and still others who escaped capture attempts. Step 4: Israel’s “Grapes of Wrath” Operation against Hezbollah The second Hezbollah-Israel war, dubbed Operation “Grapes of Wrath” (April 11–27, 1996), ended the “July Agreement” and represented a major escalation aimed at changing the rules of the game between the two sides. Israel’s objective was to pressure Lebanon and Syria to contain Hezbollah operations. During this operation, the Israeli Air Force carried out 1,800 sorties, targeted 500 objectives including both civilian and military infrastructure, and displaced 400,000 civilians—a figure that corresponds exactly to the current situation, in addition to the razing of villages in the south. The culmination of this war was the Israeli artillery bombardment of a UNIFIL center in the town of Qana, where hundreds of civilians were seeking refuge, resulting in the deaths of 106 people. Israel claimed it was a blunder, while Hezbollah called the incident deliberate. Nevertheless, the Qana massacre sparked enormous international pressure, leading to a ceasefire. Operation Grapes of Wrath failed to stop Katyusha rocket fire on Israel and ended after sixteen days of fighting with an unsigned written agreement, dubbed the "April Agreement," brokered by France and the United States. This agreement stipulated a fragile and ill-defined rule of engagement: "Hezbollah will not fire from populated areas, and Israel will not bomb populated areas." Furthermore, a committee comprising the United States, France, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel was established to monitor violations and investigate complaints. It bears a striking resemblance to the "Mechanism" established by the November 2024 ceasefire, which followed the Gaza War and comprised the same members, with the exception of Syria, and the addition of UNIFIL. Separated by 33 years, these two committees proved ineffective in halting hostilities. The "April 1996 Agreement" affirmed Hezbollah's right to act against military targets within the "security zone" south of the Litani River, occupied by Israel and held by the SLA, while sparing civilians and residential areas on both sides of the river as well as in Israel. This agreement was considered a major turning point because it implicitly legitimized Hezbollah operations against the IDF and the SLA inside Lebanese territory and indirectly amplified Iran's growing influence in Lebanon. Indeed, Tehran was the big winner of this agreement and proved to its Syrian and Palestinian allies, as well as its American and Israeli enemies, that it could initiate wars through its proxies, and consequently torpedo the Oslo and Madrid peace processes. Curiously, the cessation of hostilities and the continuation of Hezbollah's activities perfectly aligned with American objectives of pressuring Israel to make concessions to Syria and encouraging Syria to reach a peace agreement with Israel (to be continued). Read also: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (2) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

A Lebanese Image Encapsulating Iranian Impudence
By
Khairallah Khairallah
Published

Against a backdrop of more than a million displaced persons and the rubble of over fifty-five Lebanese villages and towns in the South, the "Islamic Republic" held a commemoration in Beirut — Lebanon's capital — to mark the fortieth day of mourning for Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, assassinated by America and Israel on 28 February last. The spectacle of this commemoration betrays an impudence with few equivalents, not least because the Iranian ambassador Mohammad Reza Shibani — declared persona non grata by the Lebanese government — occupied the front row, though he has never once presented his credentials. His continued presence in Beirut is nothing but further proof of the contempt with which Iran regards Lebanon and the Lebanese, a contempt that is, at its root, of Persian character, grounded in a sense of superiority towards everything Arab in the region. The image of those seated in the front row — among them the Minister of Health, one of Hezbollah's representatives in the government — encapsulates, on its own, the Iranian impudence in Lebanon. It illustrates in concrete terms the wager that the "Islamic Republic" continues to place: holding Lebanon in its grip and turning it into one of its bargaining cards. This wager on the Lebanese card dates back to that ill-omened day in the summer of 1982 when the vanguards of the Revolutionary Guards entered the city of Baalbek. It was no coincidence that those Guards — who had crossed Syrian territory on the pretext of confronting Israel — chose to install themselves in a Lebanese army barracks named the Sheikh Abdullah barracks. Striking a blow at the Lebanese army was one of the foremost objectives of the "Islamic Republic," as embodied by its Revolutionary Guards. The image of the Khamenei fortieth-day commemoration thus appears more than meaningful. It reveals, first of all, the refusal of the "Islamic Republic" to accept that Lebanon has now dissociated its path from Iran's own. Tehran cannot bring itself to acknowledge that Lebanon is striving to exist outside direct Iranian control. This blindness stems from an inability to come to terms with the regional and international realities that eventually brought the war inside Iran itself, after long years of unparalleled success in deploying its instruments — most notably the Lebanese Hezbollah — to extort the world and the Arabs alike. What began with the Guards' entry into Baalbek and their occupation of a Lebanese army barracks, in open defiance of all international laws and conventions, continued with an Iranian campaign targeting the American University of Beirut. In the summer of 1982, the Iranians abducted university president David Dodge from Beirut through their Lebanese proxies and transferred him to Tehran. The Iranian authorities subsequently released Dodge following efforts made by Rifaat al-Assad, who was then seeking to ingratiate himself with the Americans and to present himself, in due course, as a potential successor to his brother Hafez. Iran succeeded in driving the United States out of Lebanon. It prevailed, effectively, over American presence in the country — particularly following the bombing of the American embassy in Beirut in April 1983 and of the Marines' headquarters near Beirut airport in October of the same year, an attack that inflicted on the American military its heaviest losses since the Vietnam War. Two hundred and forty-five American servicemen were killed. The Iranian campaign against the American presence in Lebanon never ceased. There is no need to revisit the kidnappings of Americans in Beirut, nor the assassination of Malcolm Kerr, the American University's president, in 1984, all the way through to the day Rafic Hariri was assassinated on 14 February 2005, an event that opened the path to the imposition of total Iranian guardianship over the country in the wake of the Syrian military and security withdrawal. There is a fundamental Iranian incapacity to accept that Lebanon has changed and that the region has changed with it. The fortieth-day commemoration for the "Supreme Leader" confirms this incapacity, now transformed into outright impudence. What remains of the Iranian leadership cannot conceive of the "Islamic Republic" without Lebanon in the position of a vassal state. There is a refusal of a reality that is nonetheless pressing: Lebanon is capable of recovering its status as an independent and sovereign state while simultaneously freeing itself from the Iranian stranglehold that drove it to the present catastrophe — a catastrophe that struck the Shia community first and foremost, before any other, and devastated the land of the South, its villages, its towns and its people. The "Islamic Republic" will not be able to flee from international and regional reality indefinitely. It is plain that the impudence to which it has resorted in Lebanon is but one facet of this Iranian flight, with its multiple dimensions — among them the response to the United States and Israel through acts of aggression against the Arab Gulf states. No country in the world can continue its flight from reality without end. The reality is that the "Islamic Republic" has lost every war it waged on the margins of the Gaza war — whether in Lebanon, in Syria, or in Gaza itself, which Israel has obliterated from existence just as it simultaneously obliterated the leadership of Hezbollah. The loss of Syria remains Iran's most significant loss, as Syria was the bridge to Lebanon. The "Shia Crescent" that once extended from Tehran to Beirut and stretched toward southern Lebanon no longer exists. In brief: impudence cannot conceal impotence. Only the admission can cover that impotence — the admission that Lebanon is no longer an Iranian protectorate, as Syria was in the days of Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad, when the "Shia Crescent" was still alive and thriving.

A General Shia Amnesty… to Step into the Age

I once followed a long speech by the late Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, in which he recounted in painstaking detail the events of “the day the Prophet’s family women were taken captive.” He was visibly and deeply moved throughout. I remember being genuinely struck by the way this painful episode was summoned as though it had occurred two or three days before, presented in a manner admitting no question of its veracity, as if transmitted by eyewitnesses whose testimony stood beyond all doubt. Images of village women weeping in churches on Good Friday, listening to the chant “Wa habibi” or “I Am the Sorrowful Mother,” came naturally to mind. But those rituals remain anchored in their spiritual dimension, not in the precise time, place, and circumstances of the event itself, unlike the Ashura commemorations and the days associated with them, among which figures “the captivity of the Prophet’s women.” I say today that this may well be the greatest paradox embedded in the collective memory of the Shia majority: to remain captive to the moment of “al-Taff,” as if time had stopped there, in Karbala, in the year 61 of the Hijri calendar. And just recently, at the opening of 2024, Baghdad witnessed a scene of surrealism unsurpassed in kind: the trial of Yazid ibn Muawiya, as though a contemporary court could settle a conflict fourteen centuries old by judicial decree. The truth is that this profoundly sensitive matter will find no resolution in the corridors of courtrooms, but in the labyrinthine depths of a psychology and a mentality that refuse to this day to exit the condition of “eternal mourning.” The time has come for a bold step, perhaps “shocking” to some, yet necessary for those who genuinely wish to cross the bridge of history toward the future. We need a “general Shia amnesty,” not as a form of forgetting the crime, but in acknowledgment that what occurred was a struggle for power, like thousands of conflicts that peoples and states have traversed across the ages, from pharaonic Egypt to the Persian and Mesopotamian empires, from Athens and Rome to Paris and the Americas. This amnesty must encompass everyone, including the accused Shimr ibn Dhi al-Jawshan, on the basis that “they know not what they do.” All were instruments in a merciless machinery of governance, fuel for a purely human struggle over throne and influence. If the concern is “justice,” al-Mukhtar al-Thaqafi attended to that task in his time, putting the sword to the necks of the killers and all, or nearly all, who had participated in that catastrophe, closing the blood account with blood. As for the perpetual psychological summoning of revenge, day after day, that is a formula for unending disasters, calamities, and catastrophes forever and ever. Opening a new page is not a luxury; it is an imperative. Entering the modern age is impossible when memory is laden with blood, with remorse, with historical enmities and calls to restore a wounded dignity. We human beings need forgiveness to find peace, need “amnesty” to move forward. History is something we read in order to learn from it, not to inhabit it. Turn the page. Believe me, nothing is more beautiful than being born anew each morning.

USA-Iran: A frozen power struggle against a backdrop of Iranian division

All attention is focused on Washington, where the second round of direct talks between Lebanon and Israel, at ambassadorial level, is taking place at 11 PM Beirut time, while the conflict between Iran and the United States remains stuck in this grey zone of tensions into which it has slipped. A grey zone that can, however, at any moment tip towards escalation or appeasement, if mediators, particularly Pakistan, manage to find an acceptable agreement formula for both parties. For Lebanon, the stakes are considerably higher and revolve around two short-term and long-term objectives: in the short term, it is about obtaining, in a first phase, an extension of the ceasefire. Subsequently – which will be more complicated as long as Hezbollah is not disarmed – it is about obtaining a halt to Israeli acts of violence in the south of the country where Tel Aviv's soldiers continue to build a buffer zone through destruction, as well as a potential withdrawal of these forces, and the release of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. It is around these elements that discussions will take place at the White House and no longer at the State Department, according to the Axios website, where Lebanon's ambassador, Nada Moawad, is to demand, on instructions from Beirut, an extension of the ceasefire that came into effect last Thursday and whose duration is only ten days. She was also to demand that, during this truce, the Israeli army suspend its targeting of homes, hospital and educational establishments, places of worship, and journalists. Secretary of State Marco Rubio will be present at the meeting, alongside the Lebanese and Israeli ambassadors who are expected to be received by President Trump. In the long term, the Lebanese authorities hope to conclude an arrangement with Israel, which may be called a peace agreement or something else – it is still too early to say – whose main purpose is to shield the country from new wars. By initiating direct dialogue with Israel, the government is taking a path certainly fraught with pitfalls but one that is essential to free the country from the state of dependence on Iran into which Hezbollah had plunged it. For once, the Lebanese government has room for maneuver, allowing it to act solely in the interest of the Lebanese, without being forced, under the impetus of Hezbollah and its allies, to prioritize the strategic calculations of various parties. It is moreover from this sole perspective that the Hezbollah outcry against the ongoing diplomatic process must be approached. Its success will mark the end of the satellite state and the emergence of a sovereign state, if the government sees its sovereignist initiative through and holds firm against the obstacles that the pro-Iranian axis will undoubtedly place in its path. Apparently designated as the group's spokesperson, Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah held another press conference on Thursday to warn against the resumption of direct talks with Israel. In addition to the usual thinly veiled threats, he played on emotions in his speech, dwelling on the admittedly cowardly and condemnable targeting of journalist Amal Khalil, killed on Wednesday in an Israeli strike on el-Tiri, in the Bint Jbeil district. His remarks, like those of his leader, Naim Kassem, tend to distort reality to claim the role of hypothetical savior in a catastrophic situation for which their organization is solely responsible and, above all, to defend the pseudo-legitimacy of an abnormal state they wish to perpetuate. They primarily highlight the gap between two logics: one that seeks to keep Lebanon prisoner of cross-border strategic interests, Hezbollah having sufficiently demonstrated that it obeys only orders from Tehran, and the other, led by the Lebanese government, which consists of taking the necessary initiatives and measures to protect Lebanese citizens from the dangers to which Hezbollah exposes them. In this context, President Joseph Aoun reaffirmed, during the Council of Ministers on Thursday, his willingness to travel to Washington for discussions with President Donald Trump concerning the Lebanese-Israeli dossier, emphasizing the importance of this meeting for future events, particularly for the reconstruction of Lebanon. He did not comment on Mr. Trump's remarks who had announced his desire to invite his Lebanese counterpart and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for discussions in Washington, but on his X account, the Presidency of the Republic indicated that Joseph Aoun 'never considered contact with Netanyahu'. In this process of re-establishing Lebanese sovereignty, Lebanon is supported by the majority of Lebanese and by the Arab and international community. Saudi Arabia, which is closely following the dialogue between Beirut and Tel Aviv and remains concerned about a revitalization of Lebanon, has dispatched an emissary to the Lebanese capital. The Advisor to the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Yazid bin Farhan, held a series of discussions with officials, including the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berry, an ally of Hezbollah. During his talks, the Saudi envoy emphasized the need for the implementation of the Taif Agreement, which among other things provides for the disarmament of all militias, and sounded out his Lebanese hosts regarding the dialogue with Israel. Qalibaf's resignation? This is taking place to the rhythm of exchanges of fire between Israel and Hezbollah, which uses this nebulous 'resistance' to launch not rockets, but drones, against northern Israel. In the area delimited by this famous Yellow Line, a fictitious demarcation supposed to mark the limits of the Israeli army's operational zone, it is as if the war has not stopped. The Israeli army, however, operated outside this zone on Thursday evening, targeting a car on the Choukine road (Nabatiyeh district), killing three individuals. On the side of Iran and the United States, the impression is that not much is happening for the moment, as the two adversaries seem to observe each other from a distance, and defy each other to see who will yield first. The only information that broke this routine of pressures is that of a possible resignation of the Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Qalibaf from his position as head of the negotiating delegation. It was reported by Israeli media and has not yet been confirmed by official Iranian sources. If it proves to be true, Qalibaf's resignation will have above all demonstrated the extent of divisions within the Iranian establishment. For now, the standoff between Tehran and Washington still revolves around the Strait of Hormuz, controlled by the Islamic Republic, and the American blockade of Iranian ports. Iran announced that it has begun collecting transit fees from cargo ships it allows to cross the strait, while Donald Trump announced he had ordered the US Navy to target minelayers. «The first revenues from Strait of Hormuz transit fees have been deposited into the Central Bank's account,» said Hamidreza Hajibabaei, Vice-President of the Iranian Parliament, according to Tasnim news agency. At the same time, the Pasdaran announced that they had taken control of two cargo ships in the Sea of Oman, in what appears to be a reaction to the requisition, by the US Navy, of an Iranian commercial vessel. On his Truth Social network, Donald Trump affirmed having ordered the navy to «shoot down any boats, no matter how small (...) that are laying mines» in the Strait of Hormuz. «Our minesweeper boats are clearing the strait right now. I order here that this activity continues, but at triple its current level,» he added. It remains to be seen how long this logic of calibrated pressure followed by Iran and the United States will last. Are they awaiting any breakthrough in efforts to resume discussions in Islamabad? If both agree to prioritize diplomacy in their power struggle over nuclear and ballistic weapons issues and, on the Iranian side, Lebanon - which Washington rejects - they give the impression of having a less clear vision on the outcome of a resumption of military operations. Only Israel, which regularly claims to have its finger on the trigger, seems to have a clear idea on the subject. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Saar affirmed on Thursday that Tel Aviv «is only awaiting the American green light to eliminate the Khamenei dynasty and bring Iran back to the Stone Age».