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Lebanon and the Lebanese cannot confront the challenges facing the country while divided to this degree over the great strategic choices, especially the question of how to deal with the Israeli occupation and resolve the issue of confining weapons to the state, a legitimate, self-evident demand recognized in every country in the world, for there is no state that accepts the existence of an armed faction beyond its control, capable of igniting a major war not merely without its consent but without so much as consulting it. The lines of vertical fracture in Lebanon keep widening, and the rift among the Lebanese deepens by the day, until Lebanese political discourse finds itself confined between two poles: one racing toward a peace whose conditions have not yet ripened, and another retreating into the field without reading the exceptional transformations the region has witnessed over the past three years, from uncontested Israeli supremacy to the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria to the American-Israeli-Iranian war. As for the argument that those who negotiate are not those who resist on the ground, it is valid and obstructs the negotiations currently underway in Washington, however early they remain, particularly given that Israel, in all previous negotiating experiences with other parties, was never disposed to make any concession whatsoever, let alone a gratuitous one. Faced with this dangerous political schism among the Lebanese, it is necessary to revisit certain realities that neither side nor any of the contending parties can ignore or avert their eyes from. Chief among these is the acknowledgment that there are historical Israeli aggressions against Lebanon, and that the successive wars Israel waged against the Lebanese were not exclusively aimed at achieving the declared objectives, whether driving out the Palestinians in earlier times or destroying Hezbollah today. There is a manifest Israeli vengeance against Lebanon: against its civilians (and the images of Black Wednesday on 8 April 2026 remain vivid in memory), against its villages and towns, against its infrastructure, against its hospitals, and above all against its pluralist experience, which contradicts Israeli uniformity and reflects the richness of a Lebanese society that, despite all its difficulties, takes pride in its diversity, unlike Israeli society, which proclaims the supremacy of one of its components and treats the others with extreme arrogance and contempt. Among the other realities that must be acknowledged is the return of occupation to the lands of the South and the invention of what has been called the "yellow line," in reference to the Gaza Strip and the other colors Israel uses to fragment the West Bank and plant settlements within it. Fifty-five villages have now come under occupation in practice, a grave setback when measured against the great national achievement of the year 2000, namely the complete withdrawal without conditions, without a peace treaty, and without even a security arrangements agreement. Yet the problem lies not only in acknowledging these realities, but also in the serious search for ways of addressing them, whether through armed resistance or political negotiation. The dilemma consists equally in the fact that it is inadmissible for political negotiations not to draw any benefit from the card of the field, just as it would be illogical for the field to remain entirely disconnected from political negotiations. On the matter of negotiations, it is useful to continue working toward separating the Lebanese track from any other track. Lebanon has suffered enough from the tying of its trajectories and destiny to those of other countries, and the experience of "twinning" the Lebanese and Syrian tracks during the era of tutelage remains before us, having amply demonstrated that it never served Lebanon's interests in any way. That said, the Lebanese negotiator can draw on the card of the field in one way or another, rather than going to Washington empty-handed with an approach that carries a hint of supplication and a search for sympathy. If the present political moment is characterized by an American attention to Lebanon, manifested in pressure on the Israeli government for a ceasefire, it must be borne in mind that the network of American-Israeli interests is far deeper and more entrenched than Lebanon's modest calculations. Lebanon cannot compete with Israel for Washington's affection, and the matter is far more complex than that. Drawing on the "card of the field," however, also requires an acknowledgment on the part of Hezbollah, and those who stand behind it, that the era of complete disconnection from the Lebanese state is no longer acceptable at the Lebanese, Arab, or international level, and that one of its most harmful manifestations was the dragging of Lebanon into endless and fruitless wars, and that there is a genuine need to work, under some formula to be determined, within the fold of the state. And above all, this step would not merely strengthen Lebanon's negotiating position, but would also help bridge the internal rift, relieve the pressure, and ward off the security or social explosion whose elements are slowly and steadily accumulating. If the crude dialogue formulas of national dialogue tables no longer yield any results, new formulas must be devised that take mutations into account, reinforce Lebanon's resilience, and block the road to civil war at a moment when Israel is lying in wait to incite the communities against one another, a game it has played many times before. In this context, it is also incumbent on the "peace camp" to rein in its momentum somewhat, whether in its rush toward "media normalization" or in raising issues that are entirely premature and amount to nothing more than free gifts to Israel, among them the hasty proposal to repeal the boycott law against Israel adopted in 1955, which criminalizes any dealings with it. Lebanon remains in a state of belligerence to this day, and Israel proves this daily, through the two thousand martyrs and more who fell in the last war. Just as the "resistance camp" is expected to refrain from threatening fitna, internal war, and the subjugation of all Lebanese in order to "discipline" them, brandishing the specter of a new May 7, which remains an unjustifiable stain on those who perpetrated that act in 2008. It is equally called upon to desist from affixing the labels of collaboration, treason, and Zionism to all who hold a different opinion. Lebanon may be standing before a historic opportunity, and that is true. But the matter requires discernment and awareness in the way it is managed, rather than haste and recklessness, lest the opportunity turn into a curse that reignites the fuse of civil war. Without dialogue, in some form or another, tensions will deepen, and the mission of liberating the occupied lands and putting a definitive end to the war will become all the more arduous.

Over the past three weeks, Lebanon’s negotiating position has shifted quietly but significantly. Direct Lebanon-Israel talks are underway in Washington. These talks are capped by a 10-day ceasefire that began April 16 and was extended by three weeks on April 23 at Lebanon’s own request. The regional and domestic context has changed, but Lebanon’s government has not yet adapted apparently. Outside Lebanon and in the GCC more specifically, there is growing recognition that seeking Hezbollah’s disarmament and a full peace treaty with Israel is no longer realistic. Prominent regional actors assume that pursuing such outcomes now would likely rupture Lebanon internally, reviving sectarian confrontation that they are trying to avoid. Egypt and Saudi Arabia persistent advisory to Lebanon to adopt a fundamentally more cautious approach is underpinned by the outcome of the April 8 th ceasefire between the United States and Iran, which was concluded without Iran making meaningful concessions on its nuclear program, its ballistic missile arsenal, or its support for proxy forces. While Iran did suffer severe damage in its conventional military infrastructure as a result of the joint U.S.-Israeli military action, it retained a meaningful stock of enriched uranium that stops short of a weapon but is close enough to constitute persistent leverage. It kept a residual ballistic missile arsenal, reduced but not eliminated. Critically, its network of regional proxies, of which Hezbollah is the most prominent, is weakened but still functional. More importantly, Iran demonstrated during the crisis that it holds a card it had not previously played on this scale, which is the ability to threaten or partially restrict passage through the Strait of Hormuz. What Iran chose not to use is equally significant. The Houthis in Yemen retain independent strike capacity. Furthermore, Iran’s ability to conduct grey-zone operations through its disruptive networks inside the Gulf or even Western countries remains a card held in reserve. Taken together, this residual asymmetric arsenal means that Iran entered the post-ceasefire period not as a defeated power ready to surrender, but as one with meaningful cards still to play, albeit wounded and battered. For the GCC states, this reality informs every future strategic calculation. A total victory over Iran is no longer on the table. Engaging Tehran, accepting some of its red lines, offering economic normalization, and mitigating rather than dismantling its influence become the rational alternative, and possibly the only one short of an open confrontation in which the GCC has considerably more to lose than a battered Iran. In this context, the regional pressure on Beirut to accommodate rather than confront Iran’s interests, including its stake in Hezbollah’s survival as a political and military force, will only intensify. Every concession the GCC makes to Iran in exchange for regional stability is a concession that narrows Lebanon’s own room for manoeuvre. The assumption that Iran was sufficiently weakened to allow a decisive push for Hezbollah’s disarmament has been overtaken by events. In such a context, Riyadh may seek to offer a “Lebanese package” as part of its broader diplomatic engagement with Tehran. A Lebanon in the flames of a civil war would make that package impossible to deliver while putting Saudi de-escalation efforts at direct risk. The Syrian dimension adds further urgency. Having invested substantially in the post-Assad transition, Saudi Arabia cannot afford instability crossing eastward from Lebanon, which becomes very likely in the event of sectarian violence triggered by a push to normalize relations with Israel. Israel has made its position unambiguous. It will neither withdraw, nor relinquish its ability to strike inside Lebanon until Hezbollah disarms. Under these rigid requirements, Hezbollah has condemned the talks as a humiliation and declared it will not abide by any agreement reached without a full withdrawal of Israeli forces and a facilitated, generously funded return of displaced families to all locations in Southern Lebanon affected by current Israeli operations. The structural deadlock this creates is not entirely new. Before October 7, 2023, Lebanese politics rested on a regional balance of power defined by the GCC's reluctance to avoid direct confrontation, which allowed Iran to maintain its influence and left Lebanon with little choice but to accommodate an armed Hezbollah as a permanent feature of its political landscape. The question now is whether a meaningful deal can be constructed that honestly accommodates this reality. The Israeli security strip inside Lebanese territory along the border, the Lebanese army’s role south of the Litani, and the rules of engagement for UNIFIL, are all real and unresolved complicating factors ahead of any deal. The Saudi Egyptian advice to President Aoun is to secure the minimum level of domestic buy-in needed to prevent an internal rupture by downgrading the previously expected peace treaty to a deal, limited in scope, that Hezbollah and its constituencies would not perceive as an existential threat. Without such a consensus, any agreement risks being either unimplementable or a catalyst for civil conflict. Deals that tick the box of national consensus would be more of enhanced versions of previous deals (UNSCR 1701 or the 1949 armistice), possibly entailing a clearer and enforceable mandate for UNIFIL, a staged re-deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani tied to measurable milestones, and a phased mechanism for Israeli withdrawal linked to those same milestones. The key question, though, is whether Israel is willing, after all that has happened since October 2023, to return to the status quo ante. A full peace treaty with Israel and the disarmament of Hezbollah are unattainable under the present circumstances. What remains possible is most likely a security arrangement that reduces the risk of renewed war, gives the Lebanese army a genuine role in the south, and creates conditions for the Lebanese state to progressively reassert institutional authority in areas where it has long been absent. Full sovereignty is not a destination that today’s deal can reach, but it is one that a well-constructed arrangement can keep within sight.

It is now no secret to anyone. Deep differences pit senior Iranian officials against each other regarding the direction that (potential) negotiations with the United States should take. This divide, which is increasingly bursting out into the open, has practically frozen, or even called into question, what some call "the diplomatic option" in the search for a way out of the current conflict. These differences tearing apart the two antagonistic currents within the Iranian regime – the Revolutionary Guards against the so-called "moderate" faction – have practically rendered obsolete the visit that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had begun at the end of the week in Islamabad. Right from the start, this visit by the head of Iranian diplomacy was torpedoed by the president of the national security commission in the Iranian Parliament, who declared that "Araghchi is not entrusted with any mission in Pakistan concerning the nuclear negotiations." He also stressed that "the nuclear negotiations constitute one of the red lines for Iran." His role having been marginalized from the outset, starting from Tehran, Mr. Araghchi contented himself with meeting Pakistani leaders, to whom he handed a document defining Iran's position in the current conflict. The document emphasizes "Iran's deep reservations regarding American demands," highlighting that the Islamic Republic demands "an end to the naval blockade and American attacks." According to some sources, the Iranian minister clarified to his Pakistani interlocutors that he was unable to modify the document in question "because it is a nightmare to reach the Supreme Leader"… A direct consequence of the "call to order" from Tehran: a meeting between Mr. Araghchi and American negotiators, as part of the 2nd round of talks with the United States (expected for several days), was no longer on the agenda. The Iranian minister therefore left Islamabad late Saturday for Oman. President Donald Trump immediately canceled the departure of his two negotiators for Islamabad, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, emphasizing that he could not ask them to make an 18-hour trip "to sit at a table and discuss nothing." He added: "Our negotiating team has wasted a lot of time traveling unnecessarily (…). No one knows who is in charge in Iran. Even they don't know (…). We make an 18-hour trip to talk with people when we don't know who they represent in Iran"… High tension in Fanar and the Sunni neighborhoods of Beirut On the Lebanese front, three major developments marked the day of Saturday, April 25. In southern Lebanon, the Israeli army carried out a targeted airstrike hitting a vehicle carrying three Hezbollah militiamen who were killed instantly. A second strike targeted a motorcycle ridden by a member of the pro-Iranian party, who was also killed instantly. Two other supporters of the Shiite group were additionally eliminated in the Litani region. In the evening, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was set to order the IDF to "forcefully bomb Hezbollah positions in Lebanon"… Other major developments this Saturday, April 25: in the Sunni neighborhood of Sakyet el-Janzir in Beirut, and in the capital's suburb of Fanar, two serious incidents sparked high tension at the grassroots level. In Fanar, in the (Shiite) neighborhood known as "el-Zeaiterieh," two young Hezbollah supporters beat up a municipal agent. The parish priest of Fanar, Father Rabih, immediately intervened to contain the incident, but he was in turn assaulted and insulted by the two young supporters. The priest then took refuge in the Saint Joseph Church of Fanar. He was, however, pursued by the attackers, who stormed into the church uttering death threats against him and attacking the worshippers present. The incident caused high tension in Fanar, where residents gathered in front of the church in a display of anger. In the evening, Metn MP Ibrahim Kenaan indicated that following contacts made with Army Intelligence and the Internal Security Forces, the two attackers were apprehended and handed over to ISF Intelligence. MP Elias Hankache confirmed on his end that the two attackers had been incarcerated. In Beirut, elements of the State Security Service made an untimely intrusion, engaging in heavy automatic weapons fire (which nearly killed a young girl), into the Sunni neighborhood of Sakyet el-Janzir to apprehend a notable figure, Abou Ali Itani (a supporter of the Future Movement), who owns electricity generators and is accused of increasing electricity rates without legal authorization. The untimely intervention by State Security agents and the heavy automatic weapons fire provoked an angry reaction among the neighborhood's residents, who accused the security agents of "blatant bias," asserting that the officer in charge of the unit that intervened in the neighborhood is close to Hezbollah and wanted to target Abou Ali Itani because of his openly hostile positions towards the pro-Iranian party. The tension in Sakyet el-Janzir quickly spread throughout the capital's Sunni neighborhoods, where roads were blocked in Kaskas, Mazraa, Aisha Bakkar, Karakol Drouz, el-Mounla, Verdun, and Hamra. The behavior of the State Security agents was stigmatized by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and the Mufti of the Republic. Late in the afternoon, a delegation of mukhtars and residents visited the Minister of Interior to demand that measures be taken against the culprits. In fact, the government commissioner to the military tribunal, Judge Claude Ghanem, questioned five State Security agents suspected of being involved in the incident. Finally, it should be noted that the former leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Joumblatt, was received yesterday by Syrian President Ahmed Chareh.

Anyone examining Hezbollah's logo and the image it represents will note that, since its creation, this party has been an armed wing of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is no longer a simple symbolic representation, but a reality supported by facts: Hezbollah has supported Iran because it is its armed wing, and Iran has often boasted of controlling four Arab capitals, including Beirut. The organic link between the 'head' and the 'armed wing' was confirmed by the ceasefires in Iran and Lebanon. The two agreements were inextricably linked; when an agreement wavered in Tehran, the other wavered in Beirut. So much so that some research and study centers claim that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), just as it controls the decision-making centers in Iran, also controls those of Hezbollah in Beirut. There are at least two pieces of evidence supporting this: First, the assassination of a Revolutionary Guards commander who was alongside Hassan Nasrallah in the same room. Second, the former Iranian ambassador to Beirut was the target of a pager attack, as he was using a device distributed to military and security officials of the party and the Revolutionary Guards. The flag or emblem, as it appears in the image, represents an arm holding a rifle, with the inscription 'Hezbollah is victorious' above it. The Hezbollah flag thus appears as: an Iranian arm holding a rifle. Describing Hezbollah as an 'Iranian arm' is no longer a simple political slogan chanted by its opponents. Over time, this assertion has turned into an interpretation supported by a series of historical and on-the-ground facts that reveal the deep and organic link between the party and the Revolutionary Guards. The relationship between the two is not based on a fleeting alliance or a passing convergence of interests, but rather on direct collaboration, continuous funding, and strategic support clearly manifest in times of both war and peace. The former Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, was not bluffing when he stated: 'Our weapons and our money come from Iran,' going so far as to declare: 'I am proud to be a soldier in the army of Wilayat al-Faqih.' Since its creation in late 1982, Hezbollah has never been a Lebanese project, but rather a concrete extension of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Revolutionary Guard Corps supervised the training of its first fighters in Baalbek and established its ideological framework on the basis of 'Wilayat al-Faqih'. The party therefore answers solely to the Iranian Supreme Leader. This point alone is enough to discredit any notion of independence, because an organization that derives its ideological legitimacy from an external leadership cannot be considered a fully sovereign Lebanese actor. Moving from theory to practice, the picture becomes clearer. During the July 2006 war, the confrontation was not a simple local operation, but part of a complex regional context. This operation was part of the Iranian deterrence strategy against Israel and the United States. The abduction of the two Israeli soldiers was carried out at Iran's request, as later leaked documents revealed. The military and logistical support provided to Hezbollah during this conflict was a crucial element in its ability to resist, reinforcing the hypothesis that the military decision was part of broader Iranian calculations. This same pattern was repeated in the subsequent phases. Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian war was not motivated by internal Lebanese concerns, but was a direct response to the desire to protect Iran's influence in Damascus, its most important ally within the 'axis of resistance'. In this case, Hezbollah was no longer a mere beneficiary of support, but a field instrument at the service of implementing regional policies led by Tehran, thereby consolidating its status as a military force projected abroad. In recent years, these indicators have become even more marked. The events following October 8, 2023, and what has been described as a 'war of support and harassment', revealed a series of coordinated operations that go beyond the purely Lebanese framework. Furthermore, the repeated rocket fire, including the six on March 2, testify to an involvement in a broader regional conflict, where the fronts, from Gaza to Lebanon via Yemen, converge within a single strategic framework steered by Iran. Some might argue that Hezbollah retains a certain decision-making autonomy and takes into account the Lebanese context and its sectarian and political complexities. However, this argument clashes with the reality of funding, armament, and training, with the party relying almost entirely on Iran for these essential aspects. In political science, whoever holds the instruments of power has the greatest ability to influence decision-making. Therefore, speaking of independence is more a matter of theory than practice. Even the visual symbolism of the party conveys connotations that go beyond the local framework. Its iconic logo, depicting a hand brandishing a rifle and the slogan 'Hezbollah is victorious', is not just a simple propaganda tool, but a reflection of the culture of the Islamic Revolution, which glorifies 'armed resistance' as an ideological instrument. While the interpretation of the hand as the 'arm of the Revolutionary Guards' remains symbolic, it falls within the structural relationship uniting the two entities, with the symbol becoming the visual expression of an existing political and military function. More importantly, the regional behavior of the party is almost entirely consistent with Iran's strategic priorities. It fights where Iran fights, de-escalates tensions when Iran de-escalates tensions, and intensifies them when deterrence is necessary. This synchronization cannot be explained by chance or a mere convergence of interests; rather, it indicates deep coordination, or even direct leadership in certain cases. Ultimately, calling Hezbollah an 'Iranian armed wing' does not mean it is a mere instrument without a will of its own, but rather that its will is constrained by a strategic framework defined by Tehran. The facts, from its foundation to its funding and military actions, clearly indicate that Hezbollah operates within an Iran-led system and constitutes one of its main proxies in the region. Consequently, the debate is no longer about the existence of a link between Hezbollah and Iran, but rather about the extent and limits of this link. What remains certain, however, is that this connection is so deep that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to separate the Lebanese and Iranian decision-making processes regarding Hezbollah during major conflicts.

The 2025 United States National Security Strategy (NSS) is centered on the "America First" principle and demands greater strategic autonomy from its European allies, whom President Donald Trump is pressing to take charge of their own defense on their continent. Washington would thus have its hands free to focus first on its domestic situation and on the American continent, infiltrated by China and Russia, and then on the Pacific Basin. To this end, it needs to reduce its involvement in the Middle East and keep it sustainably stable. For this purpose, the definitive neutralization of the threat from Iran and Hezbollah is essential. A weakened Iran would pave the way for an unprecedented expansion of the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. The Abraham Accords Initiated during President Trump's first term, the Abraham Accords mark a break from the traditional "Land for Peace" diplomacy (or "a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza for Peace"), in favor of a "Peace through Prosperity" approach, which means: prosperity instead of a State for the Palestinians. At the current stage, the Abraham Accords encompass Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and Kazakhstan. They aim to seal an Arab-Islamic-Israeli security bloc, or a "regional NATO", including Israel and the Arab countries, capable of self-regulating the Middle East and autonomously containing Iran. This would allow the United States to reduce its ground forces, save billions, while maintaining a moderating role in the region, to retreat to its "America First" priority, and to pivot toward Asia to counter China without leaving a security vacuum that Tehran or Moscow could fill. Still within the framework of this strategy, Turkey is an indispensable partner for Washington, serving as a vital counterweight against Iran and Russia, despite Ankara's ideological dimension and persistent tensions over the Kurdish issue. The blockade against Iran: a strategy of strangulation but with flaws Iran is in a situation of critical economic survival facing the American naval blockade established on April 13, 2026. This blockade does not stop at the Strait of Hormuz but extends to the Gulf of Oman, and prohibits oil tankers and other ships from anchoring at the ports of Jask and Chabahar, located outside the Persian Gulf. In principle, this paralyzes almost all of Iran's maritime imports and exports, especially oil. Faced with this naval blockade, Tehran can technically hold out for a few months thanks to revenues secured by the surge in oil barrel prices between February and mid-April 2026, which partially offset the drop in exported volumes. Iran's daily losses amount to approximately 435 million dollars. Tehran had anticipated this scenario by developing infrastructure to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, but their capacity remains largely insufficient. This involves the Caspian Sea, which offers a route to Russia and Kazakhstan, but supplies through this route remain marginal compared to national needs. Then there are the railways and roads connecting Iran to Turkey, Iraq, and Turkmenistan to import consumer goods and export non-oil products. These alternative routes absolutely cannot compensate for the Persian Gulf, through which 90% of Iranian oil transited before the crisis. Another strategy pursued by Tehran to break the blockade and bypass international sanctions is the "ghost fleet" (or dark fleet), which is the pillar of the regime's economic survival and the financing of its regional allies, notably Hezbollah. This is a vast clandestine network of 320 oil tankers on which Iran depends to export its crude. To escape international and American surveillance, the tankers of this dark fleet deploy sophisticated camouflage tactics by disabling their signaling systems to become "invisible" or by resorting to the falsification of their GPS geographic coordinates. The oil is then transferred on the high seas, via transshipment, to other tankers aimed at masking the Iranian origin of the cargo. This system is reinforced by the recurrent use of flags of convenience (Panama, Liberia, Cook Islands) and shell companies based in Dubai or Hong Kong, allowing for frequent changes of identity and ownership. Despite the draconian American naval blockade, this fleet demonstrates persistent efficiency. According to Lloyd's, 29 to 35 tankers from the dark fleet have reportedly already managed to bypass the American naval deployment to deliver their crude to China. This shadow logistics thus allows Tehran to maintain vital emergency revenues, defying the total economic asphyxiation aimed for by the American administration. However, the US Navy has already seized six ships from this ghost fleet and turned away 29 other regular tankers that tried to bypass the blockade. Be that as it may, without a lifting of the blockade or a massive diplomatic intervention, the economic asphyxiation of Iran could become irreversible by the summer of 2026. Iran is therefore strangled but shows no apparent sign of weakening. However, the eyes of both Washington and Tehran are discreetly turned toward China. The role of China: a solution looms on the horizon Today, China stands out as Iran's main client and sole economic shield. At the same time, Beijing needs the United States market, the largest in the world, to balance its economy. Washington also needs China to provide American citizens with economic goods at affordable prices. This gives China the capacity to act as a pragmatic mediator in the current crisis. Sino-Iranian ties are a true lifeline for the Islamic Republic, and Sino-American ties are leaning toward appeasement. In 2025, China absorbed nearly 90% of Iranian oil exports via the ghost fleet, but this is only a fraction of Chinese imports. Furthermore, fearing the disruption of its global energy supplies and its exports, China has hinted that it promises to materialize the 400 billion dollars of investments in Iran initially planned in 2021, in exchange for flexibility on the part of the Iranians. President Trump has moreover credited Beijing with having facilitated the April 2026 ceasefire. Additionally, China avoids any direct military support to Tehran and has eased tensions around Taiwan. The US administration stays the course on the NSS For its part, Washington uses commercial interdependence with China as a silent pressure weapon, continuing to impose sanctions prohibiting China's access to American technologies and equipment, and limiting vital Chinese exports to the United States. Already in 2025, these exports had decreased by 37 billion dollars compared to 2024. Last October, in Seoul, Trump and Xi Jinping met and reduced sanctions on both sides. They were supposed to meet again in April 2026 to continue the detente in their trade war, but this summit was postponed following the Iran war. The lifting of American sanctions imposed on China is a strategic need for Xi Jinping, who finds himself forced to play the role of moderator and put pressure on Iran. From a geopolitical perspective, by thus stabilizing the Middle East through joint Sino-American pressure, America secures a balanced relationship with its Asian rival, as stipulated in the 2025 NSS.

The victory of Peter Magyar and his party “Tisza” marks a historic turning point in the Hungarian political landscape, ending sixteen years of Viktor Orbán's rule and his Fidesz party. The elections were described as the most important in decades, not only because of the record popular turnout, but also because their outcome granted the opposition a two-thirds majority in parliament, enabling it to amend the constitution and roll back the illiberal policies Orbán had entrenched during his years in power. The new president Magyar pledged to restore press freedom and reform state media, in a move aimed at dismantling the system of information control on which the previous regime had relied. The great surprise was Orbán's acknowledgment of defeat immediately after the results, without attempting to cling to power by force, which spared the country a political crisis or violent protests. Causes of Defeat The defeat was not born of a single electoral moment, but was rather the product of accumulated economic, social, and political pressures that had gradually eroded Orbán's legitimacy. Moreover, Magyar's organised campaign — he had previously been an ally of Orbán — succeeded in uniting the opposition behind a single figure capable of genuinely competing with Fidesz. Orbán's reliance on negative propaganda and fear-mongering had also ceased to convince voters and instead turned against him, as his messaging lost credibility in the face of a deteriorating economic reality. 1. Orbán's Rise and the Construction of the Economic Model Since the crisis of 2008, Viktor Orbán built his popularity on a promise of economic prosperity and a "work-based society," with a focus on job creation and making citizens more self-reliant. This model rested on low-wage foreign investment, attracting foreign companies to employ local labour at reduced salaries with the aim of lowering production costs and increasing the country's competitiveness on global markets. While this model does generate employment, it leaves the national economy fragile before global crises and limits the capacity to improve living standards. 2. Economic Stagnation and the Decline of the Model Orbán's successes in raising employment slowed markedly after the Covid pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, exposing the fragility of the economic model on which his years of rule had depended. Hungary, which had prided itself on high employment rates in the previous decade, found itself from 2022 onwards facing a harsh economic reality: near-zero growth and the highest inflation in the European Union, directly affecting citizens' daily lives through rising prices and a decline in purchasing power. Yet the crisis was not merely economic; it deepened into a profound social and political crisis. Citizens felt that Orbán's promises of building a "work-based society" were no longer achievable in the face of global crises and market pressures. 3. Erosion of Popular Support and Ethical Crises Despite the high voter turnout, Fidesz's electoral base shrank from 3.1 to 2.3 million voters, a clear indicator of the erosion of public trust in Orbán and his party. This decline was not simply a natural consequence of economic factors; it was compounded by ethical and political crises that damaged the party's image, most notably scandals involving the cover-up of child sexual abuse cases, which undermined the party's legitimacy and its capacity to present itself as the guardian of traditional values. Frustration grew over pervasive corruption and the glaring social inequality highlighted by images of the lavish palaces owned by the ruling elite, in contrast with the hardships endured by the middle and working classes, widening the gulf of trust between the people and the government. All of this contributed to the rise of his rival Peter Magyar, who was able to capitalise on the general loss of confidence and present himself as a more upright and competent alternative. 4. Cultural Discourse and External Admiration In the face of internal decline, Orbán attempted to compensate through nationalist and cultural discourse by means of what are known as the "culture wars," directing attention towards questions of identity and the defence of the nation against "globalism." He portrayed the European Union, international financial institutions, and liberal organisations as "globalist" forces threatening Hungary's identity and culture, focusing on border protection, rejection of European migration policies, and the assertion of "traditional values" against what he regarded as a deconstruction of family and society. Yet despite his anti-globalisation rhetoric, his economic model depended on foreign investment — German car manufacturers, Chinese battery factories — making him vulnerable to global fluctuations. That is to say, while presenting himself as a leader resisting the "liberal globalisation" imposed by Brussels and the West, he had in practice bound the Hungarian economy to globalisation. In foreign policy, Orbán leaned closer to Russia, opposing European Union policies toward Ukraine, and became a symbol of alliances hostile to Western globalisation. He also received direct support from Trump, who saw in him a model for populist nationalism opposed to liberal globalisation. He consequently became an icon of the global populist right, a star of conservative conferences around the world — such as the Conservative Political Action Conference, where he presented himself as a "David" resisting a "Goliath of globalisation." This American annual conference, attended by Donald Trump as its headline figure, became a platform for the global export of conservative populist discourse, particularly after a version of it was hosted in Hungary, being cited across Europe and Latin America as a source of inspiration for the nationalist right. Yet this right-wing populist identitarian cultural discourse, which had previously been an effective instrument for mobilising support, was no longer sufficient in the face of economic deterioration and degraded public services. Voters had become more preoccupied with rising prices and declining living standards than with nationalist slogans. Meanwhile, nationalist leaders across Europe and the United States continued to extol Orbán as a symbol of resistance to globalisation, regarding his experiment as a model for confronting "global threats." But this external admiration remained detached from Hungary's internal reality, changing nothing in the daily suffering of its citizens or in the decline of their trust in the system. 5. International Repercussions These results represent a blow to the nationalist and divisive discourse of which Orbán had been the standard-bearer, and reveal the limits of this model's effectiveness, particularly in Europe. Russia is among the biggest losers, having lost its most powerful voice within the European Union in what concerned the obstruction of aid to Ukraine. The United States under the Trump administration has lost a prominent ally in Europe, despite its attempts to support Orbán before the elections. China, as usual, watches with caution, having invested heavily in Hungary's electric vehicle sector; its interests may be affected should Magyar recalibrate his orientation to strengthen ties with the European Union. Perhaps the biggest loser is the global populist right, particularly its allies in France: Marine Le Pen and her Rassemblement National, and Éric Zemmour with his Reconquête party. Among the other major losers are the Law and Justice party (PiS) in Poland, Nigel Farage and the Reform Party in the United Kingdom, former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, and former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. But the greatest winners are, first and foremost, the Hungarian people, who expressed their rejection of corruption and authoritarianism, alongside the European Union, which has recovered a partner more aligned with its orientations, and Ukraine, which may now find it easier to secure support within the Union following the retreat of pro-Russian influence. The recent Hungarian elections were not merely an internal change of power, but a global message against right-wing populism and corruption, and a blow to Russian and American attempts to influence Europe. Orbán's experiment reveals the limits of "pro-worker conservatism": it succeeds when it delivers tangible economic promises, but collapses when tested by global crises. The elections also demonstrated the limits of "informational authoritarianism": when the economy deteriorates and the opposition unites behind a strong alternative, instruments of disinformation and propaganda become less effective and lose their capacity to determine outcomes. Orbán's fall was not solely the result of his authoritarianism or cultural discourse, but of the failure of his economic model and the erosion of ethical trust in his party. The experience reveals that regimes dependent on the control of information are not impregnable, and that they collapse when they lose credibility before economic and political crises. Magyar's success, for its part, reflects the inclination of voters toward a more capable, moderate centrist alternative, gathering both centre and liberal left, even though he is conservative and shares some of Fidesz's policies. Magyar therefore does not represent a radical shift in public policy so much as a declaration that Orbán's era has exhausted its momentum. The challenge before Magyar remains that of achieving genuine reforms capable of rebuilding public trust, without losing the support of voters who were originally part of Fidesz's base.