Lebanon-Israel Maritime Deal Put to the Test by Regional War

Israeli statements hinting at a possible challenge to the maritime border agreement with Lebanon have revived questions about the durability of a compromise that, since its signing in 2022, has been portrayed as a stabilizing mechanism between Beirut and Tel Aviv.

Despite the devastating war into which Hezbollah drew Lebanon, the agreement has held firm. Yet as the regional landscape undergoes profound change – particularly amid the energy crisis triggered by the Iran-U.S. standoff over the Strait of Hormuz – questions about its long-term survival are resurfacing.

For Laury Haytayan, a Middle East hydrocarbons governance expert and MENA director at the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), “Israeli threats amount more to political pressure than to a genuine strategy aimed at dismantling the agreement.” She considers it “unlikely that the maritime agreement will be revoked,” even as Lebanon is currently engaged in direct peace negotiations with Israel and similar initiatives are expected between Arab states and Israel under the Abraham Accords framework, with the same American backing. Such a move would, moreover, be “incoherent” with the opening of direct negotiations, particularly given Washington’s pivotal role in securing the 2022 agreement, the product of two years of mediation.

Haytayan notes that “negotiations began in 2020 under the Trump administration and continued during the presidency of Democrat Joe Biden, who appointed Amos Hochstein as mediator.” Hochstein led an intensive mediation effort that culminated in an agreement reached in October 2022 under the government of Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid. Benjamin Netanyahu, then in opposition, had vowed to overturn the agreement should he return to power. Re-elected just weeks later, in October-November 2022, he ultimately chose to preserve the agreement.

Diverging Interpretations

The agreement nevertheless continues to be subject to differing interpretations regarding its legal and political balance, both in Lebanon and in Israel.

Laury Haytayan points out that “Lebanon had strong legal arguments to claim a larger maritime zone, based on international law and United Nations mechanisms, under which Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is defined by Line 29.”

This line, backed by several experts and notably by Lebanese military negotiators in talks with Israel, extended Lebanon’s claimed EEZ further out to sea. It runs from Ras Naqoura and would grant Lebanon an additional 1,430 square kilometers – a demarcation documented in 2011 in a report by the UK Hydrographic Office, based on detailed legal reasoning.

However, this claim was never formally submitted by the Lebanese state to the United Nations. When political authorities – represented chiefly by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who led the negotiations in the absence of a president and a functioning government – took over the talks from the military, Lebanon ultimately adopted Line 23 as its maritime border. This line, which also starts from Ras Naqoura, resulted in the loss of 860 square kilometers for Lebanon, as well as the Karish gas field. It was this line that Lebanon registered with the UN and used as the basis for the 2022 agreement.

Haytayan recalls that “Lebanese negotiators at the time considered it the best possible compromise.” An explanation that remains disputed to this day.

On the other side, Israeli also considered that it had made significant concessions. Two differing narratives therefore continue to coexist, with no convergence on how to interpret the ultimate balance of the agreement.

A Potential Peace Dynamic

In the event of a peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel, Haytayan favors a logic of continuity rather than a revision of the existing framework.

According to her, any future peace deal between Beirut and Tel Aviv “would not necessarily alter the maritime agreement already in place,” which could instead serve as a foundation for future energy cooperation.

The fact that the agreement has held for several years conveys a sense of stability, even if a fragile one. “If Israel were to challenge it, Lebanon could reactivate certain legal claims, particularly around Line 29, invoking international law and the UN,” she argues.

Haytayan points to the possibility of projects involving international companies already active in the region, citing in particular the Italian energy group Eni. “Eni has a plan to develop gas exploitation projects in Cyprus through infrastructure located in Egypt in order to reduce costs,” she explains.

Such regional models could, over time, inspire future energy cooperation depending on the nature of political agreements.

However, Haytayan stresses that “internal dynamics in Lebanon remain fragmented, and trajectories will depend as much on sovereign choices as on international pressures.”

She notes that “the expected economic benefits for Lebanon have not yet materialized, largely due to the effects of the 2023 war,” and that energy issues remain tied to development objectives.

In this context, Haytayan emphasizes the need for Lebanon to “define a clear strategy for developing its oil and gas resources, particularly in the south of the country,” in a framework that extends beyond energy extraction to encompass stabilization and regional development.

Security, Economic, and Institutional Logics

The priorities of the various actors involved in the dossier diverge sharply. According to Haytayan, “the United States prioritizes the economic dimension, Israel focuses on security, while Lebanon must attempt to reconcile both.”

She also stresses that “(peace) negotiations must be conducted strictly by the Lebanese state within a clear institutional framework.” In her view, Hezbollah must not be indirectly involved in the talks, as was the case during the negotiations that led to the 2022 agreement, “given the concessions it made over Karish.” Part of that gas field falls within the 1,430 square kilometers delimited by Line 29, which military experts had claimed before the political leadership relinquished the claim.

An Energy Sector Still Taking Shape

Lebanon today hosts several international companies operating under offshore exploration contracts, among them TotalEnergies, QatarEnergy, and Eni. Results have so far been limited, with no major breakthrough yet in commercially viable discoveries, particularly in Block 9 of the Qana field north of Line 23.

Haytayan notes that “these international players are embedded in global strategies in which Lebanon does not always represent an immediate priority.”

Against this backdrop, diversifying energy partnerships emerges as a central challenge for Lebanon. Haytayan underscores that “the main issue remains attracting American companies,” an objective that the ongoing direct negotiations between Tel Aviv and Beirut could help advance.

The Strait of Hormuz

Regional tensions involving Iran and the Strait of Hormuz add a further geostrategic dimension to the region’s energy dynamics.

That maritime passage remains essential for the gas exports of several countries in the region, particularly in the Gulf, and any disruption could prompt a search for alternative routes.

In this context, “some actors, including QatarEnergy – already present in Lebanon – may be prompted to adjust their investment strategies,” Haytayan notes.

She insists on “the need for institutional coordination in Lebanon, particularly between the ministries of Energy and the Economy and the presidency, in order to build a coherent energy vision.”

According to her, “the national strategy must be clarified so the country can position itself within regional dynamics.”

Haytayan adds that “the discourse must be primarily economic,” especially when addressing international investors – particularly American ones – in a context where institutional credibility and strategic visibility remain decisive factors in attracting investment into Lebanon’s energy sector.