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There are certain keywords whose mere utterance is enough to put your interlocutor from the camp of the Momana’a on alert: the moment one pronounces “Palestine,” “resistance,” “America,” or “Israel,” something triggers within him, a kind of mental switch, and he stiffens to the point where any calm, objective discussion becomes impossible. The problem in Lebanon today is no longer that of divergent opinions, but rather the absence of the thinking process itself. Ready-made positions are summoned instantly, discourses repeated unchanged, choices maintained in spite of everything that shifts around them. As though we never questioned ourselves, never re-evaluated anything, never asked: are we still genuinely thinking about what we are doing, or are we merely repeating what we have grown accustomed to, simply because it has become part of our identity? This is precisely where the danger begins, when repetition substitutes itself for thought. What occurs in the mind of the Momana’a partisan is closer to a programmed psychological defence mechanism than to a mere political opinion. When one pronounces any of the following words — “Palestine,” “resistance,” “America,” “Israel” — something happens within him that resembles the activation of a preset programme, in the manner of prêt-à-porter, and this operates on several levels. First: the exclusivity of identity and its reduction. The cause — Palestine — has ceased to be a political question open to debate, where one might weigh which position would serve it best; it has become a component of personal identity. Any debate on the subject is therefore received as an attack on the self, rather than as political analysis. Second: the conditioned response. Modelled on what psychology designates by the term stimulus, at the mention of the word “Israel,” the immediate response is “absolute enemy,” one that would have attacked us before we attacked it — without analysis, without examination of possibilities, without reflection on the best way to confront it, or on the results of that confrontation to date. Third: cognitive dissonance. When facts contradict conviction — for instance, the effects of the axis’s policies on Lebanon — an inner tension takes hold, an ambivalence, whose resolution is the adoption of the most convenient solution: denying reality by reinterpreting it, or attacking directly the one who articulates it. Fourth: collective closure and conformity. Alignment with the group prevails: within an environment such as that of Hezbollah, opinion is not individual but collective, and any deviation from the line is treated as betrayal. Critical thinking becomes a threat to cohesion. What sometimes appears to us as rigidity or refusal to engage in debate cannot therefore be reduced to a merely hardline political stance; it is the result of a coherent discursive and psychological structure, built with care, repeated and reformulated with insistence, until it transforms into an automatic reflex of thought. This structure departs from a decisive point, that of the prior definition of reality. All fundamental terms — “the enemy,” “the resistance” — are not put forward as subjects for debate, but as definitive truths. Within this framework, America and Israel are presented as an absolute enemy, and “the resistance” is accorded absolute legitimacy. The debate no longer concerns choices, but operates within boundaries drawn in advance that may not be crossed. Once this framework is installed comes the second stage: loading language with affect. Words such as “sacrifices,” “steadfastness,” “dignity,” and “aggression” are employed not to describe reality, but to provoke an intense emotional response. When emotion takes the lead, analysis retreats, and objection becomes less a difference of opinion than a form of moral betrayal. Upon these foundations is built a “closed binary” that tolerates no gradation: one is either with the resistance or with the enemy. The grey zone disappears, the natural complexity of any political reality is effaced, and there is no longer any space to think about compromises, provisional arrangements, or even a national interest independent of this sharp divide. For the circle to close, every alternative is discredited in advance. Any differing proposal is immediately labelled a “deviation,” a “conspiracy,” or a “betrayal of history and of the sacrifices.” The idea is not discussed on its own terms, but pre-emptively distorted, so that the mere act of reflecting upon it already carries a moral risk. In parallel, the notion of “community” is invoked as the supreme reference. One speaks in the name of “the people,” of “national constants,” of “the honourable” — as in the discourse of Hezbollah — implying that whoever dissents is not merely diverging in opinion, but placing himself outside the community itself. This is where fear enters: the fear of exclusion, of the accusation of treason, or of the loss of belonging. But what is most dangerous in this structure is the articulation of the inside and the outside. When internal dissent is presented as a graver danger than the external threat — as emerges from the declarations of certain Hezbollah MPs — the internal opponent is transformed into an existential threat, rather than a partner in debate. At this point, internal escalation is pre-emptively justified. At the end of this trajectory, a single choice is presented as the only solution: no alternative to “the resistance” in its current form, whatever the circumstances, the balance of power, or the contradictions with the country’s interests. The circle closes entirely. As this structure repeats itself over time, it comes to resemble a “button” pressed in the mind: a single word is enough to trigger a complete chain of prefabricated judgements. Thought is no longer necessary, because the conclusion is known in advance. The debate then ceases to be a confrontation of ideas and becomes a collision of identities. And it is precisely at this level that the mind stops functioning, not because it is incapable of doing so, but because it was never trained to step outside this closed framework.

The conflicting statements and abrupt reversals by President Donald Trump are set to reshape relations with Europe, NATO and America’s allies. They are also likely to trigger reactions from countries in the Pacific and the Middle East that once viewed U.S. protection as credible. The West is playing for moderation and seeking a role in securing the Strait of Hormuz once hostilities end. Will the United States find itself sidelined in the region in favor of another, unlikely protector? And will Lebanon’s settlement be brokered by France – with or without Europe? Following the U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran on February 28, 2026 – an operation about which neither Western and European leaders nor governments, nor NATO officials, had been informed – President Donald Trump called on them to back him by helping safeguard security in the Strait of Hormuz and by providing direct support for U.S. operations. Most heads of state and governments declined. Trump’s response was unequivocal, if deeply inconsistent. After denouncing the refusal as a “gross mistake” and branding European countries as cowards, he insisted that the United States did not need them and would act alone as “the strongest nation in the world.” Escalating his rhetoric further, he declared that NATO without the United States would be nothing more than a “paper tiger.” He even raised the prospect of disengaging from the alliance, implicitly threatening to free Washington from its obligations under Article 5 of the NATO treaty. To remove any ambiguity from his remarks, Trump argued that America’s allies failed to stand by the United States in times of crisis while continuing to benefit from what he described as a one-sided alliance. Why, he asked, should Washington automatically guarantee their defense? He then set out his threats – a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in Europe – and his demands for support (participation in the naval blockade against Iran). After publicly rejecting the proposal, several countries barred American aircraft involved in military operations against Iran from using their airspace. Lack of coherence In his statements, President Trump lacks coherence. A call for support – even for active participation – is followed by a dismissive show of indifference, as the United States, “the strongest country in the world,” is capable of winning this war alone. The notion of war thus emerges, a case in which, the U.S. president argues, NATO members are bound to fulfil their obligations under the founding treaty. Yet it was he who triggered this war – encouraged by Israel, a co-belligerent. He is therefore the aggressor. The transatlantic organization has a “defensive” function. In this specific case, Article 5 does not apply. When it has intervened, it has done so only under a United Nations mandate. Suddenly, the President of the United States judges that NATO has no role to play in acting and seeks to keep it out of this conflict, while at the same time exerting renewed pressure on allies and declaring that he will act alone because he can. In reality, he seeks the participatory support of his allies without that support being provided under the NATO framework. As a result, everywhere the United States plays a protective role, doubts arise over the reliability of its declared and formalized security guarantees. NATO members and Europeans are not the only ones questioning them. Pacific countries – Japan, Australia and South Korea in particular – can now only doubt the promised support in the event of Chinese intervention. To these countries are added Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. When a head of state – primus inter pares within NATO – triggers a conflict that could escalate into a world war, he cannot expect the members of the organization to follow him, support him, and take part in military operations blindly. Nor can he, after having treated them in an offensive, vulgar and hurtful manner – he is addressing elected officials, and therefore the peoples they represent – then declare in a contemptuous tone that he can act alone and does not need them. In any case, it must be emphasized that NATO members, even if they do not speak with a single voice and even if there have been some disagreements, are broadly aligned – not in a fully unified position, but on a similar wavelength – and are joined by Pacific countries. The project of ensuring security in the Strait of Hormuz after the cessation of hostilities brings many of them together. The entire world, including the Near and Middle East – and therefore Lebanon – can take note of the restraint shown by Russia and China. It would be naïve to think they are not acting behind the scenes in line with their own interests. But their position, similar to that of Europeans and U.S. allies, in refraining from participating in military operations, reduces the risk of a slide into a confrontation of truly global scale. We can only endorse the general position adopted by European governments, NATO member states, and the main concerned Pacific countries, while nevertheless noting their principled commitment to ensuring security in the Strait of Hormuz – a commitment that it would be desirable to extend to the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and then to the entire Red Sea. If that were the case, we could only welcome their wisdom. Would it be illusory, or even utopian, to think that such a common stance might be taken into account by the Iranians during peace negotiations? One might think that, in Lebanon, it is the same war. At first glance, the protagonists appear identical. On one side, Hezbollah, remotely controlled by Iran, with Israel as the key player and, behind it, the United States, which for now positions itself as a moderating force. On the other side, Iran, the true key player, the United States as another key player, and Israel, which – after acting an unsuccessful instigator and then being reined in – has become a follower. But the differences are significant when it comes to the future of these two theatres. One is regional, the other global. One excludes Europe, and above all France. The other currently excludes Europe and the envisaged coalition of some forty countries – including Pacific states. The Iranian issue appears insoluble, so much so that the – justified – demands of the United States run counter to those firmly defended by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, now the country’s dominant force. Beyond these currently incompatible demands, Donald Trump’s approach in terms of analysis, diplomacy and negotiating skill falls far short of what would be required. He has nothing to offer other than violence. If he does so, one should beware of Russian and Chinese involvement. Going forward, the behavior and decisions he is likely to take will have consequences for the conduct of international affairs and for the settlement of disputes between states. Donald Trump may well prevail. But at the cost of what abandonments? Whom and what would he sacrifice before November? It is likely that the real long-term winner will be Iran. On the risk scale, the probable outweighs the possible. Could a deep questioning of the reliability of U.S. protection by Gulf countries lead to the replacement of American bases? By which protector? China and Russia would stand to benefit. If France decides to support Lebanon in the firm stance now embodied by its president, it will have to do so with conviction and determination. Half-measures no longer have a place. These are therefore two different wars, whose resolutions must be coordinated. One could be addressed in isolation; the other cannot. Will President Trump take this into account in the final “round” of negotiations with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps? “What has changed most over there is not China, it is not Russia, it is Europe: it has stopped counting” ( The Conquerors , postface – André Malraux). Rather than looking at Ukraine through rose-tinted glasses and focusing solely on oil prices when it comes to the Middle East, Europeans and France should aspire to promote a “firm peace” in Lebanon.

In his opening address to the eighth Fatah congress, President Mahmoud Abbas laid out the official vision of Palestinian legitimacy as it stands today and as it must take shape in the near future, sounding the alarm over the dangers wrought by the continuing war on Gaza, the unprecedented pace of settlement expansion in the West Bank, the relentless Judaization of East Jerusalem, and the Israeli government’s unswerving pursuit of the displacement and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from their own land — a confluence of threats he described as posing existential risks of an altogether exceptional gravity. He called on the international community, on friends and allies, on all who champion the Palestinian cause, to work toward enabling the National Authority to assume its full responsibilities in the Gaza Strip in the name of the State of Palestine, through its official institutions and in cooperation with UN bodies and the administrative committee mandated to operate in the sector according to the outcomes of the “World Peace Council,” while firmly rejecting any arrangement that would entrench the separation of Gaza from the West Bank or give institutional form to a duality serving neither the political solution nor the building of a Palestinian state. The congress convenes on the days of the Nakba commemoration, the 14th, 15th, and 16th of May. The president also underscored the pioneering role of Fatah as standard-bearer of the national project, and paid particular attention to the role of women and youth in the run-up to legislative and presidential elections expected before year’s end, making 2026 the year of restoring the Palestinian political order and reinvigorating its legitimacy by constitutional standards, the year, in short, of a renewed Palestinian democracy. This is the framework within which Fatah’s political mission in the days ahead can be summarized, and from which the contours of the next phase can be drawn, together with the strategies and action plans needed to lift the cause out of its present weakness, meeting its challenges in a way that serves both the people and the homeland and restores the cycle of political life. By Acclamation One who looks at the congress platform will notice twenty-five portraits dominating the scene, at the centre of which presides the emblematic figure of Yasser Arafat, and beside him the martyrs of the movement’s Central Committee, barely a third of whom died in their beds, having survived both the battles and the assassins. The shadow of the historic leadership stretches long, to the point where it cannot be stepped around without discernment and foresight. At the Tunis congress convened after the departure from Lebanon, President Arafat had opted not to have the votes cast for him counted, knowing that after 1982 no challenge to his authority could aspire to rival his stature. Just as the departure from Lebanon had been an exceptional moment, so too was the schism it produced, sustained by the Assad regime and financed by the defunct Libyan one. At the height of the battle for legitimacy, Arafat was elected by acclamation to a standing ovation, before the Central Committee had even been chosen. This tradition carried over into subsequent congresses, as was witnessed again in Ramallah, where all present could see that President Abbas had borne the legacy of his predecessors with patience and authority, embodying each stage of Fatah’s evolution in its struggle for survival and continuity and preserving the movement’s historic place in the Palestinian collective consciousness and public life, at a time when the break with Hamas had reached its most acute point and the dangers had reached the degree that allowed enemies to unleash their war of annihilation, displacement, and erasure. Those following the congress proceedings observe that the founding generation is still present, alongside the generation of the stone Intifada and that of the second, while the generation of the current struggle for survival adds something genuinely new to the picture. All of this belongs to three successive political orientations: the first, from the beginning, with liberation, armed struggle, and historical right as its rallying cries; then the shift toward political rights, the Authority, and the State; and now, in the wake of the war of annihilation that followed October 7, the slogan “Baqoun” — “We Remain” — captures the whole tableau of Fatah’s eighth congress: we remain so that there may be a state for the next generation. Rescue The image of the Gazan woman sifting through the rubble of her destroyed home for any trace of what it once was, even a broken plate at the back of her kitchen, resembles the shepherd driven from his land or the farmer who will not let go of the tree his father left him. It is for all of them that one hears the voice of President Abbas working, together with the American administration, to salvage what can still be salvaged from the Oslo Accords, while Talmudic members of the Knesset press to legislate their annulment and open the door to colonizing Palestinian cities after seizing control of “Area B,” currently under Palestinian self-rule. This backdrop reduces the immediate tasks of Palestinian day-to-day politics to nothing other than rescue operations, pure and simple. The work program of the newly elected Central Committee can no more escape this reality than transcend it. Given the composition and diversity of congress delegates, it is clear that the new Central Committee, with half of its nine veteran members carrying the inheritance of the founding, the armed struggle, and the stone Intifada, sees its other half constituted by a generation formed in the second Intifada, where mass mobilization and armed violence, which we subsequently renounced, were intertwined. Some among them also carry the vision of the modern state and of what Palestinian statehood must look like in any foreseeable future. Yet these energies, seasoned, intermediate, and new, can only bear fruit if their holders work as a genuinely unified team, steering Fatah first toward political cohesion with President Abbas’s platform, then opening new channels to amplify Palestinian presence in the American arena, with the goal of stopping the open Israeli war being waged against us across all territories occupied in 1967. Without achieving this, talk of success in defending our legitimate political rights, recognized by the overwhelming majority of states in the world, will ring hollow. The political realism that defines President Abbas is not a personal disposition; it is the product of a long sedimentation of struggle within the Fatah experience and its successive transformations, from the broad slogans that answered the aspirations of the people since the Nakba of 1948 to the acute attentiveness to people’s urgent needs after a war of annihilation. Should the National Authority succeed this year in organizing legislative and presidential elections, one could then say that the slogan “Baqoun” has been made real through the highest possible voter participation, and that what we stand to gain in the wake of those elections will make it possible to affirm that passage to a new phase is within reach, with clear-eyed awareness of the formidable challenges that stand before the Palestinian people.

Iran responded Monday to a new U.S. proposal aimed at breaking the diplomatic deadlock and bringing a lasting end to the war in the Middle East, its Foreign Ministry said, adding that exchanges with Washington were continuing "through the Pakistani mediator". Iran reiterated its demands on Monday, particularly calling for the release of frozen Iranian assets abroad and the lifting of international sanctions suffocating its economy. The spokesman also insisted on the payment of reparations for the war, which he described as "illegal and baseless". On Sunday, Iranian media denounced the "excessive conditions" imposed by the United States in its latest offer. According to the Fars agency, they demand that Iran maintain only a single active nuclear site and transfer its stockpile of highly enriched uranium to the United States. A Risky Gamble In this context, Iran formally established Monday a new body, the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, to manage this passage. The exact prerogatives of this new structure were not immediately revealed. But according to the specialized journal Lloyd's List, it is "responsible for approving ship transits and collecting passage fees in the Strait of Hormuz". Indeed, the Islamic Republic believes that controlling this chokepoint would be a magic weapon to force the United States to back down. The Revolutionary Guards even threatened Monday to charge for the use of submarine fiber optic cables crossing the Strait of Hormuz, noting that any disruption to this equipment would cost the global economy up to "hundreds of millions of dollars per day". In a message on Telegram, the ideological army of the Islamic Republic stated that in the name of Iran's "absolute sovereignty" over its territorial waters, the country "could declare that all fiber optic cables crossing the maritime route are subject to permits, monitoring and tolls"… Without question, this radical position comes from the hardline faction of the regime, namely the Revolutionary Guards. But this risky posture could trigger a resumption of military confrontation. For the Pasdaran and hardliners in the regime, this is nothing less than an existential war that they seek to perpetuate. While Iran has lost many leaders, its infrastructure has been severely damaged by bombardments, and its economy is depleted, the ruling class refuses to capitulate—and is even demanding concessions. Tehran believes that Donald Trump will lose patience over rising gas prices before the midterm elections in November. The near-paralysis of the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of global hydrocarbon production normally transits, has lasted since the war began on February 28, to which Washington responded by imposing a blockade on Iranian ports. The blockade of this passage drove oil prices soaring. But what Iranian leaders forget is that the circumstances are not ideal, as the population is very hostile to this standoff, especially following the large protests in January, suppressed with bloodshed (nearly 40,000 deaths in two days, January 8 and 9), and because of the war's impact on the economy and infrastructure. A Grim Record It is on this point that Iran was singled out in Amnesty International's annual report released Monday, which states that the number of executions recorded worldwide rose in 2025 and reached its highest level since 1981, a surge mainly due to Iran, where executions more than doubled last year. Alone, the Islamic Republic accounts for 80% of executions recorded in 2025 by Amnesty. Some 2,159 people were executed by hanging in the country last year, compared to 972 in 2024. "Iranian authorities have intensified their use of capital punishment as a tool of political repression and control, driving an unprecedented surge in the number of executions," the NGO notes in its report. The resort to executions was particularly pronounced after the 12-Day War between Iran, Israel and the United States in June: 654 executions were recorded before this conflict, compared to 1,505 between July and December. Death sentences and executions in Iran following the protest movement in the country in January and the start of the Middle Eastern conflict on February 28 are not included in Amnesty's report. But according to NGOs based in certain European countries, no fewer than 600 Iranian teenagers and young people, many of them university students, have been hanged since January. On the Ground… A drone strike caused a fire Sunday near the Barakah nuclear power plant in western United Arab Emirates, with no injuries or increase in radioactivity, authorities denouncing a "terrorist attack". Air defense systems detected "three drones that had entered from the western border," two of which were successfully intercepted, while the other "struck an electrical generator" near the site, according to the UAE Defense Ministry. The ministry denounced a "terrorist" attack, seemingly suggesting Iranian involvement. The attack, "whether carried out by the principal actor or by one of its agents, represents a dangerous escalation," it said on X. Abu Dhabi has repeatedly accused Iran of carrying out strikes since the ceasefire of April 8, which ended hostilities between the Islamic Republic, Israel and the United States. Moreover, Saudi Arabia indicated Monday that it had intercepted three drones over its territory, specifying that they had apparently been fired from Iraqi territory. It should be noted in this context that Qatar and the UN Secretary-General strongly condemned the drone strike on the Barakah nuclear power plant sector. In Lebanon… On the Lebanese front, despite the (theoretical) entry into force Sunday at midnight of the extension of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah for a period of 45 days, Israel continued its strikes Monday against positions and infrastructure of the pro-Iranian party in several localities in South Lebanon and the Bekaa. The Israeli military called for the evacuation of three localities in the Tyre and Nabatiyeh regions in anticipation of bombardments. On Sunday, an Israeli strike near Baalbek in the town of Douriss killed the Islamic Jihad commander in the Bekaa.

With this sixth instalment in the “Israel-Hezbollah” series, we continue to examine the current situation through the lens of history, steering clear of the impassioned, ideological or romantic narratives that often obscure realities on the ground. Readers may draw their own conclusions. Previous articles revisited Hezbollah’s rise since the Taif Agreement, its first two wars with Israel, and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon in May 2000. Following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2000, and at the insistence of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, the United Nations officially certified on June 16, 2000, that the pullout was complete and in full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425, which was thereafter deemed implemented. UNIFIL subsequently delineated an Israeli withdrawal line known as the “Blue Line,” identifying 13 disputed points between the two countries covering an area of less than one square kilometer. The line is often mistaken for the Paulet-Newcombe line, drawn in 1923 as the border separating Lebanon and Palestine under the French and British mandates. Instead of using Israel’s withdrawal on May 24, 2000, as an opportunity to restore state sovereignty – particularly in southern Lebanon – President Émile Lahoud and the Lebanese government, both aligned with Syria, chose to provide institutional and political backing to Hezbollah under the banner of the “resistance.” That narrative risked being seriously undermined by the United Nations’ official confirmation that Israel had fully withdrawn. Lahoud’s position perfectly suited both Syria and Iran, neither of which wanted Hezbollah stripped of its “armed struggle” slogan. Damascus was determined to preserve its leverage over Israel, whether for potential future peace negotiations or in the event of armed conflict with the Jewish state – an objective that aligned with Tehran’s efforts to strengthen the Shiite militia as its key instrument in Lebanon and across the region. Anticipating the problem, the Lebanese-Syrian security apparatus of the time – a network of senior Lebanese and Syrian intelligence officers working in tandem – came up with the argument that would allow Hezbollah to retain control over southern Lebanon as a military pressure platform against Israel. That pretext was the Shebaa hamlets, better known as the Shebaa Farms. The Special Case of the Shebaa Hamlets In April 2000, just weeks before Israel’s withdrawal, General Jamil al-Sayed – then head of Lebanese General Security and a close ally of President Émile Lahoud – revived Lebanon’s claim to the Shebaa hamlets in a bid to justify the continuation of Hezbollah’s “resistance.” Lebanese land registry records had in fact established since 1949 that the 62-square-kilometer area belonged to Lebanon, although it appeared on maps as Syrian territory. Israel occupied the area in 1967, at the same time as it seized the Golan Heights. That strategic shift, coordinated with Damascus – notably through General Sayed’s ties to his Syrian counterpart, General Ali Mamlouk – provided the Lebanese state with a pretext to reject the United Nations’ certification of a full Israeli withdrawal. The Shebaa hamlets had been the subject of a border dispute between Lebanon and Syria since the French mandate period. The disagreement was never fundamentally resolved after the two countries gained independence. During the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel occupied the hamlets, where Syrian regular forces had been stationed since the early 1960s, and extended its military infrastructure on the Golan Heights to include the area. Lebanese police and customs officers had been stationed there from independence until the 1958 civil conflict, when Syrian militias and pro-Syrian Lebanese armed groups – involved in the uprising against President Camille Chamoun – forced Lebanese police and customs officers to withdraw and seized the area, using it as a military base to target the Lebanese army barracks in Marjayoun. At the end of the 1958 war, those militias pulled back into Syrian territory, but Lebanese police and customs officers never returned. The Syrian army later established positions there, and Syria continues to include the hamlets on its military maps. Lahoud, Architect of the “Complementarity” Between the Army and the “Resistance” Following the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, and up until 2000, Lebanon never formally claimed the Shebaa Farms before the United Nations as occupied territory, effectively accepting international maps that placed the area within Syria. This claim only emerged officially in 2000, with the clear aim of challenging the completeness of Israel’s withdrawal and thereby legitimizing the ensuing discourse of “resistance.” That narrative was significantly amplified by President Émile Lahoud, the principal political guarantor of Hezbollah at the highest levels of the state. Even when he served as commander-in-chief of the army, he had already developed the concept of “complementarity” between the Shiite militia and the Lebanese regular army. In his view, the army’s role was to maintain internal order – which in practice entailed the repression of sovereigntist forces opposed to Syria and Hezbollah – while the “resistance,” namely Hezbollah, was tasked with defending the country against Israel. Lahoud had indeed facilitated, since he had commanded the army, the transfer of Iranian weapons via Syria to Hezbollah positions in the Beqaa Valley and southern Lebanon. Despite pressure from the United Nations, he systematically refused to deploy the Lebanese army in the area vacated by Israel, arguing that doing so would effectively turn the army into a “border guard” on behalf of the Jewish state. For his part, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri acted in tandem with Lahoud, serving as Hezbollah’s legislative and diplomatic linchpin. He ensured that the ministerial statements of successive governments after the Israeli withdrawal explicitly included Lebanon’s “right to resistance to liberate its territory,” thereby legitimizing Hezbollah’s arsenal. To reinforce the argument that the Shebaa hamlets constituted occupied territory that had to be liberated, and to impose new rules of military engagement, Hezbollah carried out a cross-border operation on October 7, 2000, just four months after the Israeli withdrawal. During the raid, it “captured” three Israeli soldiers, who were later found to have died at the time of the incident. The attack, which involved Hezbollah using UN-marked vehicles, triggered a diplomatic crisis between UNIFIL and Israel. In January 2004, a German-mediated agreement led to a prisoner exchange: Hezbollah returned the bodies of the three soldiers and released a civilian hostage, while Israel freed 435 detainees and returned the remains of 59 fighters from the Shiite militia. (to be continued) Read also: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (5) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (4) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (3) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (2) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (1)

In our previous article, we reviewed Gibran’s life. In this second installment, we explore several facets of the thinker: the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche, Gibran the rebel, and his role as a precursor of Lebanese nationalism. “I am a son of earth and sky. The forest is my church, the field my sanctuary, and the stars my companions in meditation.” Gibran Khalil Gibran “Man is a rope stretched between the animal and the Superman – a rope over an abyss .” Friedrich Nietzsche During his stay in Paris, Gibran discovered Nietzsche, a revelation that profoundly transformed both his thought and his style. He moved from a melancholic, nostalgic poet to a thundering prophetic voice. His writing became aphoristic, prophetic, and powerful. Yet unlike Nietzsche – an atheistic, cynical, and deeply pessimistic thinker – Gibran remained profoundly faithful and filled with hope. In fact, Gibran reinterpreted Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch (Superman) through his Eastern sensibility as well as through his vision of Lebanese nationalism and the freedom of peoples. Moreover, the very structure of The Prophet (Al-Mustafa addressing a crowd before the veils are lifted) strikingly echoes Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra . “The Wanderer, 1928.” Charcoal. (Gibran Khalil Gibran Museum) The Relationship with the Church: A Rebellious Believer “ Your faith is within you; and it is the beating of your heart. ” “ Religion is a heart that opens, not a doctrine that closes. ” Gibran Khalil Gibran Gibran’s relationship with the Church was one of passionate “love and hate.” A Maronite Christian by birth and cultural upbringing, his childhood was steeped in the spirituality of Lebanon’s sacred Qadisha Valley, the historic refuge of Lebanese monks. His style was directly shaped by the Bible, which he read repeatedly. In The Prophet , his central character speaks in parables, reminiscent of Scriptures. Yet Gibran would go on to become one of the fiercest critics of ecclesiastical institution. His book Rebellious Spirits , published in 1908, caused a scandal. He denounced the alliance between feudal lords and the clergy, describing certain priests as “wolves in sheep’s clothing.” Upon publication, the book was deemed “heretical and revolutionary.” Yet, Gibran was not attacking faith itself, but the institution’s hypocrisy. “You have your religion and I have mine,” he wrote. Although influenced by Sufism and Hinduism, Gibran remained fundamentally Christian. He was a Christian of the early origins, who reduced everything to Jesus, to whom he devoted absolute reverence. Deeply influenced by European Romanticism and American Transcendentalism, he saw Christ not as a figure of suffering and submission, but as a fierce “lion,” a revolutionary who breaks the chains of organized religion. Today, his relationship with the Church becomes more reconciled. He is widely welcomed in ecclesiastical circles. In the United States, some priests officiate weddings by reading passages from The Prophet . Academic theses by religious scholars have been devoted to him. Moreover, the first Arabic translation of The Prophet was carried out by an Orthodox priest. “The Archer, 1923.” Aquarelle. (Gibran Khalil Gibran Museum) The Invention of an “Imaginary Lebanon” “ Lebanon is the soil of my soul and the cradle of my dreams. Your Lebanon is an octopus-like government with many tentacles. ” Gibran Khalil Gibran At a time when Lebanon was under Ottoman rule and later the French Mandate, Gibran played a key role in shaping modern Lebanese identity. Yet he was not a political ideologue. From New York, where he founded the Pen League (al-Rabita al-qalamiyya), he revolutionized Arabic literature and gave new face to the creative genius of the Lebanese diaspora. He became a national symbol embodying an intellectual, free and spiritual Lebanon. Influenced by Nietzsche, Gibran advocated for a Lebanese identity rooted in freedom, strength, and self-transcendence. He did not envision a Lebanese people defined by victimhood or submission, but a nation freed from corruption and intellectually open to the world: a Lebanon as a bridge between cultures, distinct from the Arab world through its spirituality, history, and openness. During the great famine of 1914, Gibran actively supported Lebanon through his writings, but when President Ayoub Tabet offered him a ministerial post, he refused, convinced that politics was not his path. Today, Gibran’s writings are regularly appropriated by Lebanese politicians and repurposed in the service of opportunistic nationalism. Invoking Gibran allows some political figures to project an intellectual and moral stature while ignoring his sharp critiques of corruption and hypocrisy of those in power. Gibran, an Unwitting Icon of Counterculture In the United States, The Prophet , published in 1923, became something of a counterculture bible in the 1960s. It won over hippie’s circles with its universal spirituality and ecumenical tone. Students read it on campuses and held it up as a manifesto for a spiritual quest outside institutional frameworks. Yet this image is reductive. Gibran was neither a guru nor a New Age prophet. He is a Christian revolutionary, profoundly imbued with Christ. Read more on this topic: Gibran Khalil Gibran: A Bridge of Light Between East and West (1/3)