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A virtuous revolution is underway in the Maronite Church: Bkerké has decided to give the wives of its married priests an identity – the “khouriyates.” They are named Rita, Paulette, Nadia, Nour, Charlotte and Dounia, and all are married to Maronite priests. They are the “khouriyates,” the feminine form of “khoury” (priest), an affectionate designation they have always carried. On May 16, they took part in the first national gathering of priests’ wives in the Maronite Church, which moved to formally recognize them and ensure they are fully integrated into their husbands’ priestly journey. In a message to the assembly, Cardinal Mario Grech underscored the initiative’s dual thrust: fidelity to the Eastern tradition of the Maronite Church, alongside openness to the prominent place and role women must hold in contemporary society. The meeting, a historic first, was jointly prepared and launched by the Diocese of Antelias, led by Bishop Antoine Bou Najem, and the Patriarchal Committee for the Follow-up of the Synod on Synodality, chaired by Bishop Mounir Khairallah, Bishop of Batroun. Its theme was: “The Vocation and Mission of the Khouriye in the Church.” For the 154 priests’ wives in attendance, the gathering was a profound gift: recognition by the community and the promise of ongoing formation. “It even happened that, in the assembly, there was a priest’s wife whose son is himself a married priest,” jokes Rita Abou-Mitri, 49, coordinator of the group of priests’ wives within the Diocese of Antelias. The body played a driving role in bringing this national first to fruition. “The oldest had been married for fifty years, while the most recent had been married for only a week!’ she adds with a laugh. The number of “khouriyates” in Lebanon is in fact higher, Rita acknowledges, noting that precise data on the matter remains unavailable. The importance of Maronite priests in Lebanese society hardly needs stressing, both in urban centers and rural villages. Their marriage is an integral part of the Maronite tradition and is often seen as a factor of stability, fertility and unity. Within the Maronite Church, they hold a particular status: their state of life is chosen prior to ordination. As diocesan priests, they cannot be consecrated as bishops, nor can they remarry after the death of their wife. In the West, Pope Francis has authorized their presence and ordination, given their growth and the migratory flows that have taken them out of the Middle East. A trained nurse, Rita and her husband, Georges Abou-Mitri, parish priest of Saint-Michel Church in Beit Cha’ar (Metn), have three children: two boys aged 15 and 18, and a 11-year-old girl. They met when Georges was preparing for the priesthood at the Ghazir seminary (Kesrouan). Her husband’s academic background includes hotel management, spiritual accompaniment and philosophy. There is no sense of betrayal or guilt in their relationship. Father Georges had, from that time, chosen marriage, following a process of discernment with his spiritual director. “Leaving God for God” For this couple, the two vocations – marriage and the priesthood – are not in contradiction. One of the “golden rules” of their shared life is flexibility, a principle established by Saint Vincent de Paul for the Daughters of Charity: “There are certain occasions in which one cannot keep the order of the daily schedule (...); charity is above all rules (...). God calls you to prayer, and at the same time He calls you to that poor sick person. This is called leaving God for God.” “It is a law of freedom,” Rita explains. “Like any mother, there are moments when I have to cut Mass short to take care of the children, or leave a meeting if urgency requires it. At the same time, I must exercise great restraint in my interactions with the various social or charitable parish committees, youth organizations, First Communion annual preparation, women’s groups, relations with the school system, and so on.” “It is our partnership that makes the family grow,” she continues. For Rita, this means that the two vocations are conceived and lived together, and that together they form a pastoral team without introducing a false hierarchy into the couple. There is a delicate balance to be found in the mutual service they render to one another. The priority is that Father Georges’ priestly ministry bears fruit, without their marriage falling into solitude and exhaustion, or the children being neglected. “On the contrary,” Rita stresses, “our good understanding is reflected in my husband’s relationship with his parishioners. If there is tension in the air – and it does happen – or if fatigue becomes too visible, it creates problems, and they notice it immediately. Moreover, both our families prioritize Georges’ schedule and reorganize their timetables accordingly. The children adapt as well.” Rita notes, however, that in the early phase of her marriage, in order to care for her young children, she had to give up her contract at a major hospital in Beirut. During those years, the family relied on her husband’s teaching salary, as he provides catechism classes and spiritual accompaniment in two different schools. It is also customary in Maronite parishes for priests to receive a salary. However, this amount is not standardized and depends on each parish’s resources. In the best cases, it does not exceed $600 per month. Some parishes may reduce it to as little as $100, considering that priests can supplement their income through baptisms, weddings and funerals they celebrate. It remains nonetheless the case that, in the Maronite Church, a priest’s housing is normally provided by the parish, his children receive free schooling, and he benefits from medical and hospital insurance covered by his diocese, as well as a pension fund. “Whether the priest is single or married, it makes no difference, provided he does not look back, takes up the yoke of service and follows Christ in joy,” says Bishop Paul Nahed, himself a married priest and secretary general of the Patriarchal Committee for the Follow-up of the Synod on Synodality. Cardinal Grech: “A True Calling” Welcomed and accompanied by Patriarch Bechara Rai, Bishop Mounir Khairallah of Batroun, who oversees the Synod on Synodality follow-up, Bishop Antoine Bou Najem of Antelias, and Bishop Paul Nahed, participants at the gathering listened to a video message from Cardinal Mario Grech, Secretary General of the Synod of Bishops in Rome, which Father Nahed described as “strikingly open.” “Your invitation,” Cardinal Grech said, “though surprising, allowed me to appreciate the value of the journey your Church is undertaking in order to remain faithful to its own tradition (...). Given that the tradition of the Eastern Churches has always emphasized the importance of a married clergy, it is essential, in the present time and in the face of growing sociocultural changes, to recognize that women should occupy a role more in keeping with their immense capacities; this role should be able to fully accompany the priestly journey, and even become an integral – and not secondary – part of it.” Addressing the wives directly, Cardinal Grech added: “Be faithful to your calling. It is indeed a true calling. Live alongside your husbands as priests, offering them your abilities and intelligence, and above all your faith, your hope and your love – this love that draws its strength from the wonderful gift God has given you: becoming mothers within the ecclesial community.” Divided into small groups, the women present experienced what is known as “conversation in the Spirit,” a moment of sharing and listening to what the Holy Spirit says to the Church through the believing community. They also met Patriarch Rai, who patiently answered numerous practical questions regarding their situation, including widowhood. A committee will be responsible for following up on the meeting and developing a program of biblical and pastoral formation. For Rita Abou-Mitri, “the spirit of listening, discernment and participation dominated the day, reflecting a spiritual atmosphere in which participants experienced a Pentecost.”

The tragedy of Yemen derives, in part at least, from the rise to power of a figure such as Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi at a particular juncture in history, and from the errors committed by men of his kind both before and after unification. In the present moment, it has become possible to speak of a country shattered into fragments, searching for some formula by which to reconstitute itself, that is, if reconstitution remains possible at all for a state of considerable strategic significance, a portion of which Iran now holds under its sway. Abd Rabbuh Mansour, whom death claimed just a few days ago, was ultimately nothing more than the expression of a certain political type: the man who arrives from the military apparatus carrying a culture so meager as to disqualify him entirely from governing a country as singularly complex as Yemen. He came to the presidency after spending fourteen years as the shadow of Ali Abdallah Saleh, serving as vice-president, the same Saleh whom the Houthis would later murder, once he had ceased to be head of state. Abd Rabbuh succeeded Ali Abdallah Saleh, who was compelled to resign in February 2012, and remained president until April 2022. It was at that point that the powers with meaningful influence over Yemen acknowledged his incapacity to lead the country. A Presidential Leadership Council of eight members was convened, headed by Dr. Rashad al-Alimi, who appears manifestly capable of somewhat more effective governance, however marginally so. How, then, had the late president reached the presidency in 2012, and before that the vice-presidency in 1994? And more fundamentally, why did Abd Rabbuh Mansour himself become one of the constitutive elements of the Yemeni tragedy, through the accumulation of errors he committed, errors too numerous to catalogue in any comprehensive way? One must first note that Abd Rabbuh Mansour was a native of the southern province of Abyan. He was associated with the former southern Yemeni president Ali Nasser Mohammed, himself from Abyan, who was driven from power by his adversaries in what came to be known as the "January events" of 1986. Abd Rabbuh, who had served as deputy chief of staff in the South, took refuge in Sanaa following Ali Nasser's fall. In the summer of 1994, he joined the southern faction surrounding Ali Abdallah Saleh, in the aftermath of the rupture between Saleh and Ali Salem al-Beidh, the socialist party leader who sought to reverse unification. A bitter war ensued, ending in the defeat of the socialist party. This trajectory allowed Abd Rabbuh to ascend to the vice-presidency, having gone to considerable lengths in his support for Ali Abdallah Saleh in his war against the separatists. I once asked Ali Abdallah Saleh how he could possibly choose someone like Abd Rabbuh Mansour as his deputy, given that the man possessed no qualifications of any kind whatsoever. He answered me word for word: "I want someone who won't cause problems", drawing on his experience with Ali Salem al-Beidh, vice-president of the presidential council after unification, whom he described as a "complicated" personality who had wanted to be a genuine "partner" in power. Abd Rabbuh Mansour remained a peripheral figure throughout his tenure as vice-president. He was obliged to endure Ali Abdallah Saleh, who had gradually transformed himself into a temperamental head of state, prone to fits of anger directed at his own aides for no discernible reason. When Ali Abdallah Saleh was forced to resign in early 2012, Abd Rabbuh Mansour revealed an altogether different character. He left no means of vengeance against his predecessor untried: he made a conspicuous point of refusing to return his calls, while methodically working to dismantle the military institution. His overriding aim was the elimination of any influence that the former president and his son, Brigadier General Ahmad, might retain within the armed forces. The outcome was the destruction of any remaining hope of rebuilding a functional Yemeni army. Whether fully conscious of it or not, Abd Rabbuh effectively placed himself in the service of the Houthis when he refused to confront them in the province of Amran during their march on Sanaa in the summer of 2014. Ali Abdallah Saleh had urged him to stop the Houthis at Amran, arguing that the fall of the province inevitably meant the fall of the capital. He dispatched four emissaries to him, among them Yahya al-Raï and Aref al-Zouka, carrying an unequivocal message to this effect. Abd Rabbuh nonetheless rejected the advice, declaring that he "refused to settle Ali Abdallah Saleh's scores with the Houthis." What actually happened was that he provided cover for the Houthis' advance and their seizure of the Yemeni capital on 14 September 2014. In everything he did, Abd Rabbuh Mansour never possessed the minimum of political culture that governing any country requires. He went as far as signing the "Peace and Partnership Agreement" with the Houthis shortly after they laid their hands on Sanaa, an agreement attended by a United Nations representative, which conferred upon the Houthis a legitimacy they badly needed. This did not prevent them from placing him under house arrest. Abd Rabbuh managed to escape that house arrest in Sanaa only through a mediation in which the Sultanate of Oman played a decisive role, persuading the Houthis to look away while he slipped out to Aden. Abd Rabbuh Mansour was, in the final reckoning, one component of the Yemeni tragedy. A man with no relationship to politics whatsoever found himself presiding over a country in the grip of an existential crisis, a crisis largely provoked by the Muslim Brotherhood, who sought to uproot Ali Abdallah Saleh in order to take his place. Saleh was no angel, and his errors were many, but the Brothers who turned against him failed to grasp that they were playing the Houthis' game, never pausing for a moment to consider what Yemen might become after Saleh was gone. Yemen had the misfortune of having, at a critical period in its history, a president of Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi's particular stamp. This country deserved someone of finer quality: someone who knew at least something of Yemen itself, of its surrounding environment, and who understood that vengeance cannot serve as a policy, however many personal humiliations one may have been made to endure.

The fourth round of direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations convened Tuesday evening at the U.S. State Department in Washington, under American auspices, as tensions remained high in southern Lebanon, where the Israeli army continues its military operations and presses further north of the Litani River. The Lebanese-Israeli talks, in which former Lebanese ambassador Simon Karam is participating on the Lebanese side, are set to resume Wednesday in the American capital. On the military front, Israeli aircraft carried out a series of airstrikes throughout Tuesday and into the evening, targeting positions as well as weapons and ammunition depots in several villages across the districts of Tyre, Bint Jbeil and Nabatiyeh. The cities of Tyre and Nabatiyeh were not spared. By the end of the day, the Israeli army reported the presence of “dozens of Hezbollah militiamen” who had reportedly retreated into Tyre’s Christian quarter. Yet it was the situation in Beirut’s southern suburbs that dominated the attention of political and diplomatic circles on Tuesday. The eleventh hour agreement brokered Monday evening by President Donald Trump, following urgent contacts with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, stipulated that Israel would suspend what appeared to be an imminent air assault on the southern suburbs, in exchange for Hezbollah halting its rocket fire against Israel. The deal secured by the American president thus rests on a simple equation: the southern suburbs in exchange for northern Israel. Netanyahu and his Defense Minister, Israel Katz, made it clear on Tuesday that should the pro-Iranian party resume firing on Israeli territory, Israel would strike Hezbollah positions in Beirut’s southern suburbs. That approach was rejected Tuesday by a senior Hezbollah official, who stated that the group would not accept any partial ceasefire and remained committed to securing a comprehensive and permanent cessation of hostilities. That position mirrors that of the Lebanese government, which intends to press the same case during the Washington talks. It is becoming increasingly clear that Beirut’s southern suburbs are caught in a precarious equilibrium, given the ongoing Israeli military operations in the south, a dynamic that could trigger retaliatory strikes by Hezbollah against Israel. In that context, Tel Aviv announced late Tuesday that one of its commando units had deployed north of the Litani River, near the town of Zawtar. The other development that captured the attention of media outlets in both the United States and Israel on Tuesday was the tone surrounding Monday’s phone call between President Trump and Netanyahu. An Israeli television channel confirmed late in the day that the exchange between the two leaders had been particularly tense. An American website reported Tuesday morning that the White House chief had addressed the Israeli prime minister in terms that were far from cordial. The same Israeli channel further reported that sources close to Netanyahu said on Tuesday morning that Monday’s exchange had been the most strained contact between the U.S. president and the Israeli prime minister since the start of Donald Trump’s second term nearly a year and a half ago. Netanyahu was scheduled to convene his ministerial team on Tuesday evening to review developments across the region. Finally, the UN Security Council held an emergency session overnight Monday, at France’s request, to address the deteriorating military situation in Lebanon.

For long decades, Israel waited for the right moment to liquidate what it considers a threat to its project, whether Palestinian, Lebanese, or linked to the Iranian regional agenda. Beyond military preparation, it worked steadily to arrange the diplomatic and media conditions needed to secure international cover for a major battle whose ambition was to redraw the face of the Middle East. When the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation erupted on October 7, Benjamin Netanyahu's government promoted the discourse of “existential danger”, exploiting the alignment of the major Western powers and above all the United States. That was the historic opportunity Netanyahu had been waiting for to unleash the devastating war machine, not only against Hamas but against anything that could be classified as an ally or supporter. At the heart of this plan, Iran committed its first sin by issuing the order to drag Lebanon into the war through Hezbollah, in what was called the “support front”, on October 8. That day, Israel did not conceal its intentions but warned clearly that southern Lebanon risked becoming “a second Gaza”. The second sin followed when the confrontation widened and transformed into a battle directly tied to Iranian calculations for avenging the death of Khamenei, with no connection whatsoever to Lebanese interests, to the security of the Lebanese people, or to the future of the South. The catastrophic reality now lies exposed for all to see: for every Israeli armoured vehicle hit, an entire village is erased, its inhabitants displaced, its sons killed. It has become unmistakably clear that Lebanon is paying the price of a confrontation between two foreign projects — Israel, which rejects the Lebanese model, civilisational, plural and prosperous, and Iran, which persists in keeping Lebanon an advanced terrain and a first line of defence for its Islamic revolution. Amid this existentially grave tableau, the President of the Republic launched a courageous and bold initiative, one that no one before him had dared to undertake, driven solely by the ambition to save the country and restore decision-making to the State. In complementarity with that position, the Prime Minister affirmed on his part that the path of dialogue and direct negotiation, however difficult and complex, remains the only realistic course for sparing the Lebanese further haemorrhage and destruction. What gives some reason for hope today is that authentic cry which rose from beneath the rubble and ashes of our steadfast South. It is the voice of the true Southerner, who refuses gratuitous death, who refuses to see his villages and his sons serve as fuel for others' wars or as a sacrifice on the altar of regional calculations. That voice calls openly for the full and effective presence of the State, for the monopoly of arms in the hands of legitimate institutions, and for rallying behind the Lebanese Army as the sole authority in matters of security and sovereignty. Faced with this reality, one can no longer count on the conscience or good faith of local parties who continue to practise evasion and dissimulation, knowing full well they are losers in advance. In these decisive circumstances, the policy of equivocation, obstinacy, and sabotage of national solutions is no longer merely a political error; it has become a form of abdication of national responsibility, a betrayal of the people and the homeland. Supporting the President of the Republic and the head of government, backing these rescue orientations, and standing firmly behind the Lebanese Army is no longer an ordinary political choice among many; it has become a national and moral duty that imposes itself on everyone. And the question swells, the call grows urgent: where are the forces of change? Where are the protesters of 17 October? Where are the children of the Cedar Revolution and all those who believe in sovereignty and freedom? Why do you not unite today around the cry of your own people in the South? Why do you not stand as one front against the occupier and the usurper to support the project of building the State? The hour of truth and decisive choice has come: either move toward a sovereign, free, capable State that holds exclusively the decision of war and peace and protects its children, or remain in the whirlwind of collapse and destruction, leaving the homeland hostage to the foreign projects that contend over its soil.

Israeli statements hinting at a possible challenge to the maritime border agreement with Lebanon have revived questions about the durability of a compromise that, since its signing in 2022, has been portrayed as a stabilizing mechanism between Beirut and Tel Aviv. Despite the devastating war into which Hezbollah drew Lebanon, the agreement has held firm. Yet as the regional landscape undergoes profound change – particularly amid the energy crisis triggered by the Iran-U.S. standoff over the Strait of Hormuz – questions about its long-term survival are resurfacing. For Laury Haytayan, a Middle East hydrocarbons governance expert and MENA director at the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), “Israeli threats amount more to political pressure than to a genuine strategy aimed at dismantling the agreement.” She considers it “unlikely that the maritime agreement will be revoked,” even as Lebanon is currently engaged in direct peace negotiations with Israel and similar initiatives are expected between Arab states and Israel under the Abraham Accords framework, with the same American backing. Such a move would, moreover, be “incoherent” with the opening of direct negotiations, particularly given Washington’s pivotal role in securing the 2022 agreement, the product of two years of mediation. Haytayan notes that “negotiations began in 2020 under the Trump administration and continued during the presidency of Democrat Joe Biden, who appointed Amos Hochstein as mediator.” Hochstein led an intensive mediation effort that culminated in an agreement reached in October 2022 under the government of Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid. Benjamin Netanyahu, then in opposition, had vowed to overturn the agreement should he return to power. Re-elected just weeks later, in October-November 2022, he ultimately chose to preserve the agreement. Diverging Interpretations The agreement nevertheless continues to be subject to differing interpretations regarding its legal and political balance, both in Lebanon and in Israel. Laury Haytayan points out that “Lebanon had strong legal arguments to claim a larger maritime zone, based on international law and United Nations mechanisms, under which Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is defined by Line 29.” This line, backed by several experts and notably by Lebanese military negotiators in talks with Israel, extended Lebanon’s claimed EEZ further out to sea. It runs from Ras Naqoura and would grant Lebanon an additional 1,430 square kilometers – a demarcation documented in 2011 in a report by the UK Hydrographic Office, based on detailed legal reasoning. However, this claim was never formally submitted by the Lebanese state to the United Nations. When political authorities – represented chiefly by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who led the negotiations in the absence of a president and a functioning government – took over the talks from the military, Lebanon ultimately adopted Line 23 as its maritime border. This line, which also starts from Ras Naqoura, resulted in the loss of 860 square kilometers for Lebanon, as well as the Karish gas field. It was this line that Lebanon registered with the UN and used as the basis for the 2022 agreement. Haytayan recalls that “Lebanese negotiators at the time considered it the best possible compromise.” An explanation that remains disputed to this day. On the other side, Israeli also considered that it had made significant concessions. Two differing narratives therefore continue to coexist, with no convergence on how to interpret the ultimate balance of the agreement. A Potential Peace Dynamic In the event of a peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel, Haytayan favors a logic of continuity rather than a revision of the existing framework. According to her, any future peace deal between Beirut and Tel Aviv “would not necessarily alter the maritime agreement already in place,” which could instead serve as a foundation for future energy cooperation. The fact that the agreement has held for several years conveys a sense of stability, even if a fragile one. “If Israel were to challenge it, Lebanon could reactivate certain legal claims, particularly around Line 29, invoking international law and the UN,” she argues. Haytayan points to the possibility of projects involving international companies already active in the region, citing in particular the Italian energy group Eni. “Eni has a plan to develop gas exploitation projects in Cyprus through infrastructure located in Egypt in order to reduce costs,” she explains. Such regional models could, over time, inspire future energy cooperation depending on the nature of political agreements. However, Haytayan stresses that “internal dynamics in Lebanon remain fragmented, and trajectories will depend as much on sovereign choices as on international pressures.” She notes that “the expected economic benefits for Lebanon have not yet materialized, largely due to the effects of the 2023 war,” and that energy issues remain tied to development objectives. In this context, Haytayan emphasizes the need for Lebanon to “define a clear strategy for developing its oil and gas resources, particularly in the south of the country,” in a framework that extends beyond energy extraction to encompass stabilization and regional development. Security, Economic, and Institutional Logics The priorities of the various actors involved in the dossier diverge sharply. According to Haytayan, “the United States prioritizes the economic dimension, Israel focuses on security, while Lebanon must attempt to reconcile both.” She also stresses that “(peace) negotiations must be conducted strictly by the Lebanese state within a clear institutional framework.” In her view, Hezbollah must not be indirectly involved in the talks, as was the case during the negotiations that led to the 2022 agreement, “given the concessions it made over Karish.” Part of that gas field falls within the 1,430 square kilometers delimited by Line 29, which military experts had claimed before the political leadership relinquished the claim. An Energy Sector Still Taking Shape Lebanon today hosts several international companies operating under offshore exploration contracts, among them TotalEnergies, QatarEnergy, and Eni. Results have so far been limited, with no major breakthrough yet in commercially viable discoveries, particularly in Block 9 of the Qana field north of Line 23. Haytayan notes that “these international players are embedded in global strategies in which Lebanon does not always represent an immediate priority.” Against this backdrop, diversifying energy partnerships emerges as a central challenge for Lebanon. Haytayan underscores that “the main issue remains attracting American companies,” an objective that the ongoing direct negotiations between Tel Aviv and Beirut could help advance. The Strait of Hormuz Regional tensions involving Iran and the Strait of Hormuz add a further geostrategic dimension to the region’s energy dynamics. That maritime passage remains essential for the gas exports of several countries in the region, particularly in the Gulf, and any disruption could prompt a search for alternative routes. In this context, “some actors, including QatarEnergy – already present in Lebanon – may be prompted to adjust their investment strategies,” Haytayan notes. She insists on “the need for institutional coordination in Lebanon, particularly between the ministries of Energy and the Economy and the presidency, in order to build a coherent energy vision.” According to her, “the national strategy must be clarified so the country can position itself within regional dynamics.” Haytayan adds that “the discourse must be primarily economic,” especially when addressing international investors – particularly American ones – in a context where institutional credibility and strategic visibility remain decisive factors in attracting investment into Lebanon’s energy sector.

The suspense of the day on Monday, June 1st, centered this time on the fate of the southern suburbs, which had experienced the past twenty-four hours under the threat of imminent Israeli bombardments. Late in the evening, President Donald Trump announced the conclusion of an agreement providing for a halt to Hezbollah fire against Israel in exchange for a suspension of Israeli bombing of the southern suburbs, which was about to be carried out. The White House chief made this announcement on his social network Truth Social, indicating that he had held a "very productive" conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In an allusion to the raid that appeared imminent against the southern suburbs, he indicated that "no troops will go to Beirut, and the forces that were on their way have turned back." President Trump further indicated that "through high-ranking representatives, I had a telephone conversation with Hezbollah, and they have agreed to cease fire, in the sense that Israel will not attack them and they will not attack Israel." Late in the evening, an authorized American source clarified that contacts with Lebanon regarding ceasefires took place with President Joseph Aoun. It was Monday morning that tensions rose dramatically when the Israeli Prime Minister and his Defense Minister Israel Katz announced in a joint statement that they had ordered the military to bomb the southern suburbs, specifically the drone and ammunition depots, drone manufacturing centers, and Hezbollah command posts. Shortly after this statement was released, a massive exodus of residents from the southern suburbs was recorded, causing traffic congestion at the exit from the region. To prevent tensions from escalating into security incidents, the military set up fixed checkpoints to seal the entrances to Ain el-Remmaneh. While Israeli aviation conducted raids throughout the day against Hezbollah positions in several villages in the south—the deadliest raid completely devastated an entire neighborhood in Tyre—the government undertook urgent contacts to prevent the Jewish state from executing its threats against the southern suburbs. The head of the legislature and leader of the Amal movement, Nabih Berry, notably declared that Hezbollah had agreed to cease its fire against Israel. Later in the day, the Iranian regime renewed its maneuver aimed at attempting to control the Lebanese chessboard. It thus stressed that any attack on the southern suburbs would directly impact northern Israel, inviting residents of that region to evacuate in case of strikes against the Beirut suburbs. In the afternoon, Tehran announced it was suspending (indirect) negotiations and message exchanges with the United States due to Israeli threats. To which President Trump responded in the evening: "I don't care if negotiations with Iran are interrupted. I can wait a long time; it's them who are losing." This aggressive stance adopted by Iran to prevent bombardments against the southern suburbs at all costs led some analysts to question the reasons for such an attitude and to wonder what is so important hidden in these suburbs that would explain the Iranian regime's position on this matter. In any case, information available late in the evening made it possible to clarify the situation as follows: The ceasefire announced by President Trump does not necessarily concern South Lebanon, where raids continued intensively late into the night against several villages. The agreement reached Monday implicitly stipulates an equation whereby the bombing of the southern suburbs will be carried out if Hezbollah resumes its attacks against Israel (Mr. Netanyahu indicated in the evening that he had emphasized this point during his telephone conversation with President Trump, while clarifying at the same time that the army will continue its operations in the South). Late Monday night, the pan-Arab channel al-Hadath reported that Hezbollah launched rockets against northern Israel, particularly in the direction of Metula where alarm sirens were activated. According to some sources, the head of the White House intervened to suspend the bombardment of the southern suburbs so as not to compromise the new round of direct talks between Lebanon and Israel, scheduled for Tuesday and Wednesday at the State Department in Washington. It should be noted at the regional level that the American military command indicated Monday morning that US aviation bombed Iranian positions on Saturday and Sunday, notably air defenses, radars, and drone and missile launch centers. At the same time, the US military intercepted and destroyed two ballistic missiles over the weekend that had been launched by the Revolutionary Guards toward a US military base in Kuwait. Late Monday night, the Revolutionary Guards stated that they had launched a missile against "a vessel belonging to the American Zionist enemy".