Articles

The 60-day American-Iranian roadmap must be understood in the context of the ultimatum cycles that define President Donald Trump's Middle East strategy — a method built on alternating between threats of total destruction and purely transactional diplomacy. In April 2025, a first unilateral 60-day ultimatum demanding that Tehran dismantle its nuclear program was met with a categorical refusal from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, triggering massive U.S. B-2 bomber strikes in June 2025 against Iranian nuclear sites. A year later, in April 2026, faced with a strangling blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the White House doubled down, threatening to devastate vital Iranian infrastructure "within four hours" — a credible threat that forced Tehran to accept, at the last moment, the principle of a ceasefire, paving the way for the protocol signed at Versailles by President Trump. Maritime security in the negotiations On the operational front, the United States and Iran established at Bürgenstock a "direct communication line" designed to prevent any maritime incidents in the Strait of Hormuz, the main transit point for Iranian and Arab oil. At the same time, the U.S. Treasury granted a sanctions exemption through August 21, 2026, covering Iranian oil and petrochemical products. These measures carry real weight for both Washington and Tehran: they address Iran's demand for immediate economic relief and reduce, in the short term, the risk of an oil price spike. They also highlight the barter logic underpinning the negotiations — security in exchange for market access — and the fragility of solutions built on temporary exemptions rather than lasting guarantees. Lebanon and deconfliction: can a mechanism without Israel hold? The creation of a "deconfliction cell" tasked with enforcing the ceasefire in Lebanon brings together the United States, Iran, Qatar, Lebanon, and Pakistan — but excludes Israel, a first in four decades, unlike the current mechanism and the committees established under the July 1993 and April 1996 understanding agreements. The omission of Tel Aviv is politically explosive. For Israel, which regards Hezbollah as an existential threat, being shut out of a cell that will govern its own front line is unacceptable — and Benjamin Netanyahu has made that clear on multiple occasions — as it curtails Israel's military and operational freedom of action in southern Lebanon. For Washington, this configuration creates a dilemma: how to stabilize Lebanon without alienating Israel, or risk losing the support of a key strategic ally against Iran by imposing constraints Israel deems dangerous. Over the longer term, the effectiveness of this deconfliction cell is in serious doubt, and the ceasefire in Lebanon remains fragile. The nuclear file: stated intentions but no binding commitments Progress on the nuclear issue is questionable. JD Vance raised the prospect of IAEA inspectors returning, sparking some optimism, but Iran's Foreign Ministry clarified that Tehran had signed "no new nuclear commitments" during the session. In other words, the door is open to oversight and transparency, but without any Iranian commitment to transfer 60%-enriched uranium to China or Russia, to dilute it, or to halt enrichment activities. At this stage, Iran's nuclear program is admittedly in a degraded state and non-operational as a result of American and Israeli strikes. In return for IAEA oversight, Iran expects tangible and lasting economic and security guarantees — none of which are currently in sight. Without a binding timeline for dismantling Iran's nuclear capabilities, the core of the problem remains unresolved. This ambiguity makes a lasting agreement difficult to achieve without robust, verifiable technical clauses backed by automatic penalties in the event of a violation. Economic gains: a temporary lifeline on top of the networks circumventing sanctions Tehran's official announcement of a successful conclusion to the technical negotiations — sealed by a White House agreement to release $12 billion in frozen Iranian funds — illustrates a purely transactional logic. This major financial unblocking immediately triggered a long-distance standoff, revealing the fragility of the process: while Donald Trump rushed to announce on his social media platforms that these funds would be required to go toward purchasing American agricultural products, the Iranian government categorically rejected that directive. While the American administration seeks to frame a favorable business arrangement as a geopolitical concession, Iran intends to enshrine this financial victory as a sovereign restitution, free of any unilateral commercial strings. Furthermore, Iran's dependence on the Chinese market remains a decisive factor, even though Beijing is not directly at the heart of the negotiations. China thus remains an essential energy partner for Tehran, and its interests help partly account for Iran's restrained posture — namely, keeping the Strait of Hormuz open. Finally, the shadow cast by the sanctions-circumventing export networks that remain in operation undermines the ability of Western diplomacy to exert sustained pressure. Risk summary and scenarios In brief, beneath the surface optimism on display in Switzerland, the sixty-day truce is constantly threatened by four geopolitical triggers. The first is the fundamental gap between Washington's expectations — which demand that Tehran renounce its nuclear ambitions — and Iran's position, which views the deal as nothing more than an economic respite with no strategic trade-off. The second lies in Israel's exclusion from the Lebanese deconfliction framework, which leaves the Netanyahu government free to militarily undermine the ceasefire in Lebanon in order to neutralize Hezbollah, thereby forcing Iran to retaliate. The third is Hezbollah's quiet resumption of efforts to reorganize its ranks and covertly redeploy a combat apparatus against Israel — something it managed to do with remarkable skill after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, again after UN Resolution 1701 in 2006, and once more following the ceasefire of November 27, 2024. Should Hezbollah repeat this pattern of behavior, it would once again hand Israel a pretext to resume hostilities and override Washington's directives. Finally, the fourth geopolitical trigger threatening the truce is the inherent unpredictability of Donald Trump, who is subject to pressures from both his right and his left flanks, which could lead him to unilaterally abandon the Bürgenstock process. If any one of these pressure points gives way, the chain reaction will be immediate: the instant reimposition of the American blockade will provoke, as a symmetrical response, a new Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz, plunging the Gulf and the Middle East back into crisis. Conclusion: conditional de-escalation, not guaranteed peace The next 60 days will determine whether this roadmap is the prelude to a gradual pacification, or merely the framework for a delay that simply postpones the confrontation. For now, we are witnessing a fragile period of relief that might allow for the patient construction of verifiable guarantees and the eventual conclusion of a formal agreement by late summer 2026 — though not without the potential risk of a return to war in Lebanon and the Gulf. A successful stabilization would thus transform a hot war into a highly militarized regional cold war, hanging by a thread and dependent on several potential breaking points over the medium and long term. Read more on this topic: USA-Iran: A roadmap under time pressure (1/2)

On the third day of the fifth round of Lebanese-Israeli talks in Washington, what were described as difficult discussions between the two Lebanese and Israeli politico-military delegations were expected to yield a statement of intent outlining the framework for more substantive negotiations and future cooperation between Lebanon, Israel, and the United States. The statement of intent was set to be announced and signed by Lebanon and Israel at 11 p.m. Beirut time, but the announcement was delayed as discussions between the two sides continued. According to several consistent sources, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is throwing his full weight behind efforts to bring Lebanon and Israel to sign the statement. Meanwhile, a number of isolated incidents were reported throughout Thursday's day and evening between the Israeli army and Hezbollah militants. Shortly before midnight, Israeli aircraft carried out a strike on the village of Beit Yahoun, in the Bint Jbeil district. The debates on this final day of the fifth round of talks unsurprisingly centered on the Israeli withdrawal and the future of Hezbollah's military arsenal. These are two issues on which the two sides were struggling to reach agreement, even as the U.S. Secretary of State, currently touring the Gulf, spoke of progress in the talks. For Israel, under heavy American pressure to pull back at least to the Blue Line, the equation is straightforward: no withdrawal as long as the pro-Iranian group retains its weapons and poses a threat to the country's north. Lebanon, for its part, reaffirms its determination to extend its sovereignty over its entire territory and argues that the continued presence of the Israeli army in the South would complicate that effort. Beirut is therefore demanding a full Israeli withdrawal as a precondition, while Tel Aviv wants the Lebanese army to deploy in the South before its forces pull back. The two sides were also struggling to reach agreement on the 'pilot zones,' which would serve as the starting point for an Israeli withdrawal whose timeline has yet to be established. According to Yediot Aharonot , Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly succeeded in convincing Donald Trump to stop calling for a withdrawal, on the condition that Washington is brought into the 'pilot zones' project in the South, from which Israel would gradually withdraw in exchange for a strengthened deployment of the Lebanese army. Netanyahu also reaffirmed, in a speech late in the day, that his troops would maintain a presence in 'the security zones in Gaza and Lebanon' and that 'missions have yet to be carried out against Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas.' Tel Aviv has admittedly scaled back its operations in the southern part of the country significantly, but its army continues to eliminate Hezbollah fighters. Three people were killed in a drone strike that targeted a vehicle near Mayfadoune, in the Nabatiyeh district. The Lebanese file is, as is well known, embedded in the talks between Washington and Tehran, at the insistence of the Islamic Republic, which seeks to retain its grip over any process affecting the country's fate and has appointed itself Lebanon's spokesperson—despite Lebanon's official rejection of any Iranian interference in its affairs. Dismissing the criticism leveled by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam at Tehran's behavior, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, once again declared that Israel must leave 'the entirety of Lebanese territory' of its own accord, or else be 'forced to flee in defeat.' Tehran continues to make an unconditional Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon a condition for the continuation of its negotiations with Washington. For their part, the United States and Gulf countries reaffirmed, in a joint statement issued at the close of the Gulf Cooperation Council ministerial conference held in Manama, the need to keep the two diplomatic processes underway in Washington and Switzerland separate. Hezbollah's parliamentary bloc echoed the IRGC's position, urging the Lebanese state to 'take advantage of Iranian support' and warning it against 'making concessions to Tel Aviv.' Israel responded immediately through Defense Minister Israel Katz, who announced that his country 'will strike Iran hard if it attacks us because of our operations in Lebanon.' Standoff over the Strait of Hormuz At the regional level, the standoff over the Strait of Hormuz intensified sharply on Thursday, as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps rejected an Omani initiative — backed by Washington and the Gulf states — aimed at securing navigation through this strategically vital waterway. This development threatens to complicate the ongoing diplomatic efforts toward regional peace, particularly as Iran — which is proclaiming itself the victor in its confrontation with the United States and Israel, while grappling with serious financial and economic difficulties — is seeking to maximize gains of this kind. According to the Wall Street Journal, transit tolls could earn Tehran up to $40 billion per year — enough to bail out the regime, especially if its assets remain frozen by Washington. In a sign of an emerging crisis, a tanker was 'struck by an explosive device of undetermined origin southeast of an Omani port,' the British Navy announced late in the day. Three other cargo vessels, including a tanker, passing through the same corridor were forced to turn back, according to the same source. Tehran had counted on Oman to help it sidestep international pressure and impose a toll on the Strait of Hormuz, but the sultanate quickly distanced itself from that position, announcing two new temporary shipping lanes established along its coastline in coordination with the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Oman's Foreign Minister, Badr al-Busaidi, assured that no 'transit fees' would be imposed, while clarifying that Muscat was continuing discussions with Tehran regarding costs related to certain administrative and maritime security services. While this decision was broadly welcomed by the Gulf states, the Revolutionary Guards — who are intent on maintaining control over one of the world's key energy transit points — immediately rejected it. In a counter-statement, they declared that 'the only authorized routes for transiting the Strait of Hormuz are those announced by the Islamic Republic of Iran.' Accusing Muscat of failing to consult them, they warned that any vessel taking an alternative route would face 'sanctions,' without specifying their nature. The American response was swift. In Bahrain, where he was attending the GCC ministerial conference, Marco Rubio flatly rejected any notion of tolls or fees in the strait, stating that 'no country can claim ownership of an international waterway.' For Washington, the issue goes far beyond the Gulf. American officials fear that a precedent set at Hormuz could embolden other powers to monetize passage through strategic straits around the world, which would cause 'total chaos,' Rubio warned. It remains to be seen what impact this episode will have on US-Iran negotiations. On one hand, the Revolutionary Guards believe that any concession regarding Hormuz would be tantamount to a loss of regional influence. On the other hand, while the United States is eager to reach a deal with Iran, it is not willing to do so 'at any price,' Marco Rubio reaffirmed in Manama. The U.S. Secretary of State reiterated that no provision of a future agreement with Iran should jeopardize the "security, stability, or prosperity" of Gulf states, in an obvious attempt to reassure these monarchies, as a new round of technical talks between American and Iranian experts is scheduled to take place in Switzerland later this month. This commitment was reflected in the final communiqué of the Manama ministerial conference. The issue of ballistic missiles was included in the statement, even though it does not appear in the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding and Tehran refuses, on the grounds of regional balance of power, to have this matter made subject to negotiations. The Gulf states' foreign ministers called on Washington to include the issue of Iranian missiles and Tehran-backed armed groups in the talks aimed at bringing a lasting end to the war in the Middle East. "Sustainable regional peace and security require addressing the full range of Iranian threats, including its ballistic missiles, drones, and support for armed groups in the region," the GCC ministers stated.

At the initiative of the Focolare Movement, the Maronite Archbishop of Antelias, Mgr Antoine Bou Najem, hosted, on May 29, at the Cathedral of the Resurrection (Mtayleb), an evening of prayer and presentations bringing together leaders and members of 35 ecclesial movements, most of which emerged within the Charismatic Renewal following the Second Vatican Council. In this two-part article, we present this event – an unprecedented gathering – and its significance for the Church in general, as well as the “theological status” of these ecclesial movements in relation to the Church hierarchy, as developed in the 1990s by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the future Benedict XVI, then Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. A springtime of the Church In the late 1960s, coming out of what theologian Karl Rahner described as “a winter of the Church,” the first rays of an extraordinary awakening – the Charismatic Renewal – began to rise in Lebanon and across the Catholic world. One of the theological keys to this phenomenon was – and remains – the experience of Jesus’ love for each person and the rediscovery of the action of the Holy Spirit, through charisms given for the building up of the Church and of each believer individually. The Second Vatican Council had restored to prominence the idea that the Spirit bestows gifts not only on the hierarchy, but on all the faithful, for the common good of the Church. This vision made it easier to understand the emergence of new forms of Christian life, suited to the circumstances of the time and made possible by the outpouring of the Spirit, a new dynamic, and the experience of God’s presence. Meanwhile, as the first shoots of an ecumenical charismatic community emerging from English-speaking academic circles were taking shape, war broke out in Lebanon. For years, in the fervor of those early days, the prayer group and the community born of this renewal drew in young people who, unaware of the dangers of bombardments, kidnappings and other perils of the time, showed heroic fidelity to prayer meetings and to the human community that grew out of them. And all could testify that where they believed they were “giving everything,” they were in fact “receiving everything,” not without some “misunderstandings” from those close to them. From these spontaneous and sometimes disorienting beginnings, this “springtime of the Church” has since spread across the world, including Lebanon, where its contribution to the “new evangelization” is now recognized and appreciated. The novelty of certain charisms and the outpouring of the Spirit were at times difficult to explain or accept. But these groups and communities have now entered a phase of relative ecclesial maturity, patient communion, shared responsibility and deeper rootedness in the Church. To oversee their development within the Catholic world, Pope Francis created “Charis”, a body under the Dicastery for the Laity, tasked with serving all currents of the “Charismatic Renewal.” On May 29, at the initiative of the Focolare Movement and for the first time in Lebanon, 35 of these ecclesial movements and communities present in the country came together in their diversity at the Cathedral of the Resurrection (Mtayleb – Maronite Diocese of Antelias). The local bishop, Mgr Antoine Bou Najem, assisted by the Apostolic Nuncio, Mgr Paolo Borgia, offered them the hospitality of his cathedral and formally gave them the floor. Fulfilment of a promise The meeting was presented by Fadi Bouzamel (Focolare) as “the fulfilment of a promise made in 1998 to Pope John Paul II by Chiara Lubich.” That promise was to work tirelessly, “in keeping with the Focolare vocation to unity,” to bring the new ecclesial movements closer together, to help them get to know and appreciate one another, and to foster cooperation in their shared mission of evangelizing the world, in accordance with each one’s charisms and under the authority of their bishops. Why 1998? To answer that question is to go back to the World Congress of Ecclesial Movements held in Rome on 31 May 1997. That day, John Paul II had an “unforgettable encounter” with more than two hundred thousand people belonging to some fifty ecclesial movements and new communities. They represented a growing “current of grace,” which his predecessor, Saint Paul VI, welcoming the Charismatic Renewal in 1975 at the heart of St Peter’s Basilica, had described as “a chance for the Church.” In 1998, at Pentecost, John Paul II’s sense of wonder was renewed during a vast gathering held from 27 to 29 May in St Peter’s Square, bringing together 400,000 leaders and members of ecclesial movements and new communities from all over the world. Stunned, the world discovered that day a Church in its youth, a Church capable of receiving and fostering every charism, a Church able to embrace diversity within unity, the missionary vitality of the laity, and the catholicity of the ecclesial movements and new communities that emerged in the wake of the Second Vatican Council. Among the most influential movements, to name only the best known, were the Focolare Movement, born amid the Second World War (1942), the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, the movement Communion and Liberation, the Neocatechumenal Way, the Community of Sant’Egidio, the Emmanuel Community, and the Chemin Neuf Community. Addressing the crowd, John Paul II said: “I have referred to them as new realities that still await recognition and proper appreciation. Today I see, and I rejoice in it, that they show greater personal maturity. They represent one of the most significant fruits of this springtime of the Church, already announced by the Second Vatican Council, but often hindered by the process of secularization that is unfolding (…) and that promotes models of life without God (…). We therefore feel the urgent need for a strong proclamation and for solid, in-depth Christian formation. Today we need mature Christians, aware of their baptismal identity, their vocation, and their mission in the Church and in the world! We need living Christian communities! And here are the ecclesial movements and new communities: they are the response inspired by the Holy Spirit to this dramatic challenge at the end of the millennium. You are that providential response.”

The second day of the 5th round of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, held on Wednesday, June 24, at the State Department in Washington, focused on examining the concrete mechanism to be put in place to "manage" the partial — and at this stage symbolic — withdrawal of Israeli forces from certain sectors of the border region. In line with the ongoing discussions on this plan, the Lebanese army will need to progressively replace Israeli units as they gradually withdraw. Sources generally considered well-informed note that this handover will be carried out by Lebanese army units supervised and under the "security" and operational control of the American military command. The ongoing talks in Washington on this matter will continue for a third day on Wednesday, June 25. Regarding the ultimate goal of these Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, a senior State Department official stated on Wednesday that the Trump administration is working to "put a definitive end to the cycles of violence between Lebanon and Israel." He added, in order to clearly define the framework of the talks — no doubt to keep them well removed from the hegemonic media posturing of the mullahs' regime — that "Lebanon and Israel are negotiating in their capacity as sovereign states to achieve peace." While the talks of this fifth round have yet to yield clear results, a fragile and tense calm continues to prevail on the ground in the southern zone along the border with Israel. This lull is nonetheless marked almost daily by isolated security incidents, as was the case on Wednesday when the Israeli army shot and killed two Hezbollah militants who were approaching Israeli positions in the area of the strategic hill of Ali el-Taher. At the same time, an Israeli drone fired a rocket at a car traveling on the road to Kfar Remman (Nabatiyeh district). Two people were killed in the strike. Late in the afternoon, another drone strike was reported in Nabatiyeh el-Fawqa, while artillery fire was directed at the village of Yater, in the Bint Jbeil district. These isolated incidents come as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on Wednesday that the Jewish state "has not concluded its operation in South Lebanon," emphasizing that as long as he remains Prime Minister, the Israeli army will not fully withdraw from the buffer zone it is working to establish and consolidate in southern Lebanon in order to secure northern Israel. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz also indicated on Wednesday that the Trump administration has not asked Israel to withdraw from South Lebanon. To close out this Lebanese file — which appears to be moving forward in "small steps" — it should be noted that President Joseph Aoun reaffirmed on Wednesday that the Washington negotiations are entirely separate from the American-Iranian talks initiated in Switzerland. The Regional Dimension On the regional front, three core issues continue to fuel disagreements between the Americans and Iranians over the interpretation and understanding of the framework agreement reached between the two sides. The Trump administration — and the president himself in particular — misses no opportunity to assert that experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency will indeed inspect Iranian nuclear sites, a claim the Iranian regime's leadership consistently and categorically denies. At the same time, President Trump makes clear that the Iranian assets to be unfrozen will be used exclusively to purchase wheat, corn, and soybeans directly from the American market on behalf of the Iranian population, which would benefit U.S. farmers and producers. This approach is, however, rejected by senior officials in Tehran, who repeatedly make clear to anyone willing to listen that it is solely up to the Iranian leadership to decide how the assets unfrozen by the U.S. Administration will be used. Another point of contention between Washington and Tehran is the management of international maritime navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian regime continues to push on multiple fronts to impose, as a fait accompli, its control and sovereignty over the strait by charging fees for administrative, "ecological," and "security" services allegedly provided to vessels passing through this waterway. This is clearly a toll by another name… which prompted President Trump to state on Wednesday that if Iran moves to impose a disguised toll in the Strait of Hormuz, he will simply and outright halt negotiations with Tehran…

After 48 chaotic hours marked by threats of breakdown, the first high-level session between the American and Iranian delegations concluded under the joint mediation of Qatar and Pakistan. The protocol signed at Versailles on June 17 had until now appeared to be a fragile ceasefire; it has now been transformed into a genuine diplomatic exercise following the formal endorsement of a 60-day roadmap. This is expected to lead either to a final agreement—along the lines of the arrangements that have shaped the Middle East since 1948—or to a new open crisis. The political and military risks between the two parties remain fully intact, within an extremely compressed timeframe. Qatar's role Qatar's pivotal role in the negotiations between Iran and the United States illustrates, on one hand, that Iran's coercive tactics—through its bombardment of the emirate—have paid off, and on the other, the forceful return of transactional diplomacy, in which geopolitics gives way to what looks more like a business deal. Already the longstanding custodian of secret financial channels between Washington and Tehran, Doha leveraged its soft power in Switzerland to establish itself as a guarantor of a degree of regional stability. Sharing with Iran the world's largest natural gas field while also hosting the United States' main military base in the Middle East, Qatar has skillfully maneuvered to orchestrate, first, the freezing of Iranian assets under pressure from Washington, and then their unfreezing—thereby reopening the Strait of Hormuz. But the strength of Qatar's mediation also lies in the closeness of its economic networks to Donald Trump's inner circle. Whether it is Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner or special envoy Steve Witkoff—both present in Switzerland alongside JD Vance—the two key figures in the American delegation maintain close financial ties with the emirate's sovereign wealth funds. This unprecedented entanglement of private interests and affairs of state has made it possible to transform a highly combustible ideological conflict into a commercial negotiating table, though not without risks. By further integrating Qatar into the heart of the deconfliction cell on the Lebanese front, Washington is validating the emergence of a Qatari sponsorship that is reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East. For Lebanon, the worst outcome of this affair would be a new Doha Agreement, like the one struck in 2008. The main new development to emerge from the talks in Switzerland is this roadmap, which sets off a genuine 60-day race against the clock, with extended technical negotiations aimed at implementing the memorandum of understanding. The teams are staying on-site in Bürgenstock and technical working sessions are expected to multiply. This tight timetable locks Washington and Tehran into a political trap, in which the time needed for concessions becomes a volatile countdown under mounting domestic pressure in both countries. Could the 60-day deadline be extended? The American administration cannot afford to wait: the White House is under urgent pressure to deliver quick results in order to stabilize energy markets and validate its transactional diplomacy doctrine. A technical stalemate in Switzerland, compounded by a possible extension of the truce, would hand Iran the ideal scenario: continuing to pocket petrodollars thanks to the temporary lifting of sanctions on its oil sales, while keeping its nuclear program shrouded in ambiguity. Faced with Iran's clock ticking away, the American executive would find itself trapped by its own right-wing public opinion—most notably Senator Roger Wicker, Republican of Mississippi and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who publicly declared that this agreement "negotiates away and squanders" the military victories of the United States armed forces. Senator Ted Cruz, Republican of Texas, has been firing on all cylinders against the unfreezing of $12 billion in Iranian assets, arguing that sending billions to the ayatollahs amounts to directly funding anti-American terrorism and formalizing Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz. Senator John Cornyn, Republican of Texas, has condemned the deal for allowing Iran to freely sell its oil and replenish its coffers to rebuild its ballistic missile arsenal, with no reciprocal commitment on nuclear dismantlement. Senator Rick Scott, Republican of Florida, has expressed his categorical refusal to trust the Tehran regime. But the most significant of all is Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina and one of Donald Trump's closest allies, who has staked out a cautious yet firm position: he insists that any final agreement be submitted for Congressional approval and a vote, refusing to let the executive branch alone validate the unfreezing of funds. So if the 60-day truce is to lead to a treaty, Donald Trump will have to contend with a coalition of Republican hawks crying betrayal and Democrats decrying a blank check. This opposition represents the first major domestic obstacle to the success of the Swiss roadmap. When Capitol Hill comes to Bürgenstock Donald Trump is also facing pressure from his left. On June 23, the U.S. Senate passed, by a vote of 50 to 48, a resolution limiting the president's war powers. This constitutional motion does not carry the legal force to paralyze the White House, but its political timing is awkward. By joining with Democrats, four Republican senators broke ranks with their party to challenge Donald Trump's monopoly on military decision-making vis-à-vis Tehran, calling on him to obtain Congressional approval for any act of war. This legislative stance weakens the American negotiators at Bürgenstock: Iran now knows that Donald Trump's threat to resume bombing at the slightest misstep is politically hamstrung by a Congress that could cut off the funding he needs. Moreover, it pushes the American president—furious at what he calls a "patriotic betrayal"—to harden his tone in order to assert his authority, even at the risk of undermining the technical working sessions himself through incendiary posts on social media. Caught between the demands of Mojtaba Khamenei, the fury of a sidelined Israeli ally and its allies within the American administration, and the constitutional pushback from his own Congress, the 60-day roadmap looks more than ever like a precarious reprieve, with each side watching for the other's first misstep. American unpredictability and dual-track diplomacy The negotiations indeed nearly collapsed when, on June 21, Donald Trump threatened live on Fox News to resume strikes against Iran and intervene in the Strait of Hormuz if no agreement was reached within 60 days. The Iranian delegation then suspended its participation, and it took intensive mediation efforts by Qatar and Pakistan to bring the negotiators back to the table. This kind of public intervention highlights a persistent tension between the ground-level diplomacy conducted by JD Vance, Jared Kushner, and Steve Witkoff, and a presidential communications style that serves as a reminder of where decision-making authority lies—at the risk of undoing progress made behind the scenes. Therein lies the core strategic paradox: the combination of maximum verbal threats and pragmatic diplomatic practice. This paradox may well succeed in extracting concessions, but it also triggers crises of confidence on the Iranian, Pakistani, and Qatari sides. (To be continued)

Diplomatic activity intensified on Tuesday around two issues that have dominated international headlines in recent weeks: the discussions between Washington and Tehran and the direct talks between Lebanon and Israel. The fifth round of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations opened at the Pentagon, but not before President Joseph Aoun issued a firm reminder of the guiding principle that should govern the three-day talks: respect for Lebanese sovereignty. Mr. Aoun, who has repeatedly criticized Iran’s blatant interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs, treated Tehran and Tel Aviv as equally responsible. “We will accept nothing less than an end to the Israeli occupation and to all forms of foreign domination,” he said, in a barely veiled reference to Iran. He expressed hope that the discussions would lead to “the full restoration of Lebanon’s sovereignty over every inch of its territory,” according to a statement released by his office. For Beirut, the objective of these talks is to turn the ceasefire into a concrete mechanism facilitating an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the return of displaced residents and the release of prisoners. According to sources at the presidential palace, quoted by the local news agency al-Markaziya, precise instructions were given to the head of the Lebanese delegation, Ambassador Simon Karam, to firmly uphold these priorities while seeking military and security arrangements that can be implemented on the ground, where the ceasefire remains under strain. On Tuesday, the Israeli army opened fire on groups of individuals it described as “Hezbollah terrorists” in the area of the strategic Ali Taher hill, killing at least two people. According to Israeli media reports, the discussions are focusing in particular on the creation of “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon. According to Haaretz , Tel Aviv has drawn up several maps outlining an experimental withdrawal from certain areas south of the Litani River and the Yellow Line, where the Lebanese army would deploy under U.S. supervision. In Lebanon, officials say that the military and security discussions will be followed on Thursday by political talks, with a particular focus on the disarmament of Hezbollah. The proposed “pilot zones” naturally enjoy U.S. backing, as they would serve as a real test of the Lebanese army’s ability to maintain security in southern Lebanon and prevent Tehran from re-establishing its influence there. The plan nevertheless faces two major obstacles. First, the Islamic Republic, which refuses to loosen its grip on Lebanon, has been included in the mechanism to be established. The reasons behind this presence, which is at best inopportune, have yet to be officially explained. Second, Lebanon does not appear to be involved in the practical preparations for the arrangement, as suggested by details released about Joseph Aoun’s two phone calls with U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Both men called him on Tuesday to express their support for his positions and those of the government in favor of restoring Lebanese sovereignty. According to a statement from the presidency, they informed him that “preparations for the formation and operation of this body are currently under consideration.” It remains to be seen what role Lebanon will play within this framework, as Beirut continues to advocate keeping the Lebanese-Israeli and Iranian-American negotiating tracks separate. Joe Raggi Calls on Arab Countries In Amman, where he was taking part in the 165th ministerial meeting of the Arab League, Foreign Minister Joe Raggi called on Arab states to support “the independence of the Lebanese negotiating track” from the U.S.-Iran axis. He stressed that Lebanon’s future should not be decided in its absence. Washington appears to still back this position, as reflected in JD Vance’s response to Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, who had questioned the U.S. stance on Lebanon and Hezbollah. In his reply, Vance said the United States considered President Aoun and the Lebanese government to be “the only legitimate authority in the country.” The U.S. vice-president also insisted that talks with Tehran “were not intended to grant it a role in Lebanon’s future, but to ensure it exerts pressure on Hezbollah to comply with its commitments.” In any case, the pro-sovereignty camp – against which Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem again lashed out on Tuesday, accusing it of serving Israeli interests – says it will not lower its guard. More than 400 Lebanese figures have co-signed an appeal to “save Lebanon,” built around three main points: rallying around the state, supporting direct negotiations with Israel, and rejecting the tutelage Iran seeks to impose on Lebanon through its military arm, Hezbollah. In the same vein, the parliamentary bloc of the Lebanese Forces, MPs from the Kataëb party, and a group of independent lawmakers – including Ashraf Rifi, Michel Moawad and Fouad Makhzoumi – submitted a memorandum to Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, urging the Lebanese state to prepare a legal, financial and diplomatic case to pursue compensation from the Islamic Republic of Iran for damages and losses resulting from the latest war on the Lebanese front, which they attribute to Iran. French diplomacy also remains heavily engaged in post-war developments in Lebanon. In three separate calls with Joseph Aoun, Nawaf Salam, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, French President Emmanuel Macron discussed the progress of the U.S.-Iran negotiations, the consolidation of the ceasefire in southern Lebanon, and preparations for the post-UNIFIL period. As the international force’s mandate is due to expire from 2027 onwards, Paris is consulting several European partners to define the terms of a possible replacement international presence. Tensions Rising Meanwhile, U.S.-Iran talks have entered a new phase, with both sides agreeing to establish four working groups focused on sanctions relief, the nuclear program, Iran’s economic reconstruction, and monitoring compliance with commitments. U.S. officials remain optimistic, but signs of friction are emerging, as Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi are in Islamabad for talks with Pakistani officials, who are involved in mediation with Washington. U.S. President Donald Trump said Iran had agreed to “high-level nuclear inspections” and that “inspectors will be on the ground at the appropriate time,” a claim swiftly denied by Tehran. Iranian officials said the Islamic Republic has no intention of allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect certain nuclear sites recently bombed by Israel and the United States. Trump responded: “If Iran is looking for trouble, let it try to acquire a nuclear weapon.” A second point of contention is the release of frozen Iranian assets. Tehran announced an agreement providing for the immediate unfreezing of $12 billion in assets, in two instalments of $6 billion. Trump, however, said the funds would be placed in escrow and used exclusively for the purchase of American food and medical supplies. Iran’s UN ambassador immediately rejected that interpretation, insisting that Tehran would remain solely in control of how its assets are used. While the United States aims to ensure the funds are used to support the Iranian people amid an unprecedented socio-economic crisis, Iran’s clerical leadership, facing acute financial pressure, is seeking to replenish its resources in order to secure its own survival. Dispute Over the Strait of Hormuz A third point of friction concerns the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has reaffirmed its intention to retain administrative control over this strategic waterway, which on Tuesday recorded its highest maritime traffic levels since the start of the war. Iran and Oman have begun talks on the terms and costs of future services related to managing the corridor, while Washington strongly opposes any Iranian control over the strait. Against this backdrop, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who began a tour of the Gulf on Tuesday, reiterated on his arrival in Abu Dhabi that “no country is permitted to collect tolls or fees on an international waterway.” The aim of the tour is to “reassure Gulf allies about the memorandum of understanding with Iran.” Rubio is expected to discuss with the leaders of the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain the memorandum of understanding with Iran, the security of the Strait of Hormuz, and the stability guarantees sought by these countries, which Iran targeted during its war with the United States and Israel.