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Have We Become Stupider?

Or Are We Experiencing a Transformation in the Structure of Knowledge?
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By Mona Fayad
Published Sep 5, 2026 - 20:01
The question “Has the world become stupider?” frequently returns in contemporary debates about digital media, search engines, and social networks. On the surface, it seems simple. Yet behind it lies a deeper issue concerning the very nature of knowledge: how it is produced, how it is transmitted, and how it is consumed. Perhaps “Have we become stupider?” is not the most accurate question. A better one might be: Is knowledge still being transmitted in a way that allows it to be understood and made productive? Do most readers still go back to the original texts? Or do they turn instead to summaries and to what is said about those texts through material circulating among readers? One key to understanding this phenomenon lies in the work of British psychologist Frederic Bartlett, who conducted a series of experiments in the 1930s on what he called “serial reproduction.” In these experiments, one person would be asked to hear a story and then retell it to someone else, who would in turn retell it to a third person, and so on. The results were striking: with each new transmission, the story was not conveyed as it had originally been told, but was reformulated. Some details were omitted, others were exaggerated, and still others were replaced by elements that better suited the recipient’s background, experience, and culture. By the time the chain had passed through enough people, the original story had become something entirely different. This simple model reveals a fundamental truth: memory is not a neutral container, but a mechanism of reconstruction. When knowledge passes through multiple intermediaries, it is not “preserved” but “reproduced.” Here we begin to see the resemblance to our contemporary world, and with it the fear that we may be becoming stupider. In the age of digital media, knowledge no longer travels through oral transmission, but through chains of mediation: an article is summarized, then quoted, then reposted as a short post, before being further reduced to a sentence or a headline. In this context, we might borrow a metaphor that appeared in a journalistic text: a library whose books are gradually replaced by summaries, then by summaries of summaries, until the reader is left facing layer upon layer of reduction. We might call this the “raccoon chain”: the raccoon does not read the original, but rummages through what remains of it. It is worth clarifying that the choice of the “raccoon” is not arbitrary. The metaphor symbolically condenses a cognitive condition that is becoming increasingly entrenched. This animal, which lives on the fringes of cities and rummages through garbage bins, does not produce its own food but feeds on the leftovers of what others have produced. Despite its practical intelligence and its ability to pry things apart, pick through them, and seize what is useful, it does not understand what lies before it. It treats things simply as material available for immediate use. This is what knowledge begins to look like in an age of serial reduction: texts are shortened, then shortened again, until all that remains are scraps of meaning, rearranged and circulated without any genuine connection to their source. At that point, we have not merely moved away from the original. We have entered a new phase in the production of information or knowledge, in which the cognitive actor is no longer a reader or a thinker, but a collector of fragments of meaning who redistributes them in forms designed for rapid consumption. “Raccoon culture,” then, is not merely a description of superficiality. It is an accurate description of the degradation of the knowledge chain itself: from creation to summary, from understanding to formal processing, from ideas to something resembling only their faded trace. Yet this phenomenon cannot be understood apart from the technological structure that governs it. Here Marshall McLuhan becomes relevant, with his famous formulation: “The medium is the message.” The problem lies not only in content, but also in the form through which that content is transmitted. Contemporary digital media do not simply convey information. They reshape it according to the logic of speed, condensation, and fragmentation. Long texts become unsuitable for consumption, while an idea becomes acceptable only if it can be compressed into a few shareable lines. This transformation produces a striking paradox: we live in a time when access to knowledge is no longer difficult. It is excessively easy. And with that excessive ease comes what might be called a “cognitive illusion”: reading a brief passage or a quick summary can be enough to make a person feel that they have grasped an idea. Yet this feeling of possession is not necessarily accompanied by deep understanding, or by the ability to reconstruct or critique that knowledge. This is where we encounter what might be called the “semi-educated”: people who possess the signs of knowledge but not its structure, its vocabulary but not its internal logic. The problem becomes even more complex when viewed through the lens of attention. Instead of remaining in a state of sustained concentration, as in traditional reading or prolonged reflection, the mind now exists under continuous informational bombardment: notifications, clips, headlines, and successive waves of content. This does not merely fragment attention. It reshapes it according to a logic of constant jumping between short units of meaning, rather than the gradual and cumulative construction of an idea. I am reminded here of a joke that we used to tell and that was widely circulated during the days of popular demonstrations. It vividly illustrates the process of reduction and reshaping of content. After the occupation of Palestine, many popular demonstrations took to the streets chanting, “Down with the Balfour Declaration!” The joke was that by the end of the demonstration, the slogan had become, in Arabic, “Let one fall from above,” a completely different phrase that retained something of the original slogan’s rhythm and sound. This image may help bring us closer to what happens in everyday language when knowledge is transformed into short messages that are collectively repeated. A demonstration begins with a precise political slogan. Through repetition, collective immersion, and sonic rhythm, it gradually turns into a completely different formula. The new version may preserve the rhythm and emotional charge of the original, while losing its meaning and original significance. What remains is no longer the meaning, but the emotional energy of the phrase. Here, in another form, we encounter what Bartlett observed: what matters is not merely what was said, but how it was retold and how it was reinterpreted within a changing social context. If we bring these strands together, we might say that what we are experiencing today is not so much a “collapse of intelligence” as a transformation in the conditions under which intelligence operates. The human mind has not changed radically, but the environment in which it functions has changed profoundly: from an environment that allowed slow accumulation to one that imposes the rapid and fragmented reproduction of knowledge. This transformation creates a permanent tension between two kinds of thinking: reflective thought, which requires time, and rapid thought, which demands an immediate response. Seen in this light, the question “Have we become stupider?” is partly misleading. It may be more accurate to say that we are increasingly exposed to conditions that make deep thinking less stable, or less possible, and knowledge more vulnerable to fragmentation and recycling. As for stupidity, if the term can be used, it may not be a quality of the mind at all, but rather a side effect and a characteristic of the cultural structure that has emerged. It is a technology that reshapes our relationship with the world. Thus, rather than seeing this as a decline in human capacities, we might understand it as a transformation in the “knowledge environment”: an environment in which it has become easy to know something, but harder to truly understand it in depth.
Opinion
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By Youssef Mouawad - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 13:25
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In 2010, Israel violently intercepted the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish ship chartered by a humanitarian NGO to bring aid to the Gaza Strip, which was under Israeli blockade at the time. This was the last straw, and the incident brought the simmering hostility between Erdogan's government and the Jewish state out into the open. (AFP)
The war has not yet ceased in our south, and already it threatens to break out among our neighbors. In other words, we live on borrowed time, lurching from one conflict to the next. And for good reason! The bombing of a Syrian base very nearly escalated into an all-out clash between Ankara and Tel Aviv. That was on August 18, and Benjamin Netanyahu didn't mince his words: his country would not tolerate a Turkish military foothold that could spread into southern Syria. The warning was all the more forceful given that eight strikes had targeted the Abu al-Dhuhur air base, just 70 kilometers from the Turkish border. It's worth recalling, too, that since the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Erdogan has become the chief mentor of the new Syria under Ahmed al-Sharaa, helping rebuild its armed forces and turning it into a strategic partner. This is no longer Hafez al-Assad's Syria Was it this renewed tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv that prompted a meeting between Syria's top diplomat, Assaad Chaibani, and Mossad chief Roman Gofman, in Jordan on August 23? Yet this quiet parley did not spark outrage across the Arab world the way Anwar al-Sadat's surprise visit to Israel did in 1977. A taboo was officially broken—and indeed, who would have imagined such talks taking place under the Baathist regime? Israel might have been expected to welcome this, but contrary to expectations, it halted neither its airstrikes nor its territorial incursions, as seen on August 27 in Quneitra. The fact is, things have changed. Under Hafez al-Assad, Syria was a regional power that, while not exactly formidable, was feared by its immediate neighbors, Arab or otherwise. No one wanted to pick a fight with it, which allowed it to pursue, within certain limits, an assertive foreign policy that often bordered on provocation. As a result, thanks to the autonomy it exercised and the room to maneuver it granted itself, Syria had become, at least geographically, a buffer zone between an "Erdoganist" Turkey flaunting its unabashed brand of Islam on one side, and Israel, a state Jewish to its core, on the other. But now, in a country worn down by Baathist mismanagement and ravaged by years of civil war, Turkey has begun staking its claims—and will inevitably find itself face to face with an Israel that occupies part of Syrian territory. What can we expect? Given the outsized egos of both Netanyahu and Erdogan, and assuming both leaders remain in power, we should brace for an epic showdown across Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian, or even other territories. This will be a fight of feints and dodges, of underhanded tactics as well as head-on attacks, close combat, and rising tensions right up to the breaking point. And this despite a September 2025 report from the Congressional Research Service concluding that direct confrontation between Turkey and Israel remains unlikely, precisely because both states are well aware of the cost such a war would entail. Still, in the realm of conflict studies, leaders and other elites don't always act rationally! All the more so since, in the eyes of Israeli observers, the slogan now popular in Anatolia—"Make Turkey great again"—hardly reassures the Zionist state. Washington will find it increasingly difficult to contain or keep apart two adversaries already gearing up for battle. Turkey, the new Iran? Yes, that's one hypothesis, but only in a face-off with Israel, since Syria has overnight become a zone where 'two security perimeters overlap' — the Turkish and the Israeli, the Muslim and the Jewish. And it can't be ruled out that Shiite militancy, that mobilizer of "proxies," might end up allying itself, even if only temporarily, with a 'Muslim Brotherhood version' of political Islam championed by Ankara! So we would have, against all odds, a Hezbollah backed by its former enemy, Ahmad al-Sharaa, an Islamist who emerged from Jabhat al-Nusra and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham! Against a common adversary, a reversal of alliances is always legitimate and opportune. But this would only be a tactical alliance, dictated by the exigencies of the moment, one that couldn't presume anything about the future. With Arab nationalism now out of the picture, Turkey won't settle for economically capturing the Syrian market of 25 million consumers: it will want to wield political influence in Damascus, and to that end will deploy its military and security apparatus. Since the shaky power of the Syrian president can't fulfill certain sovereign functions or oversee the various branches of the state, it will inevitably turn to the expertise of its northern neighbor. Does this mean Turkey will get sucked into the spiral of 'announced belligerence'? Everything points that way, and we can already see the early signs of a spiral reminiscent of the US involvement in Vietnam under Lyndon Johnson. Indeed, if the Syrian state intends to rebuild itself, it will first need an army capable of quelling the centrifugal tendencies of the Alawites, the Druze, and other factions calling for the country's breakup. And it's up to Ankara to provide that and to bolster the central authority based in Damascus. But Israel, which has gotten into bad habits in Syria and intends to keep its freedom of aerial action there, cannot tolerate an army built along NATO lines that could serve as a proxy for a neo-Ottoman venture. And Lebanon, from primary stage to secondary stage? A new stage is now set for a new script that will define new rules of the game! What will become of Hezbollah, caught in a trap? Well, in that scenario, it could benefit, even if only partly, from Damascus's logistical support — support it has sorely lacked since the fall of Bashar al-Assad. And perhaps, through a shift in the tectonic plates, Lebanon would move from being the initial stage to being merely a secondary stage of a regional conflict. But frankly, that would do us a lot of good!
Today's Essential
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By LevantTime . - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 00:55
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The ICRC convoy carrying the released civilians left the area occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon and traveled to the point marking the start of the zone controlled by the Lebanese authorities. (AFP)
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced on Friday that it had transferred four more people released by Israel to Lebanon, a day after the release of a first civilian. They are three Lebanese nationals and two Syrians, according to the ICRC. This is the first time such an operation has taken place since negotiations between Lebanon and Israel began in April under US auspices. During the last round of talks in August, Beirut had requested the release of a first group of its nationals captured by Israel in southern Lebanon, where Israel is at war with the pro-Iranian Hezbollah. Their relatives estimate their number at around thirty, including fighters from the Islamist movement. In a statement, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun thanked the United States and the ICRC, saying the release "confirmed the soundness of the position" taken by Lebanon, which is engaged in negotiations with Israel that Hezbollah rejects. On Thursday, the United States praised "the government of Israel and the government of Lebanon for demonstrating good faith through these initial steps," expressing hope that this would "serve as a foundation for broader discussions on other civilian matters." The two countries are set to hold another round of negotiations in September, though the date has not yet been set. According to the Israeli prime minister's office, Thursday's announcement "follows efforts by Israel and Lebanon to locate and repatriate the remains of Jewish community leaders who were kidnapped and killed in Lebanon" between 1984 and 1986. Israeli strikes intensify On the ground, Israeli strikes killed three people and wounded 23 others on Friday in southern and eastern Lebanon. Israel stepped up its strikes in the region on Friday, after announcing Thursday evening that it had taken control of the Ali Taher mountain ridge, which had served as a strategic position for the pro-Iranian Hezbollah and overlooks Nabatiyeh, among other areas. The army will now reinforce its positions there in order to "prevent the enemy from retaking the area," said Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz. A strike also hit the Tyre region, particularly the village of Rmadiyé, according to the National News Agency (NNA). For Trump, the war in Iran is "small potatoes" Regarding the war in Iran, US President Donald Trump sought on Friday to downplay its impact on the United States ahead of the crucial midterm elections. "A lot of people aren't calling it a war. I call it a military conflict, because it's small potatoes for us. It's not a big deal. We did Venezuela, and we did that," he told reporters in the Oval Office when asked about his vice president, JD Vance, who had said the day before that he didn't want to call the conflict a war. With fuel prices surging because of the war and threatening to cost Donald Trump's Republicans their majority in Congress in November's midterm elections, his administration is working to downplay the scale of the conflict. According to the president, the United States is carrying out "targeted strikes," insisting that it is "not currently engaged in fighting." He also claimed that the United States controlled the Strait of Hormuz and had wiped out Iran's armed forces. "What we've accomplished is remarkable. We took control of Venezuela, and we've essentially taken control of Iran," he said.
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Persistent escalation between the US and Iran over the Strait of Hormuz

Tensions between the Americans and Iranians had been gradually escalating for several days, against a backdrop of Iranian strikes on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The worst-case scenario materialized overnight Wednesday into Thursday: the Americans launched heavy strikes on Iran, as US President Donald Trump had threatened the day before. Iran, true to form, fired missiles at several Gulf countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar — and this time added Jordan to the list. Jordan intercepted 10 missiles fired at its territory around midday. A significant escalation, to say the least. The American strikes on Iranian soil are the heaviest in months: the province of Bushehr, in particular, was targeted by missiles that struck within the perimeter of the nuclear site located in the region, according to Iranian media. A provincial official denied mid-afternoon that Kharg Island — through which the bulk of Iranian oil is exported — had been hit. US Central Command announced in a post on X that it had struck nearly 90 military targets in Iran by Thursday morning. The Iranian regime reported 14 deaths and 78 injuries over the past two days, and accused the United States of war crimes for what it called 'strikes on civilian infrastructure,' specifically bridges and the railway leading to the city of Mashhad. The rhetoric matched the renewed tensions on the ground, this time coming from Iran's chief negotiator, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Ghalibaf. He declared that 'the Strait of Hormuz will only reopen on Iran's terms, not under the pressure of American threats.' Indeed, the strait remained closed yesterday due to the tensions, reflecting an unchanged Iranian stance. There was no indication on Thursday that tensions would ease or that negotiations would resume anytime soon, even as Donald Trump said during the day that 'the Iranians have called and want to make a deal,' while adding that he was no longer confident in 'their willingness to honor any agreement.' Pakistani and Qatari mediators worked to push for a return to calm. But broadly speaking, Iran appears increasingly isolated. Echoing statements made the day before by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte — who had called for firmness against the Iranian regime — French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said Thursday that it was Iran that had violated its agreement with the United States, and that its 'maneuvers' must stop if negotiations were to continue. In the meantime, Iranians pressed on with the drawn-out ordeal of the endless funeral ceremonies for their assassinated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his family. The coffins arrived in Mashhad during the day for burial — an event somewhat overshadowed by the American strikes. Yet crowds still turned out, along with the usual bellicose chants calling for Trump's death. The Israelis, who have been allied with the Americans throughout this conflict with Iran, made no official comment on the latest escalation. However, according to leaks in Israeli media, Israeli sources confirmed that the army remained ready to respond to any potential Iranian attack. A diplomatic flurry in Beirut As usual, Lebanon is acting as a sounding board for events unfolding across the region. The Lebanese capital was the scene of a flurry of diplomatic activity on Thursday, with a series of visits by US Ambassador Michael Issa alongside a tour by an Iranian delegation. Issa's main visit was to Baabda, where he met with President Joseph Aoun to deliver the official invitation for his visit to Washington on July 21. He also took the opportunity to discuss the implementation of the framework agreement signed by Israel, Lebanon, and the United States, particularly regarding the mechanism for the Israeli withdrawal from pilot zones, where the IDF is to be replaced by the Lebanese army "without leaving a vacuum." The key announcement was that an American delegation would be arriving within the coming days to oversee the process. Mr. Issa also met with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berry and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. As for the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, all eyes are on Rome on July 15 and 16, a change of venue that has unsettled the Lebanese side, which fears a less effective American involvement — previous rounds having taken place in Washington. The change of venue does not signal a lesser American commitment, but is due to logistical considerations, as the U.S. Ambassador assured President Aoun on Thursday. In turn, the Lebanese president asked him to pressure Israel into complying with the terms of the framework agreement signed with Lebanon in June. On the ground, the Israeli army continues its destruction in occupied villages, targeting both buildings and tunnels. Thursday was marked by a sharp statement from Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, responding to Trump's remarks the previous day regarding the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. "We did not ask anyone's permission to enter Lebanon, and we will remain there until Hezbollah is disarmed," he declared. For now, Hezbollah is not retaliating against Israeli operations. Concerns about a new escalation in southern Lebanon — should Iran find itself in a difficult position in its confrontation with the United States — were expressed by various sources in the media. The other diplomatic tour on Thursday was that of an Iranian delegation led by the Deputy Foreign Minister. It was received by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berry, to whom it reaffirmed Iran's support for Lebanon. From Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri, the delegation heard remarks reaffirming Lebanon's resolve to stand against any occupation and foreign interference. These statements echoed those of Lebanese Foreign Minister Joe Rajji, who was visiting Cyprus on Thursday and reiterated that Lebanon must stop paying the price for wars it did not choose, and that no single party should ever again monopolize decisions of war and peace — a clear reference to Hezbollah. For the Iranians, times have certainly changed… In this context, it is also worth noting the visits by the Russian Ambassador to President Aoun and to Interior Minister Ahmad Hajjar. Syria removed from the U.S. terrorism list Another major development on Thursday: the U.S. president announced his intention to remove Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Following Trump's meeting with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa the previous day in Turkey, on the sidelines of the NATO summit, this move is the culmination of a process that should allow the young Syrian government to attract greater investment and international engagement. On the Iraqi front, the disarmament of armed groups and the fight against corruption continue to be pursued in tandem. A curious discovery was made on Thursday: an enormous sum of money, stolen from the Treasury, was found hidden inside a rainwater drainage pipe… In Iraq as well, a strike was carried out against a group of Iranian Kurdish dissidents in Iraqi Kurdistan. This is not the first time these groups have been targeted by the Tehran regime, which seeks to maintain its grip on Iraq as much as on Lebanon.

From Excess Power to State Power
By
Samir Abdelmalak
Published

The Middle East is undergoing unprecedented transformations that are reshaping the region’s security and power landscape. After years of open wars and proxy conflicts, the region is gradually moving toward a new approach built on strengthening the nation-state, reducing the influence of non-state armed organizations, and rebuilding military and security institutions as the sole guarantor of stability. Against this backdrop, Lebanon has a rare opportunity to rethink its defense architecture in a manner that reflects these regional changes while safeguarding its national interests. Over the decades, Hezbollah has accumulated advanced military and technological expertise in command, intelligence, drones, electronic warfare, communications, and logistics. This expertise represents valuable human capital that should not be allowed to go to waste. Instead, within the framework of the state’s legitimate authority, it should be integrated into the Lebanese Armed Forces and the country’s security institutions, thereby strengthening state sovereignty instead of perpetuating divided authority over national security. International experience, from South Africa to Colombia, has consistently shown that ending conflict does not require excluding former fighters or discarding their expertise. Rather, it depends on reintegrating them into state institutions under clear professional and legal standards. The success of any transition ultimately rests on the state’s ability to absorb these capabilities while firmly establishing its exclusive monopoly over the use of force and over the authority to decide on war and peace. The transformations now reshaping the region, together with the new economic and security priorities they impose, make it imperative for Lebanon to launch a national dialogue on a comprehensive defense strategy. This should be accompanied by a plan to modernize the Lebanese Armed Forces, establish a National Center for Defense Innovation and Cybersecurity, and capitalize on Lebanese expertise in advanced technologies and cutting-edge defense industries. The new equation is no longer based on multiple centers of power, but on a state strengthened by its institutions, capable of protecting its borders, earning the confidence of the international community, and attracting investment. The present moment is not one for settling scores, but for building a new national compact that places every talent and every area of expertise at the service of the Republic. States do not recover because one faction prevails over another. They recover when the state itself becomes the only victor, and when arms, sovereign decision-making, and sovereignty itself are brought entirely under the authority of constitutional institutions. Only then can Lebanon open the way toward stability and prosperity in a Middle East that is changing at remarkable speed.

Bypassing Hormuz Is Driving Iran Mad
By
Khairallah Khairallah
Published

At its core, one question demands an answer: what drove Iran to so flagrantly violate the memorandum of understanding it had reached with the United States through the negotiations held in Switzerland with an American delegation led by Vice President J. D. Vance? There are, no doubt, many reasons that may explain Iran’s strange behavior, bordering on irrationality. It prompted President Donald Trump to go so far as to describe Iranian officials as “sick” and “liars” with whom no meaningful dealings are possible. He went even further, using language that revealed profound disappointment with Iran’s leadership before announcing the end of the memorandum of understanding. The most important explanation for Iran’s irrational conduct, however, lies in the determination of the region’s countries to find ways of bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, whether through the Red Sea or the Mediterranean. Such a strategy requires understandings with Jordan and Syria, or with Iraq and Türkiye, to allow oil and gas to reach ports from which they can be exported to Europe and other parts of the world without remaining at Iran’s mercy. Tehran simply realized that time, on which it had long relied, was no longer working in favor of its strategy and that serious efforts were underway to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway it regarded as its principal leverage in confronting the United States. The Gulf states’ search for alternative routes for oil and gas pipelines has deprived the “Islamic Republic” of its strongest card, the very one that persuaded the US administration to conclude the memorandum of understanding with Iran, unaware that it was dealing with a regime unlike any other, one detached from every value associated with international law and respect for the sovereignty of other states. Since its establishment in 1979, the Iranian regime has consistently pursued only one policy: blackmail. In any case, the United States’ decision to launch military strikes in response to attacks by the Revolutionary Guard on commercial tankers, including one Qatari and one Saudi vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz, reflected President Trump’s belated discovery of the true nature of both Iran’s leaders and the regime itself. Even a belated realization is better than no realization at all. Even a delayed recognition of the Iranian regime is preferable to none at all. It should never have taken this long for Donald Trump to understand whom he was dealing with or to realize that the Iranian regime has never changed. At no point has it respected international law or even the most basic humanitarian values. The tragedy inflicted on South Lebanon by the “Islamic Republic” stands as compelling evidence. From Tehran’s perspective, the memorandum of understanding with the US administration was nothing more than an opportunity to buy time. Nor did the regime honor its central provision, namely what Washington understood to be the guarantee of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Keeping Hormuz open was a matter of strategic importance to Trump himself, who regarded falling oil prices as a major achievement that he could present to the American public. He needed that accomplishment to strengthen his standing with ordinary American voters. It therefore came as no surprise that he reacted furiously when the Revolutionary Guard once again began obstructing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. By then, Iran had already realized how seriously the countries of the region were pursuing alternatives to the strait. That explains Tehran’s renewed focus on Yemen and the Houthis, who resumed threatening Saudi Arabia after observing a relatively long period of restraint. For Iran, the Houthis can play a decisive role in disrupting navigation through the Red Sea and preventing oil tankers from passing. It was no coincidence that the “Islamic Republic” violated the internationally imposed restrictions on Sanaa Airport to demonstrate that the Houthis remain one of its strategic cards and are in no position to break free from Tehran’s authority. One further point is of critical importance. Donald Trump is not the only one to have rediscovered the true nature of Iran and the regime in Tehran. Pakistan, too, has come to the simple realization that its mediation between the United States and Iran serves no real purpose. At most, Islamabad can function as another Iranian card, nothing more. The “Islamic Republic” exploited Pakistan to the fullest. Islamabad helped convince the Trump administration that a balanced agreement with Iran was possible, one built on preserving freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s strategy of buying time has ultimately backfired. Before anyone else, the countries of the region have made it clear that they refuse to remain hostage to the Strait of Hormuz. That, more than anything else, explains Tehran’s increasingly irrational behavior, which failed to anticipate that Donald Trump would eventually lose patience and revert once again to the logic of force. Has the war returned? That is the great question, and it is still too early to answer. One thing, however, is certain: depriving the “Islamic Republic” of the Strait of Hormuz as its principal strategic card, and the regional effort to bypass the waterway, prompted Tehran to jeopardize its memorandum of understanding with the United States. After all, what value does such an agreement still have if Iran no longer possesses the Hormuz card with which it could pressure the world and influence global oil and gas prices? The strait was Iran’s trump card. It enabled Tehran to secure a memorandum of understanding under which the United States made significant concessions, including linking Iran to the search for a solution in Lebanon. The regional drive to bypass the Strait of Hormuz is much like taking a favorite toy away from a child. The Revolutionary Guard’s conduct is, in the end, nothing more than the reaction of a child who has just had its favorite toy taken away.

When Sociology White Washes Hezbollah
By
Makram Rabah
Published

There is a logic that reappears every time the question of Hezbollah’s weapons is raised. It tries to present the party not as an armed authority that has confiscated the decision of a sect and a country, but as the natural extension of Lebanon’s Shiite community — as though objecting to Hezbollah were an objection to Shiites themselves, and as though disarming it meant uprooting an entire community from its history, memory, and means of protection. This logic is not only wrong. It is insulting. It reduces Shiites to their fear. It turns their long history into a prelude to a rifle. It treats an entire community as though it cannot exist except inside the network of an armed party — as though Jabal Amel, Najaf, jurisprudence, reform, scholars, intellectuals, farmers, students, merchants, and all the Lebanese Shiite national experiences were nothing more than a preparation for Wilayat al-Faqih. The truth is that Shiites did not begin with Hezbollah, and they will not end with it. Before the party, there was a full history of knowledge, politics, society, moderation, representation, and demands for justice. There was Sayyed Mohsen al-Amin, Imam Musa al-Sadr, Sayyed Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine, Sayyed Hani Fahs. There was a Lebanese Shiite discourse that understood the meaning of the state, the meaning of partnership, and the meaning of dignity — a dignity that cannot be reduced to weapons outside institutions, cannot be measured by the number of rockets, and cannot be sold in the marketplace of regional axes. Hezbollah benefited from fear, from the Israeli occupation, from the absence of the state, from long-standing marginalization, and from real wounds inflicted on the South, the Bekaa, and the southern suburbs. But benefiting from a wound does not give anyone the right to own the body. What may have begun, at a certain moment, as an answer to fear gradually became a permanent system for fabricating fear. The party tells people: I protect you from danger. Then it makes its own existence a permanent reason for summoning danger. It says it protects the South, then turns the South into an open battlefield. It says it protects Shiites, then makes them pay the price of its wars, sanctions, alliances, and decisions in which they have no say. As for the talk of hospitals, schools, loans, salaries, and services, it does not prove the legitimacy of the weapons. It exposes the scale of the catastrophe. When a citizen needs a party in order to be born, to learn, to receive treatment, to borrow money, to work, and to bury his martyr, this is not a supportive environment as much as it is a structure of social captivity. Services do not grant the right to declare war. Assistance does not justify the confiscation of decision-making. A monthly salary does not turn a family into a false witness for the legitimacy of arms. Mafias also provide protection. Totalitarian regimes also distribute bread. Gangs also know how to make people dependent on them. But the question is not what such a power gives. The question is what it takes. And Hezbollah has taken far more than it has given. It has taken the decision of war and peace. It has taken the right to dissent inside the Shiite community. It has taken the image of Shiites in Lebanon and the Arab world. It has taken religion and turned it into a mobilization machine. It has taken martyrdom and turned it into political capital. It has taken fear and transformed it into a long-term contract of submission. The most dangerous thing Hezbollah has done is that it tied the fate of Shiites to its own fate. It made any pressure on it appear as pressure on them, any criticism of it appears as an insult to them, and any attempt to disarm it appear as a threat to their very existence. This is not social genius. It is calculated political blackmail. When the party places a hospital, a school, a loan, a salary, a martyr, and a rocket in the same chain, it is not building a normal society. It is building a large cage — a cage with many service doors, but one that does not allow free political exit. Shiites have every right to ask: Who will protect us? This is a legitimate question. It is a question that must not be dismissed, because the Lebanese state has failed them, as it has failed others, and because the South has paid a heavy price in occupation, wars, and destruction. But a legitimate question must not be turned into an eternal answer in favor of a militia. “Who will protect us?” does not mean that weapons must remain forever outside the state. It does not mean that the decision of a community and a country should remain in the hands of an organization tied to a regional project. It does not mean that people should be forced to choose between the party and annihilation, between the state and slaughter, between Lebanon and Iran. Protection is not achieved by making fear permanent. Protection is achieved through a capable state, one army, one decision, borders that are not controlled by an organization, and a foreign policy that is not run from the southern suburbs or from Tehran. Protection means returning Shiites to the state, not convincing them that the state is impossible and that the party is their only destiny. Those who say that the failure of the state justifies the survival of the militia are like those who say that the failure of a doctor justifies handing the patient over to a charlatan forever. The memory used to justify the weapons is also an incomplete memory. Yes, there is 1978, 1982, the Israeli occupation, and official abandonment. But there is another memory too: the wars at home, the suppression of independent Shiite voices, the accusations of treason against dissenters, the dragging of Lebanon into the 2006 war, the sending of young men to Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, the transformation of the South into a platform in a conflict its people do not decide, and the forcing of people to call defeat victory and ruin steadfastness. No one has the right to speak in the name of Shiite memory while erasing from that memory everything the party has done to Shiites themselves. No one has the right to invoke the images of Israeli occupation in order to prevent questions about the party’s occupation of political decision-making. And no one has the right to turn old fear into a title deed over the future. Shiites are bigger than Hezbollah. The South and its villages are not a storage site for Iran’s rockets. The southern suburbs are not a barracks. The Bekaa is not a military corridor. Martyrdom is not a blank check in the hands of a party. Religion is not a party card. Deprivation is not an eternal license to confiscate the state. Memory is not a prison. Fear is not an identity. What is required is not to leave Shiites without protection, but to liberate them from a false equation that tells them their protection can only come from the force that has confiscated their decision. What is required is not to ignore their wounds, but to prevent the trading of these wounds. What is required is not to deny that the state has failed, but to reject the transformation of that failure into a permanent mandate for an armed party. A state is built when it is reclaimed from militias, not when what remains of it is handed over to them. The worst kind of defense of Shiites is the one that presents them as a community trapped inside a single fate, with no future except weapons, no security except the party, and no dignity except in a project whose decision they do not own. This defense may appear, on the surface, to be sympathy. In essence, it is erasure. It does not see the Shiite as a free citizen, but as a frightened dependent who needs an armed guardian to explain to him the meaning of survival. The truth is simpler than all this rhetoric: Hezbollah no longer protects Shiites from danger. It has become the danger from which it asks them to fear everything except itself. And when protection becomes captivity, when victimhood becomes trade, and when weapons become destiny, the duty of speech is not to ask how to preserve this system, but how to liberate people from it. A community that produced scholars, reformers, resistance figures, thinkers, and citizens must not be reduced to an organization, especially one that has failed morally before it ever did politically. People who paid the price of occupation, wars, and abandonment must not be asked to pay new prices so that the party may remain above the state. Anyone who truly wants to do justice to Shiites should begin by recognizing that they belong to no one — not to a party, not to an axis, and not to a Supreme Leader. Shiites are Lebanese citizens. Their protection lies in a state that protects them, not in a militia that uses their fear. And their future lies in Lebanon, not in waiting for another war decided by others and paid for by them.

Crisis, Catastrophe and the Shaking of the World (6/7)

This essay offers a journey through the figures of crisis and catastrophe, from ancient cosmologies to the lived experience of the world’s upheaval. By bringing together the Greek, Biblical and Indian traditions with the thought of Jan Patočka, it explores the ways in which civilizations have conceived disorder, collapse, irreversibility, and even the very possibility of action when meaning itself begins to waver. Published here as a series of seven essay-chapters, this text follows a demanding yet essential thread: to understand whether catastrophe is a sudden rupture, a slow disintegration of the world, or the deepest truth of our age. Here follows the sixth part. Decision and War: Arjuna, the Epic Figure of the Mahābhārata, Confronting Carl Schmitt To ward off catastrophe? It cannot be fought. It exerts its own gravity, haunts us, infiltrates the very forms of reason. To separate crisis from catastrophe? Perhaps that is no longer possible: the former has become a rhythm, the latter a horizon. What we call governing is thus reduced to a fragile art: remaining on the line of uncertainty where the world oscillates between its end and its beginning anew. Schmitt’s thesis that “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” elevates crisis into the moment of truth of the political. Yet this elevation can only be fully understood when situated within the broader horizon of catastrophe. For Schmitt, the state of exception never emerges as a mere accident affecting an otherwise stable order. It always unfolds against the backdrop of a real or anticipated threat of the collapse of the juridical and institutional order. Catastrophe thus fulfills an essential hermeneutical function: it provides the very condition through which crisis becomes intelligible, thereby justifying the necessity of a sovereign decision capable of preventing the dissolution of the political into anomie. [1] Within this perspective, the vocabulary of urgency, necessity, and existential peril serves not merely to describe an extreme situation. It helps constitute the stage upon which sovereignty can appear. Catastrophe becomes less an empirical event than a conceptual framing, a dramatic threshold where the political is reduced to its pure possibility. Far from being contingent, the exception functions as a dispositif continually returning law to its extra-normative origin: the act of deciding. Such a dramaturgy nevertheless calls for critical distance. By identifying catastrophe as the founding moment of the political, Schmitt tends to naturalize a vision of the world in which collective survival is perpetually threatened, thereby legitimizing a capacity for decision without genuine limits. Such a framework obscures the possibility that legal orders may themselves incorporate mechanisms of internal resilience: graduated procedures, institutional safeguards, and exceptional norms specifically designed to prevent crises from degenerating into collapse. By presupposing that only a sovereign decision can avert catastrophe, Schmitt constructs a topology of the political in which the exception becomes the implicit keystone of all normativity. Seen in relation to catastrophe, the Schmittian crisis therefore appears less as an objective fact than as a conceptual structure intended to legitimize a form of power that affirms itself through the suspension of the rule. The fragility revealed by the exception concerns not only the juridical order itself; it also affects the very mode of thought that transforms it into the instrument of sovereignty. By closely binding together decision and catastrophe, Schmitt offers a conception of the political grounded in extremity, at the risk of confusing the exception with the latent norm of collective life. Giorgio Agamben carries this logic to its point of reversal. Arguing in Homo Sacer and State of Exception that the boundary between norm and exception has dissolved, he maintains that the state of exception is no longer an interruption but the contemporary paradigm of government. [2] Schmitt’s sovereign, the concentrated figure of power, gives way to a diffuse administration of life in which “bare life” is exposed to a power capable of indefinite expansion. Catastrophe is no longer an external threat justifying decision, but a permanent structure of modern politics: a mode of biopolitical governance that generalizes emergency while blurring the very distinction between legality and illegality. In this way, Agamben shows that Schmitt’s thought, originally conceived to think the exception, paradoxically finds its fulfillment in a world where the exception itself has become the rule. In The Endless Crisis: Essay on the Modern Experience of Time , Myriam Revault d’Allonnes argues that crisis possesses a constitutive ambivalence: it is both the temporal form proper to modernity, a world held in suspension and traversed by permanent transformation, and the paradoxical sign of the exhaustion of the political once that crisis becomes permanent. But if all temporality becomes indistinguishable from crisis, what remains of the decisive moment? Where Schmitt saw in the exception the original scene of sovereignty, Revault d’Allonnes instead diagnoses the dissolution of the bond that once united crisis and decision. [3] Krisis , etymologically the moment of judgment, gradually slides into chronic inertia: instead of opening a space for intervention, it becomes the indeterminate background of a world governed by management. This shift profoundly transforms the very structure of the political. Crisis is no longer a singular event calling for a sovereign act; it becomes an ordinary condition, monitored, quantified and administered through mechanisms of forecasting and optimization. In this form, it ceases to represent a critical threshold and becomes instead a logic of neutralization: crisis is anticipated, modeled and absorbed into technical protocols of regulation. The political is therefore no longer defined by its capacity to decide, but by its ability to stabilize continuously a world perceived as intrinsically unstable. Within such a context, catastrophe comes to occupy the place vacated by crisis. Whereas crisis has been absorbed into the routines of government, catastrophe becomes the only form of event capable of reactivating the decisional gesture. Far from constituting an unpredictable rupture, it functions as a regulative horizon: a specter invoked to justify the exception, to reintroduce sovereign decision where the normalization of crisis no longer provides the opportunity for it. This reversal sheds light on the manner in which contemporary powers mobilize the possibility of collapse, whether climatic, sanitary, financial or security-related, in order to legitimize exceptional measures that have become integrated into the very normality of governance. This development belongs to what may be called a bio-datapolitical paradigm: an architecture of power characteristic of the technoscientific age, in which the management of living beings and the management of data have become inseparably intertwined. The biological and the digital, life and information, now constitute the twin vectors of a rationality oriented toward anticipation, modeling and preventive regulation. The issue is no longer merely, as in Foucauldian biopolitics, the governance of populations. It is now the production of calculable environments, predictable behaviors and quantifiable risks. Technoscience is no longer an instrument placed at the service of politics; it has become the very condition of its possibility, its deepest infrastructure. Biopolitics governs life; bio-datapolitics formalizes life into data in order to render it anticipable, modulable and algorithmically governable. This paradigm finds profound resonances in the cosmology of karman, in which every act ( karman ) is inscribed as an immanent trace and a power of persistence, accumulating within a causal continuity that exceeds the instant of its accomplishment. The subject thus appears less as an autonomous agent than as the nodal point of a chain of embedded causalities, traversed by integrated determinations that configure its possible futures. The world presents itself as a fabric of invisible yet operative correlations, in which the infrastructure of reality is conceived as the relational intelligibility of becoming: a socio-cosmic matrix where action, consequence and the disposition of existences articulate themselves according to a rationality that is at once normative, processual and profoundly stratified. [4] Where Vedic thought articulated an operative ontology of the world through ritual, the digital age seems to establish a computational ontology of reality, in which the real is continually produced as the effect of calculation, modeling and optimization. Within such an algorithmic universe, crisis loses its historical intensity. It is de-singularized, de-dramatized and reduced to a variable within adaptive systems oriented toward the continuous processing of weak signals, whether in public health, financial markets, climate or security. Politics is reduced to a permanent loop of adjustments, calibrations and preventive responses. Catastrophe, by contrast, acquires a paradoxical function: far from being merely the collapse that is feared, it becomes the imaginary mechanism through which the exception is naturalized, decisions are automated, and the logic of surveillance and control is indefinitely expanded in the name of emergencies yet to come. To think the future of the political therefore requires re-examining the entanglement of crisis and catastrophe in light of algorithmic techno-capitalism. Not in order to surrender to an apocalyptic vision of the present, but to recover the possibility of a critique that refuses to be absorbed into the derealization of power, a power that governs less through decisions than through correlations, less through law than through calculation, and less through events than through their indefinite anticipation. The encounter with the Bhagavad-Gītā , that philosophical and spiritual dialogue at the heart of the Mahābhārata , in which Krishna instructs Arjuna concerning action, duty and lucidity, makes it possible to shift decisively the way we think decision, crisis and catastrophe. Where Schmitt sees in crisis the justification for decisive power, the Indian text instead makes it the site of an inner teaching. The opening scene, in which Arjuna stands paralyzed before the symbolic collapse of the warrior order, is indeed a crisis, but not a Schmittian one. It requires no suspension of the norm. Rather, it reveals that action can never be grounded upon an external norm. Crisis is an inner catastrophe, the dissolution of all bearings, the impossibility of acting, which calls not for a decisionist sovereign but for a transformation of perception. Genuine decision arises not from the exception but from disidentification. Krishna teaches Arjuna that action must be free of appropriation ( niṣkāma karma ), that the subject of action is not the ego, and that only a non-egological vision of the order of the world ( dharma ) can render action just. Decision is therefore not rupture but understanding; not the suspension of the norm, but an intuition of reality. Where Schmitt maintains that the sovereign founds order through decision, the Gītā suggests instead that the cosmic order, ṛta and dharma , alone makes possible a decision that is not violence. [5] This reversal becomes even more profound when the Bhagavad-Gītā addresses catastrophe. In Schmitt and Agamben, catastrophe appears as the framework within which the political reveals itself: either as the horizon of exceptional power or as the diffuse norm of government. In the Gītā , however, it belongs to an entirely different order: it is internal, existential and cognitive. During the theophany (Chapter XI), the vision of Time, the destroyer of worlds ( kālo ’smi lokakṣayakṛt ), refers not to political collapse but to the cosmic truth of becoming, dissolving the illusion of sovereign mastery over the world. Faced with this ontological catastrophe, the issue is not to decide more forcefully, but to understand that every truly just decision presupposes a passage through fear and a reconfiguration of one’s relationship to action. Catastrophe, far from justifying sovereignty, becomes a pedagogy of detachment. This rereading proves especially fruitful in relation to the contemporary condition. Whereas bio-datapolitics transforms crisis into the algorithmic management of the future, the Gītā proposes a different relationship to time: an intensified present aligned with dharma , where action depends neither upon the fear of catastrophe nor upon its governmental instrumentalization. The subject is no longer sovereign but processual, traversed by the guṇas , while agency itself can never be reduced to a reaction to weak signals. Thus, in the light of the Gītā , sovereignty undergoes a profound requalification. True sovereignty is not the capacity to suspend the norm, but the capacity to detach oneself from oneself. It is not decisional but inward; not rooted in collapse, but in lucidity. Neither crisis nor catastrophe founds order: both merely reveal the illusions of the subject who believes himself to govern, as well as the limits of models that ground action upon urgency, fear or technological anticipation. The Gītā does not deny crisis; it transfigures it. It does not deny catastrophe; it cosmologizes it. It does not deny decision; it de-psychologizes it. In doing so, it opens a path that escapes both Schmittian decisionism, Agamben’s normalized exception, and the endless crisis of algorithmic governance: another conception of the subject, of time and of action, one that relocates the political toward a non-sovereign sovereignty. Modern political thought has often inscribed action within a logic of rupture. For Schmitt, sovereignty manifests itself in the decision taken under conditions of exception, that is, in the capacity to decide when order itself appears to waver. This dramatic conception of the political makes crisis the moment of truth and catastrophe the horizon that justifies the suspension of norms. Yet such a philosophy of action, founded upon urgency, reaches its limits once crisis ceases to be an event and becomes a permanent condition. As Myriam Revault d’Allonnes has shown, late modernity transforms crisis into a diffuse temporal structure: it is no longer a decisive moment but an indefinite temporality, administered and absorbed into systems of anticipation to the point of obliterating the very possibility of decision. Within today’s bio-datapolitical framework, marked by the centrality of algorithmic models, political action gradually shifts from intervention to calculation, from deliberation to reaction to weak signals. The subject itself is configured as an operator of adjustment rather than as a genuine power of action. It is precisely here that the Bhagavad-Gītā , especially when reread through Bal Gangadhar Tilak, opens a radically different philosophical perspective. The crisis that inaugurates the text, Arjuna’s paralysis before the symbolic collapse of the warrior order, has nothing Schmittian about it: it requires neither the suspension of the norm nor the emergence of a sovereign. Rather, it reveals an inner truth: action can be legitimate only if it has been wrested away from fear, calculation and appropriation. [6] Tilak powerfully demonstrates that the Gītā teaches neither withdrawal nor renunciation, but a transformation of subjectivity that makes just action possible. Far from reducing politics to sovereign decision, he argues that action in accordance with dharma precedes every sovereign decision because it arises from an adequate relationship to reality. The agent does not act in order to avert collapse; he acts because his action participates in a cosmic order of which he is neither the master nor the center. The Gītā thus transforms the very notion of crisis. Crisis is not a political threshold but a trial of perception. The true catastrophe is not external disaster but the inward collapse of the subject who discovers that action can no longer rely upon familiar points of reference. The theophany of Chapter XI, in which Krishna reveals himself as “Time become the destroyer of worlds,” does not constitute a political apocalypse; it unveils the ontological structure of becoming. It is not the world that collapses, but the illusion of the sovereign subject. In this sense, catastrophe is not the foundation of an exceptional decision: it is an event of truth dissolving the very idea of sovereignty understood as autonomous power. This perspective stands in direct opposition to the contemporary logic of algorithmic governance. Whereas systems of prediction transform crisis into a variable of permanent management, the Gītā proposes a temporality grounded in the intensity of the present. To act according to dharma is to free oneself from the primacy of the future over the present, to break with the reactive dynamics of anxious anticipation. Tilak emphasizes that genuine action emerges precisely where the subject ceases to be determined by the fear of consequences: just action is not an effect of risk, but the expression of an inner alignment. Within the horizon of this philosophy, sovereignty is no longer the capacity to decide in urgency, but the capacity to free oneself from the affective and heuristic determinations governing reaction. One then understands that the Gītā , especially as interpreted by Tilak, profoundly reconfigures the field of political philosophy. It shifts sovereignty from the register of decision to that of availability. [7] It rejects the notion that crisis or catastrophe can found the political: both reveal only the illusion of a subject who believed himself master of order and capable of suspending its course. What the Gītā illuminates is that action owes nothing to rupture and everything to lucidity. It depends not upon collapse, but upon a deeper understanding of our place within reality. Far from justifying power through threat, it dissolves power into an ethic of non-appropriative engagement. Thus the Gītā offers a major conceptual alternative to Western models of crisis and exception. It denies neither the world’s vulnerability nor history’s instability, but it refuses to make either the engine of the political. Instead, it proposes an ontology of action in which sovereignty ceases to be the exceptional gesture of a transcendent subject and becomes the manner in which a transfigured subjectivity assumes its place within the fabric of becoming. In this sense, it invites us to rethink the very possibility of action in a world saturated by crises and haunted by catastrophe: not by seeking to master the exception, but by learning to act without it. This shift, however, becomes intelligible only if we recognize that every theory of government rests, whether explicitly or implicitly, upon an underlying cosmology. To govern always means, in one way or another, to situate oneself within an implicit cosmology. Crisis can therefore be nothing other than a misalignment within the world itself; catastrophe, for its part, belongs not merely to the order of events but to a transformation in the very cosmological regime of reality. The return to both the Biblical and the Sanskrit traditions is therefore of decisive importance, for it enables the reconstruction of the deepest layers of what may be called a political cosmosophy. By this we mean a way of thinking the political from within its cosmological foundations, situating it within a comprehensive conception of the order of the world ( cosmos ), of time and of becoming. Political cosmosophy does not regard the political as an autonomous domain, reduced to institutions, sovereignty or norms. Rather, it understands it as a modulation of a more fundamental cosmic order, capable of unfolding according to different regimes: cyclical, eschatological, chaotic or algorithmic. ⸻ [1] Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty , trans. George Schwab, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985 (orig. ed. 1922), p. 5. [2] See Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception , trans. Kevin Attell, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005; and Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life , trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. [3] Myriam Revault d’Allonnes, La Crise sans fin. Essai sur l’expérience moderne du temps , Paris: Seuil, 2012, especially the Introduction. [4] In Cooking the World: Ritual and Thought in Ancient India (Paris: La Découverte, 1989), Charles Malamoud demonstrates a decisive structure of Vedic thought: reality is not primarily constituted as an object of representation or contemplation, but as a field of effective operations traversed by ritual procedures that ensure both its transformation and its intelligibility. Within this perspective, ritual cannot be understood as a secondary language signifying an already constituted cosmic order. On the contrary, it is a productive dispositif through which reality comes into being under differentiated forms. Malamoud’s analysis of cooking ( pāka ) plays a paradigmatic role here: it condenses a single logic of transformation simultaneously involving matter, form and meaning. Cooking, in this framework, designates not merely a technical operation but a genuine transmutation of reality in which the state of things, their symbolic status and their cosmological inscription are jointly reconfigured. Vedic thought may therefore be understood as a form of operative ontology, insofar as being is never given as a stable substance but always as the provisional result of a set of regulated operations. This ontology unfolds through a differentiated continuity linking three mutually corresponding registers rather than opposing them: technical gesture as the material organization of action; ritual efficacy as the internal normative validity of that action; and cosmic transformation as the ontological correlate of the accomplished rite. What emerges decisively from Malamoud’s work is that these levels do not belong to heterogeneous spheres, technical, symbolic and metaphysical, but to one and the same logic of the transitivity of reality. The Vedic world thus appears as a continuum of operations in which reality is never simply observed but continually produced, adjusted and stabilized through chains of efficacious gestures. A rationality of action thus takes shape that refuses to separate knowledge from operation or technique from cosmos. The world is not an external object to be described but the internal correlate of a regulated praxis in which knowing and transforming coincide within a single operative economy of reality. By extending Malamoud’s approach, it becomes possible to illuminate the contemporary regime of the operativity of reality in a new way. This structure enables us to think the contemporary mutation of the world as a transition from a ritual-symbolic operativity to an algorithmic and infrastructural operativity. Reality becomes a field of generalized calculability in which operativity no longer proceeds through ritual but through continuous technical dispositifs organizing in advance the very conditions of action, perception and decision. Algorithmic infrastructure no longer merely processes reality; it configures it, partitions it and renders it anticipable. It thus institutes a form of immanent ritualization grounded no longer in symbolic or sacred mediation, but in the automated repetition of computational sequences structuring behaviors and orienting conduct. [5] Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgita , London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948, pp. 91-118. [6] Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Shrimad Bhagavad Gita Rahasya, or Karma-Yoga-Shastra , Poona: Tilak Bros., 1915 (English translation of the original Marathi), especially the sections devoted to the doctrine of karma-yoga and to the interpretation of the Bhagavad-Gītā as a teaching of selfless action ( niṣkāma karma ). [7] Nagappa K. Gowda, “The Sthitaprajna as the Foundation of the Nation: Tilak and the Gita Rahasya,” in The Bhagavadgita in the Nationalist Discourse , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. The author analyzes Tilak’s interpretation of the Bhagavad-Gītā , showing how he transforms the figure of Arjuna into the ethical subjectivity of dharma .

Trump’s “The MOU Is Over”: A Tactical Move or a Statement of Fact?

Is the ceasefire between Washington and Tehran entering its final days – or even its final hours? The question has taken on renewed urgency since Wednesday morning, as tensions between the two capitals have escalated sharply amid a new military standoff over the Strait of Hormuz. Since the end of the Israeli-American military campaign against its territory, the Islamic Republic has pursued a policy of brinkmanship, pushing its provocation to the limit in an effort to extract as many concessions as possible from President Donald Trump under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) the two countries signed last June. Tehran appears to be betting that Trump’s preference for a diplomatic resolution to the conlict – driven by economic, financial and U.S. domestic political considerations – in order to push the envelope further without fearing that negotiations, which are expected to resume in the coming weeks, will be called into question. Is Tehran also testing Trump’s patience? That, too, is a legitimate question. Whatever the answer, the Islamic Republic is playing a dangerous game. Its strategy could ultimately shatter the Memorandum of Understanding and prompt the U.S. president to follow through on his threats of a large-scale – but limited – military operation aimed at forcing the Iranian leadership in accepting his terms. By sounding the death knell for the June agreement with the terse but unequivocal declaration, “The MOU is over,” on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara, and by calling the leaders of the Islamic Republic every name in the book – the mildest of which were “liars” and “sick people” – President Donald Trump made no secret of his exasperation. Yet he stopped short of announcing measures suggesting a complete break. Instead, he said it would be up to his negotiators to decide whether talks with the Islamic Republic should continue. If they choose to do so, he added, they will have to report back to him. Still, late Wednesday evening, Trump sought to make clear the extent of his frustration. “I’m not sure I want to make a deal with them [the Iranian leaders],” he said. “We can play games, but I’m not sure I want to make a deal. Let’s just finish the job.” Asked by a reporter what had changed, given that he had praised some senior Iranian officials just last month, President Trump replied: “I got to know them.” U.S. Strikes Against 80 Targets Iran has its own calculations. Donald Trump has his own as well. The question is which side will ultimately prevail. The latests U.S. statements came after another overnight flare-up of violence around the Strait of Hormuz, triggered by Iranian fire earlier on Tuesday against three oil tankers transiting the Omani shipping corridor, which Tehran rejects. According to Washington, the attacks constitued a blatant violation of the June ceasefire. The U.S. response was immediate: the reinstatement of the ban on the production and sale of Iranian oil and its derivatives. A few hours later, U.S. forces launched strikes against more than 80 military targets in Iran, leaving eight people dead, according to Iranian media. Explosions were reported near the Strait of Hormuz, particularly around Bushehr, not far from Kharg Island, the country’s main oil export terminal. The Islamic Republic retaliated by striking back, claiming through state media that it had targeted “85 U.S. military facilities located at bases in Kuwait and Bahrain,” as reported by Iranian media. In Kuwait, the Iranian strikes caused widespread power outages. Threats and Counterthreats Wednesday was marked by a succession of American threats and Iranian counterthreats, with Tehran – whose bad faith is by now well established – arguing that Washington was the party that violated the ceasefire and that “Donald Trump should bear the consequences himself,” according to Ali Akbar Velayati, an adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. In a post on his X account, Velayati warned that “the axis of resistance will not stand idly by if American adventurism continues,” a reference to the possible involvement of Iran’s regional proxies. Tehran also vowed to take “decisive measures” to defend its interests if Washington were to step up the pressure. Iran’s military command warned that “any country facilitating U.S. military operations against Iranian territory would become a legitimate target,” in a thinly veiled threat aimed at Bahrain and Kuwait. But in this dangerous game, Iran finds itself virtually alone. The United States, Europe, and the Gulf countries all reject what Tehran is attempting to impose by force: exclusive control over the strategic Strait of Hormuz, which would allow it to exert influence over global maritime trade and compensate for the erosion of its regional influence. In Ankara, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz echoed international opposition to Iran’s ambitions. Rutte said the U.S. response was “absolutely necessary,” arguing that a firm stance toward Iran was essential. The German chancellor described it as “fully justified.” Donald Trump did reiterate his threats against the Islamic Republic throughout Wednesday, but the tone he struck this time was noytably different from his previous statements. The U.S. president appears ready to cross that threshold, as American and Israeli media reported possible Israeli-U.S. coordination in this context. For Trump, however, the pressure would continue to mount: the restoration of a maritime blockade, control of the strategic island of Kharg, and the resumption of military strikes. He announced late Wednesday afternoon that attacks against Iranian military targets “could resume overnight.” Later that day, CENTCOM announced on its Telegram channel that “more than 20 U.S. warships are patrolling the waters of the Middle East – with providing further details – to ensure stability and security.” The announcement was a reminder of the U.S. military presence in the region. NATO, Syria and Lebanon The NATO summit, during which the U.S. president addressed several issues, was expected to set the record straight on several issues. Although he was highly critical of NATO and of European countries that he said had failed to support him in his war against Iran, Donald Trump announced that he had no intention of withdrawing from the alliance. He also said he was considering selling F-35 fighter jets, the crown jewels of the U.S. military aviation, to Ankara – a move likely to anger Tel Aviv – and removing Syria from U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Regarding Lebanon, Trump referred to Israel’s stated willingness to withdraw from the areas it still occupies in the southern part of the country, but did not elaborate. He placed the withdrawal within the framework of ongoing negotiations between Tel Aviv and Beirut, which are expected to resume in Rome on July 15 and 16. According to several media reports, Lebanese authorities have yet to be officially informed by the Washington of those dates and have expressed reservations about the announcement, which was made without prior consultation with them. The dates and location were specified by Italy and Israel. According to the same sources, Lebanon has made Israel’s withdrawal from two “pilot areas,” as provided for in the framework agreement, a condition for attending the Rome talks. Another important engagement for Lebanon is President Joseph Aoun’s official visit to Washington on July 21, at the invitation of his U.S. counterpart. The Lebanese Embassy in Washington announced the visit on Wednesday. The invitation is expected to be formally delivered to President Aoun in the coming hours by U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa. The main focus of the discussions will be the implementation of the framework agreement recently signed between Israel and Lebanon, which notably provides for the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and Hezbollah’s disarmament. In this context, it is worth noting that President Trump was asked about possible Syrian involvement in Hezbollah’s disarmament on the sidelines of the NATO summit. His response was less categorical than his previous positions on the issue. “They could help. We’ll see. I think progress is being made, and I think they could do a good job,” he said.