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Have We Become Stupider?

Or Are We Experiencing a Transformation in the Structure of Knowledge?
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By Mona Fayad
Published Sep 5, 2026 - 20:01
The question “Has the world become stupider?” frequently returns in contemporary debates about digital media, search engines, and social networks. On the surface, it seems simple. Yet behind it lies a deeper issue concerning the very nature of knowledge: how it is produced, how it is transmitted, and how it is consumed. Perhaps “Have we become stupider?” is not the most accurate question. A better one might be: Is knowledge still being transmitted in a way that allows it to be understood and made productive? Do most readers still go back to the original texts? Or do they turn instead to summaries and to what is said about those texts through material circulating among readers? One key to understanding this phenomenon lies in the work of British psychologist Frederic Bartlett, who conducted a series of experiments in the 1930s on what he called “serial reproduction.” In these experiments, one person would be asked to hear a story and then retell it to someone else, who would in turn retell it to a third person, and so on. The results were striking: with each new transmission, the story was not conveyed as it had originally been told, but was reformulated. Some details were omitted, others were exaggerated, and still others were replaced by elements that better suited the recipient’s background, experience, and culture. By the time the chain had passed through enough people, the original story had become something entirely different. This simple model reveals a fundamental truth: memory is not a neutral container, but a mechanism of reconstruction. When knowledge passes through multiple intermediaries, it is not “preserved” but “reproduced.” Here we begin to see the resemblance to our contemporary world, and with it the fear that we may be becoming stupider. In the age of digital media, knowledge no longer travels through oral transmission, but through chains of mediation: an article is summarized, then quoted, then reposted as a short post, before being further reduced to a sentence or a headline. In this context, we might borrow a metaphor that appeared in a journalistic text: a library whose books are gradually replaced by summaries, then by summaries of summaries, until the reader is left facing layer upon layer of reduction. We might call this the “raccoon chain”: the raccoon does not read the original, but rummages through what remains of it. It is worth clarifying that the choice of the “raccoon” is not arbitrary. The metaphor symbolically condenses a cognitive condition that is becoming increasingly entrenched. This animal, which lives on the fringes of cities and rummages through garbage bins, does not produce its own food but feeds on the leftovers of what others have produced. Despite its practical intelligence and its ability to pry things apart, pick through them, and seize what is useful, it does not understand what lies before it. It treats things simply as material available for immediate use. This is what knowledge begins to look like in an age of serial reduction: texts are shortened, then shortened again, until all that remains are scraps of meaning, rearranged and circulated without any genuine connection to their source. At that point, we have not merely moved away from the original. We have entered a new phase in the production of information or knowledge, in which the cognitive actor is no longer a reader or a thinker, but a collector of fragments of meaning who redistributes them in forms designed for rapid consumption. “Raccoon culture,” then, is not merely a description of superficiality. It is an accurate description of the degradation of the knowledge chain itself: from creation to summary, from understanding to formal processing, from ideas to something resembling only their faded trace. Yet this phenomenon cannot be understood apart from the technological structure that governs it. Here Marshall McLuhan becomes relevant, with his famous formulation: “The medium is the message.” The problem lies not only in content, but also in the form through which that content is transmitted. Contemporary digital media do not simply convey information. They reshape it according to the logic of speed, condensation, and fragmentation. Long texts become unsuitable for consumption, while an idea becomes acceptable only if it can be compressed into a few shareable lines. This transformation produces a striking paradox: we live in a time when access to knowledge is no longer difficult. It is excessively easy. And with that excessive ease comes what might be called a “cognitive illusion”: reading a brief passage or a quick summary can be enough to make a person feel that they have grasped an idea. Yet this feeling of possession is not necessarily accompanied by deep understanding, or by the ability to reconstruct or critique that knowledge. This is where we encounter what might be called the “semi-educated”: people who possess the signs of knowledge but not its structure, its vocabulary but not its internal logic. The problem becomes even more complex when viewed through the lens of attention. Instead of remaining in a state of sustained concentration, as in traditional reading or prolonged reflection, the mind now exists under continuous informational bombardment: notifications, clips, headlines, and successive waves of content. This does not merely fragment attention. It reshapes it according to a logic of constant jumping between short units of meaning, rather than the gradual and cumulative construction of an idea. I am reminded here of a joke that we used to tell and that was widely circulated during the days of popular demonstrations. It vividly illustrates the process of reduction and reshaping of content. After the occupation of Palestine, many popular demonstrations took to the streets chanting, “Down with the Balfour Declaration!” The joke was that by the end of the demonstration, the slogan had become, in Arabic, “Let one fall from above,” a completely different phrase that retained something of the original slogan’s rhythm and sound. This image may help bring us closer to what happens in everyday language when knowledge is transformed into short messages that are collectively repeated. A demonstration begins with a precise political slogan. Through repetition, collective immersion, and sonic rhythm, it gradually turns into a completely different formula. The new version may preserve the rhythm and emotional charge of the original, while losing its meaning and original significance. What remains is no longer the meaning, but the emotional energy of the phrase. Here, in another form, we encounter what Bartlett observed: what matters is not merely what was said, but how it was retold and how it was reinterpreted within a changing social context. If we bring these strands together, we might say that what we are experiencing today is not so much a “collapse of intelligence” as a transformation in the conditions under which intelligence operates. The human mind has not changed radically, but the environment in which it functions has changed profoundly: from an environment that allowed slow accumulation to one that imposes the rapid and fragmented reproduction of knowledge. This transformation creates a permanent tension between two kinds of thinking: reflective thought, which requires time, and rapid thought, which demands an immediate response. Seen in this light, the question “Have we become stupider?” is partly misleading. It may be more accurate to say that we are increasingly exposed to conditions that make deep thinking less stable, or less possible, and knowledge more vulnerable to fragmentation and recycling. As for stupidity, if the term can be used, it may not be a quality of the mind at all, but rather a side effect and a characteristic of the cultural structure that has emerged. It is a technology that reshapes our relationship with the world. Thus, rather than seeing this as a decline in human capacities, we might understand it as a transformation in the “knowledge environment”: an environment in which it has become easy to know something, but harder to truly understand it in depth.
Opinion
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By Youssef Mouawad - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 13:25
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In 2010, Israel violently intercepted the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish ship chartered by a humanitarian NGO to bring aid to the Gaza Strip, which was under Israeli blockade at the time. This was the last straw, and the incident brought the simmering hostility between Erdogan's government and the Jewish state out into the open. (AFP)
The war has not yet ceased in our south, and already it threatens to break out among our neighbors. In other words, we live on borrowed time, lurching from one conflict to the next. And for good reason! The bombing of a Syrian base very nearly escalated into an all-out clash between Ankara and Tel Aviv. That was on August 18, and Benjamin Netanyahu didn't mince his words: his country would not tolerate a Turkish military foothold that could spread into southern Syria. The warning was all the more forceful given that eight strikes had targeted the Abu al-Dhuhur air base, just 70 kilometers from the Turkish border. It's worth recalling, too, that since the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Erdogan has become the chief mentor of the new Syria under Ahmed al-Sharaa, helping rebuild its armed forces and turning it into a strategic partner. This is no longer Hafez al-Assad's Syria Was it this renewed tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv that prompted a meeting between Syria's top diplomat, Assaad Chaibani, and Mossad chief Roman Gofman, in Jordan on August 23? Yet this quiet parley did not spark outrage across the Arab world the way Anwar al-Sadat's surprise visit to Israel did in 1977. A taboo was officially broken—and indeed, who would have imagined such talks taking place under the Baathist regime? Israel might have been expected to welcome this, but contrary to expectations, it halted neither its airstrikes nor its territorial incursions, as seen on August 27 in Quneitra. The fact is, things have changed. Under Hafez al-Assad, Syria was a regional power that, while not exactly formidable, was feared by its immediate neighbors, Arab or otherwise. No one wanted to pick a fight with it, which allowed it to pursue, within certain limits, an assertive foreign policy that often bordered on provocation. As a result, thanks to the autonomy it exercised and the room to maneuver it granted itself, Syria had become, at least geographically, a buffer zone between an "Erdoganist" Turkey flaunting its unabashed brand of Islam on one side, and Israel, a state Jewish to its core, on the other. But now, in a country worn down by Baathist mismanagement and ravaged by years of civil war, Turkey has begun staking its claims—and will inevitably find itself face to face with an Israel that occupies part of Syrian territory. What can we expect? Given the outsized egos of both Netanyahu and Erdogan, and assuming both leaders remain in power, we should brace for an epic showdown across Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian, or even other territories. This will be a fight of feints and dodges, of underhanded tactics as well as head-on attacks, close combat, and rising tensions right up to the breaking point. And this despite a September 2025 report from the Congressional Research Service concluding that direct confrontation between Turkey and Israel remains unlikely, precisely because both states are well aware of the cost such a war would entail. Still, in the realm of conflict studies, leaders and other elites don't always act rationally! All the more so since, in the eyes of Israeli observers, the slogan now popular in Anatolia—"Make Turkey great again"—hardly reassures the Zionist state. Washington will find it increasingly difficult to contain or keep apart two adversaries already gearing up for battle. Turkey, the new Iran? Yes, that's one hypothesis, but only in a face-off with Israel, since Syria has overnight become a zone where 'two security perimeters overlap' — the Turkish and the Israeli, the Muslim and the Jewish. And it can't be ruled out that Shiite militancy, that mobilizer of "proxies," might end up allying itself, even if only temporarily, with a 'Muslim Brotherhood version' of political Islam championed by Ankara! So we would have, against all odds, a Hezbollah backed by its former enemy, Ahmad al-Sharaa, an Islamist who emerged from Jabhat al-Nusra and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham! Against a common adversary, a reversal of alliances is always legitimate and opportune. But this would only be a tactical alliance, dictated by the exigencies of the moment, one that couldn't presume anything about the future. With Arab nationalism now out of the picture, Turkey won't settle for economically capturing the Syrian market of 25 million consumers: it will want to wield political influence in Damascus, and to that end will deploy its military and security apparatus. Since the shaky power of the Syrian president can't fulfill certain sovereign functions or oversee the various branches of the state, it will inevitably turn to the expertise of its northern neighbor. Does this mean Turkey will get sucked into the spiral of 'announced belligerence'? Everything points that way, and we can already see the early signs of a spiral reminiscent of the US involvement in Vietnam under Lyndon Johnson. Indeed, if the Syrian state intends to rebuild itself, it will first need an army capable of quelling the centrifugal tendencies of the Alawites, the Druze, and other factions calling for the country's breakup. And it's up to Ankara to provide that and to bolster the central authority based in Damascus. But Israel, which has gotten into bad habits in Syria and intends to keep its freedom of aerial action there, cannot tolerate an army built along NATO lines that could serve as a proxy for a neo-Ottoman venture. And Lebanon, from primary stage to secondary stage? A new stage is now set for a new script that will define new rules of the game! What will become of Hezbollah, caught in a trap? Well, in that scenario, it could benefit, even if only partly, from Damascus's logistical support — support it has sorely lacked since the fall of Bashar al-Assad. And perhaps, through a shift in the tectonic plates, Lebanon would move from being the initial stage to being merely a secondary stage of a regional conflict. But frankly, that would do us a lot of good!
Today's Essential
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By LevantTime . - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 00:55
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The ICRC convoy carrying the released civilians left the area occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon and traveled to the point marking the start of the zone controlled by the Lebanese authorities. (AFP)
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced on Friday that it had transferred four more people released by Israel to Lebanon, a day after the release of a first civilian. They are three Lebanese nationals and two Syrians, according to the ICRC. This is the first time such an operation has taken place since negotiations between Lebanon and Israel began in April under US auspices. During the last round of talks in August, Beirut had requested the release of a first group of its nationals captured by Israel in southern Lebanon, where Israel is at war with the pro-Iranian Hezbollah. Their relatives estimate their number at around thirty, including fighters from the Islamist movement. In a statement, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun thanked the United States and the ICRC, saying the release "confirmed the soundness of the position" taken by Lebanon, which is engaged in negotiations with Israel that Hezbollah rejects. On Thursday, the United States praised "the government of Israel and the government of Lebanon for demonstrating good faith through these initial steps," expressing hope that this would "serve as a foundation for broader discussions on other civilian matters." The two countries are set to hold another round of negotiations in September, though the date has not yet been set. According to the Israeli prime minister's office, Thursday's announcement "follows efforts by Israel and Lebanon to locate and repatriate the remains of Jewish community leaders who were kidnapped and killed in Lebanon" between 1984 and 1986. Israeli strikes intensify On the ground, Israeli strikes killed three people and wounded 23 others on Friday in southern and eastern Lebanon. Israel stepped up its strikes in the region on Friday, after announcing Thursday evening that it had taken control of the Ali Taher mountain ridge, which had served as a strategic position for the pro-Iranian Hezbollah and overlooks Nabatiyeh, among other areas. The army will now reinforce its positions there in order to "prevent the enemy from retaking the area," said Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz. A strike also hit the Tyre region, particularly the village of Rmadiyé, according to the National News Agency (NNA). For Trump, the war in Iran is "small potatoes" Regarding the war in Iran, US President Donald Trump sought on Friday to downplay its impact on the United States ahead of the crucial midterm elections. "A lot of people aren't calling it a war. I call it a military conflict, because it's small potatoes for us. It's not a big deal. We did Venezuela, and we did that," he told reporters in the Oval Office when asked about his vice president, JD Vance, who had said the day before that he didn't want to call the conflict a war. With fuel prices surging because of the war and threatening to cost Donald Trump's Republicans their majority in Congress in November's midterm elections, his administration is working to downplay the scale of the conflict. According to the president, the United States is carrying out "targeted strikes," insisting that it is "not currently engaged in fighting." He also claimed that the United States controlled the Strait of Hormuz and had wiped out Iran's armed forces. "What we've accomplished is remarkable. We took control of Venezuela, and we've essentially taken control of Iran," he said.
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The Conflict of All Contradictions
By
Michel Touma
Published

The long and interminable conflict sparked by the Iranian mullah regime's endless transgressions will likely go down in history as a conflict defined by the verbal diarrhea that all parties engage in, throwing up a thick smokescreen that barely conceals their internal failures and, above all, a bewildering and pervasive incoherence. This incoherence manifests almost daily in actions that are completely at odds with the bellicose, deeply irrational statements made on all sides. Iran's leaders, for example, have chosen to pursue a lasting, strategic agreement with the United States. Yet at the same time, they continue to label the US an "enemy" and the "Great Satan" that must be brought down and "inevitably" avenged, sooner or later, no matter the circumstances — as stated on Saturday evening in a communiqué attributed to the new Supreme Leader, the elusive and mysterious Mojtaba Khamenei, about whom it remains unclear whether he is still alive, and if so, whether he is truly in full possession of his mental faculties, or whether, on the contrary, his virtual presence is being kept alive in people's minds by Tehran's new powerbrokers, who attribute decisions and positions to him as events unfold and the balance of power within what remains of the Islamic Republic continues to shift. To complete the picture, it must be noted that Iran's senior officials have indeed signed a roadmap with Washington outlining talks spread over 60 days — yet they miss no opportunity to stress that they have no trust in the United States and will only agree to enter negotiations if the US administration "changes its attitude," "stops its threats," and "respects the terms of the memorandum of understanding"! This refusal to negotiate has not, however, prevented the resumption of direct bilateral dialogue — contradictions aside — as a meeting of American and Iranian "experts" was scheduled for this Sunday, July 12, in Pakistan. The belligerent — and often outright insulting — posture that the pillars of the Islamic Republic continue to adopt toward the United States, despite the calm atmosphere that should normally surround any peace negotiation, reached new heights mid-week when Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations "advised" the American ambassador, in the middle of a Security Council meeting, to be "polite" (!), adding that "it would be better for him and for his country"! American incoherence Yet incoherence is not confined to the Iranian side alone. President Donald Trump stated mid-week that negotiations with Iran's leaders — whom he described as "sick" — "are pointless and a waste of time," adding that the memorandum of understanding with Iran is "null and void." Nevertheless, he went ahead and gave the green light to restart talks (!), claiming that the Iranians had specifically requested the resumption of negotiations and that he had agreed to their request — while simultaneously signaling to the Islamic Republic that the ceasefire now belongs to the past… Iranian leaders were quick to respond on Saturday, asserting that they had never requested a resumption of talks and that reports to that effect are "allegations" spread by "media close to Israel." They further stated that Iran refuses to re-engage with US negotiators until the Trump administration has "reversed its (hostile) positions" and until the American-Lebanese-Iranian committee tasked with resolving the South Lebanon issue has been formed, in accordance with the agreement reached with US Vice President JD Vance under the memorandum of understanding — signaling that Iran is once again asserting its desire to reclaim the Lebanese card, in disregard of the Lebanese government's own policy on the matter. The inconsistency in the parties' stances was further on display Saturday in the Strait of Hormuz file. The Trump administration issued an ultimatum to Tehran, demanding that it publicly release an official document acknowledging that Iranian attacks earlier in the week against three vessels in the Strait of Hormuz had been a mistake. Washington above all demanded that the Islamic Republic commit publicly and in writing to no longer carrying out attacks against tankers using that waterway. The Iranian authorities deflected the US ultimatum by claiming that this week's attacks on the three vessels were a "technical error" — even though the incidents had unfolded over a twenty-four-hour period. Adding to the absurdity: this "technical" explanation — which rules out any deliberate political act — was naively deemed acceptable by certain American officials. As for a statement committing Iran to cease attacks on shipping, Tehran sidestepped the issue by dispatching its Foreign Minister to Oman on Saturday to persuade the sultanate to issue a joint communiqué emphasizing the need to ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz — allowing the Islamic Republic to avoid giving the impression that it had yielded to American demands on this point. The question remains whether the Trump administration will, once again, play along with Iran's game… Lebanese-US Military Meeting On the Lebanese front, a US military delegation traveled to Yarze on Saturday, where it held a meeting with the army commander and senior officers to work out the details of establishing the pilot zones that the Lebanese army is to take charge of under the framework agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel. The initial phase of the process envisaged under this framework is expected to take shape within the coming days. Accordingly, the Lebanese government officially announced Saturday evening that Lebanon will take part in the next round of direct negotiations with Israel, to be held this time in Rome on July 15 and 16, under American supervision. Lebanon had set as a condition for its participation in this meeting that the establishment of the buffer zones — implying an initial Israeli withdrawal — be effectively launched on the ground, which appeared to have been accomplished by Saturday evening…

War and the Bitter Knowledge of Geography

In ordinary life, we inhabit what anthropologists call a milieu : a space infused with memory and human relationships, made up of the home, the village square, the neighborhood shop, the mosque or the church, and the road to school. In wartime, place is transformed into space. It becomes an object of measurement and management: range, field of vision, supply line. The shift is from meaning to function, from dwelling to calculation and enumeration. It is as though the land were stripped of its story and rewritten in the language of war. War fractures our sense of belonging. Belonging is ordinarily built through stability and the quiet repetition of daily life: the same road, the same faces, the same habits. Once a place becomes threatened, belonging gives way to a state of anxiety. One remains attached to a place that may have to be abandoned at any moment. What emerges is a form of “provisional belonging”: you love the place, yet no longer trust that you will be able to remain there. This paradox leaves a lasting fracture within. The body, too, is transformed. In times of peace, it moves through familiar places almost without conscious thought. In war, it learns to bend, to enter the world of calculation: to hide, estimate distances, decipher sounds, scan its surroundings before every movement. The senses become an early warning system. The land is now understood through danger: Where can you hide? Which way can you pass? Which route offers the least exposure? At what moment? This is a form of “embodied knowledge” that reshapes our relationship with the world at an unconscious level. It is not only place that changes. Time changes as well. In war, time becomes compressed. Brief moments carry decisions of life or death. Human beings are pulled away from extended time, the continuity that links past, present, and future, into an overwhelming present. This compression weakens the capacity to plan and strengthens the instinct to react. The land is no longer the stage upon which a life is built, but the setting in which fleeting moments must be managed. Wars turn human beings into numbers. Philosophically, this is part of the rationalization of war: reducing people to units that can be counted. Here, a double alienation takes hold: alienation from the self, because I am not merely a number; and alienation from the land, which no longer recognizes my story, only my location. All of this threatens the very idea of human dignity, rooted in one’s name, one’s history, and one’s life. After war, the land is never neutral again. Every hill, every bridge bears an imprint: loss, fear, survival. Memory attaches itself to places and continually recreates them. Returning after war therefore never means returning to the “same” place, but to a place whose meaning has been reshaped. This also explains why people may feel like strangers even in their own villages. The land itself is now read through different eyes, having been treated as a defensive position, an observation post, an unsafe home, or an escape route. War creates overlapping geographies instead of a single geography. This multiplicity generates a struggle not only over control but also over meaning. Who owns the land? Not merely the one who controls it, but the one who succeeds in imposing its interpretation. This war has revealed to us a geography of Lebanon that we never truly knew. Villages have become military positions. Roads have turned into escape corridors leading away from the inferno of war. Rivers have become natural barriers. Bridges are destroyed to sever lines of communication, while the high ground becomes observation posts from which the enemy can be monitored. Fierce battles are fought to seize these elevations in order to dominate the terrain and maintain surveillance. Human beings have been reduced to numbers: the dead, the missing, the displaced, or those driven to beg for survival. Cars have become homes, while homes have been reduced to rubble. We have discovered villages, roads, hills, valleys, ravines, and rugged terrain whose existence we scarcely knew, landscapes capable either of slowing an advance or facilitating it. We did not know our country in this form. We are no longer people with a history, memories, and professions. We have become targets for aircraft, missiles, and drones, a theater of war where an enemy sees nothing extraordinary in invading and attacking us in order to fight the soldiers of an occupying state, whether directly through its own officers or through its party, which openly defines itself as an Iranian soldier. Iran exploits us in pursuit of its dream of reaching the Mediterranean, an ambition it has cherished since the time of Cyrus, only to see it frustrated time and again. All of this leaves me astonished. I find myself standing before this bitter and deeply paradoxical knowledge, this somber, painful understanding that war forces upon us. Wars do not merely transform politics. They also redraw geography in the minds of those who live through them. The places themselves remain, yet their meaning is overturned. The village that once embodied life and human relationships becomes a military position. The road that once connected people becomes a possible route to survival. The bridge that once shortened distances becomes a target. This is not simply “new knowledge.” It is a distortion of the human relationship with place. In times of peace, geography is lived. In times of war, it is measured: firing range, field of vision, supply line, or escape route. Even language changes. Instead of saying “home,” we say “position.” Instead of “valley,” we say “corridor.” Instead of “hill,” we say “strongpoint.” Most devastating of all, the human being is reduced as well. Not merely to a number, but to a category: dead, missing, displaced, or waiting for assistance. This is a brutal process of dehumanization, yet it lies at the heart of the logic of war, which sustains itself through counting, classification, and simplification. It is precisely here that the deepest pain begins: the moment a person feels they have lost their irreducible individuality and have become nothing more than another “case.”

NATO 3.0: The Awakening of the Ottoman Giant Within the Alliance (2/2)

July 8, 2026 will go down as a pivotal date in the history of the Atlantic Alliance. The "Ankara Declaration," published at the close of the NATO summit held in Turkey, highlighted a profound transformation — technological, financial, and geopolitical alike. This shift to NATO 3.0 refocuses the organization on a doctrine of informational superiority and high-intensity territorial defense, with Turkey affirming itself as the southern cornerstone. A financial revolution: the Bank for Defence and Resilience One of the summit's most innovative aspects is its response to the financial challenges of rearmament. Although the European Union established the 150-billion-euro SAFE fund (Security Action for Europe) for defence in 2025 — from which Canada and Turkey are excluded — the Atlantic Alliance had to find its own solution to bring these countries on board. Against a backdrop where member states are committing to raising defence spending to as much as 5% of GDP, nine countries — including Turkey and Canada — announced the creation of the Bank for Defence, Security and Resilience . This institution, headquartered in Canada, will have an impressive financing capacity of $134 billion. Its primary objective is to provide preferential-rate loans to support dual-use infrastructure projects (both civilian and military), as well as to strengthen cybersecurity and fund the direct rearmament of member countries. The Informational Doctrine: AI and the 'Combat Cloud' The Ankara summit marks a shift away from a traditional military vision — focused on the number of armored vehicles and divisions — toward a doctrine centered on decision-making superiority. For NATO, this means its armed forces must understand a situation, decide, and act faster and more effectively than the adversary. It is no longer solely a matter of material superiority: the concept rests on three pillars. 1) Data mastery: the instantaneous fusion of sensor data (satellites, drones, radars, cyber sources) analyzed by artificial intelligence. 2) Accelerating the command cycle: through digital wargaming — strategic simulations that pit human teams against highly realistic scenarios — plans are tested without real-world risk, logistical and tactical weaknesses are identified, and AI analyzes every decision to provide actionable intelligence to military headquarters. 3) Protection against cognitive warfare: measures to shield leaders and populations from manipulation and disinformation. Within this framework, the Warfighting Cloud is taking shape: a transatlantic, interoperable combat cloud that connects all allied sensors in real time. Fighter jets, naval vessels, ground-based radars, and satellite constellations all feed their data into it, delivering an instant, comprehensive picture of the battlefield. This infrastructure, deeply integrated with AI, is enshrined in the summit's final declaration: advanced AI models will be embedded in the planning and execution of operations. The goal is straightforward: to shorten the decision-making loop so that NATO can respond more quickly than its adversaries to increasingly complex and fast-moving threats. A record-breaking industrial agenda: AWACS and Drone Edge The industrial dimension of the summit demonstrated unprecedented momentum, with more than $50 billion in contracts signed in a single day. Two major announcements illustrate this drive to modernize. First, the replacement of NATO's aging fleet of American-built AWACS radar aircraft. NATO selected the Global Eye system from Swedish manufacturer Saab (pictured). This is a highly strategic choice: the Global Eye is one of the few systems capable of detecting and tracking the new generation of hypersonic missiles, which have become a central concern for European security. Additionally, the 'NATO's Drone Edge' initiative was launched with a massive budget of $40 billion over five years. This sweeping plan aims to procure autonomous and unmanned systems across all domains: aerial drones, maritime drones, and ground robots. Within this framework, the Alliance has already confirmed the purchase of high-altitude 'Triton' reconnaissance drones from American manufacturer Northrop Grumman, bolstering surveillance of borders and strategically significant areas. American disengagement and European autonomy The Pentagon has begun a partial physical withdrawal from the European continent, in line with the American security strategy announced at the end of 2025. The United States is pulling one of its two aircraft carriers assigned to the NATO area. They are also withdrawing one of every two strategic bombers and cutting their F-15 fighter fleet in Europe by a third. The Reaper, drones, critical for surveillance, are also seeing their presence cut in half. This withdrawal effectively forces European nations to step up and shoulder a greater share of their own defense. This is the very essence of NATO 3.0: an Alliance in which European allies, Canada, and Turkey are no longer mere junior partners, but the pillars of collective defense — particularly in managing conventional threats on European soil and other threats on its southern flank. A high-intensity closing communiqué The Ankara Declaration reaffirms Article 5 — 'an attack on one ally is an attack on all' — while emphasizing support for Ukraine and preparedness for high-intensity warfare. For 2026, allies — primarily European ones — will allocate €70 billion to equipping and training Ukrainian forces, with a commitment to renew this in 2027. The declaration also takes aim at Iran, asserting that it must never acquire nuclear weapons and demanding respect for freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. NATO 3.0 refocuses the Alliance on deterrence and defense. Combining technological innovation, sovereign financial tools, and greater European responsibility in the face of partial American withdrawal, NATO is preparing for confrontations where data and autonomy will make all the difference. Turkey the summit's big winner — but… Turkey emerges from the summit as a central player in NATO 3.0, securing significant diplomatic and industrial gains, though not all of its ambitions were fulfilled. As the summit's host nation, it has strengthened its role as an East–West pivot and joined the nine founding members of the new Defense and Resilience Bank, which manages $134 billion — a potential lever for its defense industry. The emphasis on the 'Drone Edge' initiative ($40 billion) and the integration of artificial intelligence validate its strategy centered on autonomous systems (drones, etc.) and position its companies as key partners. Washington also agreed to the sale of engines for Turkey's future Kaan fighter jet, valued at $700 million. However, despite a diplomatic shift toward gradually lifting restrictions on the sale of Western military components and American F-35s, removing the Congressional veto in Washington remains essential for these intentions to be realized.

Crisis, Catastrophe, and the Shaking of the World (7/7)

This essay explores the figures of crisis and catastrophe, from ancient cosmologies to the lived experience of the world’s upheaval. By bringing into dialogue the Greek, biblical, and Indian traditions with the thought of Jan Patočka, it examines how civilizations have conceived disorder, collapse, irreversibility, and even the very possibility of action when meaning itself begins to falter. Published here in seven chapter-essays, this work follows a demanding yet essential thread: to understand whether catastrophe is a sudden rupture, a slow disintegration of the world, or the deepest truth of our age. This is the seventh and final installment. Regimes of Shaking: Patočka, the Puruṣa, and the Question of the Front in the Algorithmic Age Yet each regime possesses its own mode of shaking, within a line of thought inspired by J an Patočka (1907-1977). To grasp the full significance of such a claim, one must first situate the philosophical gesture of the Czech phenomenologist. A disciple of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Patočka did not think the world from the abstract comfort of an academic chair, but in the midst of the political upheavals and ideological saturation of the twentieth century. As co-founder and spokesperson of Charter 77 in Prague, an ethical civic initiative defending legality and human rights that ultimately cost him his life, he forged, in his Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History , the radical concept of “shaking.” [1] Far from being a merely political reaction, shaking designates a transformation in the world’s relation to itself within historical experience. Before the shock, human beings inhabit the everyday “life-world” ( Lebenswelt ), governed by the concerns of survival, comfort, and technical management: a functional sphere where objects and social roles follow one another without any ultimate meaning ever truly being questioned. [2] Shaking occurs when this structure of practical self-evidences begins to crack. [3] The world does not disappear, but it ceases to be immediately intelligible as something self-evident, compelling human beings to move from mere biological subsistence toward naked spiritual existence. [4] For Patočka, this shaking is concretely rooted in the experience of historical catastrophe and extreme peril. His gesture directly inherits, while profoundly subverting it, the genesis of Heidegger’s Dasein , itself haunted by the trauma of the First World War. Heidegger’s concept of Unheimlichkeit (uncanniness, or the experience of finding oneself without a home) found its hidden historical grounding in the experience of the trenches, where the familiar world collapsed, yielding to the raw contingency of death. In both thinkers, catastrophe functions as a major phenomenological operator: it shatters the world’s usability. Faced with extreme danger, objects cease to serve their ordinary functions, routines collapse, and official discourses lose their veneer of truth. Heidegger’s Dasein then experiences anxiety before Nothingness, while the Patočkian shaken individual is thrust before his own radical finitude. In both cases, the world remains, but its immediate intelligibility has collapsed, wrenching the individual away from the reassuring chatter and tranquil certainties of the “They” ( Das Man ).[5] It is, however, in the outcome of this crisis that Patočka radically departs from his German master, introducing a decisive ethical bifurcation. In Heidegger, the escape from inauthenticity culminates in a monadic ontology: being-toward-death isolates Dasein , since no one can die in my place. Authenticity is attained through a sovereign, tragic, and solitary “resoluteness” ( Entschlossenheit ), in which the subject assumes its own destiny. It was precisely this primacy of pure decision, detached from any universal ethical demand, that historically enabled Heidegger to succumb to the illusion of a collective resoluteness embodied in a National Socialist destiny. By contrast, Patočka shows that catastrophe does not separate human beings but founds a paradoxical community. The paroxysm of violence engenders a leap beyond Force: the shaken individual is not simply one who experiences the physical fear of dying, but one who suddenly understands that war, technical organization, and conflicts of interest are empty idols. Because the victims of catastrophe share the same nakedness, they recognize one another as beings of freedom, forever withdrawn from the empire of Force. Hence, when this phenomenological insight is unfolded across different “cosmological regimes,” that is, the historical ways in which the world discloses and orders itself, it becomes evident that every epoch possesses its own ontological vulnerability. A regime is defined not merely by its tools or its internal crises, but by the specific trajectory of its shaking. In the cyclical regime, characteristic of mythical temporalities or saṃsāra , where stability rests upon cosmic repetition, shaking takes the form of the rupture of recurrence itself. It is the vertigo of a crack opening within the certainty of eternal return. In the eschatological regime, oriented toward a promise of salvation or linear fulfillment, shaking is embodied in the undecidability of the end, leaving humanity suspended before the void of an expectation deprived of its divine resolution. In the chaotic regime, where political and conceptual order strives to contain primordial forces, shaking manifests itself through the resurgence of the formless at the very heart of form, revealing the fundamental precariousness of all human constructions. [6] Within the contemporary algorithmic regime, characterized by the total calculability of reality and the aspiration to absolute technical control, the ultimate shaking lies in the excess of the unpredictable over the calculable. It is the precise moment when contingency shatters the illusion of cybernetic mastery. [7] It is when catastrophe or extreme peril shatters this final technical shell that the true metaphysical breakthrough occurs. Thrust before Nothingness, the individual joins with others to give birth to the “solidarity of the shaken.” Unlike conventional political alliances, which unite around material interests or against a common enemy, this solidarity brings together those who no longer have interests to defend, neither homeland, nor class, nor power, but only their naked dignity. The Patočkian shaken individual does not seek to master destiny or to bring history to a close through an act of sovereign power; rather, he keeps the wound of catastrophe open, drawing from it a universal ethical resistance. Ultimately, this encounter redefines the very meaning of the Sacred. The sacrifice of the shaken is never a utilitarian investment made for the sake of a future ideological victory; it stands instead as pure witness before the absurd, an act that opens the world rather than sealing it within dogmatic certainties. The structure of the sacrifice of the shaken, as Patočka unfolds it, a pure gift without calculation of reciprocity that opens the world instead of closing it, finds a profound resonance in the Vedic notion of yajña (यज्ञ), the cosmic sacrifice. In the Ṛgveda (X.90), the Puruṣasūkta hymn describes the creation of the entire world as the result of the sacrificial dismemberment of the Puruṣa (पुरुष), the primordial Cosmic Man: the cosmos comes into being not through an act of will or power, but through a total self-offering, leaving nothing behind and expecting nothing in return. [8] The sacrifice is not performed in order to obtain something. It is the very condition that makes the order of the world possible. The kinship with the sacrifice of the Patočkian shaken is striking: in both cases, what is offered is not a particular possession but existence itself, and the act carries a cosmological, not merely moral or political, significance. By refusing to negotiate existence on the plane of possession or power, and by courageously taking one’s stand on the plane of being, the shaken individual attains the “Life in Truth.” [9] He does not seek to restore an illusory “peace,” which is often nothing more than another name for passive technical mobilization, but rather to preserve the painful clarity acquired within the rupture itself. This phenomenological thread makes the solidarity of the shaken the only spiritual force capable of confronting the nihilistic night of modernity. Within Patočka’s ontology, the solidarity of the shaken finds its paradigm in the experience of the Front. It remains inseparable from the concrete proximity of death and from the wrenching away from everyday existence brought about by direct confrontation with finitude. In a hyper-digitalized world, however, the very structure of experience has been transformed: technology no longer merely administers survival, that “bare life” of which Agamben spoke. It now colonizes the very horizon of presence itself. The sacrifice of the Puruṣa presupposed a real dismemberment, an irreducible materiality of the offering. The digital, by contrast, tends toward disembodiment. The “solidarity of the shaken” thus risks dissolving into a mere “connectivity of the outraged,” where commitment no longer truly engages the body, but only its imaginary projection. Exposure to danger gives way to self-staging; a community of destiny is transformed into a mere aggregation of profiles. Within this context, the experience of the Front has not disappeared. It has shifted. It now consists in preserving zones of shadow, spaces of ontological opacity where existence escapes its own conversion into data, its reduction to quantifiable flows and exploitable information. The Front no longer lies solely upon the line of fire, but at the frontier where the irreducibility of the human is at stake before the total digitization of being: the body first transformed into image, then the image itself reduced to the circulation of a simulacrum devoid of hylomorphic thickness, stripped alike of its hylē and its potentia. What remains is no longer presence itself, but only its abstract and calculable trace. The Front thus becomes the site of resistance to absolute transparency. In Vedic India, Ṛta , the cosmic order of the world, was sustained through the irreducible enigma of sacrifice. Contemporary technical rationality, by contrast, seeks to abolish every zone of shadow, dissolving all mystery into the univocity of calculation. Where sacrifice opened a breach toward what exceeds human mastery, the algorithmization of reality aspires to seal that breach, reducing being itself to the horizon of predictability. The true Front of our age may therefore lie precisely here: in safeguarding whatever, in humanity and in the world, remains irreducible to every operation of calculation. Yet this project of closure bears within itself its own contradiction. As the promise of total mastery over reality expands, so too grows a proportional frustration born of the impossibility of abolishing the constitutive indeterminacy of existence once and for all. The more technology claims to neutralize the event, the more it collides with the irreducible residue that escapes its models. Absolute transparency thus becomes the horizon of a desire condemned never to be fulfilled. Out of this tension emerges a dynamic of acceleration in which the pursuit of control rushes headlong toward the very catastrophe it sought to avert. Such a perspective recalls certain intuitions of Indian thought concerning the Kali Yuga . The Dark Age appears there not merely as an era of decline, but as the moment when the contradictions of a historical cycle reach their point of saturation. Catastrophe is not an external accident interrupting the order of the world; it is the very fulfillment of a logic that has become incapable of limiting itself. Yet as it approaches, it is already, in a certain sense, surpassed. For the extreme proximity of dissolution simultaneously reveals the limits of whatever had claimed to establish itself as totality. Thus, the movement that seems to race toward final closure paradoxically encounters what it cannot absorb: a negative transcendence, a reserve of being irreducible to every formalization. Within the perspective of the Kali Yuga, the end is never an absolute end; it is the point at which the exhaustion of one form once again makes possible the emergence of another beginning. Catastrophe remains real, but it ceases to be ultimate. What is revealed, at the very heart of the foretold collapse, is not the definitive triumph of calculation, but its metaphysical impossibility. Where everything seemed destined to be reduced to transparency, shadow still remains; where being appeared fully convertible into information, an unassimilable remainder endures. It is perhaps in fidelity to that remainder that the true solidarity of the shaken may now be sought. [1] Jan Patočka, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History , trans. Erazim Kohák, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 1996. The notion of “shaking” ( otřes in Czech) appears primarily in Essays V and VI , devoted to the wars of the twentieth century as limit-experiences, and is further developed through the complementary notion of the “solidarity of the shaken,” the ethical and political bond uniting those who have passed through the experience of the front and the imminence of death. Within the Sanskrit tradition, such shaking may be compared to the notion of saṃvega (संवेग), the sudden existential shock or awakening provoked by confrontation with suffering ( duḥkha , दुःख), impermanence ( anitya , अनित्य), or imminent death ( maraṇa , मरण). In Buddhist and Jain texts, saṃvega is precisely what shakes ordinary existence ( saṃsāra , संसार) and opens the way toward an authentic life. Yet saṃvega belongs within a soteriology: it marks a stage along a path leading toward liberation ( mokṣa , मोक्ष). Otřes , by contrast, possesses no such soteriological telos. It constitutes an ontological structure of historical existence rather than a moment within a spiritual itinerary. Put differently: saṃvega is an inner shock that liberates one from history; otřes is a collective shock that commits one to history. [2] The notion of Lebenswelt (“life-world”) occupies a central place in Husserl’s later phenomenology. See Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology , trans. David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, especially §§33-55. Patočka inherits this concept directly, yet radicalizes it by stripping it of its transcendental-subjective grounding and transforming it into a pre-personal and historical field of experience. [3] The expression “structure of practical self-evidences” refers to what Patočka, following Heidegger, describes through the regime of Verfallenheit (“fallenness”), namely the absorption of existence into the everyday world of the They ( das Man ). See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, §§35-38. [4] Jan Patočka, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History , op. cit. This distinction structures the entirety of Essays V and VI , where Patočka articulates the passage from the first movement of existence, rooting ( Verankerung ), governed by survival and security, toward the third movement, the breakthrough ( Durchbruch ) into authentically historical existence. On the theory of the three movements of existence, see also Jan Patočka, The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem , trans. Erika Abrams, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2016. [5] On the hidden historical grounding of Heidegger’s Unheimlichkeit in the trauma of the First World War, see Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil , trans. Ewald Osers, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998; as well as Françoise Dastur, Heidegger and the Question of Time . On Unheimlichkeit itself, see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , §§40 and 58. The decisive difference between Heidegger and Patočka concerns the status of catastrophe. In Heidegger, anxiety ( Angst ) before Nothingness remains a formal existential structure revealing the finitude of Dasein independently of any determinate historical content. Patočka, by contrast, refuses this neutralization: shaking ( otřes ) is irreducibly historical and political, bound to the wars of the twentieth century as singular and collective events. In doing so, Patočka concretizes Heidegger’s existential analytic. Where Heidegger conceives crisis as a universal ontological disclosure, Patočka understands it as a historically situated civilizational event bearing an ethical responsibility that formal ontology alone cannot assume. On this critical transformation of Heidegger by Patočka, see Étienne Tassin, “The Community of the Shaken,” in Jan Patočka: Philosophy, Phenomenology, Politics ; see also Paul Ricoeur, Preface to Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History . [6] On the chaotic regime and the tension between form and the formless in primordial cosmogonies, see Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil , trans. Emerson Buchanan, Boston: Beacon Press, 1967, especially the section devoted to myths of chaos and creation. Ricoeur analyzes what he calls the “myth of dramatic creation,” exemplified by the Babylonian Enūma Eliš , as a symbolic structure in which cosmic order emerges through struggle against primordial chaos. Tiamat , the power of the formless and undifferentiated waters, must be defeated and dismembered by Marduk for the ordered cosmos to come into being. Ricoeur’s central insight is that, within such a regime, evil is neither secondary nor accidental: it is co-original with creation itself, inscribed within the very structure of reality. Order never definitively conquers chaos; it contains and represses it without ever abolishing it. The resurgence of the formless within form is therefore a permanent structural possibility rather than a contingent accident. Ricoeur’s interpretation closely echoes Hermann Gunkel, Creation and Chaos in Primeval Times and the Eschaton ( Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit ), Göttingen, 1895, who first demonstrated the continuity linking cosmogony and eschatology in the Semitic traditions: the primordial chaos ( Tehom ) returns at the end of time as an eschatological threat. For a comparative reading extending to Vedic cosmogonies, where Vṛtra (वृत्र), the dragon of drought and obstruction, must be defeated by Indra in order for the waters and light to be released ( Ṛgveda I.32), see Jan Gonda, The Vision of the Vedic Poets , and Georges Dumézil, The Destiny of the Warrior . On the persistence of this structure in modern philosophy, see also Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age , especially the chapters analyzing the modern attempt, and ultimate failure, to eliminate the primordial anxiety of chaos by transforming it into a rationally solvable “problem.” [7] Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time , Vol. I: The Fault of Epimetheus , trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998; see also Antoinette Rouvroy, ”Algorithmic Governmentality and the Prospects of Emancipation” (originally published in French as La “gouvernementalité algorithmique et les perspectives d’une politique critique du web” ), which analyzes the limits of total calculability in the face of the irreducible contingency of reality. [8] Wendy Doniger (trans.), The Rig Veda: An Anthology , New York: Penguin Classics, 1981, X.90 ( Puruṣasūkta ), pp. 31-33. [9] “Life in Truth” is a central concept in Patočka’s philosophy. It designates a mode of existence that refuses to be reduced to adaptation to the demands of survival, utility, or social conformity, and instead assumes lucidly the truth of the human condition as disclosed in limit situations such as historical crisis, confrontation with finitude, or the collapse of self-evidences. It entails a displacement of existence away from the stabilizing regime of illusion toward an openness to truth, understood not as the possession of knowledge but as a risky exposure to what reveals itself through the shaking of meaning. Life in Truth should not, however, be understood as a stable condition opposed to life in untruth, but rather as the constitutive tension of shaken existence itself. Patočka’s lived experience is thus traversed by a continual movement of destabilization and renewal. Shaking does not simply lead to collapse or resignation; it opens the possibility of a conversion in the mode of existence, whereby the human being, torn away from the reassuring forms of everyday life, nevertheless remains exposed to the temptation of returning to closure. The shaken therefore inhabits an existential in-between, where truth is never possessed once and for all, but must continually be sustained against the pull of reassurance, forgetfulness, and the technical reduction of the world.

How Much Distance Should Lebanon Keep from Syria?

Can Lebanon and Syria ever enjoy calm, balanced relations founded on mutual respect? It is difficult to believe so when our relationship has so often been governed by hostility, suspicion, and threats carried through. Throughout our shared history, no humiliation has been spared us, regardless of the regime ruling in Damascus. Take, for example, what befell our small country beginning in August 1948, when Khaled al-Azem*, then Prime Minister of Syria, imposed "controls on imports and an embargo on goods destined for Lebanon." In the collective memory of our fathers' generation, his name remains forever associated with the closure of the Syrian-Lebanese border in 1949—a decision driven by political motives as well as protectionist policies. It amounted to an attempt to suffocate Lebanon economically and force it into submission. Even then, Lebanon served as Damascus's whipping boy—long before Abdel Hamid Khaddam turned it into his favorite scapegoat. The political circles of Damascus have never truly accepted the Lebanese exception, even if, at times, they resigned themselves to it. Our Syrian neighbors—and brothers nevertheless—have always harbored what psychologists call mixed feelings toward Lebanon: an uneasy blend of admiration and resentment. This ambivalence has repeatedly poisoned the ties between our two countries, made all the more inescapable by geography. Lebanon, for its part, has not always been beyond reproach. From its territory—more or less treated as a sanctuary—plots were often hatched against successive governments in the Umayyad capital, whether those governments were legitimate or the product of military coups. It was enough to lead some observers to conclude that responsibility was shared. The Weight of History and the Tyranny of Geography Burdened by decades of accumulated prejudice, could Lebanon ever have maintained peaceful relations with Damascus? Ghassan Tueni, who in his younger years had briefly flirted with the idea of a Greater Syria before abandoning it, eventually arrived at a wise compromise. In his view, Lebanon should never be governed against Syria—but neither should it ever be governed by Syria. So, when Syrian leaders reassure us today about the sincerity of their intentions, we may certainly welcome their words. Yet we would be mistaken to ignore one fundamental reality: both physical and human geography have locked Syria and Lebanon into a relationship that is extraordinarily complex—perhaps even inextricable. Historically, no ruler has been able to consolidate power in Damascus without casting an eye toward Beirut and seeking to tame that vibrant city whose economic dynamism and cultural vitality have always stood in sharp contrast to Syria's centralized political tradition. Which is why one can only hope that Syria will eventually reconcile itself with the simple fact that Lebanon is not merely a piece of territory allegedly torn away from it in 1920 by the decision of French General Henri Gouraud. And even if that had indeed been the case, more than a century has now passed. Much water has flowed under the bridge, and it would be exceedingly difficult today to find Lebanese who would advocate an Anschluss with the Syrian hinterland. Is it not enough that we already share the same bed? As early as March 1950, the "economic divorce" between Syria and Lebanon had effectively been pronounced. As a punitive measure, Damascus imposed a blockade along the border. Lebanon rejected the economic integration being offered, convinced that Syrian-style protectionism was incompatible with its own ultraliberal economic model. From that moment onward, the two countries embarked on fundamentally different paths: Syria embraced socialism—first in its Nasserist version and later under Baathist rule—while the sweeping nationalization policies of the 1960s widened the gulf between them even further. The two states would never again be able to restore the masalih mushtaraka—these "common interests" inherited from the French Mandate. This may explain the reservations recently expressed by Fares Souaid, who questioned the usefulness of creating a new Lebanese-Syrian High Joint Commission when normal diplomatic relations are already conducted through the exchange of ambassadors. Such an institution would merely revive memories of the Lebanese-Syrian Supreme Council—the symbol of the darkest years of Lebanon's subjugation under the triumphant rule of Hafez al-Assad. If we are indeed to wipe the slate clean and open a new chapter with our larger neighbor, it would be sheer folly to let the wolf back into the sheepfold under the guise of a joint commission—whether economic or otherwise. *It is worth recalling that this same Khaled al-Azem was only too happy to escape the military regime that seized power in Damascus. Having taken refuge in Beirut, he marveled in his Memoirs at the freedom enjoyed by the Lebanese—a freedom from which he himself, as a political exile, was able to benefit. He was hardly the only Syrian outcast who had once denounced Lebanon and its "intolerable independence," only to end up settling here. I am thinking of Shukri al-Quwatli, Ghassan Jadid, Akram al-Hawrani, Muhammad Umran, and many others besides.

Is a New Chapter Beginning in the Middle East?

During major periods of geopolitical transformation, states are not always the driving force behind events. Yet they can find themselves in a position that allows them to redefine their role. Lebanon, which for decades has served as an arena for regional and international rivalries, may now be facing a rare opportunity to move from being a country shaped by crises to one capable of helping shape a new phase in the region. This prospect comes at a time of profound change across the Middle East, as regional and international powers reassess their priorities after years of open conflict. One of the key questions is whether the difficulties facing the US-Iran understanding process could lead to a reordering of priorities, making the strengthening of the Lebanese state part of a broader regional approach. Such a possibility does not mean that Lebanon would suddenly become the centre of international politics. Rather, it suggests a potential shift in how the country is perceived. Instead of being viewed solely as a security issue tied to regional tensions, Lebanon could increasingly be seen as a key component of a new regional balance based on stronger state institutions and greater stability. Over recent years, Iranian influence across the region has faced growing challenges. The balance of power has shifted in Syria, some of Tehran’s regional allies have seen their freedom of action diminish, and in Iraq, political currents have increasingly emphasised the importance of an autonomous and balanced national decision-making process. These developments do not signal the end of Iranian influence, but they do point to a more complex regional environment, one less conducive to reproducing the model of influence that prevailed over the past decade. In this context, Lebanon assumes particular importance. The existence of a Lebanese state capable of fully exercising its sovereignty, strengthening its military and security institutions, and securing its borders serves the interests of multiple stakeholders. For Lebanon, this path is above all about restoring the very principle of the state and the unity of national decision-making. For the international community, it offers an alternative model for managing crises, one that relies on state institutions rather than non-state actors. One of the most significant potential shifts would be a transition from an international approach focused on preventing Lebanon’s collapse to one centred on supporting state-building. Such a strategy requires a long-term vision that moves beyond emergency assistance toward sustained investment in institutions, the economy, security, and good governance. It is within this framework that the possible convergence of interests between the United States and Lebanon, as well as between Washington and Tel Aviv, can be understood. The United States has long sought to contain Iranian influence across the region, while Israel is looking for security arrangements capable of ensuring the long-term stability of its borders. Lebanon, for its part, needs a regional environment that enables it to consolidate its sovereignty and reclaim its natural role. This convergence does not necessarily imply the emergence of new formal alliances, nor does it mean that the interests of all parties are identical. It does, however, open the way to an approach based on a simple premise: that a strong state is the foundation of stability, and that capable national institutions may provide a more durable guarantee of regional security than the continued logic of confrontation. The decisive factor, however, remains Lebanon itself. No external support can produce lasting results unless it is matched by a clear domestic commitment to strengthening state institutions and affirming their primacy. Sovereignty is not merely an international demand; it is, above all, a national choice that requires broad political consensus. Against this backdrop, President Joseph Aoun’s visit to Washington on 21 July takes on particular significance. Meetings of this kind should not be measured solely by their symbolic value, but also by their ability to set a practical process in motion. If the visit leads to closer cooperation in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, strengthening state institutions, encouraging investment, and reinforcing stability, it could mark the first step toward redefining Lebanon’s place in the region. Historical transformations do not unfold overnight. Even if the meeting sends encouraging signals, the success of any new course will require sustained commitment from all parties, both domestically and internationally. What is needed is not simply a declaration of intent, but clear implementation mechanisms capable of shielding Lebanon from a return to the cycle of recurring crises. At the regional level, the future of relations between the United States and Iran will remain a decisive factor. Should the two countries fail to reach understandings capable of reducing tensions, Washington may increasingly seek partnerships with states and institutions able to generate stability. In that case, Lebanon could become part of a broader strategy based on strengthening states rather than managing conflicts through competing spheres of influence. The paradox is that Lebanon, which has paid a heavy price because of its geographic and political position, may now have an opportunity to turn that very position into a source of strength. Instead of remaining a crossroads of crises, it could become a meeting point of interests: between the Arab world and the international community, between stability and development, and between security and sovereignty. The period ahead will test the ability of the Lebanese people to seize this opportunity. International support, however important, cannot replace national decision-making. At the same time, national resolve requires a regional and international environment that allows it to succeed. 21 July may not, in itself, prove to be a historic turning point. It could, however, mark the beginning of a new conversation about Lebanon and the role it can play. If diplomacy is matched by concrete action, the country may begin the transition from managing crises to building the state. Ultimately, Lebanon’s future will not be determined solely by the rivalries of major powers. It will also depend on the ability of the Lebanese themselves to transform regional change into a national project capable of restoring the state to its rightful place and role.