Levant Time logo
Back to Article
Opinion

What Are We to Make of This Provisional Ceasefire Agreement?

News feature image
Author portrait
By Youssef Mouawad
Published Apr 11, 2026 - 08:54

For a resounding victory, it was anything but! Donald Trump, wary of getting drawn into the Persian Gulf, found a way out by scaling back his ambitions. No more talk of changing the regime of wilayat al-faqih, nor of putting a definitive end to Iran’s nuclear program (1). With the Islamabad Agreement of April 7, he will have to settle for a consolation prize: the reopening of communication routes and free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz “in coordination with the Iranian armed forces.” Does that make it a victory for the ayatollahs? Certainly not!

 

Javad Zarif and Foreign Affairs

 

While Iran has shown resilience, its forces are nevertheless exhausted and its country drained. Moreover, its negotiators in Islamabad seem ready to abandon their Lebanese proxy to its fate. Tehran will not formally admit this, but Javad Zarif hinted as much in an article in Foreign Affairs (2). The former Iranian foreign minister used the opportunity of an academic contribution (?) to propose a roadmap to end the raging regional conflict: he advocated reciprocal concessions between the belligerents, de-escalation, and diplomatic normalization.

 

In exchange for the lifting of U.S. sanctions and the ban on the sale of its hydrocarbons, Iran would drastically reduce its uranium enrichment program, which would moreover be placed under international supervision, etc. With regional security ensured, the Persian Gulf would become a zone of prosperity and fruitful exchange. In this idyllic vision of the future, exporting the Islamic Revolution would no longer be on the agenda. This explains why there is no mention of our Mediterranean Middle East, let alone the Palestinian cause or the Al-Aqsa Mosque!

 

Still, it is curious that Javad Zarif does not tell us what fate he intends for Hezbollah. Does he plan to sacrifice it as a pawn on the political chessboard? (3)

 

“Eternal Darkness” and the Islamabad Agreement

 

The plan proposed by Zarif suggests that Iran should be allowed to claim a strategic victory, so that it does not lose face and can enter negotiations with the “Great Satan.” And indeed, that is what happened: no sooner had the ceasefire been declared than Hezbollah—not just Iran—claimed to be “on the brink of a great historic victory.”

 

Nevertheless, the Iranian-backed militia called on displaced residents from the South, Dahieh, and the Bekaa “to show patience, to stand firm,” and not to return to their homes until it gave the green light. And rightly so, since the said ceasefire, which supposedly enshrined Iran’s victory, hardly concerned the Lebanese theater of operations. Lebanon was not meant to benefit from the cessation of hostilities. Indeed, on April 8, Eyal Zamir, the Israeli Chief of Staff, declared: “We will continue to strike the terrorist Hezbollah and exploit every opportunity… Strikes will continue as part of Operation ‘Eternal Darkness.’”

 

So to those of our fellow citizens who proclaimed victory too soon, we say: do not be mistaken about Benjamin Netanyahu’s intentions. As far as his northern border is concerned, he has opted for full-scale escalation. And he reminds us of this constantly through repeated strikes, as if to say: “I am not bound by the Islamabad Agreement.” And to add: “Lebanese, you serve as human shields for Hezbollah!”

 

Postscript

 

At a time when official Lebanon is preparing to launch peace negotiations in Washington with the State of Israel, one can expect a dirty trick from the Islamic Republic. Facing the possible loss of its proxy—the Party of God—it will seek to bypass the government and will not hesitate to inflame civil conflict among the Lebanese if doing so serves its interests. With nothing left to lose, Hezbollah would once again be used to sow chaos!

 

1 – It should be noted that the Farsi version of the ceasefire agreement stipulates the continuation of uranium enrichment within the framework of Iran’s nuclear program. This addition does not appear in the original version circulating in English among diplomats and journalists. And this is not the only discrepancy between the two versions.

 

2 – Javad Zarif, “How Iran Should End the War: A Deal Tehran Could Take,” Foreign Affairs, April 2026. For failing to take national interests into account, this article immediately earned its author a reprimand from the Iranian authorities.

 

3 – Likewise, Iranian threats to withdraw from the agreement following the “Black Wednesday” carnage would be purely symbolic—a smokescreen and a subterfuge to mask their real intentions.

Related Articles
View All
Related Videos
View All
Related Podcasts
View All