


For a long time, Iraq was the keystone of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s geostrategic maneuvers and ambitions. Without Iraq, nothing holds together: neither the land corridor to Syria, nor the sanctions-busting economy, nor the network of militias that provided Iran with strategic depth in the Gulf. Powerful Shiite militias (the PMF), financed, trained, and supervised by the Revolutionary Guards, controlled for years the border areas of al-Qaim/Bukamal, through which weapons, fighters, and technologies transited toward Syria and Lebanon.
The Iraqi government, wavering, constantly oscillated between Washington and Tehran, yet Iranian leverage remained massive. Today, Iraq has become a field of contradictions: U.S. pressure is increasing to sanction pro-Iranian networks; militias have been weakened by the disorganization of the Syrian front; the recent internal dispute over the classification of Hezbollah and the Houthis—placed on and then removed from terrorist lists within a few days—clearly reveals confusion; and, last but not least, an Iraqi nationalism is taking shape that rejects Iranian interference as much as American dominance.
Baghdad is now walking a tightrope between Washington, Tehran, and Riyadh. Tehran retains real and essential influence there, but no longer the “corridor” that made Iraq a natural extension of its defensive architecture. The Iraqi link still exists; but it no longer structures the regional space.
Gaza, or the Palestinian Depth of the Iranian Axis
There remains Gaza. Why this geopolitical attachment to the Palestinian card, beyond the political asset it had represented since 2006—namely, a Sunni extension of Iran and a bargaining chip with the West over the nuclear issue, as a tool of pressure on Israel?
To understand Gaza within the Iranian system, one must dismantle the myth: Hamas is not an Iranian creation. Hamas is the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its establishment was clearly facilitated by Israel in order to create a counterweight to Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, to divide Palestinian ranks, and to justify the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the grounds of the existence of an extremist terrorist actor.
Between 1990 and 2000, Hamas gradually moved closer to Iran and Hezbollah, against the backdrop of its rejection of the Oslo Accords. In 2007, the takeover of Gaza at Fatah’s expense increased its growing dependence on Iranian support at all levels. To be sure, Hamas is not Hezbollah—which is a direct emanation of the Pasdaran through Lebanese intermediaries. It retains ideological and tactical autonomy—but it is fully embedded in Iran’s strategy.
For Tehran, Gaza serves three functions. First, it constitutes a permanent internal front against Israel. The Gaza Strip is unavoidable for Tel Aviv: enclosed and explosive, it is impossible to neutralize politically without a colossal human and military cost. The systematic destruction of the enclave and the methodical elimination of its inhabitants since October 2023 have failed to crush Hamas. The conflict ties down part of the Israeli army, prevents Israel from freely projecting power across the region, and opens a permanent breach in Israel’s internal security… but, paradoxically, it allows Benjamin Netanyahu to remain in power despite the corruption charges against him.
Second, Gaza provides Palestinian legitimacy to the Iranian narrative—a function also performed by Hezbollah’s discourse. Without Gaza, Iran cannot claim to be the champion of the Palestinian cause. With Gaza, the “resistance” narrative takes on substance—the rockets fired at Tel Aviv and Ashkelon supplying the imagery necessary for Iranian grandstanding. It is the perfect distraction, diverting Arab populations from what matters most: the grip of the vilayat-e faqih over the Middle East, in the name of restoring a mythical imperial golden age.
Next article: Israel and the alliance of minorities: a paradoxical stability (4/5)
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