Lebanon: The Hezb at a Point of No Return?

Since the end of the July 2006 war, Lebanese observers and foreign analysts alike have tended to measure Hezbollah’s strength by the number of missiles it possessed, the size of its arsenal, or its ability to threaten Israel. Today, however, events call for an entirely different yardstick. The question is no longer how many weapons the group still retains, but whether it remains capable of rebuilding the military strength it spent more than four decades constructing.

This lies at the heart of the current phase.

Following the meeting between Lebanese President General Joseph Aoun and U.S. President Donald Trump, the sustained U.S. diplomatic engagement that preceded and followed it, the negotiations underway in Rome, and the increasingly persistent discussion surrounding the expansion of the Lebanese Army’s deployment and the linkage between reconstruction and the restoration of the Lebanese state’s authority over security decisions, it has become increasingly clear that the international approach no longer seeks simply to disarm Hezbollah through political agreement or military action. Instead, it aims to make the reconstitution of its military capabilities increasingly difficult, if not impossible.

In other words, the strategy has shifted from destroying military capabilities to preventing their reconstitution.

This is the context in which what might be described as “structural erosion” should be understood: a process affecting five interconnected dimensions simultaneously, namely territory, weaponry, the social base, state institutions, and regional depth.

First: The Loss of Territory as a Military Environment

The villages of southern Lebanon were never merely places where Hezbollah fighters were stationed. They formed part of a sophisticated military infrastructure comprising tunnels, weapons depots, command centers, and fortified launch positions.

The latest war targeted that infrastructure on an unprecedented scale. At the same time, the deployment of the Lebanese Army and international monitoring mechanisms have made any attempt to rebuild it far more difficult and far more vulnerable to detection and attack.

Control of territory is no longer simply a matter of physical presence. It is measured by the ability to exploit that territory for military purposes. That ability is now eroding rapidly.

Second: The Erosion of Military Capability

Hezbollah still possesses weapons and retains the ability to carry out limited operations should it choose to do so. But there is a fundamental difference between possessing the capacity to conduct tactical harassment and being capable of sustaining a prolonged strategic war.

Its arsenal of precision-guided missiles has suffered significant losses. Its command-and-control structures have become more vulnerable, while its supply lines no longer function as they once did.

At the same time, the transfer of weapons through Syria and Iraq has become considerably more complex as a result of political and security developments in both countries, compounded by increasingly stringent regional and international monitoring.

As a result, Hezbollah now appears more capable of using what remains of its arsenal than of replacing what it has lost.

Third: Hezbollah’s Constituency Is Changing

This may well be the most sensitive factor.

Southern Lebanon has emerged from the war burdened by widespread destruction, displacement, and severe economic losses. Faced with the urgent need for reconstruction, growing segments of the population have become increasingly dependent on the Lebanese state, as well as on Arab and international assistance.

At the same time, Hezbollah’s social and financial institutions no longer appear capable of playing the role they assumed after the 2006 war, whether because of mounting economic pressures, logistical constraints, or the changing regional environment.

This does not necessarily point to a political shift within the Shiite community. It does, however, suggest that priorities are beginning to change. The desire for stability and the restoration of normal life is gradually taking precedence over the logic of open-ended confrontation.

As this transformation unfolds, securing the social support necessary to rebuild Hezbollah’s military infrastructure becomes more difficult than ever before.

Fourth: The State Is Reclaiming Its Role

For the first time in many years, the Lebanese state, backed by clear international support, is moving to reassert its security role in southern Lebanon.

The Lebanese Army is no longer viewed simply as another force deployed alongside other actors. It is increasingly regarded as the only legitimate institution entitled to exercise the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

In this light, the ongoing negotiations appear to be more than temporary security arrangements. They represent an effort to consolidate a new reality in which areas under the Army’s deployment fall exclusively under state authority, with reconstruction assistance and international aid conditioned on preserving that reality.

Consequently, Hezbollah’s military freedom of action is gradually shrinking, not only on the battlefield, but also in legal and political terms.

Fifth: Regional Depth Is No Longer What It Once Was

Since its founding, Hezbollah has relied on a regional support network provided by Iran through Syria and, later, through Iraq.

Today, however, that network faces mounting challenges.

Borders are subject to tighter surveillance, the political landscapes in both Damascus and Baghdad have evolved, and the United States is seeking to embed these constraints within a long-term regional security architecture designed to prevent the reconstitution of military capabilities in exchange for reconstruction and stability.

In other words, the objective is no longer to eliminate every weapon, but to make any future rearmament project politically, economically, and militarily prohibitive.

Beyond Weapons: The Battle for Regeneration

The significance of these developments lies in the fact that they do not target a single component. Rather, they undermine the entire ecosystem that once enabled Hezbollah to regenerate its strength.

The territory is no longer as secure as it once was. Supply lines have become more fragile. The social fabric has grown increasingly strained. The Lebanese state is steadily reasserting its presence. And international backing for this process has become clearer than ever.

The central question, therefore, is no longer whether Hezbollah still possesses missiles.

It is whether, five years from now, it will still be capable of recovering the level of strength it enjoyed before the war.

The answer to that question, far more than the number of missiles remaining today, will shape Lebanon’s future.

Toward a New Model

If Washington, together with its regional and international partners, succeeds in consolidating the gains achieved through the Rome process in the coming months, Lebanon may be on the threshold of a historic transition, moving from the balance of arms to the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

Such a transition will neither be swift nor free of obstacles or attempts at obstruction. Yet current indicators suggest that the international strategy is no longer centered on defeating Hezbollah militarily, but rather on gradually containing it within Lebanon’s political system while, step by step, stripping it of the foundations that enabled it to emerge as a regional military power over the past decades.

This is where the concept of structural erosion acquires its full meaning.

History teaches that armed organizations do not disappear when they lose a battle, but when they lose the ability to replace their losses and regenerate their strength.

That may well be the greatest challenge confronting Hezbollah today. It is also, perhaps, the defining challenge of the new phase now opening for both Lebanon and the wider region.