From Rome to the Third Republic: Has Lebanon’s Refoundation Begun?

History does not remember only the cities where wars came to an end. It remembers the cities where new political orders were born.

That is why Rome may one day be remembered not merely as the city that hosted another round of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, but as the place where the process of reshaping Lebanon’s political and security architecture began after a war that profoundly altered the regional balance of power.

The meetings scheduled in Rome are about far more than a ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal, or a prisoner exchange, important as those issues undoubtedly are. They form part of a broader process aimed at translating the outcome of the war into a new political reality capable of preventing any return to the pre-war status quo.

International experience shows that the consequences of war do not truly end when the guns fall silent. They endure until a new political order is established, one capable of addressing the causes of conflict and preventing its recurrence. That appears to be precisely what the United States is seeking to achieve in Lebanon.

From President Joseph Aoun’s visit to Washington, to the Framework Agreement, and now to the Rome meetings, the sequence appears increasingly coherent. Each step seems to belong to the same broader trajectory: moving from managing Lebanon’s recurring crises toward redefining the foundations of the Lebanese State.

The first objective of this process is to establish a clear principle: one State, one army, and one security authority.

The issue of the State’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force is no longer merely a Lebanese or international demand. It has become the cornerstone of rebuilding the State itself. No country can fully reclaim its role while decisions of war and peace remain outside its constitutional institutions.

Reducing Lebanon’s crisis to the issue of weapons alone, however, would be an incomplete reading. The country’s predicament has never been limited to the existence of an armed force operating alongside the State. It also stems from the gradual weakening of state institutions under a political system that entrenched sectarian power-sharing and transformed public institutions into spheres of political patronage.

It is within that context that Nabih Berri’s role must be understood. He has remained one of the longest-serving and most influential figures at the heart of Lebanon’s political establishment.

Over the past decades, his influence has extended far beyond his position as Speaker of Parliament or his political alliance with Hezbollah. He has been one of the principal architects of the system of governance that emerged after the Taif Agreement.

Just as Hezbollah helped entrench a parallel security structure by maintaining an armed force outside the State’s institutions, several political actors, with Berri among their foremost representatives, helped consolidate a system of governance based on sectarian quotas and political appointments, where loyalty too often outweighed competence.

The result has been an overburdened state administration, a bloated public sector, widespread disguised unemployment, and a steady erosion of the ability of public institutions to perform their most basic functions.

Rebuilding Lebanon, therefore, cannot be confined to resolving the issue of weapons. It also requires rebuilding the State itself: a modern public administration, an independent judiciary, effective institutions, and appointments based on merit rather than political allegiance.

This is also the context in which the growing pressure surrounding Nabih Berri should be understood.

So far, Washington has not targeted him personally. Instead, it has delivered clear political signals by increasing pressure on figures and networks associated with his political circle. The underlying message appears unmistakable: the next phase will not allow the old rules of the game to endure.

The objective may not be to sideline Berri but rather to redefine his role.

His political experience and extensive network make him a figure who cannot simply be ignored during any political transition. The question now is whether he will become a partner in building Lebanon’s new State or remain a defender of the system that led the country into its present crisis.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, faces a different kind of historic test. The challenge is no longer simply to end military confrontation, but to redefine its place within the Lebanese State. It now faces a choice:  evolve into a political party operating within the framework of the State, or continue confronting a domestic and international process aimed at restoring the State’s exclusive authority.

Ultimately, Rome may prove to be far more than simply another venue for negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. It could mark the beginning of a much broader negotiation over Lebanon’s future.

If the Taif Agreement brought the civil war to an end and reshaped the country’s political balance, the next phase may well redefine the very function of the Lebanese State: a State that holds the exclusive monopoly over arms, the sole authority to decide questions of war and peace, restores its place within the Arab world and the international community, and rebuilds an economy capable of sustained recovery.

None of this, however, is guaranteed. The United States can facilitate agreements, Arab countries can help finance reconstruction, and the international community can provide political and economic support. But the task of building the State ultimately rests with the Lebanese themselves.

The real question, therefore, is not simply what the Rome meetings will produce.

Rather, it is whether Rome will open the road to Lebanon’s Third Republic.

A republic defined not merely by the end of war, but by the determination to eliminate the structural causes that have prevented the emergence of a genuine State for decades.

For Lebanon’s next battle will not simply be fought over borders. It will be fought over the very identity of the Lebanese State itself: will Lebanon remain a country divided among competing centers of power, or will it finally become a unified State, exercising sole authority over sovereign decision-making?

That is where the next chapter of Lebanon’s history will be written.