Between Negotiations and the Field: Is There Room for Reconciliation?

Lebanon and the Lebanese cannot confront the challenges facing the country while divided to this degree over the great strategic choices, especially the question of how to deal with the Israeli occupation and resolve the issue of confining weapons to the state, a legitimate, self-evident demand recognized in every country in the world, for there is no state that accepts the existence of an armed faction beyond its control, capable of igniting a major war not merely without its consent but without so much as consulting it.

The lines of vertical fracture in Lebanon keep widening, and the rift among the Lebanese deepens by the day, until Lebanese political discourse finds itself confined between two poles: one racing toward a peace whose conditions have not yet ripened, and another retreating into the field without reading the exceptional transformations the region has witnessed over the past three years, from uncontested Israeli supremacy to the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria to the American-Israeli-Iranian war.

As for the argument that those who negotiate are not those who resist on the ground, it is valid and obstructs the negotiations currently underway in Washington, however early they remain, particularly given that Israel, in all previous negotiating experiences with other parties, was never disposed to make any concession whatsoever, let alone a gratuitous one.

Faced with this dangerous political schism among the Lebanese, it is necessary to revisit certain realities that neither side nor any of the contending parties can ignore or avert their eyes from. Chief among these is the acknowledgment that there are historical Israeli aggressions against Lebanon, and that the successive wars Israel waged against the Lebanese were not exclusively aimed at achieving the declared objectives, whether driving out the Palestinians in earlier times or destroying Hezbollah today.

There is a manifest Israeli vengeance against Lebanon: against its civilians (and the images of Black Wednesday on 8 April 2026 remain vivid in memory), against its villages and towns, against its infrastructure, against its hospitals, and above all against its pluralist experience, which contradicts Israeli uniformity and reflects the richness of a Lebanese society that, despite all its difficulties, takes pride in its diversity, unlike Israeli society, which proclaims the supremacy of one of its components and treats the others with extreme arrogance and contempt.

Among the other realities that must be acknowledged is the return of occupation to the lands of the South and the invention of what has been called the "yellow line," in reference to the Gaza Strip and the other colors Israel uses to fragment the West Bank and plant settlements within it. Fifty-five villages have now come under occupation in practice, a grave setback when measured against the great national achievement of the year 2000, namely the complete withdrawal without conditions, without a peace treaty, and without even a security arrangements agreement.

Yet the problem lies not only in acknowledging these realities, but also in the serious search for ways of addressing them, whether through armed resistance or political negotiation. The dilemma consists equally in the fact that it is inadmissible for political negotiations not to draw any benefit from the card of the field, just as it would be illogical for the field to remain entirely disconnected from political negotiations.

On the matter of negotiations, it is useful to continue working toward separating the Lebanese track from any other track. Lebanon has suffered enough from the tying of its trajectories and destiny to those of other countries, and the experience of "twinning" the Lebanese and Syrian tracks during the era of tutelage remains before us, having amply demonstrated that it never served Lebanon's interests in any way.

That said, the Lebanese negotiator can draw on the card of the field in one way or another, rather than going to Washington empty-handed with an approach that carries a hint of supplication and a search for sympathy. If the present political moment is characterized by an American attention to Lebanon, manifested in pressure on the Israeli government for a ceasefire, it must be borne in mind that the network of American-Israeli interests is far deeper and more entrenched than Lebanon's modest calculations. Lebanon cannot compete with Israel for Washington's affection, and the matter is far more complex than that.

Drawing on the "card of the field," however, also requires an acknowledgment on the part of Hezbollah, and those who stand behind it, that the era of complete disconnection from the Lebanese state is no longer acceptable at the Lebanese, Arab, or international level, and that one of its most harmful manifestations was the dragging of Lebanon into endless and fruitless wars, and that there is a genuine need to work, under some formula to be determined, within the fold of the state. And above all, this step would not merely strengthen Lebanon's negotiating position, but would also help bridge the internal rift, relieve the pressure, and ward off the security or social explosion whose elements are slowly and steadily accumulating.

If the crude dialogue formulas of national dialogue tables no longer yield any results, new formulas must be devised that take mutations into account, reinforce Lebanon's resilience, and block the road to civil war at a moment when Israel is lying in wait to incite the communities against one another, a game it has played many times before.

In this context, it is also incumbent on the "peace camp" to rein in its momentum somewhat, whether in its rush toward "media normalization" or in raising issues that are entirely premature and amount to nothing more than free gifts to Israel, among them the hasty proposal to repeal the boycott law against Israel adopted in 1955, which criminalizes any dealings with it. Lebanon remains in a state of belligerence to this day, and Israel proves this daily, through the two thousand martyrs and more who fell in the last war.

Just as the "resistance camp" is expected to refrain from threatening fitna, internal war, and the subjugation of all Lebanese in order to "discipline" them, brandishing the specter of a new May 7, which remains an unjustifiable stain on those who perpetrated that act in 2008. It is equally called upon to desist from affixing the labels of collaboration, treason, and Zionism to all who hold a different opinion.

Lebanon may be standing before a historic opportunity, and that is true. But the matter requires discernment and awareness in the way it is managed, rather than haste and recklessness, lest the opportunity turn into a curse that reignites the fuse of civil war. Without dialogue, in some form or another, tensions will deepen, and the mission of liberating the occupied lands and putting a definitive end to the war will become all the more arduous.