Beijing: the fallout from the summit of two 'emperors'

On Thursday, May 14, the world's attention was focused on Beijing, where a meeting between the President of the United States, who still sees himself as a major power, and President Xi Jinping, who aspires to be even greater, could have significant consequences for many countries, both in the short and long term. For some—likely many—these consequences could be dramatic.

What will become of the state of the world after this? No one could say for certain yet.

President Trump likely spoke first about trade. President Xi did as well. The former will quickly tout his victories—a word he cherishes—on his site, as is his custom.

The Chinese president will display his enigmatic and fixed smile, hinting at his satisfaction with having obtained what he wanted. It can be presumed that trade agreements were the first to be discussed and secured. Will they be balanced, though? That's doubtful…

The President of the United States has an urgent need to satisfy his public opinion and the American people, who are now weary of seeing oil prices skyrocket, inflation and unemployment rise, and who are tired of witnessing shortages of essential materials, including fertilizers blocked in the Persian Gulf region. Not to mention other materials vital to running the American economic machine, which hasn't really achieved the objectives claimed during the presidential campaign and repeatedly promoted under the MAGA slogan (Make America Great Again).

We will know more on this matter when one side announces its victories without its interlocutor—not its partner—mentioning his own gains.

All these discussions and negotiations carry a geopolitical undertone linked to the internal situation in the United States, to China's need to restore its supply levels of oil and materials necessary for its own development and increasingly pressing growth.

The two priority issues forming this geopolitical backdrop are certainly Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, closely intertwined, as well as Taiwan.

The second point will be important in the long term. Initially, discussions likely focused on halting US support for Taiwan's defense in exchange for China reducing its demonstrations and threats against the island—essentially maintaining the status quo for now. Neither side wants to move toward confrontation. Xi has time…until 2049. Between now and then, other pressures and negotiations will occur, and Xi believes the West's position may be quite different. The West could be preoccupied by other matters than defending Taiwan, which is far from the US, although freedom of navigation through the strait known as Formosa (150 km wide) will always be a sticking point.

Trump's Dilemma

But things are not so simple for the US President. He must not appear to abandon Taiwan to its fate without compromising his already tarnished position as protector of Arabian Peninsula countries, and without damaging his image of strength and power against Iran's Revolutionary Guards. As a previous Levant Time article pointed out, these countries might quickly conclude that American defense represents a danger, which could lead one or more of them to want the Americans to leave the bases they occupy in the region. Perhaps that's why Israel decided to give the United Arab Emirates an Iron Dome. Did Mr. Trump impose this measure?

Who would benefit from this void? And if China, leveraging its ties with Iran, could assure them through its mere presence the security they seek, allowing them to focus on tourism, global events, high technology, luxury, and finance, as before? China would be the big winner in developing and expanding its Silk Road.

President Trump, who thought upon arriving at the White House for a second term that he would only need to focus on domestic security—immigration and drug trafficking—and China internationally, as his only real competitor, has realized that being tugged by Benjamin Netanyahu's sleeve was a trap he fell into quite naively.

Iran and the Strait of Hormuz

The key is therefore to address the first issue properly and handle it well so as not to revisit it or get bogged down in it. Within this shared concern—Iran and the Strait of Hormuz—there are two aspects in which both presidents have a common interest: nuclear matters and freedom of maritime navigation. China opposes nuclear proliferation. It has always made this known. As for free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, China has the greatest interest in seeing it restored as quickly as possible. This won't prevent it from wanting to limit, or even prohibit, free passage through the Taiwan Strait. Geopolitics can be quite cunning!

It's too early to speculate further. Let's wait for Mr. Trump's victory declarations, which will inevitably come, and for what Xi says or doesn't say.

Regarding maritime navigation and all the consequences of decisions that will be made or adopted by the West concerning the Strait of Hormuz, it seems useful to recall that organizing this traffic is not limited to agreements with merely commercial or geopolitical connotations. This matter falls under the application of international treaties and regulations.

Iran signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on December 10, 1982, in Montego Bay, commonly known as the Montego Bay Convention (UNCLOS). However, it has never ratified it. Iran is therefore a signatory but not a State Party to the Convention, which means it is not bound by all of UNCLOS's conventional obligations, unlike States that have ratified the treaty. This situation is comparable to that of the United States: they too have signed certain texts related to UNCLOS but have never ratified the Convention itself.

This matter is particularly important for the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has long maintained that it is not fully bound by certain 'transit passage' rules provided by UNCLOS in international straits, precisely because it has not ratified the Convention. For this reason, Iran's Revolutionary Guards claim the right to levy charges for passage through the strait. Nevertheless, many States believe that several essential provisions of UNCLOS—particularly freedom of navigation—are now part of 'customary international law' and are therefore applicable even to non-State Parties.

It will be vital for the entire world to observe how this issue is addressed and resolved. Many passages or straits could be affected by this question and navigation could be taxed by riparian States.

Before closing—provisionally—this topic, it is important not to give credence to certain commentators who appear on television or radio to discuss straits and who indiscriminately address cases like the Suez or Panama Canals. Canals are not straits. The Dardanelles constitute another special case, as do the Bosphorus, whose passage is regulated by the 1936 Montreux Convention, meticulously applied and respected, particularly regarding the presence of maritime forces not belonging to Black Sea riparian States.