Ali al-Taher: Why Did Hezbollah Refuse to Hand the Hill Over to the Army?

The battle of Ali al-Taher was not merely a military confrontation over a strategic hill in southern Lebanon. Despite its limited size, the site became a point where military, political, and regional calculations converged, exposing one of the core issues at the heart of Lebanon’s ongoing conflict: who controls the territory, who holds the weapons, and who decides on war and peace?

What is most striking is not only Israel’s entry into the site, but Hezbollah’s insistence on refusing to hand it over to the Lebanese Army, even though the Army is the only legitimate institution supposed to assume responsibility for Lebanese territory, particularly in border areas directly tied to the country’s security and sovereignty.

Why Did Hezbollah refuse?

Because handing Ali al-Taher over to the Army would not have been understood as a limited measure on the ground. It would have carried a political meaning extending far beyond the hill itself.

Such a move would have amounted to a de facto recognition of the Lebanese state’s authority over security and military decisions in the South, and of the principle that no other armed force can act as though it exercises effective authority on the ground.

The site therefore became a test of state authority, rather than merely an advanced military position.

Who Killed the fighters?

This remains the most obscure episode in the account of the battle.

The Israeli version speaks of fighters being killed and others fleeing, while independent information about how many people were present at the site, the nature of their mission, and what ultimately happened to them remains incomplete. The conflicting accounts also raise numerous questions that cannot be resolved through military statements alone.

And this is not merely an operational detail: Were most of the fighters killed inside the site? Did they manage to withdraw through tunnels and passageways? Or had they been evacuated before the Israeli operation began?

Each of these scenarios carries a different significance.

If the fighters remained until the final moments, that would mean the site witnessed a direct confrontation that ended in clear Israeli military superiority.

If, on the other hand, they were evacuated beforehand, the questions would concern who made that decision, why it was taken, and whether the evacuation formed part of a broader understanding or was simply a precautionary military measure.

And if it were established that a significant number of them had left before Israeli forces entered the site, the central questions would then be: how did they leave, who facilitated their departure, and did it take place with the knowledge of local or international actors?

At this stage, there is insufficient public evidence to determine which of these scenarios is correct. But the absence of information does not make these questions any less important. On the contrary, it deepens the uncertainty surrounding what occurred in the hours preceding the capture of the site.

What About the U.S. Ambassador’s Visit to Israel?

The timing deserves attention.

The escalation around Ali al-Taher coincided with U.S. diplomatic moves involving Israel, while reports emerged of discussions concerning the site and the possibility that it might eventually be handed over to the Lebanese Army.

This does not necessarily mean that the decision was made outside Lebanon, nor that a fully developed agreement was reached between Washington, Tel Aviv, and Beirut. But it does suggest that the site is no longer being viewed as a purely local military issue.

There is no basis for asserting that the U.S. ambassador’s visit was part of a secret deal concerning Ali al-Taher. Nor can it be stated with certainty that everything that happened resulted from a prior understanding among the parties involved.

What is clear, however, is that Washington views the future of the site as part of a broader file involving the ceasefire, the stabilization of the border, the prevention of any military presence outside the authority of the Lebanese state, and efforts to ensure that border areas do not become permanent platforms for confrontation.

Ali al-Taher thus becomes part of negotiations that extend far beyond its geography.

The site may be small on the map, but it is connected to major questions concerning arrangements in the South, the role of the Lebanese Army, the future of weapons outside state control, and the limits of Israeli influence in the region.

The Paradox That Embarrassed Hezbollah

The central political paradox is that Hezbollah refused to hand the hill over to the Lebanese Army, yet ultimately failed to retain it.

If the Israeli operation were to end with the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the handover of the site to the Lebanese Army, the outcome would be very different from the situation Hezbollah sought to impose or preserve:

Hezbollah refused to hand the site over to the state, Israel forced it out, and the state then returned to assume responsibility.

In other words, Hezbollah refused to establish the Army’s authority voluntarily, but may find itself confronted with a reality that establishes that authority by other means.

This is what makes the situation politically embarrassing, because the final outcome may appear to have achieved indirectly what Hezbollah refused to do directly.

This raises an obvious question: why was handing the site over to the Army not considered the least costly option for Lebanon?

Such a move could have been presented as a strengthening of the state’s role, a means of protecting the South, and a way of preventing Israel from using Hezbollah’s presence as a pretext to remain on the ground or advance further.

The refusal to hand the site over to the Army instead kept it within the zone of confrontation and allowed Israel to present its operation as a response to a military presence outside state authority.

Ali al-Taher Encapsulates Lebanon’s Problem

The issue goes far beyond this hill.

Lebanon cannot recover its sovereignty as long as two military authorities coexist: that of the Army and that of weapons outside state control.

Nor can it ask the international community to respect its borders while military decision-making within those borders remains divided between state institutions and an armed organization possessing capabilities independent of them.

At the same time, Lebanon cannot demand that Israel withdraw from its territory while security decisions concerning that same territory remain the subject of an internal dispute.

As long as weapons remain outside state control, the Israeli argument will persist, and the South will remain exposed to further rounds of escalation.

Sovereignty cannot be shared.

Either the Lebanese Army is the sole military authority, or Lebanon will remain an open arena for regional conflicts in which Iranian, Israeli, and American calculations intersect, while the state and society pay the price of confrontation.

This is why the real question after Ali al-Taher is not: Who won the hill?

But rather: Who will control it once the battle is over?

If the answer is the Lebanese Army, Ali al-Taher could mark the beginning of a transition in the South from the logic of “resistance” to the logic of state responsibility.

It could constitute a first step toward redefining national security so that defending the borders becomes the responsibility of state institutions rather than that of any party acting independently.

If Israel remains, however, Lebanon will once again have lost part of its sovereignty, regardless of the narrative each side puts forward to justify what happened.

In either case, one essential truth remains:

Hezbollah cannot substitute itself for the state, and Israel cannot serve as the guarantor of its sovereignty.

Lebanese sovereignty can only be restored by the Lebanese state, protected by its Army, and upheld by a clear political decision that puts an end to the duality of arms and authority.