Articles

This series of articles offers a clearer understanding of the current situation on the Lebanese scene in light of the recent past, steering clear of the impassioned, ideological, or romantic narratives that overlook realities and leaving readers to draw the necessary conclusions. The previous eighteen installments revisited the events surrounding Hezbollah’s rise to power, from the Taif Agreement to the beginning of its military intervention in Syria alongside Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Adopted unanimously on June 11, 2012, at a meeting of political leaders held at the Presidential Palace, the Baabda Declaration was intended to preserve Lebanon’s stability and shield it from the spillover of the Syrian civil war onto its territory.

President Donald Trump's threats against Iran in the wake of Wednesday's Flydubai flight incident, along with the increased U.S. military presence in the region, show that war is a real possibility, even if the door to negotiations remains open. At least in principle, since Iranian officials continue to use radical rhetoric and believe they are in a position to dictate terms to the United States. At the same time, they are escalating matters in Yemen through their ally, the Houthis. The failed hijacking attempt—or deliberate crash—of the Emirati Flydubai aircraft operating the Dubai–Tel Aviv route, carrying more than 150 Israeli passengers on September 30, clearly dominated the past week.

If the Lebanese authorities believe they are mobilizing all their energies and capabilities to address the new reality created by Israel’s occupation of roughly 7 percent of Lebanon’s territory, and making every possible effort to implement the framework agreement signed with Israel and revive the stalled negotiations in Rome or Washington, then they must also seek to devise some form of internal political dialogue, particularly with Hezbollah, which bears primary responsibility for drawing Lebanon into two successive wars, in 2024 and 2026. The Lebanese authorities have set the bar high since the political order was reconstituted with the election of General Joseph Aoun as President of the Republic in January 2025 and the formation of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government in February of the same year. It must be acknowledged that these were goals that could scarcely even have been contemplated a few years earlier, when Hezbollah’s grip on the Lebanese state and political establishment had become deeply entrenched and its military strength had driven it to expand into Syria and become immersed in that country’s complexities and problems.

September has just come to an end and, unfortunately, I did not manage to achieve one of the goals I had set myself for the month, namely to finish a text I am currently writing on Lebanese cinema. A text shot through, among other things, with the question of what this cinema should film at a time when the country is living through a new Israeli invasion, when Lebanese society is more divided than ever, and when narratives from elsewhere about what is happening to us are already beginning to emerge. I am thinking, for example, of the film that has been announced about the pager operation, which will probably remain silent about the destruction caused by Israel in southern Lebanon and instead invite the viewer to marvel at the technical feat involved in such an operation.

II. Zaydism: A Doctrine of the Living Imam and Revolt A Singular Branch of Shiism Shiism ( shī‘a , “party” of Ali) regards Ali ibn Abi Talib and his descendants, the “People of the House” ( Ahl al-Bayt ), as the legitimate successors of the Prophet. Over the course of succession disputes, it split into several branches: the Twelvers, who form the majority in Iran, Iraq and Bahrain and are also strongly represented in Lebanon; the Ismailis; the so-called “extremist” currents ( ghulāt ); and the Zaydis, today concentrated in northwestern Yemen. Zaydism takes its name from Zayd ibn Ali, grandson of Hussein, who rose up against the Umayyads and died a martyr in 740. His nephew Ja‘far al-Sadiq, who would become a major reference for the future Twelvers, refused to follow him. The split occurred precisely over this point: whether to follow the imam who takes up arms against injustice, or to wait. Zayd maintained close ties with the Mu‘tazilite Wasil ibn Ata, while Abu Hanifa, founder of one of the major Sunni schools of law, studied under him and supported his revolt. This proximity explains why Zaydism has long been described as “the most Sunni of the Shiisms.”

The latest increase in France’s debt illustrates a pressure shared by several major economies: borrowing is piling up while financing it is becoming more expensive. From deficits to interest rates, twelve questions to understand a phenomenon that is weighing on public budgets and citizens alike. France has crossed a new threshold. According to figures published by INSEE on September 29, its public debt stood at €3,595.5 billion at the end of the second quarter of 2026, equivalent to 119% of gross domestic product (GDP). It increased by €59.6 billion in three months. The government expects it to reach 121.7% of GDP in 2027.