Articles

If the state of dejection that Lebanese people are living through at this stage is understandable, given the successive defeats that have haunted them for years and reached their apex with the two wars of support launched by Hezbollah without consulting anyone — wars that led to the return of Israeli occupation, the displacement of more than a million Lebanese, and the wholesale destruction of southern villages — the excessive enthusiasm of some for peace with Israel, and the headlong rush of others toward normalization, whether media-driven or otherwise, carry no logical justification whatsoever, and the least one can say of them is that they are precipitate and irresponsible.

As negotiations on the American-Iranian front stall and security incidents multiply in the Gulf, Lebanese authorities stand out with a clearly sovereigntist strategic vision, while at the same time a military escalation occurred at the end of the week with a bombing of the southern suburb and an Iranian threat against Israel. "Lebanon is our country, not yours." These words spoken by Lebanese President Joseph Aoun during a widely-followed interview with CNN's renowned journalist Christiane Amanpour on Friday not only marked the week that just ended in Lebanon, but certainly reinforce the trend toward a clear shift in official discourse in the direction of the sovereigntist message that was central to the head of state's inauguration speech.

The Strait of Hormuz has held the world up to a magnifying mirror of its own contradictions, much as the Covid-19 crisis did, or the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Modern prosperity rests on global stability and the free flow of material exchanges — maritime routes, molecules, cables, ports, interest rates — within a globalisation built on the economy of contemporary reality. Faced with an energy crisis, reactions now follow a familiar pattern: rising oil prices make renewable energy more attractive, soaring gas prices heighten the importance of safer routes, and notions of reclaimed sovereignty reassert themselves in public debate.

Pakistani diplomacy is active on two fronts, Lebanese and Iranian, with the official visit of the commander-in-chief of the army, General Rodolphe Haykal, to Islamabad, and that of Pakistani Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi to Tehran. Though different, both missions are part of sustained efforts to restore calm in the region. The Lebanese army announced Saturday the departure of its commander for Islamabad, at the invitation of his Pakistani counterpart and the defense minister, without specifying the purpose of the visit. Because of friction between Beirut and Tehran, exacerbated by Wednesday's Lebanese-Israeli ceasefire agreement, all signs point to General Haykal's trip to Islamabad as part of Pakistan's mediation efforts between the United States and Iran. And for good reason: the Hezbollah file is among the points of contention between Washington and Tehran.

What would an indicted or accused person not do to save his own skin? Brought before a court of law for crimes against humanity or war crimes, what would a former Syrian mukhabarat officer not say if called upon to answer for his misdeeds? The Fingernails Torn from the Children of Daraa The first defendant to appear before the “Damascus Trials” was Atef Najib. We followed his testimony on social media: he answered the Criminal Court’s questions in a cold and detached tone, as though he had no concern for the fate of the teenagers whom he had consigned to the worst forms of torment. To be sure, he acknowledged the facts for what they were: around fifteen schoolboys who had scribbled anti-Assad slogans on the walls of their school had been detained for more than a month and subjected to severe abuse, including beatings and the tearing out of their fingernails.

This series of articles is intended to shed light on the current situation through the lens of the past, far removed from passionate, ideological or romantic narratives that overlook the underlying realities. It is up to the reader to draw the appropriate conclusions. The previous seven instalments offered a reassessment of the events surrounding the rise of Hezbollah’s power, from the Taif Agreement to the withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon in May 2000, the establishment of a Hezbollahland in the South and the eruption of the 33-Day War in July 2006, which was initiated by Ali Larijani..