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The following text is a translation of the speech delivered in Arabic by our colleague Michel Hajji Georgiou during a panel discussion organized on Friday, May 15, in Beirut by the news and analysis website Janoubiya , in tribute to the memory of the writer and political scientist Mohammad Hussein Shamseddine. The event featured the participation of our colleague Ali Mohammad Hassan al-Amine, director of Janoubiya , former minister Ibrahim Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine, our contributor and political scientist Hisham Dibsi, and the writer and political scientist Hassan Bazih. The objective of the text is to place Shamseddine's thought and work within the continuity of the historical, political, and moral Libanist and statist heritage of the ulema of Jabal Amel. Dear friends, I would like, first of all, to thank Mr. Ali el-Amine for this initiative in paying tribute to our friend Mohammad Hussein Shamseddine, and for his invitation to this occasion, particularly in the presence of personalities of such stature, all of whom I hold in deep respect. Mohammad Hussein is without doubt one of my masters, to whom I owe a great part of the experience I have gained and the formation of my understanding of the Lebanese idea over the past two decades, from the period that followed the declaration of the Maronite bishops in 2000 and led to the fourteenth of March 2005. I would like to take this occasion — for Mohammad Hussein “lived the other” so fully that he no longer distinguished between his own work and that of his companions along the way — to salute the memory of those companions. To speak of Mohammad Hussein Chamseddine is to speak, at the same time, of Samir Frangieh, of Nassir al-Assaad, of Saoud al-Mawla, of Fares Souaid, of Tony Khawaja — the list goes on — and of all those who, living or departed, contributed to the founding of the Permanent Congress for Lebanese Dialogue in the early 1990s. It is to speak also of sayyed Hani Fahs and sayyed Mohammad Hassan al-Amine, and, at their head, of imam Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine. The symbolism of the place where we gather requires us to salute their memory. I ask the indulgence of those present, for in speaking of Mohammad Hussein I speak at the same time of a tradition from which I am still learning, slowly and carefully, thanks to my Shia friends and maestros: the tradition of Jabal Amel, that luminous and inexhaustible source of knowledge, wisdom and fiqh. A tradition more resilient than all the ordeals that have afflicted it in the past, and than those that tear at it today. The light of this authentically human Lebanese culture will without doubt outlast this new ordeal of fire and blood through which it once again passes. Mohammad Hussein Shamseddine left as he had lived: on tiptoe, in calm and humility, without excessive eulogy or funeral oration. He did not wake on the morning when Lebanon was preparing, once again, to be sacrificed on the altar of two pathologies, one martyropathic, the other exterminatory. Like a teacher who has accomplished his mission, he departed without the quiet certainty that his legacy and his thought would outlive him. Like all those who fought for more than half a century so that the sovereign Grand Lebanon and its living together might endure, he left without even knowing whether Lebanon itself would survive. This is assuredly one of the components of the Lebanese misfortune: a century after the founding of its State, Lebanon itself remains threatened with disappearance. And we now witness, before our eyes, how a part of its land, dear to my heart, this cradle of the culture I wish to speak of through Shamseddine, has been criminally reduced to ashes and dust. Such is the curse of Lebanon. Such is the curse of Cain. * * * Mohammad, the maestro — for that is how one approached him — was not a mere thinker. He was an educator, a pedagogue, who engaged with those around him according to the level of their culture and their thought, offering his knowledge with a keen sense of service, free of any ostentatious display. Precise, rigorous, concise, not given to many words. But lavish with meaning. And he always left you with far more than the intellectual baggage you had brought to him. He was even something more demanding than that: a political thinker who offered his work as a gift to others without claiming anything in return. All the political literature on which we built the dynamics of sovereignty and independence since the 1990s, from the documents of the Kornet Chehwan Gathering to those of the secretariat-general and the annual conferences of the March 14 movement, passing through the Beirut Appeal of 2004, was born at Mohammad’s table or passed through his hands, sprung from that mind inseparable from the minds of his colleagues. * * * Dear friends, It is an honour for me that Ibrahim Chamseddine is among us this evening. Mohammad Hussein was one of the disciples of imam Mohammad Mahdi Chamseddine, from whom he inherited the conviction that wilayat al-umma takes precedence over wilayat al-faqih , and the certainty that the Shia path in Lebanon does not pass through Tehran but through the Lebanese National Pact. This conviction was not born of political circumstance alone. It is a memory extending from Jabal Amel to the present, through an intellectual chain that began with sayyed Mohsen al-Amine, passed through imam Moussa al-Sadr, reached its depth with imam Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine, and then found its critical translation in the reflections of sayyed Hani Fahs and sayyed Mohammad Hassan al-Amine, in whose symbolic legacy we are gathered this evening, in the presence of his son Ali. This conceptual chain is not a mere chronicle of ideas. It constitutes a response to a question that Lebanese Shia are living today at the heart of the war: to what does imam Hussein point? What is the meaning of Karbala? * * * Sayyed Mohammad Hassan al-Amine asked this question at his conference in Teïrdebbâh in 1993, with the precision of one who knows the limits of certainty. His answer: Ashoura is a living memory, but one that dies from misuse. When it is reduced to a mere rite, to a “hat-stand on which to hang new sorrows,” to an occasion for releasing accumulated grief nourished by disappointment after disappointment, Karbala ceases to be a driving force and becomes a burden. He warned against two equally mistaken paths: the first makes the present a repeated replica of history, under the illusion that “the mere evocation of Karbala suffices to create in our time a movement of total commitment to the causes of right and justice.” The second breaks entirely the link between present and past, reducing Karbala to a mere tragic narrative. The third path, his own, consists in reading the event within its historical conditions in order to extract what, of human motivations, has persisted across time: freedom, justice, dignity. What, then, is the essence of Karbala in this reading? Sayyed Mohammad Hassan al-Amine expressed it in an unforgettable way: Hussein had seen “the jewel of justice, unity, freedom and equality being stolen from religion in the name of religion itself.” He had seen Islam instrumentalised to cover its own contrary. He had seen jurists issuing fatwas, the Qur’an recited, the call to prayer ringing out, and behind all of this a power that pillaged, tyrannised and annihilated. And he had asked: “What could one who knew this terrifying truth possibly do?” Hussein did not go to Karbala to seek death. He went because it was impossible for him to live against what he was. He refused allegiance to Yazid, though he could have pledged it and lived — but what kind of life? A life that accepts injustice as the condition of its own continuation. That choice was not available to him. The end was not death: it was the refusal of the lie. And death was what that refusal entailed, not what it sought. This is what he said himself: “I have not gone out in arrogance or pride, nor to spread corruption or commit injustice. I have gone out to seek reform in the community of my grandfather.” One might object that the infallible imam knows his fate in advance, and that this foreknowledge makes death a choice rather than a consequence. The answer is that infallibility is not compulsion, but an absolute harmony between act and truth. Hussein did not accept death; he refused the lie, and death was what that refusal entailed. Christian experience illuminates this: Christ knows his fate and one does not say on that account that he sought death, but that he refused to betray the truth; foreknowledge of destiny does not make death an end, it makes it a testimony that there exists something greater than the fear of it. And the martyrdom of Hussein is what René Girard called the “pharmakos,” the sacrifice that does not reproduce violence but exposes its mechanism and annuls it. There is a second theft that sayyed Mohammad Hassan al-Amine pointed to: the theft of the doctrine of free will. Muawiyya “was the first ruler in Islam to wield the axe of destruction against the highest doctrine that Islam had brought: the doctrine of choice,” transforming injustice into divine decree and contestation into impiety. And it is precisely against this that Hussein rose up: against the normalisation of injustice, its sacralisation and its elevation into the will of God. This diagnosis acquires today an unbearable sharpness. Those who wage war in the name of Hussein reproduce what he resisted: they make war a fatality, martyrdom an obligation and opposition a betrayal. They steal the jewel once more, in the name of the jewel itself. Allow me, in the presence of Ibrahim Shamseddine this evening, to recall what he said in Jeb Jennin in 2008, which I had reported in my writings of the time: “God does not need human beings to defend Him. No one can present himself on the Day of Judgement and say: ‘I sent you martyrs, and therefore I deserve paradise.’ The weak god who needs our blood does not deserve to be worshipped.” Dear Ibrahim, it is as though you were describing what happens each day now… * * * From the beginning of the last century, sayyed Mohsen al-Amine had held that the rites which had transformed the remembrance of Kerbala into blood shed every year in the streets of the flagellation constituted a denaturation of the meaning of Husseinian martyrdom: they placed death at the centre of the scene when it is dignity that ought to be there. This position earned him accusations of heresy from certain circles among the ulamas of Jabal Amel themselves. He persevered nonetheless in the path of what he had discerned. More than half a century later, sheikh Mohammad Jawad Moughnieh, a Lebanese Amilite jurist, was the first to respond to the Khomeinist wilayat al-faqih with an explicit, written jurisprudential treatment, affirming that political authority in the time of occultation belongs to the umma and not to the faqih . He wrote this in 1979, shortly before his death, at a moment when opposition to Khomeini was still possible. Imam Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine completed this circle in his testaments and in his work Nizam al-Hukm wal-Idara fi al-Islam , where he distinguished between the absolute wilayat al-faqih , the governance of the jurist over State and society, and the wilayat al-umma ʿala nafsiha in the time of occultation. In his testaments he required Lebanese Shia to make their national belonging the foundation, to hold Lebanon as a definitive homeland over which no other authority could prevail. And it is Mohammad Hussein Shamseddine who transformed this vision into concrete political literature, at the heart of a Lebanese project that is national, human and universal. * * * If Mohsen al-Amine reformed the rite of memory, if Moussa al-Sadr restored to the Shia their social dignity, if Mohammad Jawad Moughnieh and Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine laid the jurisprudential framework of refusal, if Mohammad Hassan al-Amine revealed how Hussein’s name is stolen to cover what Hussein combated, it is Mohammad Hussein Shamseddine who built with all these materials the political architecture: the project of the Lebanese State as an end in itself, a State belonging to all its sons, a State that guarantees diversity without absorbing it, that watches over communities and individuals within a natural cultural complementarity grounded in the right governance of the model of living together and the idea of composite identity and a culture of empathy. What makes Lebanon what René Maheu called “a style of civilisation.” This political architecture rested on a philosophical cornerstone from which he never deviated: there is no purely Shia solution to the Shia question. The problems of each community in Lebanon are the problems of all Lebanese, and they are not resolved by the logic of confessional and identitarian withdrawal, but by that of the transversal national solution that transcends the community and touches society as a whole. In this, Mohammad Hussein extends the logic of imam Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine, the Amelit Lebanese logic: the State as the sole project, the only viable guarantor for all Lebanese components, beginning with the Shia. These words are not severed from reality: they constitute a direct response to all who today seek a “Shia solution to the Shia question,” or wager on a narrow sectarian exit that would “save” a community at the expense of the entity and the model of living together. Consistent with himself and his vision of Lebanon, Mohammad worked with his companions to break down all barriers and to meld Amelit thought into Nasrallah Sfeir’s aspiration to freedom and Hassan Khaled’s to justice and equality. He thus shattered the spiral of symbolic violence inherited from the war, which most of the forces of occupation exploited to prevent any Lebanese reconciliation. This dynamic of reweaving national unity angered the tutelage power, which reacted violently on 7 May 2001, and reacted above all against the Beirut Appeal of 2004, whose assizes it prevented. But reconciliation triumphed over violence and hatred on the fourteenth of March 2005. Mohammad Hussein did not, however, conceal his disillusionment with the way that period unfolded. He saw in the mediocrity of a Lebanese political class fleeing its responsibilities one of the fundamental causes of the retreat of the sovereignist project. This showed itself in the so-called “Orthodox” electoral law that accentuated sectarianism, then in the squalid dealings that brought Michel Aoun to the presidency and gave Hezbollah full latitude to act under the cover of legality. Mohammad saw in this not mere tactical errors, but a political and moral bankruptcy: leaders at the head of their communities, through excess of irresponsibility and lack of faith in their own capacity to weave internal understandings, and through fear of the other, resort to a regional patron who supplies them with money, weapons and surpluses of power so that they may use these against their partners and dominate them. This is the irrefutable proof of a weakness that disguises itself under the label of strength, and leads only to catastrophe, defeat, then frustration and despondency. Why this attachment to reconciliation in spite of all this? Mohammad had a golden rule he repeated, borrowed from Hamid Frangieh: “If the Lebanese agree on evil, it becomes good; and if they disagree about the good, it becomes evil.” Consensus was not for him one method among others: it was the condition of Lebanon’s very existence. My friend Hisham Dibsi knows that Mohammad Hussein began his political life as a militant in the ranks of Fatah, and as the founder of the Lebanese Popular Organisation in South Lebanon. Like Samir Frangieh, he completed his “journey to the end of violence,” and, having believed in arms as levers of change, had turned his back on them through conviction. In writing about Samir Frangieh and Hani Fahs, he was in reality describing himself: that journey from red to white, from Fatah to the construction of an inclusive national culture. He held that peace is not the mere absence of war, but “the highest degree of ethics and its most noble mission.” * * * On the very night when Hezbollah launched its absurd war, Mohammad Hussein Shamseddine left us. His departure nearly passed unnoticed in the tumult of what was unfolding. But this coincidence carries a manifest meaning: what he had intellectually combated throughout his career, the reading of Hussein as a hero of death, Iran elevated to a reference, the jewel of justice once more stolen under the banner of the jewel itself — all of this exploded that night. We are not merely commemorating today. We are affirming that Hussein died for life and not for death. We are affirming that Lebanese Shiism, that of Jabal Amel, of Mohsen al-Amine, of Moussa al-Sadr, of Mohammad Jawad Moughnieh, of Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine, of Hani Fahs and of Mohammad Hassan al-Amine, is not the extension of an imperialist project, but a part of the fabric of this homeland, difficult yet necessary. History will not forget that this slight man, seated with his cup of coffee, his cigarette and his pen as his sole instruments of work, was building, with his hands and his mind, in complete silence, the intellectual foundation of one single Lebanese project: a Lebanon founded not on the balance of forces, but on the force of balance. This long night will assuredly eventually lift, and the light of balance, reason and living together will rise, so that the Grand Lebanon may once more become that unique “style of civilisation” of which Mohammad, Samir and their companions and inspirers always dreamed and for which they tirelessly laboured.

The file of Lebanese citizens exiled to Israel is among the most complex and sensitive in the Lebanese context, because it stands at the intersection of three deeply intertwined dimensions: the consequences of the Syrian and Israeli occupations, the legacy of the civil war, and the profound divisions surrounding the very concepts of the State, sovereignty, and justice. The State was absent from South Lebanon for decades, leaving the population at the mercy of the tensions between occupation forces and militia arms. When it returned after liberation, it came with a strict security and judicial logic, devoid of any genuine spirit of comprehensive national reconciliation. This is why the file has remained an open wound: Lebanon never underwent a true transitional justice process commensurate with the post-war era and the multiple occupations that had scarred it. On the human level, the tragedy endured by thousands of people and their families cannot be ignored. It manifests in: · Forcible uprooting from their natural environment. · A devastating separation from their families and villages. · A crisis of identity and belonging, and a life suspended between two countries. As for the children born or raised there, they experience a compound crisis: they never fully integrated into that society, while some in Lebanon, their own country, regard them with suspicion and hostility. Here the fundamental moral question arises: is it legitimate to extend legal and political responsibility to wives, children, and grandchildren? Entire families are paying today for choices that overwhelming circumstances imposed on some of their members, even though the vast majority among them never bore arms nor engaged in any security-related activity. To clarify the picture further, several established truths must be affirmed. 1. Authenticity of identity : These are genuine Lebanese citizens, not strangers or newcomers to this land. 2. The choice to live : They did not go to Israel by choice, but through forced exile. They were placed before two equally bitter alternatives — either face threats of physical elimination issued by their adversaries at the time (Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah: "we will slaughter you in your beds"), or endure a harsh exile far from their homeland and loved ones. They chose to stay alive. 3. The absence of the State : They did not conspire against the State; it was the State that abandoned them, leaving them as easy prey to the occupations and foreign tutelages. 4. The peaceful record : They were not implicated in the assassination of prime ministers, nor in the elimination of sovereigntist deputies, and they neither bombed mosques nor destroyed public infrastructure. Between Justice and Revenge The essential distinction lies in separating justice grounded in individual accountability from collective revenge and permanent ostracism. Justice demands that individual responsibilities be established with precision, that trials be conducted fairly, and that the principle of inheriting guilt across generations be firmly rejected. Political and Humanitarian Conclusion This file cannot be resolved through denunciatory sloganeering; it demands the approach of a "genuine State," one founded on recognition of the specificity of the occupation period and the oppressive circumstances that accompanied it, on a clear distinction between those who committed actual crimes and those who were victims of circumstances, on respect for an independent Lebanese judiciary and the rule of law, and on treating the humanitarian dimension of families and children outside any logic of vengeance and hatred. The file of those expelled to Israel cannot, and must not, be conflated with any other file, because the true adversary in this case is the Lebanese state itself, and not any other party. National and moral responsibility therefore falls first and foremost on the President of the Republic, in his capacity as head of State and the primary custodian of the country's security and integrity, as well as of the fate of all its citizens without exception. Those who once chose to confront Israel in defence of dignity and sovereignty cannot today prove incapable of finding a way to bring their children back from forced exile and restore them to their homeland under the aegis of law, justice, and national reconciliation. In the end, Lebanon's fundamental challenge remains the same: to accomplish the transition from the memory of war and division toward the space of a State capable of articulating justice and reconciliation, without ever sacrificing either sovereignty or the human dignity of its citizens.

Obviously, one could not have expected spectacular results or decisions from the third round of direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations held Thursday and Friday at the State Department in Washington. However, it must be acknowledged that the mere fact that these bilateral face-to-face discussions took place in Washington under the auspices of the US Administration represents a significant breakthrough in itself. Beyond this politically symbolic parameter, some positive signs emerged Friday evening following the marathon meetings held by the Lebanese and Israeli delegations. The State Department emphasized that the exchanges took place in a 'positive atmosphere that even exceeded our expectations.' In the same vein, Lebanon's embassy in the federal capital stated that it 'welcomes the outcome of the discussions' with Israel, clarifying that these negotiations are part of a 'political process' that should lead to a favorable resolution of the current conflict in the direction of restoring Lebanese state sovereignty 'through its own forces.' As for Israel's ambassador to Washington, he declared that the chances of success in negotiations with Lebanon are 'high.' Concretely, Friday's marathon meeting produced practical measures: an extension of the cessation of hostilities for a 45-day period; a summons for military officers and experts from both countries to a meeting on May 29 at the Pentagon to launch 'a security process between Lebanon and Israel'; a summons for both delegations to a new round of negotiations scheduled for June 2-3 at the State Department. In the absence of spectacular and rapid decisions, the American mediator is opting for a realistic approach: the step-by-step diplomacy (favored by Kissinger) aimed at gradually building a climate of trust and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries. Change in the designation of the May 25 holiday It is worth noting, in light of the spirit of the process underway in Washington, that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam adopted Friday a symbolic measure that, while symbolic, carries significant political meaning and implications. He issued an administrative note confirming the May 25 holiday, which in previous years since Israel's 2000 withdrawal had been observed as 'Resistance and Liberation Day.' This year, the Prime Minister's note regarding the May 25 holiday makes no mention of 'resistance' or 'liberation,' but instead emphasizes that the holiday will be observed 'in solidarity with the families of martyrs, the wounded, prisoners, the displaced, and the residents of the South and border villages.' This particular and very explicit mention confirms that the government no longer recognizes the existence of a 'resistance' that Hezbollah seeks to embody regardless of all obstacles, disregarding the position of legality and the overwhelming majority of Lebanese who reject the suicidal military adventures of the pro-Iranian militia. Just Friday evening, the Prime Minister declared that it 'is time to definitively end the reckless adventures (alluding to Hezbollah) carried out in service of foreign projects,' criticizing accusations of 'treason' leveled by the pro-Iranian militia. Recall that following Hezbollah's launch of hostilities once again on March 2 to 'avenge the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei' in Tehran, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution stating that Hezbollah's security and military apparatus is now considered 'illegal.' Following this decision, the Information Minister called on official media to no longer mention 'resistance' in their news bulletins and political programs. Elimination of Hamas military chief It is worth noting, on another matter but still within this military-security context at the regional level, that the Israeli military eliminated Friday, in a targeted strike on Gaza, the head of Hamas's military apparatus, Ezzeddine Haddad, accused of being one of the masterminds of the deadly October 7, 2023 attack against Israeli civilians on the outskirts of Gaza. The Beijing Summit The second highly strategic matter that marked the news on Friday, May 15 is the conclusion of the US-Chinese summit held in Beijing, which had begun Friday. It will undoubtedly take a few days before credible and precise information is released concerning the actual outcome of the discussions that President Donald Trump and his delegation had with Chinese leaders over these two days. Already, some significant indications made public allow us to sketch out the possible implications of this historic summit on the Iran conflict. President Trump notably stated that there is complete convergence of American and Chinese viewpoints concerning Iran. Concretely, President Xi Jinping aligns with the Trump Administration's position on the nuclear issue, in the sense that, like the White House chief, he asserts that under no circumstances should the Iranian regime be able to acquire nuclear weapons. This Chinese position is not new, as illustrated by Beijing's stance during the vote on five UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iran's uranium enrichment. The first of these resolutions, dated July 2006, 'required' Tehran to cease its uranium enrichment. The mullah regime obviously disregarded this resolution. In December of that same year, the Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran to compel compliance with UN directives. To no avail… Three other resolutions were passed by the Security Council in 2007, 2008, and 2010 to impose increasingly severe sanctions on Tehran. China, like Moscow, did not impose a veto, which reflected alignment with Western countries on the necessity of compelling the mullah regime to halt uranium enrichment. During his talks with President Trump, Xi reiterated his country's principled position on this matter. Another point of convergence between Xi and the White House chief (as well as with European countries generally): rejection of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz and therefore rejection of toll imposition by the Revolutionary Guards. In parallel, the Chinese leader reportedly committed to his host not to supply military equipment to the Iranian regime. It follows from these indications that the Beijing summit could result in a weakening of Iran's position in the face of American conditions aimed at achieving a political solution to the current conflict. The coming days should in any case clarify the situation further in this regard. The big question to be raised in this connection in the short term, in light of the Beijing summit's outcome, is whether President Trump will decide to launch or not new well-targeted military operations on Iranian territory with the aim, notably, of securing enriched uranium and dealing new severe blows to Iran's economic infrastructure in order to bring the mullah regime to renounce its irrational adventures and its belligerent, arrogant behavior, defying all reason in a completely shameless manner.

On Thursday, May 14, the world's attention was focused on Beijing, where a meeting between the President of the United States, who still sees himself as a major power, and President Xi Jinping, who aspires to be even greater, could have significant consequences for many countries, both in the short and long term. For some—likely many—these consequences could be dramatic. What will become of the state of the world after this? No one could say for certain yet. President Trump likely spoke first about trade. President Xi did as well. The former will quickly tout his victories—a word he cherishes—on his site, as is his custom. The Chinese president will display his enigmatic and fixed smile, hinting at his satisfaction with having obtained what he wanted. It can be presumed that trade agreements were the first to be discussed and secured. Will they be balanced, though? That's doubtful… The President of the United States has an urgent need to satisfy his public opinion and the American people, who are now weary of seeing oil prices skyrocket, inflation and unemployment rise, and who are tired of witnessing shortages of essential materials, including fertilizers blocked in the Persian Gulf region. Not to mention other materials vital to running the American economic machine, which hasn't really achieved the objectives claimed during the presidential campaign and repeatedly promoted under the MAGA slogan ( Make America Great Again ). We will know more on this matter when one side announces its victories without its interlocutor—not its partner—mentioning his own gains. All these discussions and negotiations carry a geopolitical undertone linked to the internal situation in the United States, to China's need to restore its supply levels of oil and materials necessary for its own development and increasingly pressing growth. The two priority issues forming this geopolitical backdrop are certainly Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, closely intertwined, as well as Taiwan. The second point will be important in the long term. Initially, discussions likely focused on halting US support for Taiwan's defense in exchange for China reducing its demonstrations and threats against the island—essentially maintaining the status quo for now. Neither side wants to move toward confrontation. Xi has time…until 2049. Between now and then, other pressures and negotiations will occur, and Xi believes the West's position may be quite different. The West could be preoccupied by other matters than defending Taiwan, which is far from the US, although freedom of navigation through the strait known as Formosa (150 km wide) will always be a sticking point. Trump's Dilemma But things are not so simple for the US President. He must not appear to abandon Taiwan to its fate without compromising his already tarnished position as protector of Arabian Peninsula countries, and without damaging his image of strength and power against Iran's Revolutionary Guards. As a previous Levant Time article pointed out, these countries might quickly conclude that American defense represents a danger, which could lead one or more of them to want the Americans to leave the bases they occupy in the region. Perhaps that's why Israel decided to give the United Arab Emirates an Iron Dome. Did Mr. Trump impose this measure? Who would benefit from this void? And if China, leveraging its ties with Iran, could assure them through its mere presence the security they seek, allowing them to focus on tourism, global events, high technology, luxury, and finance, as before? China would be the big winner in developing and expanding its Silk Road. President Trump, who thought upon arriving at the White House for a second term that he would only need to focus on domestic security—immigration and drug trafficking—and China internationally, as his only real competitor, has realized that being tugged by Benjamin Netanyahu's sleeve was a trap he fell into quite naively. Iran and the Strait of Hormuz The key is therefore to address the first issue properly and handle it well so as not to revisit it or get bogged down in it. Within this shared concern—Iran and the Strait of Hormuz—there are two aspects in which both presidents have a common interest: nuclear matters and freedom of maritime navigation. China opposes nuclear proliferation. It has always made this known. As for free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, China has the greatest interest in seeing it restored as quickly as possible. This won't prevent it from wanting to limit, or even prohibit, free passage through the Taiwan Strait. Geopolitics can be quite cunning! It's too early to speculate further. Let's wait for Mr. Trump's victory declarations, which will inevitably come, and for what Xi says or doesn't say. Regarding maritime navigation and all the consequences of decisions that will be made or adopted by the West concerning the Strait of Hormuz, it seems useful to recall that organizing this traffic is not limited to agreements with merely commercial or geopolitical connotations. This matter falls under the application of international treaties and regulations. Iran signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on December 10, 1982, in Montego Bay, commonly known as the Montego Bay Convention (UNCLOS). However, it has never ratified it. Iran is therefore a signatory but not a State Party to the Convention, which means it is not bound by all of UNCLOS's conventional obligations, unlike States that have ratified the treaty. This situation is comparable to that of the United States: they too have signed certain texts related to UNCLOS but have never ratified the Convention itself. This matter is particularly important for the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has long maintained that it is not fully bound by certain 'transit passage' rules provided by UNCLOS in international straits, precisely because it has not ratified the Convention. For this reason, Iran's Revolutionary Guards claim the right to levy charges for passage through the strait. Nevertheless, many States believe that several essential provisions of UNCLOS—particularly freedom of navigation—are now part of 'customary international law' and are therefore applicable even to non-State Parties. It will be vital for the entire world to observe how this issue is addressed and resolved. Many passages or straits could be affected by this question and navigation could be taxed by riparian States. Before closing—provisionally—this topic, it is important not to give credence to certain commentators who appear on television or radio to discuss straits and who indiscriminately address cases like the Suez or Panama Canals. Canals are not straits. The Dardanelles constitute another special case, as do the Bosphorus, whose passage is regulated by the 1936 Montreux Convention, meticulously applied and respected, particularly regarding the presence of maritime forces not belonging to Black Sea riparian States.

May 14, 2026 marked the beginning of the third round of direct negotiations between Israeli and Lebanese delegations in Washington at the State Department headquarters. Contrary to expectations, the Israeli delegation was not headed by former Israeli minister Ron Dermer, who is close to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but rather by Israel's ambassador to Washington, Yechiel Leiter, as had been the case in previous meetings. On the Lebanese side, however, the delegation was this time headed by former ambassador to Washington Simon Karam, an experienced negotiator who had already been appointed by Republic President Joseph Aoun to the ceasefire monitoring committee in South Lebanon (before the current conflict). According to reports from MTV's correspondent on the ground, the atmosphere as these negotiations got underway—set to continue until Friday—was far from optimistic. The Israeli side remains committed to Hezbollah's disarmament before any other progress, threatening to expand the war if no agreement is reached. The Lebanese side, according to the correspondent, finds itself forced to continuously exchange messages with Lebanon, which reflects internal Lebanese disagreements on the matter. Nevertheless, one cannot deny the progress represented by the holding of these meetings in themselves. In Beirut, these negotiations were clearly being followed very closely. Around 5 p.m. (Lebanese time), as talks had barely begun, President Aoun received Prime Minister Nawaf Salam at Baabda Palace to discuss the ongoing negotiations. They decided to "remain in continuous contact" going forward, according to the official statement. Joe Raggi sets the record straight A different official tone came from Lebanese Foreign Minister Joe Raggi, who sought to clear up the confusion by clarifying that for Beirut, the current stage is not about concluding a peace agreement but rather ending the war. On the Hezbollah side, there has been no change in positions. Statements hostile to direct negotiations continued, as they had in previous days. Notable in this regard is a quip from deputy Hussein Hajj Hassan: "The Resistance is still in full force, and no one will be able to turn American and Israeli wishes into reality." But what should stand out most from this day are the comments by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berry, who is also leader of the Amal movement (a Shiite ally of Hezbollah). In an interview with a local newspaper, he stated that "everything will collapse" if there is not a genuine ceasefire. He even laid out the following conditions: complete withdrawal from occupied territories; reconstruction; deployment of the Lebanese army; and the return of southern residents to their homes. This was a way of reasserting his prominence just days after a Hezbollah official, Mahmoud Comati, accused President Aoun of disregarding the Parliament Speaker in his decision to pursue negotiations. Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea responded to this in an MTV interview: Berry can offer his opinion on the results of negotiations, but he cannot manage them; the matter is in the hands of the President of the Republic. Meanwhile, the South continues to burn. On Thursday, Israeli evacuation notices even reached villages in the Bekaa Valley, such as Sohmor, once again demonstrating that the expansion of fighting is underway. Raids, drone strikes, and targeted assassinations continue at a frenzied pace, just as Hezbollah attacks continue as well. Trump's visit to China The other event of the day is global in scope and could have consequences on multiple fronts. US President Donald Trump is being received with great ceremony in China by his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. With his usual exuberance, Trump called Xi his "friend" and promised a "fabulous future" for relations between the two giants. Xi called the visit "historic." But beyond these grandiose declarations and the impressive reception featuring numerous Chinese and American flags, strenuous discussions have marked these two days of official visit. The Americans came well prepared, with an impressive delegation accompanying the president and bringing together, in addition to senior Trump administration officials, around fifteen heads of the largest US companies. Controversial topics and issues involving international stakes abound: Taiwan (on this point, Xi Jinping's statement was particularly firm); trade war; the war in Ukraine... But the topic of greatest interest to the Middle East is undoubtedly the war with Iran, which was extensively discussed between the two delegations, as suggested by the statements that followed. In the evening (Levantine time), President Trump told Fox News that "the Chinese president has offered his help regarding the Strait of Hormuz," and he "committed to not sending military equipment to Iran." Until now, Tehran had been receiving weapons from this ally to whom it was selling oil at preferential prices. Apart from these statements, what could be the "deal" that was struck behind the scenes? There is no doubt that this summit should have significant repercussions on the Middle East conflict, which the coming days should clarify. The American website Axios published information indicating that upon his return from China, President Trump's options would include resuming the "freedom of navigation" project, which consists of escorting vessels through the strait under the protection of the US military. Another option being considered: new strikes on Iranian infrastructure. In this context, one piece of information that could give a clue about coming changes: a prospect of China being supplied with oil by the United States in order to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and, consequently, reduce dependence on Iran. The other notable development on May 14 was the meeting of foreign ministers from BRICS countries in New Delhi, India, which included participation by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Emirati Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, among others. During this meeting, Araghchi launched a fierce attack on his Emirati counterpart (as he himself announced on his Telegram account), accusing the United Arab Emirates of participating in Israeli-American strikes on Iran, and urging him to revise his policy toward Tehran after realizing that the alliance with Israel had done him no good. Ironically, it is Iran that has been conducting daily strikes against the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf countries since the start of this war. Are the UAE paying the price for their withdrawal from OPEC since early May and their alignment with the American-Israeli axis?

Radical shifts are taking shape across a world that, over the past two decades, has seen the slow disintegration of the global order established after the Second World War, giving way to a new system now beginning to emerge on the horizon. Since the start of his second term, and in line with his National Security Strategy (NSS 2025), President Donald Trump has redefined US priorities. First and foremost are domestic affairs – America First – and the American continent itself. As for the rest of the world, Europe, he argues, should takes responsibility for its own defense and no longer rely on the United States as it has done since 1945. In his view, Russia, despite its bellicose posture, is no longer considered a threat, having proven incapable of defeating Ukraine and incapable of invading Europe. The US president also believes that military rivalry with China over Taiwan and the South China Sea does not preclude economic accommodation with Beijing. American consumers, after all, remain dependent on competitively priced Chinese goods, while Chinese industry urgently needs access to the US market, which represents roughly 25% of global demand. Beijing, in turn, seeks broader access to American technology. As for China’s national strategy, it remains firmly centered on the Chinese Communist Party and its leader, Xi Jinping, who holds absolute authority. Its objective is to establish China as a global power and achieve self-sufficiency in key industrial inputs. While that goal has already been reached in several sectors, China still faces a critical shortfall in the domestic production of advanced semiconductors – particularly those used in artificial intelligence – which only the United States is currently able to supply. At the same time, Xi Jinping is confronting a collapsing real estate sector, industrial overcapacity, and weakening domestic consumption, which is absorbing an ever smaller share of that surplus output, especially in electric vehicle and renewable energy. As a result, Beijing faces a dual imperative: reopening the U.S. market to Chinese industry and securing the continuity of supply chains dependent on the United States, notably in food products, semiconductors, oil and gas, Boeing aircraft, and high-tech goods. The Russian and Iranian Cases As for Vladimir Putin, he is dealing with slowing growth and acute labor shortages. His government has begun selling state assets and historic sites to generate revenue, avoid money printing, and prevent currency devaluation. Higher oil prices have benefited Russia in the context of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but even at maximum production they have not resolved the underlying economic strain – not least because the financing of the war in Ukraine has become increasingly burdensome. Russian media are now openly reporting these difficulties. At the same time, morale among troops is declining, and the war – now dragging into its fourth year – is becoming increasingly unpopular. Putin is under growing internal and external pressure, particularly from President Trump, to bring the conflict to an end. He therefore needs an exit strategy. Finally, Iran has been strangled by a naval blockade that has lasted for more than a month following the US-Israeli strikes of June 2025 and the February-April 2026 war. For President Trump, the Islamic Republic remains a major nuclear threat, an obstacle to Middle East stabilization, and a barrier to freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran, for its part, remains unwilling to accept a settlement on Washington’s terms. An Entanglement of Interests on Iran Russia and China are blocking a UN Security Council resolution demanding that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while continuing to provide Tehran with military assistance in intelligence and technology. Russia supplies ammunition; China does not. Even so, this support remains carefully limited, designed to avoid direct confrontation with Washington. There is no clear Tehran-Moscow-Beijing axis. On the contrary, since April 2026, bilateral contacts have multiplied between the United States and each of these three countries separately. Negotiations between Trump and Putin are intensifying, the Trump-Xi Jinping summit was held in Beijing this week, and indirect talks between Washington and Tehran – mediated through Pakistan – continue despite Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the US naval blockade of Iranian ports. These channels operate independently of Moscow, while Beijing playing a discreet background role. Negotiations Take Priority It is increasingly clear that Trump, Xi Jinping, Putin and Khamenei all require negotiations, constrained as they are by mounting internal and external pressures. Each faces economic strain, alongside growing domestic criticism and political opposition. In the United States, the central issue is the rising cost of living, driven by higher fuel prices and tariffs that have pushed up the cost of Chinese goods. In Russia and Iran, ongoing wars and sanctions weigh heavily on economies and supply chains. China, meanwhile, is edging toward recession under the pressure of rising oil prices, rising demand for agricultural and high-tech imports, and the need to secure broader access to the American market. Sketch of a Geopolitical Repositioning Between Trump and Putin Trump invited Putin to Alaska in August 2025, offering the lifting of sanctions and the establishment of improved economic and energy relations in exchange for peace in Ukraine. Three months later, he came close to acknowledging Russian sovereignty over Ukrainian territories under occupation in his twenty-point peace plan. It is clear that he no longer fears Russia and is seeking to maintain a strategic balance between Moscow and Europe, with an end to the war in Ukraine seen as a prerequisite for that objective. These economic and territorial incentives from Trump did not appear to sway Putin. However, on April 29, the Russian president unexpectedly called Trump, much to the surprise of the White House, and held a 90-minute conversation with him. The call came fifteen days before the Trump-Xi Jinping summit and points both to the internal difficulties facing Putin and to his concern over a potential Sino-American rapprochement that could leave Russia sidelined. During the conversation, the Russian president primarily raised the revival of economic exchanges and energy cooperation between the two countries, which had been virtually shut down since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, while noting that Trump has already begun reinitiating trade with Russia. Bilateral trade reached $4.4 billion in 2025, after falling to zero following 2022, compared with $37 billion in 2021. Revelations by the Wall Street Journal in late 2025 reported a discreet project between Moscow and Washington involving large-scale American investment in Russia. During the aforementioned phone call, Trump persuaded Putin to agree to a brief ceasefire in Ukraine from May 9 to May 11, accompanied by the exchange of 1,000 prisoners on each side. He had hoped to extend the ceasefire, but hostilities resumed immediately upon its expiration. Despite intense fighting on the ground, Putin has recently shown notable flexibility: on May 9, during the Victory Day commemorations marking the end of the Second World War, he stated that the war in Ukraine was nearing its end and that he wanted to conclude it through negotiations involving the Europeans, signaling an openness to a new relationship with Europe. A possible settlement in Ukraine will depend on the positioning of China and Europe, following the outcomes of the Trump-Xi Jinping summit and European reactions to Putin’s May 9 speech. He fears that a Washington-Beijing rapprochement could further isolate Moscow, which partly explains his recent opening toward Europe.