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This series of articles aims to shed light on the current situation through the lens of history, setting aside passionate, ideological, or romanticized narratives that miss the mark on reality, and leaving readers to draw their own conclusions. The previous nine installments offered a reexamination of events surrounding Hezbollah's rise to power, from the Taif Agreement through Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, the establishment of a Hezbollah-controlled zone in the South, and the 2006 war. This article addresses the lessons of the 2006 war and its aftermath. In the operation "Truthful Promise" (el-Wa3ed el-Sadek, the name given to the July 2006 war), Hezbollah employed tactics rooted in hybrid asymmetric warfare, skillfully combining traditional guerrilla techniques, the heavy use of cutting-edge dual-purpose anti-tank missiles, and defense in depth across the entire area south of the Litani River and parts of its northern bank. Central to this strategy was the so-called "nature reserves" tactic — an intricate network of tunnels and buried bunkers designed to remain invisible in the face of Israeli air superiority, while enabling ambushes. This defensive approach was modeled on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army during their war with the United States (1964–1973), when American forces enjoyed undisputed air supremacy. The pro-Iranian group demonstrated exceptional proficiency with fourth-generation anti-tank missiles, as outlined previously. At the same time, it sustained relentless harassment of northern Israel, which remained paralyzed throughout the war by daily Katyusha rocket fire — approximately 4,000 rockets in total, averaging 100 to 120 per day — launched from concealed mobile platforms. Furthermore, the militia's fighters had no need for logistical supply lines, as weapons, ammunition, food, and survival supplies had been stockpiled in underground depots over six years, and the war lasted only 33 days. Finally, Hezbollah waged an aggressive media war: the Al-Manar channel broadcast Hassan Nasrallah's speeches, which served as a psychological weapon to galvanize his supporters and erode Israeli public morale. In this regard, and as a telling example, on July 14, 2006, Hezbollah fighters struck an Israeli corvette off the coast of Beirut using a Chinese-made C802 Silkworm precision anti-ship missile supplied by Iran, catching Israeli intelligence completely off guard. The strike killed four sailors. The incident was a major tactical shock: the ship's automated defense systems had not been activated, as the command had deemed the threat of anti-ship missiles nonexistent. In a live radio address, Hassan Nasrallah invited Lebanese citizens to look out to sea and watch the vessel burn — a moment that proved to be a decisive turning point in the psychological warfare of the conflict. Summary of Israeli tactics The Israeli military, for its part, adopted a strategy centered on air superiority, the high technology of the era, and precision operations. However, it showed considerable hesitation when it came to launching a large-scale ground offensive, seemingly intent on replicating the model of the Second Gulf War in 1991, when US-led coalition forces conducted a prolonged air campaign before advancing on the ground in Operation Desert Storm. Israeli Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, himself a fighter pilot, failed to adapt his strategy to the new realities on the Lebanese ground imposed by Hezbollah. The Israeli air force managed to destroy almost all of Hezbollah's long-range missiles (Fajr and Zelzal) within the first hours of the conflict, along with a large number of missile launching pads, Hezbollah command posts, and ammunition depots. It also succeeded in isolating southern Lebanon by destroying strategic bridges and roads. Finally, there were successful deep commando raids, such as the one in Baalbek, where an Israeli special forces unit took control of a hospital on August 2, 2006, killing 10 Hezbollah fighters and 6 civilians and capturing several civilians who were later released. On the ground operations front, the advance toward the Litani River was only partially achieved. Elite troops managed to break through but were never able to establish effective control over the southern bank of the river before the ceasefire came into effect on August 14. The inability of infantry and armored units to secure the terrain against anti-tank missiles and to halt rocket fire on northern Israel represented the primary strategic failure. The army's equipment losses, aside from the Merkava tanks and the damaged naval vessel, included one helicopter shot down by an anti-tank missile, two others damaged in a collision, and several drones. This war marked the end of the military career of Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, who today (2026) is a fierce opponent of Netanyahu and frequently takes to the streets at the head of protests against the Prime Minister. The 33-Day War: Aftermath On the Lebanese side, the death toll is estimated at 1,100 civilians, 43 Lebanese soldiers and police officers—though they were not combatants—5 UN soldiers, between 250 and 600 Hezbollah fighters, 31 Hezbollah-allied militiamen, and 52 foreign civilians. On the Israeli side, 165 people were killed, including 119 soldiers. Lebanese material losses amounted to 30,000 residential units totally or partially destroyed in southern Lebanon and in Beirut's southern suburbs, in addition to bridges, roads, and infrastructure; overall damages were estimated at between 5 and 7 billion dollars. The number of people displaced to Beirut and Mount Lebanon reached nearly 685,000, while 200,000 fled to Syria, and between 300,000 and 500,000 people were displaced from northern Israel. End of the Conflict: Resolution 1701 The conflict ended on August 14, 2006, following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Israel at that point occupied a buffer zone approximately 10 to 30 kilometers deep from the Blue Line. As soon as the ceasefire was announced, and despite the destroyed roads, displaced residents returned en masse to their villages in the South. This was the fourth return of displaced persons to southern Lebanon—brought about not by the liberation of territory by force, but by international pressure, which Iran and Hezbollah have always relied upon, as in 1993, 1996, and 2000, with that pressure aimed at stabilizing the Middle East through arrangements that have invariably proven temporary. Resolution 1701 sought to establish a 'security zone' in southern Lebanon, between the Blue Line and the Litani River (located approximately 30 km to the north). However, its implementation was selective and incomplete, which led to the situation that prevails today. For the first time in nearly thirty years, the Lebanese army deployed 15,000 soldiers along the southern border, asserting the principle of state authority—in contrast to the rhetoric of then-President Emile Lahoud, who had consistently refused to deploy the army in the south in order to leave the region under Hezbollah's control. Also in accordance with Resolution 1701, the Israeli army withdrew from the areas it had occupied during the ground offensive, and UNIFIL was massively reinforced, growing from 3,000 to nearly 10,000 peacekeepers with an expanded mandate to monitor the cessation of hostilities and assist the Lebanese army in implementing Resolution 1701. Yet none of this came to pass in the 17 years that followed… Resolution 1701 stipulated that no armed group, other than the Lebanese army and UNIFIL, should be present between the Litani River and the border. However, the dominant factions within the Lebanese government chose submission, lacking any strategic vision and failing to capitalize on international pressure. Hezbollah, in collusion with them, agreed to pull back its uniformed fighters and visible heavy weapons, but maintained a complete covert presence. It rebuilt its network of tunnels and underground bunkers, and massively reconstituted and modernized its arsenal — including tens of thousands of rockets — right under UNIFIL's nose, through Syria, which served as a land bridge between Lebanon and Iran. Israel, for its part, continued to violate Lebanese airspace on a daily basis, arguing that this was necessary to monitor Hezbollah's activities in the absence of any real enforcement of the demilitarization provisions. Resolution 1701 succeeded in maintaining relative stability and preventing all-out war for 17 years (until October 2023), but it never resolved the underlying issue of Hezbollah's military presence in southern Lebanon. Read more on this topic: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (9) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (8) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (7) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (6) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (5) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (4) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (3) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (2) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (1)

Lebanon was at the center of talks on Sunday between Iran and the United States in Switzerland. While Tehran claimed to have closed the Strait of Hormuz and U.S. Vice President JD Vance delivered remarks in an upbeat tone, President Donald Trump responded to the strait's closure with threats against Iran, prompting the Iranian negotiators to suspend the discussions. As for Lebanon, all eyes are on the direct negotiations with Israel, which have drawn the ire of Hezbollah. Sunday, June 21: the start of U.S.-Iran talks in Lucerne, Switzerland. The American delegation was led by Vice President JD Vance, and the Iranian delegation by Parliament Speaker Mohammed Ghalibaf. After a false start — the talks had originally been scheduled for Friday at the same venue — they finally got underway two days later. They were far from smooth, once again laying bare the deep divisions between the former adversaries. On the surface, the negotiating session featured plenty of handshakes and smiles, particularly among the Americans, Qataris, and Pakistanis. JD Vance's remarks were optimistic. "President Trump has asked us to turn a new page in order to transform our relationship with the Iranian people," he said, pointing to "significant progress made in recent hours." The first session was marred by diplomatic friction, as the Iranians refused to be photographed with the American delegation — and made a point of keeping Mr. Vance waiting by deliberately arriving late to the meeting room. On substance, the Lebanese question was at the heart of the talks, according to reports that reached the media suggesting the issue carried considerable weight in the discussions. In stark contrast to Vance's upbeat words, President Donald Trump posted a blunt message on his social media platform, warning that Iran must "immediately stop supporting its proxies" — including Hezbollah — or else "we will strike very hard." Shortly afterward, the American president told Fox News that he had warned unnamed Iranian officials overnight against closing the Strait of Hormuz, asserting that he could "take control of it." These firm positions sparked sharp tension inside the meeting room and led the Iranian delegation to walk out. In Lebanon, Iran's stance gave Hezbollah a new boost. The party "must take advantage" of Iran's support, declared Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah. The pro-Iranian party reserved its harshest criticism on Sunday for the direct talks between Lebanon and Israel, with a new round expected to take place on Tuesday in Washington. "American diktat," "capitulation" — a party statement spared no words in condemning the continuation of direct negotiations initiated by the Lebanese authorities on behalf of Lebanon, which are nonetheless set to proceed in Washington with both political and military delegations. Sunday evening, Tel Aviv sent a conciliatory signal to Washington, from which it had appeared to be drifting in recent times: Israeli Channel 12 reported that the Israeli army would be prepared for "limited" withdrawals from southern Lebanon. Was this a goodwill gesture toward the Lebanese authorities, or part of the broader negotiations between Iran and the United States? A week full of twists and turns The previous week had ended with an announcement by the American president of an imminent deal with Iran. He was able to head to France for the G7 having secured what he considered a diplomatic victory. The agreement was signed online by the American and Iranian presidents on Wednesday evening. Trump was in Versailles attending a dinner hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron on the sidelines of the G7, where leaders welcomed the agreement and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as what they called a "unique opportunity" to get Iran to give up its nuclear arsenal. The terms of the agreement were leaked to the media on that same date, before any official announcement had been made. Under the deal, both parties agreed to an "immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon," and committed to no longer initiating war against each other while respecting each other's territorial sovereignty. The text references a renewable 60-day window to reach a final agreement. The American naval blockade would be lifted, and the Strait of Hormuz fully reopened within 30 days. One of the most significant and contentious points in the text is the commitment by the United States and its "regional partners" to draw up a reconstruction and development plan for the Islamic Republic with a budget of "at least $300 billion." The United States would end "all types of sanctions" against Iran, while the Islamic Republic reaffirmed that it "will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons," with both countries agreeing to resolve the fate of enriched uranium stockpiles still located on Iranian soil. The US Treasury would be required to "issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil and derivative products," and the United States committed to "making fully available and usable the funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran that are frozen or subject to restrictions." Finally, the final agreement, once reached, "will be enshrined in a binding UN Security Council resolution" — a longstanding Iranian demand. The terms of this agreement were almost universally seen around the world as far more favorable to Iran than to the United States, given that Iran obtained on paper everything it had asked for, while all the clauses that matter most to the US remain to be negotiated during the 60-day period — and are therefore still uncertain, particularly on the nuclear issue. Trump denied that a single cent would be paid to Iran until the country had fulfilled all of its commitments. The Iranians, for their part, did not hold back in claiming victory. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei's response to the memorandum of understanding came on Friday in the form of a blessing wrapped in skepticism, as he suggested that his approval did not mean his views aligned with those of the other party. Mojtaba Khamenei remained, as ever, elusive and out of sight. Finally, it should be noted that despite Pakistan's diplomatic success, Qatar's role in these negotiations is becoming increasingly apparent: when the deal appeared to be in jeopardy during the week — largely due to Israeli strikes in Lebanon — a visit by Qatari mediators to Iran is said to have been decisive. Lebanon: a regional bargaining chip or a sovereign state? The text of the Iran-US agreement makes no clear mention of ballistic missiles or Iranian influence in the region. On the contrary, the text allows Iran to reassert its hold over the Lebanese card, as it managed to insert the Lebanese ceasefire as an essential condition for the agreement to take effect — even as Lebanese authorities are conducting their own separate negotiations with Israel in Washington, and even though the United States has repeatedly insisted on keeping the Iranian and Lebanese files separate. Tehran's attachment to its protégé Hezbollah shows no signs of weakening: the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament went so far as to acknowledge that the Lebanese Shia movement had fought for 104 days on Iran's behalf, while Iran itself only fought for 38 days… an unbreakable bond that neither side is trying to conceal anymore. That was without accounting for Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who, while welcoming the ceasefire, strongly reaffirmed Lebanon's determination to negotiate on its own terms and reclaim its sovereignty. This week also dealt a blow to Hezbollah and its allies on Saturday, when former minister Sleimane Frangieh — their preferred presidential candidate — and one of his most vocal associates, Mahmoud Comati, were hit with US sanctions. This would appear to be Washington's way of signaling that, despite its willingness not to jeopardize the deal with Iran, its priorities in Lebanon remain unchanged. On the ground in the South Meanwhile, on the ground in southern Lebanon, the intensity of the fighting did not let up throughout the week, and even escalated toward the weekend. The Israeli military and Hezbollah traded accusations of ceasefire violations. Israeli troops continued their attempts to seize the strategic hill of Ali Taher in Nabatieh, inflicting multiple casualties on the Lebanese side while also losing soldiers of their own. On several occasions, Iran threatened to freeze negotiations if Israeli attacks in Lebanon did not stop. It was at this point that differences of opinion between the Israelis and Americans came into full view, with Washington applying strong pressure on Tel Aviv to respect the ceasefire — a highly unusual scenario in the relationship between the two allies. In the end, it was not until Saturday evening that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formally ordered his military to "halt operations" in Lebanon, while reserving the right to retaliate at the slightest provocation from Hezbollah and warning that a withdrawal from territories occupied during the conflict was not on the table. The ceasefire that had come into effect still appeared very fragile on Sunday: despite an outward calm, some Israeli violations were reported, while Israeli forces announced the discovery of a large tunnel beneath the village of Majdelzoun, near Tyre. Statements from Netanyahu, Defense Minister Israel Katz, and Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir all pointed toward a possible resumption of hostilities at the first opportunity.

Contemporary political discourse is no longer measured solely by what a leader says, but by the meanings and symbols his words, movements, and images generate. From this perspective, the performance of U.S. President Donald Trump stands as one of the most striking semiotic models in contemporary politics—one in which language, body, and image merge into integrated tools for the production of power and influence. Donald Trump's political discourse represents an exceptional case in contemporary political literature, owing to its linguistic and semiotic characteristics, which have made it a subject of study across political science, communication studies, and political psychology. Its impact extends well beyond the content of his speeches to encompass an integrated system of verbal, visual, and bodily signs. This system reshapes the relationship between leader and audience, and lends his political performance a unique quality rooted in the construction of presence rather than the mere transmission of messages. According to theorists of discourse analysis and semiotics—such as Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, and Teun A. van Dijk—semiotics is no longer simply a theoretical framework for analyzing a political figure; it has become an indispensable approach for understanding how the United States manages its international relations at the present moment. The outcomes of the most recent G7 summit demonstrated that the American presence was defined not by the final communiqués, but by the president's personal presence. His gestures, his approach to bilateral meetings, his terse statements, and even the deliberate ambiguity of certain positions all functioned as political messages running parallel to official decisions. In this context, image and symbol are no less influential than diplomatic texts; they have become an integral part of the negotiating process and the shaping of international balances. This reflects a shift in contemporary politics away from the logic of classical diplomacy and toward a logic of 'impression management,' in which a political sign can produce an effect that surpasses that of the decision itself. Compared to his predecessors, Trump employs simple, direct language—short sentences, present-tense verbs, and intensive repetition of slogans—which broadens his audience and gives his discourse an immediate, dynamic quality. This linguistic structure is paired with a physical performance characterized by a sharp vocal tone, repetitive gestures, exaggerated facial expressions, and a bodily posture that projects confidence and defiance, together forming a deliberate semiotic system that reinforces the image of the decisive leader. Semiotics has returned to the forefront of analysis with his second term—not only because of his controversial decisions, such as imposing tariffs or redefining foreign policy priorities, but also because of his style in managing crises and manufacturing political ambiguity. His decisions and statements frequently generate a state of uncertainty both inside and outside the United States, turning ambiguity itself into a political tool deployed in negotiation and conflict management. This approach is evident in his positions toward both allies and adversaries alike: whether in his criticism of international institutions, his stance on the war in Gaza, his statements regarding Greenland and the Panama Canal, his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, his hardline rhetoric on immigration, or his repeated attacks on political elites and the media—all while casting himself as the savior against the "Deep State." This style is equally apparent in his clashes with political rivals and in the way he addresses foreign leaders, making provocation an essential component of his political communication toolkit. A linguistic and semiotic analysis reveals that Trump's discourse is built on a strict duality between "Self" and "Other," in which he reserves attributes of strength and legitimacy exclusively for himself and his supporters, while portraying opponents as the source of danger and corruption. Furthermore, his preference for short sentences and direct structures is not a sign of simplicity, but rather a deliberate communicative choice designed to maximize the media circulation of his messages and embed them more deeply in the collective consciousness. Repetition emerges as one of his most powerful rhetorical tools. Slogans such as "America First," "Build the Wall," and "Drain the Swamp," along with his repeated assertion that "Iran will never have a nuclear weapon," evolve into political symbols that compress entire policy platforms into brief, easily spreadable formulas. In this way, repetition becomes far more than a mere stylistic device—it serves to entrench ideas and shut down debate before it even begins. Trump also weaponizes language to drive political polarization, constructing a collective identity for his supporters as "real Americans" in opposition to the "Fake News" media, "corrupt elites," and "enemies of the people." He does not hesitate to use harsh and inflammatory labels against his rivals or even his allies (such as Benjamin Netanyahu), turning political discourse into a symbolic battle aimed at reinforcing internal loyalty rather than persuading opponents. This performance extends beyond language and into the body as a tool of political communication. His gestures, gaze, hand movements, posture at the podium, and even the dancing he occasionally performs at the end of his rallies all constitute semiotic signs that reinforce the image of a confident leader who defies traditional political norms. When his decisive words are paired with sharp physical cues, the impact of the message is multiplied, and the speech transforms into a fully integrated visual performance. Trump's political vocabulary draws on three primary semantic fields: war and confrontation, superiority and exceptionalism, and the embodiment of evil. His frequent use of terms such as "we destroyed," "the greatest," "the strongest," and "evil" aligns seamlessly with a populist worldview that perceives the world through the lens of an endless struggle between good and evil, between the nation and its enemies. This style has influenced several populist leaders around the world—such as former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—reflecting a political trend that challenges many of the foundations of traditional liberal democracy by prioritizing personal leadership over institutions, democratic pluralism, and constitutional checks and balances. Another dimension emerges in Trumpian discourse: the exploitation of symbols tied to 'political masculinity.' Here, conflict is not confined to platforms and policies but extends to representations of strength and hegemony within the public sphere. In his clashes with Hillary Clinton and later Kamala Harris, the discourse frequently went beyond mere political disagreement to reproduce the strength/weakness and leader/adversary duality — through sarcasm, the belittling of competence, and the portrayal of his opponent as lacking resolve or leadership ability. In this context, masculinity functions not merely as a personality trait but as a semiotic tool that projects the image of a leader capable of imposing his will, reinforcing among the populist base the archetype of the 'strong man' standing against the traditional elites. Even in his dealings with conservative figures or allies — such as Giorgia Meloni — his style, rooted in sharp humor or passing sarcasm, reflects a tendency to monopolize the center of symbolic leadership, keeping others in an orbit that revolves around his personal presence and thus turning political personality itself into an instrument for generating power. From a semiotic standpoint, masculinity in Trump's discourse is not simply a stance toward women per se, but a political sign invested in constructing the image of the hegemonic leader — one in which linguistic and bodily performance becomes a means of producing symbolic superiority and entrenching power dynamics within the political field. Nevertheless, it remains essential to distinguish between analyzing a political style and issuing preconceived judgments. A rigorous, scholarly reading requires examining facts and discourse in their proper context, free from political bias or personal preference. Ultimately, every political worldview flows from a particular conception of human nature and human behavior — which explains the growing interest among researchers in neuroscience and political psychology as tools for understanding decision-making mechanisms and the making of leadership. The Trump experience does not merely present a different model of political discourse; it reveals a deeper transformation in the very nature of contemporary leadership. Image, gesture, and symbol are now active elements in the production of political power, on an equal footing with decisions and institutions. Political semiotics therefore emerges today as an indispensable explanatory tool for understanding the shifts reshaping the international system — at a time when conflict is no longer solely about policies, but about the meanings that leadership produces, and the ways in which those meanings are perceived and disseminated on a global scale.

Many analysts have taken note of the unusually critical remarks made by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance toward Israel, viewing them as an unprecedented stance, despite the massive political, military, and economic support that Washington continues to provide to Tel Aviv. Indeed, Vance reminded Israeli critics of the diplomatic agreement with Tehran that two-thirds of the weapons that have "protected their homeland" are American-made and fully funded by U.S. taxpayers. He stressed that Israel relies too heavily on military force to resolve its crises, and that it should show greater deference to Washington as its one and only remaining strategic ally in the world. In an interview with the New York Times , Vance noted that Donald Trump is the only world leader currently showing sympathy toward Israel, before addressing Israelis directly: "You’re a country of nine million people. You can’t just kill your way out of solving every single national security problem that you have." An unprecedented shift in tone There is no doubt that a shift has occurred in the tone and manner of addressing Israel. It is rare to hear serious criticism from official American voices toward a country often regarded as the "spoiled child" of successive U.S. administrations. Those administrations typically competed in their political favoritism toward Israel — a prerequisite for pursuing a smooth political career, given the considerable influence of American lobbying groups in the corridors of Washington. That said, this sudden change in tone does not in any way mean that the current U.S. administration has "broken free" from the Zionist influence wielded by these lobbies. Nor does it mean that it is now prepared to openly debate the fact that a distinction exists between American national interest and Israeli interest — and that assuming they are permanently aligned is a political, even strategic, error that has cost, and continues to cost, the United States dearly in moral, political, and material terms. The consequences of America's historical bias America's absolute and longstanding bias in favor of Israel — along with the protective umbrella extended to it at every level, from the repeated use of the veto in the United Nations Security Council over decades to shield it from accountability for the occupation and suppression of the Palestinian people, down to the lowest levels — has, over the course of past decades, fueled deep-seated hatred toward the United States, particularly across the Arab world, creating a vast gulf between the peoples of the region and Washington. Yet these feelings of hatred have never translated into any concrete opposition movement. This is due to several factors, including: The absence of democracy in Arab countries and the suppression of their peoples, which prevents them from expressing their true sentiments. Arab fragmentation and official divisions over how to handle the Arab-Israeli conflict. The signing of unilateral peace agreements with Israel — most notably by Egypt and Jordan — which broke ranks and weakened the Arab position. This process continued years later with the Abraham Accords, which sought an almost cost-free normalization. It is worth recalling that Donald Trump's first administration moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, recognized the city as Israel's capital, and acknowledged Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. These steps, which previous administrations had dangled without ever following through, were carried out by Trump without any expectation of significant Arab backlash — and indeed, none materialized. Today, a prevailing sentiment within part of Trump's team is that Israel has "bogged down" America in a war against Iran, even though the real threat posed by Tehran — whether directly or through its armed proxies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon — was aimed far more at Israel than at the United States, despite Iran's politically hostile rhetoric toward Washington (branding it the "Great Satan," among other things). Trump himself appears to share this view, which explains his persistent push to reach a deal with Tehran — even as he wrapped that desire in threatening language, going so far as to invoke the "obliteration of Persian civilization." This also explains why the agreement is fundamentally American-Iranian in nature, even though the war involved the United States, Israel, and Iran. Trump and his team are well aware that Israel will not easily accept a deal and that it prefers the continuation of a war sponsored and bankrolled by Washington — one that serves Israel's interests first and foremost. This is what gives meaning to the U.S. Vice President's remark to the Israelis: "You can't solve all your national security problems through killing alone." An opportunity for the Gulf states? It is certainly premature to bet on a rupture between America and Israel, or to count on a full divorce between the two countries. Nevertheless, the Arab Gulf states can leverage this shift to open a political dialogue with Washington. The key pillars of that conversation should be: A refusal to drag the region into new wars on Israel's behalf. A refusal to allow American bases to become targets rather than a source of stability. An assertion that continuing to sidestep the Palestinian cause leads only to more death and destruction, with no way out. Recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people as an essential prerequisite for stability in the Middle East and the broader Arab region. The U.S. president understands the strategic importance of his relationship with the Arab Gulf states, given their oil wealth — a cornerstone of Trump's foreign policy (Venezuela being a striking example). As a result, Washington can no longer afford to keep dismissing Arab demands for a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian cause — one that begins with the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state, and with halting Israel's policy of killing and colonial expansion in the West Bank, as well as its encroachment into Lebanon and southern Syria. Only the United States has the power to rein in and hold Israel accountable — provided the political will exists, and provided the conviction takes hold that American national interest is not necessarily served by blind alignment with Tel Aviv, its expansionist ambitions, and its endless wars.

The Strait of Hormuz and Lebanon: two key military-diplomatic "weapons" Iran intends to wield to strengthen its position in negotiations with the United States, which are set to unfold over 60 days according to the memorandum signed Wednesday by both parties. Iran announced on Saturday that it was once again "closing" the strategic Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for Israeli strikes on Lebanon, while stopping short of breaking off talks aimed at reaching a final agreement with the US, which are due to begin Sunday in Switzerland. Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaïl Baghaï warned the United States on Saturday that the initial protocol would be "at risk" if its provisions were not implemented swiftly, in an apparent reference to the situation in Lebanon. "We hold Washington directly responsible for the Israeli attacks against Lebanon, and this escalation threatens regional security and stability," Baghaï stated, adding, in a barely veiled threat directed at the Trump administration, that Tehran would take all necessary measures to protect its interests, its security, and the rights of its allies. Meanwhile, the news agency Tasnim , affiliated with Iran's Revolutionary Guards, called for the suspension of negotiations and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. On Saturday evening, the Iranian army's central command stepped in with its own propaganda move, announcing that "the Strait of Hormuz will be closed to maritime traffic" as a "first measure in response to the enemy's violation of its commitments" (a reference to the US). It threatened to take "further measures" if necessary "to compel the enemy (the US) to honor its obligations" under the memorandum of understanding. CNN, citing a source, reported that Washington had informed Tehran that Israel had agreed to a ceasefire following the strikes on Lebanon, and that it was now up to Hezbollah to halt its attacks. In an initial response, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that its forces remained "vigilant." According to CENTCOM, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz continued normally on Saturday, with 55 merchant vessels passing through. "Technical talks" Sunday in Switzerland Regardless, Iran's Foreign Ministry announced that "technical" discussions between Iranian and American officials would take place Sunday in Switzerland, with representatives from Qatar and Pakistan — the mediating countries — also present. Members of the Iranian delegation include chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who also serves as Speaker of Parliament, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati, according to state television. Islamabad confirmed that these "technical talks" would take place Sunday in Bürgenstock, near Lake Lucerne. According to US Vice President J. D. Vance, envoy Steve Witkoff and President Donald Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner are already in Switzerland to "manage some of the technical elements of this negotiation." "Preparatory" discussions even began on Saturday among diplomats, according to Bern. More than 4,000 dead in Lebanon In Lebanon, despite fresh ceasefire announcements, Israel and the pro-Iranian Hezbollah movement have been clashing for two days in the south, where Israeli operations killed at least 24 people on Saturday, following 83 deaths the day before. Israeli operations in Lebanon have killed 4,057 people since the war between Hezbollah and Israel began on March 2, Lebanon's Health Ministry announced Saturday. The Israeli military announced that one of its soldiers was killed Saturday during fighting in southern Lebanon, bringing its total losses to five since the conclusion of an Iran-US agreement aimed at ending the conflict in Iran. Israel said it was targeting Hezbollah positions in retaliation for attacks on its troops. According to the Israeli military, "more than 50 projectiles" were fired by the Shiite organization at its soldiers overnight from Friday to Saturday. For its part, Hezbollah declared that Israel was "fully responsible" for the ceasefire violations. The "Ali al-Taher" stronghold The Israelis announced details on Saturday about ongoing military operations, stating that "dozens of Hezbollah fighters are trapped in tunnels beneath the hill of Ali al-Taher, in southern Lebanon." The newspaper Yediot Ahronoth, citing military sources, reported that the Israeli army has besieged dozens of Hezbollah fighters in the area, which the military says houses a central underground complex belonging to the pro-Iranian militia, as well as the headquarters of the Badr Brigade. The newspaper added that the operation, during which a tank crew and a battalion commander were killed, aimed to seize the tunnels in the Ali al-Taher area as part of ongoing military operations. The Ali al-Taher site, where launch systems are operational and large quantities of weapons are stored, is extremely difficult to target through airstrikes alone, given its depth and fortifications. Vance's message to Lebanese Christians On a separate front, U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance addressed Lebanese Christians during a Fox News interview, urging them to "hold firmly to their faith in Jesus Christ." He added: "Know that you have many friends within the U.S. government who are working toward peace in the region." Vance explained that "the core problem facing these Christians, or the reason for their great vulnerability to violence, is the presence of Hezbollah, a terrorist organization that has effectively embedded itself in Lebanon. Hezbollah occasionally fires on Israelis, who naturally respond in self-defense." He went on to say: "So there is an ongoing, albeit low-intensity conflict. However, the situation has improved significantly in recent weeks thanks to the efforts of the President, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and many other administration officials." He concluded: "Peace sometimes takes time to take lasting hold, and that is what we are working toward. In truth, that is the goal we are pursuing throughout the entire region: changing the way we have acted in the past. It is a truly beautiful part of the world."

On paper, the American-Iranian memorandum of understanding eventually signed by President Donald Trump and President Masoud Pezeshkian appears to be a document in which all outstanding questions remain unresolved. Apart from reopening the Strait of Hormuz and lifting the American naval blockade imposed on the “Islamic Republic”, nothing points to any breakthrough on the issues that continue to divide Washington and Tehran. Can one also say, at least on paper, that the Trump administration has chosen to yield to Iran rather than follow through on its initial determination to break its capacity for disruption and put an end to its expansionist project, as it had originally intended? A close reading of the memorandum’s fourteen points clearly shows that the Trump administration has left all the fundamental issues hanging in the balance. The fate of Iran’s nuclear programme remains unclear, even though Trump has repeatedly insisted that its very existence is unacceptable. There is no mention of ballistic missiles or their infrastructure, nor is there any position regarding Iran’s regional proxies, apart from the assertion that the ceasefire agreed with the United States extends to Lebanon. How will this translate on the ground in Lebanon? Are the Iranians convinced that the United States will force Israel to abide by the ceasefire there? To be fair, Israel is currently observing it. Yet the memorandum contains nothing to suggest that Israel, which is not a party to the agreement, has bowed to American pressure in Lebanon or that it will carry out, at the earliest opportunity, whatever Washington asks of it. Despite American declarations announcing a ceasefire in Lebanon, Israel’s position towards the country remains shrouded in profound ambiguity. It did not take long after the memorandum entered into force for implementation difficulties to emerge. One fact quickly became apparent: the Trump administration knows little about Iran and even less about the behaviour of Iranian officials. In the past, however, it gave the impression of understanding much more. Perhaps this was due, during Trump’s first term, to the presence of a cohesive team that fully grasped, for example, the significance of eliminating Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force within the Revolutionary Guards, and the far-reaching implications of such an event. The matter extended well beyond Iran’s domestic sphere, where Soleimani occupied the second highest position in the power structure after the now deceased Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He was also the Islamic Republic’s principal man in the region and the spearhead of its strategy. He was the de facto commander of the Houthis, the high commissioner in Iraq and the effective ruler of both Syria and Lebanon. Some believe that the current American administration suffers from the absence of a figure such as former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Pompeo understood what the Iranian regime was and how to deal with it. It is striking that, in recent weeks, the Iranian file has been removed from the State Department’s hands. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has appeared more like a mere bystander, reduced to the role of a simple observer of what is unfolding between Tehran and Washington. A group of American officials cut from the cloth of Vice President J. D. Vance, who knows very little about Iran, cannot manage a dossier of such sensitivity. What we are witnessing today is merely a new chapter in a story that began in 1979, when Iran’s new authorities held American embassy diplomats hostage in Tehran for 444 days. That hostage crisis, which elicited no American response, opened the door to further blackmail by the Islamic Republic against the “Great Satan”. Over the past forty-seven years, the Islamic Republic has manipulated most American administrations. In 2003, it even succeeded in steering the administration of George W. Bush towards invading Iraq, paving the way for its eventual handover to Iraqi sectarian militias affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, militias that had fought alongside the Islamic Republic during the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. The memorandum signed recently, a document devoid of any real viability, amounts to nothing more than a return by the Trump administration to traditional American policy towards the Islamic Republic. The possibility of the United States going to war with Iran was no more than an exceptional episode. Donald Trump has returned to his familiar position as a dealmaker seeking an agreement with Tehran. That explains why he entrusted the file to his vice president, alongside his Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff and his son-in-law Jared Kushner. Nothing has changed in Iran to justify an American concession to the Revolutionary Guards. The day when Washington can portray Iran as a place suitable for major commercial deals remains far away. What we are witnessing today is an American mindset grappling with an extraordinarily complex file whose details and history it does not understand. This is the same American mindset that once wanted to turn Gaza into a “new Riviera”, a mindset disconnected from the realities of the region. It fails to grasp that Iran has no intention of changing. All the leadership in Tehran wants is to buy time. Iran is betting on political change inside Israel, on widening American-Israeli disagreements and on the Trump administration losing the midterm elections next November. At that point, Trump would become little more than a lame duck president. We will soon discover whether that Americain wager was well founded. The American president has fallen into Iran’s trap. One thing is certain: Donald Trump is no easy man, but his enduring problem lies in the absence of a team that truly understands what Iran is, whereas Iran knows perfectly well how to deal with America. The Iranians possess decades of experience in outmanoeuvring American administrations and bending them to their advantage while waiting for the right moment to deploy the blackmail tactics they have mastered to perfection. Nor does this concern America alone. The countries of the region, as well as those of Western Europe, have, at their core, adopted an exceedingly cautious stance towards this memorandum of understanding.