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On December 7, 2025, Emmanuel Macron did something no European leader had openly done in three decades of carefully managed relations with Beijing: he spoke plainly. Hours after returning from his fourth official visit to China, the French president stated in an interview with Les Échos that Europe’s trade relationship with China had become “unsustainable.” China, he warned, was “killing its own customers.” European industry, he said, was facing a question of “life or death.” This was not the language of diplomacy. It was the language of strategic alarm. For thirty years, Europe had wrapped its relationship with China in carefully chosen euphemisms: strategic partnership, mutually beneficial trade, win-win cooperation. Macron’s words marked a rupture. They acknowledged what had long been visible in the data but absent from political discourse: Europe has become the adjustment variable in a global economic system increasingly shaped by Chinese overcapacity and American protectionism. The numbers explain the urgency. In 2024, the European Union recorded a €305 billion merchandise trade deficit with China, importing €519 billion of goods while exporting only €213 billion. The deficit now exceeds the GDP of several EU member states. More importantly, it is accelerating. From €197 billion in 2019, it is expected to approach €320 billion in 2025. This is not a cyclical imbalance; it is a structural shift. That acceleration intensified in 2025 as the United States sharply restricted Chinese access to its market through tariffs and sanctions. Chinese exports did not disappear; they were diverted. Europe absorbed the shock. Every container that could no longer land profitably in the United States sought entry through European ports. With its open market and fragmented political authority, Europe became the path of least resistance in the unfolding Sino-American confrontation. Trade flows tell only part of the story. Foreign direct investment reveals a deeper asymmetry. European firms hold more than €230 billion in investment stock in China. Chinese firms hold less than a third of that amount in Europe. Yet the nature of these investments differs fundamentally. European capital expands Chinese productive capacity and feeds its export machine. Chinese capital, by contrast, embeds itself directly into Europe’s strategic industries, acquiring technology, brands, and long-term market access. Nowhere is Europe’s vulnerability more visible than in electric-vehicle batteries. China controls roughly 80% of global battery cell production and dominates nearly every upstream chokepoint — from graphite refining to lithium and cobalt processing. This dominance is not accidental. It is the result of decades of state-directed industrial policy. Europe, by contrast, relied on market forces and fragmented initiatives. The bankruptcy of Northvolt, despite massive public support, exposed the scale of the competitiveness gap. Faced with mounting evidence of subsidized overcapacity, the European Commission imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in late 2024. Yet exemptions, regulatory loopholes, and rapid adaptation by Chinese manufacturers blunted their effectiveness. Production shifted. Assembly moved inside Europe. Market penetration continued. Europe addressed a political problem without resolving a strategic one. The deeper issue is internal. Europe’s exposure to China is unevenly distributed, producing paralysis. Germany’s industrial model remains deeply dependent on Chinese demand. Hungary has positioned itself as China’s manufacturing gateway into the EU. France, less exposed, has greater political latitude to advocate protection. These divergent interests make a unified European response exceedingly difficult. China understands this constraint. Division ensures inaction. What Macron’s intervention revealed is not merely a trade dispute, but a structural imbalance of power and political governance. Europe’s weak political construction — a union of 27 nations with limited centralized authority — finds itself caught between China’s highly centralized and disciplined industrial governance on its eastern flank and the United States’ increasingly unilateral, power-driven approach under Donald Trump on its western flank. China has spent decades building powerful industrial policies, investing trillions of yuan into sectors that were initially loss-making but ultimately yielded global dominance: automobiles, EV batteries, solar panels, rare-earth refining, electronic components, and low-end semiconductors. Europe, by contrast, relied on private corporations to deliver industrial capacity, while delegating strategic vision to EU institutions without meaningful implementation powers. The United States relied on entrepreneurship and deep capital markets to dominate profitable sectors such as oil and technology, leaving it dangerously exposed in traditional industries and critical sectors such as rare earths. Donald Trump is now using an expansive interpretation of presidential power — tariffs, sanctions, and forced reshoring — to correct imbalances that markets alone failed to address. Europe is now trapped between a rock and a hard place, with limited political tools to mount a coordinated response. It faces a narrowing set of choices. Confrontation carries retaliation risks. Inaction carries irreversible industrial decline. What is no longer viable is denial. Ultimately, Europe’s trade imbalance with China is merely the visible edge of a much larger iceberg. It exposes the central strategic weakness of the European Union’s construction — a weakness that allows two superpowers to shape a bipolar world on their own terms, while Europe’s economic weight fails to translate into commensurate political power. The question is no longer whether Europe understands the challenge. It is whether Europe can seize the urgency created by rising geopolitical tensions and accelerating deglobalization to strengthen its global governance — before its room for maneuver disappears.

Power is imposing one's will: to do, to make others do, to prevent doing, to compel others to do (Raymond Aron). The Gulf States emerged and grew wealthy thanks to the exploitation of their natural resources—oil and gas—particularly since what was later called the first oil shock of 1973. This shock was significant for what is commonly referred to as the West, namely North America and Europe, even though at that time in the 1970s a large part of Europe was not, by any means, part of the European Union and was still subject to the Soviet yoke and, equally, to that of communism for nearly another twenty years. Could it not be said that since the dawn of the 21st century, the Gulf States have, in a way, emancipated themselves from this dependence, which still provides them with a significant financial windfall, but which they have managed to use and radically transform to achieve a status other than that of rentier states? Furthermore, would it not be pertinent to say that these states have undergone, in rapidly progressing stages, a veritable cybernetic conversion akin to a revolution in the truest sense? The Gulf States in question here are, as a reminder, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. They are not all at the same stage in this evolution and transformation, but the movement is well underway for each of them, each at its own pace, according to the path it has chosen for the implementation and development of its own specific characteristics and objectives. This is therefore not an abandonment—not yet—of oil and gas, nor a break with what still sustains them, but rather an emancipation enabling them to carry out what can truly be called a revolution. Starting with the wealth offered by energy resources, they aspire to become powerful. What is this power, what processes are employed to achieve it, and what are their objectives? Concurrent Development Some data relating to these states are similar, though not identical. Geographically close, they border the Persian Gulf—only Saudi Arabia and Oman have other maritime access—and they have developed concurrently: high-quality urban planning without fearing gigantism; modernization in all areas (finance, economy, commerce, tourism) that does not shy away from climate challenges; maritime development; port and logistics hubs; and an identity also focused on luxury and excellence. Some of these states are now essential points of convergence and intercontinental air hubs. They adopted a strategy aimed at demonstrating their existence and awareness, prior to official recognition, by showcasing organization and the capacity to act in fields as diverse as sporting, cultural, and artistic events, meetings, and large-scale demonstrations. Iraq, as a Gulf state, should legitimately have been included among them. Its fate, unfortunately sealed in 2003, has not yet allowed it to join forces with the other states. Faced with Iran, which also aspires to be a Middle Eastern power, these states as a whole have asserted themselves as a genuine regional power. A different kind of power, certainly, but a power nonetheless. Next article: The Gulf States, from regional to international Note: The importance of this theme prompted the organizers of the 4th edition of the Mediterranean Strategic Meetings (RSMed 2025), a conference organized in Toulon (France) every year since 2022 by the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies (FMES), to dedicate a round table to it in the program for the days of October 8 and 9, 2025.

President Joseph Aoun's meeting with a delegation from "Journalists for Freedom" was not merely a protocolary occasion or a platform for conveying declared positions. Rather, it constituted a political event in its own right, its significance extending beyond the content of the speeches to what it reveals about the presidency's mindset, priorities, and the boundaries of engagement it chooses at this stage. The most important aspect of the meeting is not "what the president said," but why he said it, how he said it, and to whom. First: The meeting as a political act, not a media gathering The choice of a media delegation—neither partisan nor diplomatic—reflects a conscious decision to manage the political situation directly through public opinion. The presidency is not addressing a specific adversary, but rather an environment saturated with leaks and rumors, and it treats the media as a partner in shaping the political climate, not merely a conduit. In this sense, the meeting suggests that the presidency considers its primary battle today not to be with a specific political faction, but with the logic of information chaos that precedes any serious national discussion. Second: Deconstructing the Narrative Instead of Responding to It The most significant aspect of the meeting was the shift from a defensive to a conceptually proactive approach. The presidency not only sought to deny the circulating accusations but also worked to deconstruct their structure: How are they fabricated? Why are they launched? What is their political purpose? This approach indicates that the presidency understands that the danger lies not in the accusation itself, but in its transformation into a "common truth" through repetition. Therefore, the meeting aimed to break the cycle, not perpetuate it. Third: Redefining the Presidency's Position on the Weapons Issue The meeting suggests that the presidency is striving to depoliticize the weapons issue. It is not positioning itself in direct confrontation with Hezbollah, nor is it covering for them, but rather in the position of the constitutional authority that returns the issue to its natural course: the course of the state. This positioning is not neutrality, but rather an attempt to take ownership of the issue instead of engaging in conflict over it. The presidency is implicitly saying: This is not a matter for negotiation between parties, but a sovereign decision to be managed within the state's institutions and according to their established procedures. Fourth: Strategic Realism Instead of National Populism The meeting reveals that the presidency is adopting a new approach to the conflict with Israel, one that separates principled stances from the mechanisms of confrontation. The enemy remains the enemy, and the occupation a reality, but the approach is not based on emotion, but rather on calculations of capability and sustainability. This shift is understood as a rejection of transforming war into a political identity, and an insistence on keeping it a last resort, not an internal tool for consolidating influence or gaining legitimacy. Fifth: Negotiation as a Sovereign Tool, Not a Concession What emerged from the meeting suggests that the presidency does not view negotiation as a weakness, but rather as a tool of sovereignty when conducted from a position of state authority. References to negotiating and technical mechanisms reflect a desire to remove the issue from ideological discourse and return it to the professional-diplomatic sphere. Here, a clear trend emerges to separate "negotiating on behalf of the state" from "compromising on behalf of the domestic front," a separation necessary to restore the concept of supreme national interest. Sixth: The Army as a Comprehensive Guarantor, Not a Partial Tool The meeting enshrined a vision that considers the army the backbone of any sovereign path, not merely a security institution. The insistence on its multifaceted role—from security to counterterrorism—reflects an attempt to politically fortify it and prevent its reduction to a single issue, which could transform it into a party to the conflict instead of remaining an arbiter and guarantor. In this way, the presidency places the army above partisan alignments, thus thwarting attempts to target it internally or externally. Seventh: The Media: Between Partnership and Accountability Concluding the meeting with a discussion on the media is not a minor detail. The presidency assigns the media a dual responsibility: • A partner in protecting the truth • And accountable when it becomes a tool for disinformation This approach reflects an understanding that sovereignty is not only targeted by weapons, but also by information, and that media chaos can be more dangerous than an external adversary. Ultimately, the Baabda meeting was not a mere display of positions, but rather an attempt to establish a governing approach based on three pillars: 1. The state is the ultimate authority, not a partisan entity. 2. Political realism as an alternative to populism. 3. Truth as the foundation of legitimacy. In this sense, it can be said that the presidency did not issue "positions," but rather outlined a new framework for engagement: an engagement with chaos, not with factions; with narratives, not with individuals. This is a clear message: Whoever wants to challenge the state should do so openly and with facts, not behind closed doors and through rumors.

From biblical meals to the Eucharist, and, more recently, to the dialogue in Abu Dhabi, Christian fraternity is lived through conviviality and sharing. This is the fourth and final installment of our series. Christianity is, at its heart, convivial. One need only note how many of the Gospel’s most striking scenes unfold around a meal, and how much teaching the Lord delivers at the table. It is a place of shared hospitality, of upended social boundaries, of joyful fraternity and communion. At the Eucharist – the central event of Christian life – the table becomes an altar. It was over a meal that the idea for the 2019 Abu Dhabi Document on Human Fraternity was born, co-signed by Pope Francis and Sheikh Ahmad al-Tayyeb, Grand Imam of al-Azhar. According to America Today (1 December 2020; see also the Egyptian site albawaba), the meal took place in May 2016, following a working session in the Vatican Library. The discussion marked a renewal of dialogue between the Catholic Church and al-Azhar, the great Sunni institution, after several years of tension. Relations between the Holy See and al-Azhar had broken off following the attack on the Coptic cathedral in Alexandria on 1 January 2011: Benedict XVI had stressed the need to protect Christians in Egypt and across the Middle East – a statement that the Egyptian institution regarded as undue Western interference. In short, at the end of the working session, Pope Francis spontaneously asked the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, Ahmad al-Tayyeb, “Do you have plans? Are you having lunch somewhere?” When nothing was arranged, the Pope offered: “May I invite you to lunch?” It was over this very meal that the idea of drafting a joint document on human fraternity was first proposed. According to Mohammad Sammak, Secretary-General of the National Committee for Islamic–Christian Dialogue, the lunch took place at the Domus Sanctae Marthae. As the Pope himself later told the press, the significance of the encounter was clear: “The meeting is the message.” “The Francis Method”: Fraternity in Action During the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of Nostra aetate (28 October 2025), Leon XIV reflected on the event and paid tribute to what he called the “Francis method” of interreligious dialogue: lived fraternity. “One of the hallmarks of Pope Francis’s pontificate has been the pursuit of universal fraternity,” he said. “On this point, the Holy Spirit has truly ‘pushed’ him to advance with great momentum the openings and initiatives already undertaken by his predecessors, especially from the time of Saint John XXIII. The Pope has promoted both the ecumenical path and interreligious dialogue, doing so above all by cultivating personal relationships, so that – without diminishing ecclesial bonds – the human aspect of encounter is always valued. May God help us to learn from his example!” In the same session, Leon XIV added: “Dialogue is not a tactic or a tool, but a way of life – a journey of the heart that transforms all who take part, both the listener and the speaker.” “Outside the Church, There is No Salvation” Thanks to this “journey of the heart,” the approach to the texts is no longer what it was in the early centuries, when the priority was defending the unity of the Church against schisms and heresies, and upholding the centrality of faith in Christ. “Outside the Church, there is no salvation!” was the prevailing dictum. At the time, this meant that eternal salvation required formal recognition of Christ and that the Catholic Church was the place where grace was received, particularly through the sacraments of initiation – baptism and confirmation. Since Vatican II, the development of a theology of the Spirit of truth operating beyond the visible boundaries of the Church has allowed this principle to be interpreted in a less exclusive manner. Certainly, according to the Churches of the world, salvation still comes from God through Christ, and the Church, as the mystical body of Christ, remains the universal sacrament of salvation – the ordinary sign and means through which God acts and saves from sin and its consequences. Yet, as the Catechism of the Catholic Church affirms, those who are not formal members of these Churches can be saved if, through no fault of their own, they have not known the Gospel and sincerely seek the truth of God, following their conscience and the “ray of truth” that their religion has manifested to them (paragraphs 846–848). Drawing on a rarely studied affirmation in the Gaudium et spes Constitution of Vatican II, French theologian Vincent Guibert underscores this orientation of the magisterium: “The Holy Spirit offers to all, in a way known to God, the possibility of being associated with the paschal mystery” (22, 5). Nostra aetate expresses no different vision.

Yahya Sinwar died without laying down his arms. For some who praise him, this fugitive fought with pride until his last breath. He may now serve as a model to emulate for Hezbollah’s fighters. Like him—and before him—there was Saddam Hussein, unflinching before the gallows. And with that, you expect Hezbollah to surrender its weapons and submit to conditions imposed upon him… Living Dangerously Al-silah zinat al-rijal (that is, “weapons are the adornment of men”), a slogan repeated in South Lebanon, a region where a whole generation has tasted the brotherhood of arms. Military operations have given combatants a taste for the “heroic life,” an addiction one does not escape unscathed. An addiction the majority of Lebanese do not share. Moreover, the emblematic figure of al-Hussein, who fell with weapons in hand, makes any idea of capitulation odious, if not impious. The Domino Effect In any case, it is not up to Lebanese Hezbollah, nor to its command hiding in underground bunkers, to decide whether the weapons should be surrendered. On this matter, it is the Iranians—and they alone—who decide. The proxy militia in which Tehran has invested so much is merely a pawn in the regional game of Wilayat al-Faqih . It cannot be sacrificed except on the altar of the Ayatollahs’ International, whether in Qom or elsewhere. Disarmament cannot be contemplated for the sake of restoring any Lebanese sovereignty. And if the Republic of the Pasdaran were to concede Hezbollah’s weapons to whomever is entitled to them, it would set a dangerous precedent—one that would trigger a chain reaction. The Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq would soon have to play along, and Iran, that entrenched camp, would lose one defensive line after another. That said, Tehran cares little if, to delay the inevitable, its Lebanese harkis were crushed under Israeli bombs for refusing to comply with UN resolutions. The Rematch In a month or a year, hostilities between Twelver Shiites and Zionists will come to an end, if only through the exhaustion of one of the two sides. But does that mean disarmament will automatically follow? Certainly not. The Shiite tandem intends to stay on its guard. On the one hand, it needs to intimidate its Lebanese countrymen; on the other, it has not forgotten that it has made enemies with long memories. Our Syrian neighbors have neither forgiven nor forgotten the support given to Bashar al-Assad’s regime by the “Radwan forces” and other irregulars. Sooner or later, Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian quagmire since 2011 will backfire on the entire Shiite community. The revenge match is inevitable. In such a scenario, better to keep one’s weapons than to be a sitting duck—an easy target. Let the Lebanese government harbor no illusions: there will be no voluntary disarmament. Our strategists must look for more successful ways.

A striking confirmation of the turning point reached by the Trump Administration in foreign policy — this, in essence and succinctly, is how several observers and analysts reacted to the United States’ National Security Strategy, released a few days ago by the White House. This major document, about thirty pages long and preceded by a foreword from President Donald Trump, sets out in detailed form the orientations and objectives Washington has defined regarding current developments in the world’s sensitive regions and the vital issues playing out on the international stage. The ideas presented by the administration’s team in the federal capital are not entirely surprising. They had already been the subject of active debate in various political and diplomatic circles, but it is likely the first time they have been assembled so comprehensively and methodically — theme by theme, region by region — in a single official document emanating from the highest levels of power. The strategy outlined in this text broadly aligns with the vision defended by J.D. Vance well before the November 2024 U.S. presidential election. Vance, who would later become Trump’s running mate, had stressed in several public appearances — notably during the summer of 2024 — that the United States should no longer systematically place itself on the front lines of every struggle waged against the adversaries of the Western world. He urged, for example, that Europe take responsibility for its own defense, supported of course by the U.S., but without placing the entire burden on American military infrastructure. But it was especially Vance’s vision of the Middle East that drew attention and continues to be of great interest to Lebanon and the Levant. Trump’s running mate emphasized at the time that Israel and the Sunni states of the region should, like Europe, assume their own responsibilities in matters of defense and coordinate their efforts more specifically to counter Iran’s expansionism. This orientation — defended by Vance back then and reflected again in the White House’s newly released document — marks a fundamental break with the policy pursued by previous U.S. administrations (with the exception of Trump’s first term). One should recall that in the early 1980s, after the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988), the United States and Israel had practically rushed to the aid of Khomeini’s Islamic Republic, providing it with anti-tank missiles, military equipment, and spare parts to help it confront Saddam Hussein’s army. This crucial support — later revealed publicly in the Irangate scandal — fit into a broader context than the Iran–Iraq conflict (namely the funding of Nicaragua’s Contras), but its strategic objective was clearly to bolster the pragmatic wing of the Shia regime in Tehran in order to weaken the Sunni pole in the Middle East. Yet this calculation gravely misread the ideological mindset of the Revolutionary Guards, who, from Khomeini’s rise to power onward, had aggressively pushed their expansionist project to export the Islamic Revolution across the region. This miscalculation of the early 1980s ultimately meant that not only was the pragmatic wing of the Iranian regime not strengthened vis-à-vis the Sunni bloc, but the radical Khomeinist current, on the contrary, steadily grew in power, extending its influence into every economic, social, and institutional sector of Iran, bypassing the central state and sowing chronic instability in several Levantine countries. These hegemonic ambitions were accompanied by an accelerated development of Iran’s nuclear program, such that what had been perceived forty years ago as a pragmatic counterweight to Sunni power became, four decades later, a serious existential threat — one that should have been recognized for what it was had the ideological foundations of the Revolutionary Guards’ project been fully understood. The strategic — and likely fatal — error of the regime’s radical wing was its failure to recognize its own limits in a region as complex as the Middle East and its pursuit of excessive ambitions, both in its nuclear program and in its artificial entrenchment in the Levant. It is therefore hardly surprising that the National Security Strategy presented today by the Trump Administration reverses the equation of the 1980s by advocating cooperation between Israel and the Sunni states to confront the danger posed by a Shia power still struggling to accept that the region has undergone a profound geopolitical transformation — one paving the way for the emergence of a new Middle East built on lasting peace and broad-based economic cooperation.