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The meaning of Christmas challenges us more than ever, in a world that is increasingly fragmented, increasingly “nihilistic” — in the existential sense. Beyond its commercial and festive character, or even its spiritual and religious dimension, Christmas is, in principle, a hand extended toward humanity in all its flaws, its inequities, its imperfections. Without distinction. This is not about engaging in supermarket morality, nor in secularized spiritualism, but about sincerely questioning what this moment signifies, beyond immediate experience — beyond that delightful synesthesia of lights, songs, and flavors, or the joy of gifts reflected in the innocent eyes of young children. Christmas is not a celebration of withdrawal into oneself. Even though the holiday revives the familial cocoon around the fireplace and shared moments, around a table or a Christmas tree, it is not synonymous with enclosure or a return to the gregarious core. On the contrary. Since the dawn of time, the winter solstice has been an event awaited with fervor. Preparations began in spring, celebrating the flame of life within the darkness of the shadows. A majestic light of life, which first exists in sharing with others, without any difference — all others. In antiquity, on that day, social barriers were abolished, in a song of the heart celebrating altruism and a return to what defines the specificity of the human being: the sense of social service, of one’s purpose within the purpose of the other. In reciprocity, far from selfishness. That is why guests sit at the same table — not merely to reunite, but to rediscover themselves in the other, in their neighbor. This is the essence of the social bond. Christmas, in this sense, is profoundly “political” as an act of preserving society and a ritual of self-purification through the other. It is, in principle, a moment of truce, when symbolic violence is briefly suspended, revealing what has become structural throughout the rest of the year. At the end of this year 2025, marked by a disintegration of the global order likely unprecedented since the last century, this is the opportune moment to bury hatred and vengeance and to renounce violence, whatever its form or object. It is within this in-between — between the shadow of winter and the light and warmth of fire — that the harshest and most difficult inner struggle unfolds, provided one chooses not to anesthetize it through inert solipsism or Epicurean materialism. It is the ideal time for an examination of conscience, a reflection on our internal mechanisms that transform fears into moral narratives, then into closed identities; that constantly confuse survival with justice; that legitimize heroic virtue to compensate for collective irresponsibility; that allow the gradual slide of hatred from a shameful emotion into an assumed political cause. Christmas is, in a way, a stripping bare of everything that no longer holds — from the individual to the societal. In this sense, it is no coincidence that Christmas takes place in the depths of icy nights, at the moment when everyone, exhausted at the end of a year filled with responsibilities, trials, and various sufferings, struggles for survival. “The burdens are sometimes empty, but they are no less heavy,” sang Leonard Cohen. Christmas is a refuge, a manger, a place to recompose oneself away from the gaze of the world, to breathe, to dive back into the deepest parts of oneself, and to question what defines us. The sun has disappeared, and it is within oneself that it must be rediscovered — in communion with others, in a surge of hope, joy, and peace. Christmas is the epitome-moment of redemption — provided one can open one’s heart to the triptych of freedom, responsibility, and reciprocity that movement toward the other requires. It is the moment of empathy par excellence. The spirit of Christmas, beyond religions, communities, spirituality, and morality, is thus a choice of values and reference points — and beyond that, a choice of society: that of living together in difference and respect for others, and in humility. It is the moment to accept stripping oneself of the egotism conferred by power and certainty, to return to the asymmetrical doubt that makes us human — authentic, still capable of wonder, of deep self-criticism, and of expressing gratitude for what has been given to us, indiscriminately, both good and bad. On December 24–25, anger, resentment, misfortune, judgment, and evil lose their meaning. They do not fade away by magic, but through awareness. That rebirth and redemption come at this price — and that we are, despite our wounds, our torments, our flaws, our terrifying fears, invited to love, to share, and to love ourselves without judgment. And perhaps the only fundamental question still worth asking at the beginning of this catastrophic 21st century is to know what, today, still deserves to be saved beyond a profane–sacred dualism that has drifted farther than ever from that bi-directional movement between humanist transcendence and immanence. It is up to each of us to find, deep within ourselves, the answer to this question. At this stage, words are no longer of any use.

Under the effect of American sanctions, restrictions imposed by the Banque du Liban, and losses sustained during the last war with Israel, Hezbollah has sought to reconfigure its main financial arm, Al-Qard Al-Hassan. This “repositioning,” presented as “legal,” aims to preserve its grip on the parallel economy and its social base. Founded in 1982, the Qard Al-Hassan association operates outside the legal banking framework. Iranian funds initially contributed to the association's capital. These were supplemented by Lebanese capital, particularly from entrepreneurs in Africa, over several years. According to the US Treasury Department, which listed Qard Al-Hassan in 2007 on its list of sanctioned entities and then strengthened these sanctions in 2021, this association manages financial volumes comparable to those of a medium-sized bank, while escaping all official supervision. US authorities estimate that the network serves several hundred thousand beneficiaries across Lebanon, relying on significant tangible assets, including gold deposits used as collateral, without control from the Lebanese financial authorities. Since the collapse of the banking system in 2019, Al-Qard Al-Hassan has established itself as a substitute for a sector described as “deeply insolvent” by international institutions, thereby strengthening the economic dependence of Hezbollah's social base and consolidating its financial and political power outside of any state structure. Symbolic legitimacy The policy of severe restrictions imposed since 2019 by the Banque du Liban – limitations on withdrawals, control of transfers abroad, and regulation of exchange operations – has created an environment conducive to the rise of unregulated financial structures. In this context, Al-Qard Al-Hassan has appeared to some as an alternative to the state and the banking sector, due to their failure. The principle of Qard Al-Hassan, based on interest-free loans, gives this association strong symbolic legitimacy within the Shiite community. Hezbollah relies on this reference to present the association as a social work. According to political scientist Ali Hamadé, this symbolism is also strategic for the party's political influence: it has enabled it to penetrate social strata beyond the Shiite community, thus extending its economic and social grip. But in reality, Al-Qard Al-Hassan functions as a parallel banking network, manipulating large amounts of liquidity outside of any state control and beyond the official supervision of the Banque du Liban or the Banking Control Commission. Ali Hamadé notes in this context that the association has entered a phase of so-called "post-liquidation," redistributing certain activities to other Hezbollah-affiliated entities, particularly in the gold sector. Gold purchase, sale, and pawning operations are now carried out via Joud, a commercial company with a tax number and a license, whose general manager from the Karnib family is sanctioned by the United States. Banking-like activities are gradually being transferred to other legal structures, with operations presented as simple sales of goods, thus circumventing financial oversight. The closure would be inevitable Ali Hamadé further emphasizes that the timing of Al-Qard Al-Hassan's closure or control falls under the responsibility of the Presidency of the Republic, not the Ministry of Interior. This responsibility explains the caution in examining the case, particularly with the aim of avoiding financial disruptions for depositors and managing the symbolic impact of such an act on the Shiite community and beyond. Facing international and American pressure, the closure of the association now seems inevitable, even if other structures continue to take over some of its activities. This possible closure has been denied by the association, which states that it "continues to operate under its usual name, in all its branches in Lebanon." It specifies that gold purchase and sale operations, whether cash or installment, are carried out exclusively through legal commercial companies. This clarification illustrates the complexity of the progressive transfer of Al-Qard Al-Hassan's functions to entities like Joud, allowing for a legal distinction between commercial operations and quasi-banking activities.

It seems necessary to dwell for a moment on the insidious game played by Israel, acting as a puppet master, in the context of the geostrategic ambitions of the Iranian Islamic Republic. For half a century, Tel Aviv found in the “alliance of minorities” (Alawites, Christians, Druze, Lebanese Shiites, Kurds) a geopolitical buffer against the Sunni hinterland. The Israeli «periphery doctrine» (1950s-70s) was indeed based on an axiom: ally with minorities to break the Sunni encirclement. In this context, the Alawite regimes in Damascus — Hafez and then Bashar al-Assad — were declared but predictable enemies; ideologically stable; obsessed with their internal survival; and perfectly dissuadable. Israel preferred a cynical and rational Assad to a nationalist or Islamist Sunni Syria. And the Western world, both the United States and European countries, followed suit with the Hebrew state, purely out of utilitarianism. The henchmen of the Assad regime rendered so many good and loyal services to European intelligence agencies over the past four decades… why get rid of such an accommodating enemy? And, to add to the ridicule, several decades after the massacres of Homs and Hama, it is only today that these countries salute the demise of an inhumane regime they constantly legitimized, even when it resolutely massacred civilian opponents in 2011 and handed the country over to Daesh by amnestying Islamists, only to then cry wolf… Hezbollah, in Lebanon, eliminated all the leaders of the National Resistance Front to Israel, formed by the left, starting in the 1980s. What the Hebrew state did not do, the pro-Iranian party completed. Until it became a perfect border guard to prevent any Palestinian aspirations from taking root in South Lebanon. In exchange, Israel overlooked the Syrian takeover of Lebanon in 1990 and the conquest of the Lebanese state by Hezbollah starting in 2006. Moreover, it took advantage of the Hamas-Fatah quarrel to weaken the Palestinian internal front… Maintaining the mimetic rivalry With the fall of Assad and the arrival of Ahmed al-Sharaa, Israel finds itself facing a geostrategic paradox: in the short term, Iran — whose exaggerated imperialistic hubris, in Zionist logic, it was time to humble — loses its Levantine bridgehead. In the medium term, a recomposed Sunni Syria reappears — with all that this implies in terms of doctrinal, tribal-military, and regional unknowns. It must be understood that Israel has constantly sought to maintain the mimetic rivalry that already exists between the communities of the Levant against a backdrop of existential anxieties. Thus, playing Christians against Sunnis, Sunnis against Shiites, Alawites against Sunnis, according to pure Machiavellian logic… by restoring balances when they are broken. The function of this strategy is obvious: to guarantee the survival of the Hebrew state by exploiting the weaknesses, fears, and contradictions of others, as well as the fragility of the pluralism of Levantine societies. And, consequently, to eliminate any possibility of the emergence of a credible Palestinian resistance and the birth of a viable, sovereign Palestinian state with international legitimacy. Certainly, the Sharaa regime completely breaks Iranian influence, closes arms routes to Hezbollah, draws closer to Riyadh and Washington; it attempts a «conservative normalization» to exorcise its jihadist past and provides an opportunity to extend the Abraham Accords to Syria with Sunni legitimacy. But for Israel, this recomposition remains ambiguous: a former jihadist group turned state power is less legible than a stable Alawite dictatorship, and a Sunni power can serve as a complement to the Palestinian cause. While dialogue with it to push for peace is necessary, pressure on the regime must be maintained to keep it in a state of fragility and dependence, whether by neutralizing its military capabilities, stirring up factions within minorities, or creating a buffer zone inside Syrian territory. For Israel, the entire dichotomy lies here: the Iranian Empire is collapsing, but with it, the comfortable logic of the “alliance of minorities.” Tel Aviv loses an “intimate enemy” (whose fall it delayed as much as possible) in Bashar — the “old pair of socks,” to use the phrase of an Israeli official in 2011 regarding the Syrian president — for an unpredictable neighbor, but one that can guarantee lasting peace, provided it is kept under tight Western politico-economic and Israeli military control. The empire in fragments What remains for Iran at the end of 2025 is no longer an axis, but the pieces of an imploded star: Bab el-Mandeb and the Houthis, Gaza in ruins and Hamas, an isolated Hezbollah trying desperately to reconstitute itself, an Iraq under control but suffering from internal tensions, and a Syria definitively lost. Even the heart of the empire now groans under the weight of sanctions and shortages. Tehran's imperial strategy has not disappeared; it has been shattered, partly a victim of its imperialistic hubris, for wanting to play cunningly with those more powerful than itself. Like Saddam after the invasion of Kuwait. “If he debases himself, I praise him; if he boasts, I humble him“, Machiavelli advised. The frog who wanted to make herself as big as the ox, wrote La Fontaine. Darius III was assassinated by his own people after his defeat against Alexander and the fall of the empire. Will the current Iranian directory suffer the same fate? Perhaps. The difference being that Alexander had wept for Darius III. No one — absolutely no one — will shed tears over the ruins of the vilayet el-faqih. Read on the same topic “The Iranian Empire”: Anatomy of a Fall (1/5) “The Iranian Empire”: In Yemen, the Houthi Gamble (2/5) “The Iranian Empire”: The Land Corridor and the Ambition of the Levantine Empire (3/5) “The Iranian Empire”: Iraq, Open Wound; Gaza, Palestinian Depth (4/5)

For several decades, Sharjah has distinguished itself as the cultural capital of the Arab world, a title officially bestowed by UNESCO in 1998 in recognition of the emirate’s commitment to art, culture, and education, as well as its cultural landscape. Under the guidance of Sheikh Sultan bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, who has ruled the emirate since 1972, Sharjah has developed a unique artistic ecosystem in the Middle East, establishing itself as an essential destination for art lovers and cultural professionals alike. The modern history of art in Sharjah is closely tied to the founding of the Sharjah Art Foundation in 2009, under the leadership of Sheikha Hoor Al Qasimi. This multidisciplinary institution supports both local and regional artistic creations while fostering connections with international artists. The foundation regularly stages major exhibitions, organizes workshops in collaboration with partners, and offers research grants and mentorship programs aimed at empowering young artists, women, and innovative creators. The foundation is also responsible for the world-renowned Sharjah Biennial , launched in 1993, which attracts thousands of visitors and showcases works reflecting social and artistic transformations across the Arab world and beyond. The latest edition, in 2025, titled “To Carry,” brought together more than 200 artists from diverse backgrounds, who addressed pressing contemporary issues and engaged in cross-cultural dialogue. Sharjah has also invested heavily in preserving and revitalizing its architectural heritage. The historic Al Mareijah district hosts several museums and art spaces nestled within beautifully restored traditional houses, offering visitors the chance to engage with contemporary works while immersing themselves in the emirate’s historic urban architecture. At the heart of the cultural scene stands the Sharjah Art Museum , one of the Gulf’s largest museums. It provides free access to a wide range of exhibitions, from classical Arab paintings to contemporary photography, making art accessible to all audiences. Beyond these key institutions, Sharjah is home to many other notable landmarks, such as the Barjeel Art Foundation , founded to showcase the private collection of Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi; the Maraya Art Centre , dedicated to visual and digital arts; and the Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilization , which highlights the richness of traditional Islamic art. Complementing these are dozens of independent galleries and studios that further diversify the emirate’s cultural landscape, fostering exchanges between artists, curators, and the public. A steady flow of events and project calls reflects Sharjah’s proactive cultural policy, which promotes innovation, training, and artistic experimentation. Sharjah’s cultural vision strives to democratize access to art and shape an open and engaged society. Art initiatives are often complemented by conferences, concerts, film screenings, and retrospectives on prominent Arab artists such as Tarek Al Ghoussein or Hassan Sharif, while consistently welcoming European, American, and Asian creators. While deeply rooted in local and Arab traditions, Sharjah’s artistic influence resonates internationally. Close collaborations with global cultural institutions—including UNESCO—and the involvement of artists from the Arab diaspora amplify the emirate’s cultural outreach. The UNESCO-Sharjah Prize for Arab Culture , created in 1998, epitomizes this partnership by rewarding two personalities, groups, or institutions each year for their exceptional contribution to the promotion of Arab arts and culture. The emirate’s relentless vitality in cultural promotion has earned it global recognition, including the title of Islamic Culture Capital in 2014 by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and World Book Capital in 2019 by UNESCO. Balancing tradition and modernity, East and West, Sharjah has taken on the challenge of shaping a dynamic and innovative artistic hub. Its ambitious programming, celebration of diversity, and collaboration with international artists and institutions continue to cement its role as a global pioneer in Arab culture.

For a long time, Iraq was the keystone of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s geostrategic maneuvers and ambitions. Without Iraq, nothing holds together: neither the land corridor to Syria, nor the sanctions-busting economy, nor the network of militias that provided Iran with strategic depth in the Gulf. Powerful Shiite militias (the PMF), financed, trained, and supervised by the Revolutionary Guards, controlled for years the border areas of al-Qaim/Bukamal, through which weapons, fighters, and technologies transited toward Syria and Lebanon. The Iraqi government, wavering, constantly oscillated between Washington and Tehran, yet Iranian leverage remained massive. Today, Iraq has become a field of contradictions: U.S. pressure is increasing to sanction pro-Iranian networks; militias have been weakened by the disorganization of the Syrian front; the recent internal dispute over the classification of Hezbollah and the Houthis—placed on and then removed from terrorist lists within a few days—clearly reveals confusion; and, last but not least, an Iraqi nationalism is taking shape that rejects Iranian interference as much as American dominance. Baghdad is now walking a tightrope between Washington, Tehran, and Riyadh. Tehran retains real and essential influence there, but no longer the “corridor” that made Iraq a natural extension of its defensive architecture. The Iraqi link still exists; but it no longer structures the regional space. Gaza, or the Palestinian Depth of the Iranian Axis There remains Gaza. Why this geopolitical attachment to the Palestinian card, beyond the political asset it had represented since 2006—namely, a Sunni extension of Iran and a bargaining chip with the West over the nuclear issue, as a tool of pressure on Israel? To understand Gaza within the Iranian system, one must dismantle the myth: Hamas is not an Iranian creation. Hamas is the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its establishment was clearly facilitated by Israel in order to create a counterweight to Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, to divide Palestinian ranks, and to justify the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the grounds of the existence of an extremist terrorist actor. Between 1990 and 2000, Hamas gradually moved closer to Iran and Hezbollah, against the backdrop of its rejection of the Oslo Accords. In 2007, the takeover of Gaza at Fatah’s expense increased its growing dependence on Iranian support at all levels. To be sure, Hamas is not Hezbollah—which is a direct emanation of the Pasdaran through Lebanese intermediaries. It retains ideological and tactical autonomy—but it is fully embedded in Iran’s strategy. For Tehran, Gaza serves three functions. First, it constitutes a permanent internal front against Israel. The Gaza Strip is unavoidable for Tel Aviv: enclosed and explosive, it is impossible to neutralize politically without a colossal human and military cost. The systematic destruction of the enclave and the methodical elimination of its inhabitants since October 2023 have failed to crush Hamas. The conflict ties down part of the Israeli army, prevents Israel from freely projecting power across the region, and opens a permanent breach in Israel’s internal security… but, paradoxically, it allows Benjamin Netanyahu to remain in power despite the corruption charges against him. Second, Gaza provides Palestinian legitimacy to the Iranian narrative—a function also performed by Hezbollah’s discourse. Without Gaza, Iran cannot claim to be the champion of the Palestinian cause. With Gaza, the “resistance” narrative takes on substance—the rockets fired at Tel Aviv and Ashkelon supplying the imagery necessary for Iranian grandstanding. It is the perfect distraction, diverting Arab populations from what matters most: the grip of the vilayat-e faqih over the Middle East, in the name of restoring a mythical imperial golden age. Next article: Israel and the alliance of minorities: a paradoxical stability (4/5) Read on the same topic “The Iranian Empire”: Anatomy of a Collapse (1/5) “The Iranian Empire”: The Houthi Gamble in Yemen (2/5) “The Iranian Empire”: The Land Corridor and the Ambition of a Levantine Empire (3/5)

For many, forgetting is a coping mechanism that helps them overcome hardship. But it is also the means—and often the goal—sought by wrongdoers eager to erase their tracks. A population with the memory of a goldfish is every fisherman’s dream: a form of collective Alzheimer’s that guarantees a quiet life, smooth and undisturbed. Lebanon is perhaps the most striking example. Recently, some financial institutions have begun offering interest-bearing returns on cash deposits—an expression we had not heard since 2019. For many, this is worse than the apple in the Garden of Eden: Adam and Eve were naked before taking a bite, whereas we succumbed to these usurious interest rates, which led us straight into erosion and ruin. These advertisements are shocking. They suggest that before 2019 we should have been more vigilant about reckless investments—decisions made without our consent by the banks themselves. The very banks that once sold us peace of mind, a radiant future, and slogans even more saccharine than those of the Soviet regime. And yet, although it is true that the state is the primary black hole, some media outlets still manage to absolve banks of all responsibility, as if their owners were above suspicion. Curiously, every one of these bankers moved their money abroad. At least Philip Morris had the decency to consume his own product—though it killed him. Thanks to this goldfish syndrome that has turned us Lebanese into the dupes of a farce, political leaders and banks are working hand in hand to erase the past and open a “new page.” Had banks been consistent, they would have sued the state years ago. But in this chaotic political-financial entanglement, it is impossible to separate truth from falsehood, and reality remains buried in the brothels of accounting. We are being asked to start all over again—a new version of Kipling’s If , based on the idea that we Lebanese have “seen worse.” And this farce works beautifully thanks to two factors: indecency and indifference. Indecency defines those who robbed us and now flaunt the fruits of our labor. The more contemptuous these criminals become, the more their entourage of useful idiots and social climbers grows. Some transferred everything abroad during the crisis; others erase public debt with the stroke of a pen—that is to say, our savings. All of this unfolds amid near-total indifference, fueled by a foolish concept called resilience. This ability—more powerful than any sedative—wipes the memory of those whose sole obsession is to live as if nothing ever happened, a permanent carpe diem . Indecency and indifference: the twin pillars of this banana republic called Lebanon, which must remain unchanged—especially during holidays or summer seasons. Had Kipling witnessed these events, he would have been appalled by our capacity to forget, and might have written: If you can see the work of your life destroyed And, without a word—out of shame—begin again; See your savings stolen without shame or alibi, And speak of the future against sunsets and daiquiris; If you can rebuild your home, Devastated on an August 4, Stay silent and pay without raising a doubt; Knowing the state, like a spade, Will return tomorrow to dig in and tighten its grip on your throat; If you can lose everything without ever saying no, Take your servitude for quiet strength, And start over without blinking, thinking yourself resilient, Then you will truly know Lebanon, And you will be, alas, a true fool, my son.