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What will the situation of Lebanon and the region look like in the aftermath of the American-Israeli war against Iran? And what will become of the Lebanese-Lebanese rift, which has deepened to unprecedented levels under the combined weight of this conflict, of Hezbollah's engagement in it, and of the Israeli aggressions that continue to spread across Lebanese territory, as the death toll surpasses a thousand and climbs further with each passing hour? On the Iranian side, the regime's survival roughly a month after hostilities broke out constitutes an achievement in itself, and it is precisely what the partisans of what once styled itself the "axis of resistance" would readily describe as a "victory." The term, of course, remains relative, since what counts as a victory by the standards of that axis amounts to a resounding failure when measured against the actual course of the war. A regime that clings to power over ruins cannot genuinely lay claim to victory, and Iran will need many decades to recover from the collapse into which this devastating conflict has plunged it.

All attention remains focused on this new phase towards which the region seems resolutely to be heading, given Tehran's clear refusal to initiate a dialogue with Washington, based solely on the conditions set by the Trump administration for a halt to the military offensive launched on February 28. It must be said that nothing official has been announced on this subject so far by the Islamic Republic, whose leaders have already indicated that Washington's 15-point proposal is unworkable and excessive, and that they themselves have conditions for a dialogue. Among these conditions are, notably, an end to targeted attacks and assassinations in Iran, as well as solemn guarantees that the offensive will not resume. Tehran would also demand respect for “Iranian sovereignty” over the Strait of Hormuz, which it presents as a “right”.

It all goes back to 1998 — May 30 to be precise, the date on which Pakistan conducted its last nuclear test in the sands of Kharan, in Balochistan. The program, from the bomb to its entire development chain, had been financed by Saudi Arabia, with American and Israeli approval. Both capitals had consented to Islamabad joining the nuclear club in order to establish a strategic counterweight in the India-China-Pakistan triangle, at a time when Beijing and New Delhi had already crossed the threshold of nuclear armament. It was then that speculation multiplied around Iran's intention to develop a military nuclear program under civilian cover — a prospect that Tel Aviv and Washington deemed unacceptable. The Pakistani bomb, Sunni, was meant to impose a balance in the Far East; an Iranian bomb, Shia, would create an unprecedented balance of power in the Middle East, a region where Israel considers itself the foremost strategic actor. The directive imposed itself: Iran could not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. Tehran, for its part, never ceased to reaffirm the peaceful nature of its ambitions, with no military objectives in this domain.

The ten-day deadline Washington had given Tehran to respond to the fifteen conditions for a cessation of hostilities expires on Sunday, with no concrete sign of a possible de-escalation on the horizon. Positions, on the contrary, seem to be hardening, as the United States and Iran sharpen their weapons in anticipation of a possible new phase of the military conflict and confusion still reigns regarding possible talks between the two states. The violent reaction of the Islamic Republic to President Donald Trump's eagerly awaited speech to Americans on Wednesday evening, coupled with counter-threats, reveals the difficulty of the mission undertaken by mediators to push the two main belligerents to initiate a dialogue.

In this fifth week of the Iran war, President Trump's statements are equivocal. So are those of Iranian leaders. Only the Israeli position is clear: priority to military and security imperatives. Information from the theater of operations, and sociopolitical analyses in the three belligerent states, come mainly from the press. The sources cited are often biased, and highlight only a part of the facts that serve the theses of their authors. It must be noted that the majority of the Western print media and audiovisual media insist more on the costs of the war than on its strategic outcome, which cannot be purely political or purely military, but must constitute a unique strategic synthesis. The military implements its own strategy to serve national objectives. Decision-makers do the same at the political level. An assessment of this campaign should take all of this into account.

The debate over state monopoly on arms in Lebanon has ceased to be a simple question of sovereignty or legality; it has become a genuine test of the state's capacity to fulfil its fundamental functions. The problem has moved beyond the principle itself, which enjoys a near-unanimous theoretical consensus: what is lacking are the internal leverage and the national strategic vision capable of making it applicable, against a backdrop of deep regional entanglements and unprecedented economic and institutional fragility. The absence of a clear trajectory, the persistence of a policy of procrastination, and the erosion of the time factor could well constitute, in and of themselves, the gravest threat to Lebanon's stability and the future of its state.