Articles

In times of total war or acute existential crisis, when the fate of an entire population hangs in the balance, timid and hesitant half-measures are no longer acceptable. When a nation faces the expansionist and hegemonic designs of a power unbound by law or principle, and when a tyrannical, blood-soaked regime commits large-scale massacres with impunity – striking indiscriminately at civilians, at youths, at teenagers – such extreme circumstances demand clarity. They require a firm, unequivocal stance, far removed from cynical equivocation or evasive maneuvering. That is, beyond any doubt – as readers will have guessed – the situation with the regime currently in power Iran. The latest round of negotiations – yet another in a decades-long saga – between American and Iranian envoys is nothing more than a mirage. This has become a truism, as countless past experiences have shown: the leaders of the Islamic Republic have perfected the art of sterile “dialogue,” creating the illusion of openness to talks and compromise. In reality, their strategy rarely goes beyond buying time – maneuvering, hedging, and waiting for the geopolitical winds to shift in their favor. The mullahs in Tehran are counting on the inevitable alternation of power in Western democracies to exploit any weakening or regime shift in a country that “displeases” them. This familiar tactic allows them to rebound and escalate their belligerent campaign against the opposing party. Meanwhile, as they play their favorite game of “negotiation” pursuing a so-called “deal” they have no intention of honoring, these same mullahs orchestrate unthinkable massacres and mass arrests – targeting particularly youths and students. In a striking disclosure, a member of the Iranian Parliament’s Education Commission recently revealed that 28 percent of those imprisoned following last January’s uprising are under 20. Even more harrowing, an Iranian association published a list naming 200 children killed in the latest protests. The scale of the bloodshed prompted Lebanese-American political analyst, close to Republican circles, Walid Phares, to urge Washington’s leaders: if they insist on pursuing “dialogue” with Tehran, they must require the effective and immediate cessation of killings and mass arrests – and the release of those detained since January – a non-negotiable precondition for any talks with the Iranian regime. President Donald Trump was not mistaken on this point, noting during one of his trips that, for 47 years, senior officials of the Islamic Republic have consistently given the impression that they wish to “dialogue” with the West when under pressure – while simultaneously carrying out intermittent massacres and unspeakable atrocities, claiming the lives of thousands of political prisoners in detention. The fundamentally fruitless nature of any negotiations with a regime like mullah’s was skilfully highligted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who stressed that Iran is ruled by radical Shiite clerics whose decisions and strategic choices are driven entirely by theological considerations, far removed from any sense of geopolitical realism. But it was the recent remarks by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi that most clearly exposed the mullah’s regime deceptive penchant for endless discussions, brazenly finding ways to evade its written commitments. Shortly after the latest Geneva meeting with the American delegation, he bluntly acknowledged that it would be “difficult to draft the final text of a potential agreement with the United States.” In other words, Tehran reduces any agreement with Washington to a mere stylistic exercise – a rhetoric riddled with linguistic traps, deliberately ambiguous, designed to leave the door open to multiple interpretations, thereby allowing the regime to surreptitiously evade the concrete obligations such an agreement would entail. The situation in which the Islamic Republic finds itself today can be compared to a plant in an advanced state of decay. Simply pruning it – cutting off the withered stems and branches while leaving the roots intact – would achieve nothing. Those untouched roots will inevitably, in a relatively short time, cause the plant to regrow even stronger than before. The same would be true of any flawed, trap-laden deal struck with the mullah’s regime if the deep roots – those patiently and meticulously working in the shadows to revive what was once rotten – are not uprooted completely.

Museums in Iran play a key role in supporting the country’s political and diplomatic strategy. They are also crucial for preserving and showcasing the treasures of Persian civilization. The National Museum of Iran stands as the country’s foremost archaeological and historical museum. It highlights the richness of Persian heritage and houses invaluable collections spanning Iranian history – from the Paleolithic era through the Medes, Elamites, Achaemenids, Parthians, Sassanids, and into the Islamic period. Within its walls, the official narrative of “Iran” is articulated: a continuous thread running from Elam and the Achaemenid Empire to the Islamic Republic, represented by over 300,000 objects that weave together the nation’s millennia-spanning history. The National Museum is composed of two main entities: the Museum of Ancient Iran and the Museum of the Islamic Period. The Museum of Ancient Iran Established in the 1930s during the reign of Reza Shah, the main building – known as the Museum of Ancient Iran – is dedicated to the pre-Islamic period. Its architecture draws inspiration from the Sassanid style, notably the Taq-e Kasra (Arch of Ctesiphon). Designed by French architects André Godard and Maxime Siroux, the museum was inaugurated in 1937. Rather than showcasing the legendary jewels of the Shahs’ treasury, the museum presents the full sweep of Iran’s history, embodied in thousands of objects, including seals, bas-reliefs, pottery, manuscripts, statues, and more. Among its highlights are inscriptions and texts from the Late Uruk period (circa 3350–3000 B.C.), which were relocated to modern, secure storage during the 2010s. The museum also houses one of the “Salt Men” of Zanjan – a naturally mummified miner, perfectly preserved by the salt of the mine where it was discovered, dating to roughly 550–330 B.C. Other standout pieces include the monumental Shami Bronze, towering 1.94 meters and considered a masterpiece of Parthian sculpture. The museum also preserves bas-reliefs and bull-headed capitals from Persepolis (6th–4th century B.C.), of exceptional quality, offering a striking synthesis of Achaemenid architectural artistry. The collection further encompasses prehistoric pottery and ceramics from Tepe Sialk, near Kashan – true works of art dating from the 6th to the 4th millennium B.C. – as well as bronzes from Lorestan (circa 1000-650 B.C.) and gold cups and rhytons from Marlik (1400-1200 B.C.), considered the pinnacle of Iron Age Iranian craftsmanship. The Museum of the Islamic Period The Islamic Art department of the National Museum of Iran occupies a dedicated modern building, inaugurated in 1996. It houses an invaluable collection tracing Persia’s post-Islamic history, highlighting the refinement of Islamic art in Iran. The collection features Safavid artworks, ceramics, manuscripts, metalwork, textiles, and many other treasures. Among its standout pieces is the Ilkhanid mihrab from Dar-e Behesht, known as the “Gate of Paradise.” This 14th-century mosaic of glazed tiles, produced under the Ilkhanid dynasty, is renowned for its intricate calligraphy (kufic, thuluth, naskh) and its floral and geometric motifs. The museum also displays a 9th-century ceramic bowl from Gorgan adorned with an anthropomorphic bull-headed figure, watercolor paintings by Sani ol-Molk from the Qajar period (18th century), as well as elegant astrolabes and other masterpieces. The Role of Museum Curators Walking a fine line between power and memory, museum curators in Iran navigate a complex and delicate terrain. They frequently encounter subtle forms of censorship – not overt bans, but signals, recommendations, and “sensitivities” that must be observed. Even decisions about which works to display and how to frame them can involve sensitive subjects, including ancient religious pluralism, the role of women in past societies, or foreign influences. The fundamental challenge for curators is to balance the pre-Islamic narrative – of an ancient, imperial nation – with the Islamic narrative and the state’s identity strategy, all while preserving the intellectual rigor required of any historical account. Finally, it is worth noting the professionalization efforts undertaken in some of Tehran’s museums: modernization of storage and security systems, appointment of a dedicated curator for the inscriptions section, and more. These measures reflect an increasingly technocratic approach to heritage management. This raises a provocative question: in times of national crisis, is it inappropriate to focus on the fate of museums and works of art rather than the welfare of people? On the contrary – the more unsettled the world becomes, the more essential art and its guardians are, not only to bear witness but, above all, to preserve and transmit our shared human history to future generations. Read on the same topic: Museums in Iran: a Heritage Under Siege (1/2)

There was no objective behind the negotiations conducted by the American administration with the Iranian side in Muscat and Geneva other than conveying a single message. The substance of that message is that the “Islamic Republic” must change. Change must occur, whether peacefully or by force. President Donald Trump did not hesitate to declare recently that the fall of the Iranian regime would be “the best thing that could happen.” From this perspective, one can understand the repeated insistence of the American president on rejecting the return of Nouri al-Maliki to the post of Prime Minister in Iraq. From the same perspective, one can also understand the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his transfer to New York along with his wife. A carefully calculated process of encirclement is underway against Iran, accompanied by the continuous clipping of its wings after its expulsion from Syria and the practical elimination of Hezbollah, the crown jewel of the expansionist project of the “Islamic Republic.” What must be noted at present is the determination within the American administration to return to Iraq. Trump appears to have what might be called an Iraq complex. The United States paid dearly for toppling Saddam Hussein’s Baathist familial regime in 2003. It paid in blood and in hundreds of billions of dollars, only for Iran to emerge as the sole victor in a war whose rationale remains unclear to this day, particularly regarding what drove the administration of George W. Bush to undertake it. The renewed focus of the American president on the question of Nouri al-Maliki is not a mere coincidence in the current circumstances, which are marked by a dangerous escalation between the “Islamic Republic” on the one hand and both the United States and Israel on the other. It is a serious escalation, especially in light of the transfer of war by America and Israel into Iranian territory last June. Within Trump’s mind lies a set of precise calculations, among them a calculation related to Iraq, which has fallen into Iran’s embrace. The Americans, specifically the administration of George W. Bush, handed Iraq to Iran on a silver platter. This appears to remain lodged in Donald Trump’s thinking, as he has undertaken to put an end to Iranian hegemony in the region, beginning with Iraq. The United States brought Iraqi Shiite militias affiliated with Iran’s “Revolutionary Guard” and entrusted them with power in Baghdad. These militias hastened to turn against the American “occupier” and began serving Iranian interests. The Bush administration erred in everything it undertook in Iraq, particularly once it became clear that it possessed no coherent plan for the post-Saddam Hussein phase. Trump also understands that the renewed launch of Iran’s expansionist project in the region began from Iraq. With the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, the balance of power in the region shifted. Likewise, with the fall of Iraq, Syria fell entirely into Iran’s hands, and Lebanon fell as well, where the “Islamic Republic” assassinated Rafik Hariri twenty-one years ago after determining that he stood as an obstacle to Iranian expansion, which fundamentally relies on investing in sectarian instincts and replacing state institutions with militias affiliated with the “Revolutionary Guard” in one Arab country after another. King Abdullah II had warned of the dangers of handing Iraq to Iran even before the assassination of Rafik Hariri in February 2005. In October 2004, he spoke of the “Shiite Crescent” in its political meaning, as a Persian crescent stretching from Tehran to Beirut via Baghdad and Damascus. The Jordanian monarch made these remarks in an interview with the American newspaper The Washington Post. His words revealed his foresight and his penetrating understanding of the consequences that would follow Iran’s seizure of Iraq. Since entering the White House in January 2016, Trump has focused on the Iranian threat. He tore up the agreement on the Iranian nuclear file that the Barack Obama administration had worked to achieve in 2015. This occurred in May 2018. In the early days of 2020, the United States eliminated Qassem Soleimani, commander of the “Quds Force,” the spearhead of Iran’s expansionist project. This took place shortly after Soleimani left Baghdad airport, having arrived from Beirut via Damascus airport, which had served as a secure transit point for the “Islamic Republic.” The elimination of Qassem Soleimani constituted a decisive turning point at the regional level. Nothing illustrates this more than the appearance of Hassan Nasrallah, the late Secretary-General of Hezbollah, when speaking about Soleimani’s character and the nature of the relationship that bound him to him at every level, including coordination between Iran and the party in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and in more than one Gulf state. Trump returned to the White House approximately a year and a month ago. He returned under new circumstances in which Iran had weakened and its expansionist project had become a thing of the past after the “Islamic Republic” lost all the wars it fought on the margins of the Gaza war. From this perspective, it appears entirely natural to pursue the campaign against Iran beginning with Iraq, which can no longer be permitted to remain a playground for the “Revolutionary Guard,” as Lebanon and Syria once were before Israel assassinated Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut’s southern suburbs and before Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow. It is not important to delve into the labyrinths surrounding the personality of Nouri al-Maliki or to attempt to measure the degree of Iranian influence over him. For Trump, what matters is Iran’s departure from Iraq. It is unnatural for America to remain trapped in the Iranian snare. In the end, Iraq has been governed since 2003 by individuals who returned to Baghdad atop American tanks. Donald Trump rejects this ingratitude with which the American war on Iraq was met twenty-three years ago. Now, after the Trump administration has placed Iran before the choice of surrender or exposure to a broad attack from sea and air, it appears logical for Trump to seek the recovery of Iraq if the objective is truly to bring Iran’s expansionist project to an end.

What maritime policy could – or should – Lebanon pursue as part of its development efforts? And what role might the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), which succeeded the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiated in Barcelona, play in this context? The Union for the Mediterranean has essentially adopted a “land-based” framework. Whether through political and security cooperation aimed at establishing a common area of peace and stability, economic and financial collaboration to build a zone of shared prosperity, or cultural and social initiatives to foster understanding between cultures and exchanges among civil societies, the ultimate goal remains the creation of a shared prosperity area within a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA). All of this unites the land. Yet the Mediterranean is a sea surrounded by land, not lands separated by a sea. Which maritime projects might be integrated into this process? Three criteria will be decisive in selecting and prioritizing the relevant themes: – The country must be able to advance to the implementation phase without any obstacles hindering the proposed momentum. – Prioritize sectors capable of creating a large number of jobs and offering genuine opportunities for growth and advancement, thereby promoting social mobility. – Prioritize projects based on the most urgent needs, while fostering dialogue and cooperation with partner states. Missions and Projects Beyond port and commercial functions, a state’s maritime responsibilities encompass a range of sovereign and security capabilities: monitoring maritime space, safeguarding of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), combatting illicit trafficking, conducting search and rescue operations at sea, and preventing pollution. These missions are strategic for national sovereignty, economic stability, and the protection of the population. 1 – Protection of the EEZ : Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic Zone spans roughly 22,700 km². Maritime delimitation agreements with Israel (2022) and Cyprus have clarified the legal framework – a prerequisite for effective monitoring. Oversight of the EEZ must be both effective and continuous. 2 – Surveillance and control of coastal areas : Lebanon’s 225 km coastline includes commercial and fishing ports, densely populated urban areas, and sensitive industrial and energy facilities. Coastal control is therefore both a security and civil-protection imperative. 3 – Combating illicit maritime trafficking : The State is responsible for tackling the smuggling of goods, drug and arms trafficking, and illegal maritime migration. 4 – Maritime rescue and navigation safety : Within its area of responsibility, Lebanon carries out search and rescue (SAR) operations at sea, primarily through the Lebanese navy and Civil Defense. This requires close coordination among the navy, port authorities, and emergency services. A fully operational maritime SAR center, meeting international standards, should also be established. 5 – Maritime pollution is primarily of terrestrial origin: the dumping of untreated wastewater, coastal landfills, urban runoff, industrial pollution, and accidental oil spills in ports. The potential development of offshore gas resources makes it essential to strengthen anti-pollution emergency plans, enhance land-based prevention measures, and ensure close coordination between civilian and military actors. 6 – Training in maritime professions : It is a vital component of national maritime capabilities. It determines the safety of navigation, the efficiency of port and logistics operations, the State’s credibility in carrying out its sovereign missions, and the future growth of the blue economy and offshore activities. It is also a source of intercommunal integration and job creation. Strategic Framework – Establish a national maritime surveillance framework (EEZ and coastline). – Enhance offshore patrol capabilities and aerial assets. – Create a national maritime SAR coordination center in line with international standards. – Build a structured and sustainable national capacity for pollution response. – Establish an Institute for maritime professions, bringing together civilian and military participants. – Make the sea a central pillar of the national sovereignty strategy and economic recovery plan. Priorities to Define Within this overarching maritime policy framework, the State should clearly and concretely set its priorities. 1 – Establish national maritime governance to ensure continuous and effective coordination among all civilian and military maritime actors. 2 – Implement a national maritime surveillance framework (EEZ and coastline) to guarantee the State’s effective sovereignty over its maritime domain. 3 – Intensify the fight against maritime trafficking and transnational crime, reducing the economic losses and security risks associated with such activities. 4 – Develop a national search and rescue (SAR) capability at sea, safeguarding human lives and fulfilling Lebanon’s international obligations. 5 – Build a national capacity to combat maritime pollution, preventing and managing pollution, particularly in light of potential offshore development. 6 – Establish a Lebanese Institute for maritime professions and ensure the availability of essential maritime skills. 7 – Make the sea central to the national economic recovery strategy; turn the maritime domain into a driver of sustainable development. Such a maritime project – already partially underway in Lebanon – fully aligns with the priorities of international partners: ensuring regional security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean; combatting transnational trafficking and organized crime; protecting human lives at sea; and safeguarding the marine environment. Designed as a civil–security cooperation program, in line with international law and Lebanon’s multilateral commitments, it adopts an approach that integrates governance, operational capabilities, training, sustainable development, job creation, and community integration. Such a Lebanese maritime strategy should be able to progress alongside the necessary revitalization of the Union for the Mediterranean… Read on the same topic: A Maritime Future for Lebanon?

Since the Arab Spring of 2011, Libya has not been undergoing some unfinished transition but has settled into a lasting state of political dissolution. Far from paving the way for a reconstruction process, the brutal disappearance of Muammar Gaddafi's regime, on the contrary, triggered a long sequence of fragmentation, where armed violence progressively replaced the state as the organizing principle of power, as in Sudan. This series offers a structural reading of the Libyan war as a stabilized and coherent system in itself, embedded in regional and international rivalries, and now capable of eliminating any political alternative that does not fit its logic. The notion of “two Libyas” frequently recurs in analyses of the Libyan case, serving as a metaphor for the country’s territorial fragmentation. Yet the formula is misleadingly imprecise, suggesting a seemingly clear-cut – even nearly symmetrical – political division between a West dominated by Tripoli and an East structured around Benghazi. Such a depiction, however, dangerously oversimplifies a far more troubling reality: Libya is not split between two competing sovereignties, but stripped of sovereignty altogether. The institutions that claim to embody it do not, in practice, govern. They survive by delegation, under armed protection, in a state of constant dependence on forces that are external to – or hold authority over – them. In the West, the Government of National Unity led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh – and recognized by the international community – exists within a kind of enduring legal fiction. It enjoys diplomatic recognition, formal access to Libya’s overseas assets, and a seat at the United Nations – yet such recognition does not give it any real capacity to enforce decisions across the territory it is supposed to govern. In Tripoli, to govern means to bargain incessantly with armed groups that control neighborhoods, roads and key institutions. The executive decides nothing. It survives by playing Scheherazade – negotiating its own reprieve day by day – operating through a loose coalition of civil and armed actors who remain autonomous on the ground (the Special Deterrence Forces, of Salafist persuasion; the Stability Support Apparatus, structured around local militia leaders; the Misrata factions; the Tripoli Brigades; and others). This perpetual bargaining has reduced the state to a hollow, procedural shell. Ministries operate only intermittently; public policies exist mostly on paper; budgets are swallowed up by informal redistribution mechanisms designed to preserve fragile armed equilibria. The Central Bank – often portrayed as the country’s last remaining backbone – has itself become the object of rival attempts at capture and cross-cutting pressures. In the East, a Relative Order In the East, sovereignty is no more secure, despite the appearance of military hierarchy. Khalifa Haftar’s authority rests on a patchwork of tribal loyalties, security structures and external support. It imposes a degree of order, but one that is military rather than institutional. It does not rest upon an autonomous administration, but upon a chain of command and a war economy. The claim to sovereignty there encounters a fundamental contradiction: how can a power so structurally dependent on external patrons for its survival exercise full sovereignty? Strategic decisions – on war, the economy, or diplomacy – are invariably shaped by the expectations and red lines of regional and international backers. Eastern Libya does not truly govern. At best, it manages its dependency. Unsurprisingly, the coexistence of these two poles produces no stabilizing equilibrium. On the contrary, it creates a system of mutual obstruction and contained – if persistent – disorder, all the more acute because neither camp is strong enough to enforce a lasting unification, nor weak enough to be sidelined. Libya thus settles into a configuration in which division itself becomes functional, enabling local actors to maintain their positions – and external actors to project influence without taking on the burden of any genuine state reconstruction. Oil, a Driver of Fragmentation This lack of genuine sovereignty is more evident in the management of resources. Rather than fostering national cohesion, oil has become one of the major drivers of fragmentation. Terminals, fields and pipelines are controlled – or blocked – according to local calculations, and production can be halted at any moment as a political lever. As for the revenues, when they do circulate, they serve to sustain patronage networks rather than any national project. The Libyan paradox is that the country possesses ample resources to finance its own reconstruction – yet remains structurally incapable of converting them into sovereignty. In this setup, rent does not strenghten the state; it paradoxically perpetuates its dispersion, a dynamic reinforced by the institutional architecture itself. Governments succeed one another, agreements pile up, dialogue processes multiply – each presented as a decisive step towards reunification – yet, in reality, none alters the balance of power on the ground. Libyan institutions are nothing more than ghostly, hollow transit points where promises made on all sides are never fulfilled. In this landscape of desolation, the very notion of legitimacy has lost any operative meaning. Electoral legitimacy is invoked, only to be neutralized; revolutionary legitimacy is exhausted; security-based legitimacy is contested. What remains in practice are partial, local and provisional claims to authority, anchored above all in capacities for coercion. Its corollary – sovereignty, understood as the ability to decide and to compel within a given territory – dissolves amid this proliferation of competing sources of power. In Libya, authority no longer coheres; it fragments, negotiates and endures, but rarely governs. A Festering Stalemate Territorial fragmentation is not frozen in place. It is fluid, adaptable – perhaps even reversible in the short term – yet, like the wider dynamic, persistent in its logic. Zones pass from one authority to another without altering the overall structure of the conflict. Cities change hands, alliances are reshuffled, yet the absence of a unifying center remains the constant. It is precisely this fluidity that makes the Libyan predicament so resistant to attempts at resolution. There is no stable front line on which a lasting ceasefire could be imposed, nor is there any single actor capable of bringing the entire country into a binding political process. Every initiative runs up against a simple reality: no one can commit everyone, and everyone can obstruct anyone. External actors are, of course, accused of fueling division. It is true. Yet in truth they merely exploit an existing configuration – backing one camp, then another, and adjusting their level of engagement, without ever making a serious attempt to restore a sovereignty they consider unrealistic in the short term. Libya thus becomes a space to be managed – and, indeed, another festering sore within this part of Africa. As for solutions… The civilian population finds itself trapped in a double bind. On the one hand, it depends on weak institutions for essential services; on the other, it lives under the constant pressure of armed groups. In a context where politics has withered as a collective horizon, it is hardly surprising that exile becomes a personal strategy of survival. To speak of “two Libyas” is to miss the point entirely. A more accurate description would be of a country administered in pieces, where the state is little more than cardboard, sovereignty a hollow claim, and war an inexorable curse. This is neither a temporary nor accidental arrangement, but the product of a decade of compromises, patchwork fixes, and misguided rational calculations. As long as this architecture remains unchallenged, any reunification will be purely formal. Libya may change governments, sign new agreements, or convene yet another conference – but it will not regain genuine sovereignty as long as violence remains the gateway to power, and dependence on external actors its principal mode of operation. Next article: Libya as a Regional Festering Sore Read on the same topic: – 2011, Libya in the post-state era (1/5) – The Libyan Conflict: An Excessive 'Militiafication' of Politics (2/5)

Since the Arab Spring of 2011, Libya has not been undergoing some unfinished transition, but has settled into a lasting state of political dissolution. Far from paving the way for a reconstruction process, the brutal disappearance of Muammar Gaddafi's regime, on the contrary, triggered a long sequence of fragmentation, where armed violence progressively replaced the state as the organizing principle of power, as in Sudan. This series offers a structural reading of the Libyan war as a stabilized and coherent system in itself, embedded in regional and international rivalries, and now capable of eliminating any political alternative that does not fit its logic. Considering the 'militiafication' of Libya as the result of an accidental post-2011 malfunction is at least a hazardous initial premise. The process of normalizing militias has become a kind of structuring logic of the post-Gaddafi 'system.' From the moment the state collapsed without a succession mechanism, armed violence ceased to be just another tool, progressively establishing itself as the central driver of politics. And this shift, far from being caused by a sudden break, settled in insidiously, through successive slips, at the pace of tactical compromises presented as temporary and which, along the way, became irreversible. In the aftermath of Muammar Gaddafi's fall, the revolutionary brigades were initially perceived as transitional security forces, tasked with filling a void while awaiting the reconstitution of national institutions. But this fiction of 'armed transition' rested on the erroneous assumption that violence would agree to disappear on its own once its initial function was accomplished. Not at all! Violence was not instrumentalized by politics; rather, it slowly and inexorably substituted it. Thus, the militias were never demobilized. And for good reason: no authority was able to compel them to do so. Very quickly, they understood that their existence depended neither on legality nor international recognition, but on their ability to control territories, infrastructures, and flows, through military control, obviously, but also economic, social - and sometimes even symbolic control. A militia's authority over a piece of territory - a neighborhood, a port, a ministry, or a bank - is pernicious par excellence, insofar as it makes any governance impossible without it. This process profoundly transformed the nature of power, as the question was no longer who governs... Power became synonymous with blocking and torpedoing, insofar as it aims to prevent others from governing without its consent. In this sense, politics was reduced to a game of armed veto, with each significant actor possessing sufficient capacity for obstruction to hinder any attempt to centralize authority. “Political entrepreneurs” The direct consequence of this configuration has been the devaluation of institutions. Successive governments, whether based in Tripoli or elsewhere, have no longer been evaluated on their capacity to administer, but on their ability to deal with prevalent armed groups. The state budget has become an instrument of co-optation, ministerial posts bargaining chips, and legitimacy has withered in favor of the brutal realism of power relations. Thus, militias have ceased to be peripheral actors to become, in a way, 'political entrepreneurs,' developing rational strategies, investing in alliances, and diversifying their sources of income. The control of migration routes, trafficking, oil installations, or public markets is today the economic 'essence' of Libyan politics, built on the vestiges of a continuously vampirized state reduced to a legal fiction, a 'cash cow,' and a trinket for legitimizing parastatal relations with the outside. Textbook 'militiaism,' in other words. textbook , in other words. Consequently, militias have no interest in fully rebuilding the state apparatus, since a functional state would reintroduce rules, hierarchy, predictability. Meaning. Law. Conversely, a weak, fragmented, permanently negotiable state maximizes their room for maneuver at will. A windfall. Managing an unstable balance Amidst this militia order that has established itself through disorder, governing in Libya now amounts to managing an unstable balance between competing armed groups, each capable of tipping the situation through targeted escalation. And it is according to this logic that the emergence of military figures whose leitmotif is to 'restore order,' purportedly, should be explained. Khalifa Haftar is the perfect expression of the excrescences generated by chaos. His rise to power rests entirely on the promise of a regained pseudo-verticality. However, this promise relies on the same mechanisms it claims to overcome: armed loyalties, external support, war economy, etc. Failing to dismantle 'militiafication,' Haftar simply seeks to centralize it under his own authority. And the attempt partially fails because it collides with other militias that are just as rational, just as locally entrenched, and just as externally supported. The war in Tripoli, in 2019-2020, which produced neither a lasting victor nor state reconstruction, illustrates the impasse of the 'Haftar approach,' in the sense that it constitutes proof of the failure of military force as an instrument for refounding the political order. An adjustment variable The 'militiafication' also has a significant deep social effect: it redefines local hierarchies, values the capacity for violence, and marginalizes civilian elites. Unarmed political actors are thus relegated to the role of secondary mediators or symbolic figures, and their room for action depends entirely on their ability to lean on an armed force, even at the cost of major concessions. In such a landscape of desolation, the civilian population becomes an adjustment variable. Periods of calm do not correspond to pacification processes, but to temporary balances between armed groups. War is never far; it is suspended, never resolved, and this permanent suspension produces a form of normalization of violence, which becomes predictable, integrated into calculations, and accepted as an insurmountable horizon. The only horizon of war is war, war, and again war. The 'militiafication' of Libyan politics is not a fleeting pathology, but the logical result of a precise historical sequence, in this case, the destruction of the state without succession, followed by an implicit delegation of coercion to local actors. Once this threshold is crossed, returning becomes extremely costly. Disarming a militia does not only mean taking away its weapons. The current example of Hezbollah in Lebanon is the most striking proof of this. It also means taking away its role, its income, its social position, and sometimes even its identity. This explains why all attempts at reintegration, disarmament, or security reform fail. 'Militiafication' is no longer a technical problem since it has established itself as a total political fact. And to downplay its importance is to postpone the solution indefinitely, and infinitely prolong Libya's agony. The problem is not an excess of militias stricto sensu , but the absence of a political order capable of rendering them obsolete, useless, laughable. And as long as this order is not rethought from its roots, violence will continue to be the pivot of the system through self-generation. Next article: 'Two Libyas' and an elusive sovereignty Read on the same topic: 2011, Libya in the post-state era