Articles

We have long lived under the shadow of the imagined power of Iranian propaganda — or let us say, the propaganda of the Axis of Resistance — which had made Iran into a great, cohesive, and untouchable power. Events have shown that there is a vast gulf between actual power and narrative power. This had already happened with Hezbollah: many had believed in the image of its absolute supremacy. Iran deceived us, through its followers and its media army — disguised television channels, paid journalists, digital influencers of every kind, and others — by propagating its fictional narrative about: the image of technological supremacy, and the image of powerful allies who support it (China, Russia), thus fashioning in public opinion the image of an "unbreakable axis." Iran had forgotten that, in the international system, alliances are not ideological but transactional. And that China and Russia act according to their own calculations, not according to the desires of Iran's rulers with their revolutionary ideology. Iran's policies had succeeded in the past, when it was betting on buying time, deferring deadlines, manipulating its adversaries, evading responsibility for the crimes committed by its proxy arms, and making promises and pledges only to renege on them. Iran had forgotten that it would never have been able to continue with these policies had they not, in some way, suited American and Israeli policy. The question that imposes itself: is Iran truly a state? If we take the classical definition of the state — monopoly on violence, centralization of decision-making, sovereignty over territory —, Iran is a state of complete structure. But if we take the definition of the modern state as a rational-bureaucratic institution with a centralized decision-making process subject to accountability, whose purpose is to secure the interests of its citizens, then the matter is different and complex. If we invoke Max Weber's analysis of the monopoly on legitimate violence, we find that Iran, as a state, monopolizes violence, but that legitimacy within it is divided between: republican institutions, accompanied by a revolutionary and supra-constitutional structure (the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij...), meaning that the regime carries two natures: State + Revolution. And this is what generates a permanent tension between the two. And then, when revolutions transform into states, they confront a dilemma: to remain a "permanent revolution" or to become a "normal state"? The Iranian regime has not resolved this question since 1979. It employs the discourse of the state, then behaves like a transnational movement. From here arises the resemblance of the regime's behavior to that of its party: not because Iran is not a state, but because it keeps the doctrinal element above the logic of the state, and the protection of the regime is the "most obligatory of obligations." The state says: we are a sovereign entity; but the Revolution says: we are a project that transcends borders. This duality prevents complete stability. What Iran practices in its dealings with its surroundings and the world is a form of guerrilla warfare equipped with ballistic missiles, conducted through proxies distributed across the countries of the region, and based on the conduct of "asymmetric warfare." This is the logic of revolutionary movements. For the classical state responds directly, through its army, within clear equations. The proxy model, by contrast, generates a deliberate fog that renders it capable of disavowing its actions. But fog is a double-edged weapon: when it is pierced, it turns into confusion within the leadership and contradiction in the messages. In addition to all of this, Iran has turned a blind eye to its own interior and its needs. Many analyses of Iran focus on missiles and ideological alliances, in total disregard of the Iranian interior, its divisions and its peoples, the rebellion of women, the aspirations of a different young generation, economic exhaustion, and a shaken legitimacy. A powerful state is measured not only by its arsenal, but by its capacity to integrate its society. The historical narrative has turned into a burden, transformed from a resource into a constraint in which the regime has imprisoned itself. The historical narrative granted the regime meaning, allowed for continuity, and preserved its religious-sectarian identity, through recourse to perpetual mobilization. But it was transformed over time into a constraint, because it prevented any reassessment, treated every retreat as treason, and proceeded to sanctify its symbols and policies, elevating them above lived reality, instead of subjecting them to debate and reassessment according to the needs of society. Thus the Revolution has turned into a burden that Iranian society can no longer bear. And the decision has been taken to dispense with the services of this regime.

The initiative taken by Hezbollah on the night of March 1 st to March 2 to reactivate the South Lebanon front, presumably at the request of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, will it lead to a return of Israeli occupation in part of the country's southern region? This question was acutely raised on Tuesday, March 3, 2026, in light of the announcement by Israeli Defense Minister, Israel Katz, of the Hebrew State's decision to "take control of additional areas" in South Lebanon "to protect border communities." Clearly, the Israeli army will advance into Lebanese territory and occupy new sectors that will be added to the five strategic positions from which the IDF had not withdrawn after the implementation of the ceasefire agreed upon in November 2024. This new partial occupation of new territories near the border between the two countries could have two explanations. It could be the prelude to the establishment of a buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel to further secure the border and northern Israel. The question would then be to know what the extent and depth of this "security zone" could be, and what political consequences this occupation could have on bilateral negotiations. Would the Hebrew State take advantage of this advance into Lebanese territory to impose a peace agreement or at least a binding security arrangement? Some observers even go so far as to envision the occupation of much larger portions of territory than a buffer zone, alluding in this regard to a possible scenario similar to that of 1982. Proponents of this thesis rely on repeated calls launched by the Israeli army to the inhabitants of the South to evacuate their villages as soon as possible. However, a much less ambitious hypothesis, politically, is put forward in light of the current context. The new positions occupied by Israel could serve to facilitate targeted and meticulously planned operations that commando units would carry out deeper into Lebanese territory. It will therefore be necessary to wait a few days to learn more about the true intentions of the Netanyahu cabinet. Immediately, the Lebanese army carried out a tactical withdrawal from about twenty positions not far from the border with Israel. In any event, while awaiting the true intentions of Tel Aviv to become clear, the inhabitants of South Lebanon are once again suffering the anguish of forced exodus, while Israeli aviation continued on Tuesday, for the fourth consecutive day, to intermittently bomb the southern suburbs of Beirut as well as many villages in the southern regions. In the afternoon, a raid targeted a "Islamic Jihad" headquarters in Saida. Intensive raids against Tehran In Iran, Israeli aviation announced that it had carried out the ninth wave of air attacks against the centers and infrastructure of the Mullahs' regime in Tehran on Tuesday. Intensive raids were thus carried out against several sectors of the capital, which was covered in a thick cloud of black smoke by late afternoon. One of these raids notably targeted the building where the 88 experts called to elect the new Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic were supposed to meet. The building was completely destroyed. Furthermore, an airstrike killed the new Iranian Defense Minister who had succeeded the former Defense Minister two days earlier, who had been killed on February 28 during the first wave of raids against the capital. This first wave had allowed the Hebrew State's air force to neutralize Iranian air defenses and thus ensure total control of the airspace over the Tehran region. It should also be noted that missile firings continued on Tuesday against several Gulf countries. The US embassy headquarters in Riyadh was notably hit by two missiles, which caused only minor material damage. In the early evening, a strong explosion was heard in Dubai. This Iranian shelling spared no Gulf country and even encompassed the Sultanate of Oman, which had nonetheless redoubled its efforts in recent years to serve as a mediator between the Islamic Republic and the West. The intensification of missile fire towards the Gulf has significantly deteriorated relations between the monarchies and the Islamic Republic. Over the past forty-eight hours, several Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman, have adopted an openly hostile, aggressive, and firm discourse towards Tehran, which will undoubtedly have a serious impact on the future face of the Middle East.

The least that can be said about dragging Lebanon into the war targeting the “Islamic Republic” of Iran is that it constitutes a crime against the country and against the people of the South in particular. It appears that the aim is to finish off Lebanon at the very moment the United States, in coordination with Israel, has decided to rid itself of the Iranian regime. What is the point of binding Lebanon's fate to that of a regime in Iran that wants to commit suicide? What is to be done when the Israeli occupation continues to expand in the South, the number of displaced persons keeps rising, and even parts of the Bekaa are affected? Is the underlying Iranian demand to push Lebanon into an internal crisis from which it can never escape, by turning the South of the country into another Gaza? More important than all of this: can Lebanon avoid the catastrophe into which Hezbollah has plunged it, or find a way out? There are currently approximately 110,000 displaced persons from among the inhabitants of the South, while around 30 villages have been destroyed. Hezbollah appears to have decided to raise that number to some 350,000, for spurious reasons that have nothing whatsoever to do with Lebanon. In the end, what does the “Islamic Republic” want other than to drag Lebanon down with it, now that it has become clear that the regime governing it is no longer viable? Hezbollah's decision — an order that came from Tehran — comes in the wake of the greatest upheaval the entire region has witnessed since 1979, the year Iran's nature was transformed by its conversion into an “Islamic Republic” and by the redefinition of its regional role. This decision, suicidal in character, also arrives as the contours of a new regional balance begin to take shape, born from the womb of the Gaza war that began on October 7, 2023 — a war that the 'Islamic Republic' sought to exploit, and failed, through its armed proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. The problem Hezbollah faces at present is its refusal to learn from the experience of the “Gaza support war”, which ended as it ended. It waged that war and suffered enormous losses, including the elimination of its leadership and the enabling of Israel to return to occupying Lebanese territory. The Party refuses to draw lessons from that war and from the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, killed in the manner in which he was killed. It remains unclear how a party — which is nothing more than a sectarian militia bound to a foreign power — can embark on a new war without taking into account that its outcome is known in advance. It is a mystery with no explanation other than this: the Revolutionary Guard is pushing Hezbollah into committing suicide alongside it. It is clear that the Party is now under Iran's full control and is, in effect, merely a brigade of the Revolutionary Guard — nothing more. Before Hezbollah fired its rockets from southern Lebanon, the Lebanese state received clear warnings from Israel. The substance of those warnings was that Lebanon's entry into the war Iran is waging would have catastrophic consequences for the country. Despite this warning, which was conveyed to the Party, Hezbollah surprised the Lebanese by firing rockets from southern Lebanon… There is no explanation for what happened other than the Lebanese state's inability to exercise its authority over Hezbollah. The state still fears the Party. Will the Council of Ministers' decision — characterizing the Party's security and military activities as 'a breach of the law' — represent a major turning point on the Lebanese scene and a break from the logic that had imposed the ill-omened Cairo Agreement of 1969? Will it effectively break the barrier of fear toward a Party that has done nothing since its founding but systematically destroy Lebanon and the institutions of the Lebanese state, one after another? The Lebanese state is expected to demonstrate that it can implement the Council of Ministers' decision, in order to turn its attention to addressing the consequences of the catastrophe that has befallen the country. In reality, the Lebanese state — now facing a genuine new test — is dealing with a party that has made servitude to Iran its vocation, and has placed the interests of the “Islamic Republic” above those of Lebanon, and indeed above those of the Shia community itself. It is a party that sees in the death of Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei the death of its own leader. Simply put, it is difficult to deal with a party that regards suicide as a goal in itself and that views Lebanon as a component of the “Islamic Republic” led by the wali al-faqih . Very well. Hezbollah wants to commit suicide. It wants Lebanon to commit suicide alongside it, and to share the fate of the “Islamic Republic”. There is no room for the language of reason with those who wish to commit suicide. It is useful, for Lebanon, to define what it truly wants. It is useful to disengage from the logic of suicide — nothing more… and the time has come!

I stepped into Nejmeh Square as a daughter returned to trace the features of a face long hidden behind rusted locks, barbed wire, and decisions that weighed upon the hearts of the people. I visit it for the second time since it had been closed in my face — closed in our faces, for years, those of us who once believed that squares were created to belong to us, and that cities only lock themselves in old books when historians write of sieges and wars. For long years, Nejmeh Square remained a name we pronounced with caution, gesturing toward it the way one gestures toward a wound that has not healed. It was shut by those who believed they possessed its keys, and the keys of those within it; our steps were confiscated, and our reunion with its corners — which know the sound of our footsteps better than the "guards" ever could — was indefinitely postponed. I visit it as a tourist — I, daughter of this land who had chosen to stay when leaving was easier than explaining why one stays. I chose to remain, not out of heroism or defiance, but because my roots ran too deep to be torn out by a breaking news alert or a prolonged power cut. I walk today among its elegant buildings alongside relatives whose father exile carried into the arms of "the benevolent mother," where they were born. The letter ghain dominates their accent. They never pronounced the language of the dâd as we do, and their memory was not shaped to the rhythm of generators or the calls of street vendors. They looked around with a tourist's wonder, while I looked with the wonder of someone seeing her own city from the outside. We wander together, step by step, and a landmark, a few stones that remained witnesses to ages and civilizations that passed over this land, will sometimes stop us. I explain how names succeeded one another upon the city as seasons succeed one another, how Beirut was once a port of books, once an arena of cannons, once a stage for dreams larger than its modest dimensions. In my French laced with a few words of English, I try to find the words that might compress a history that resists compression. I search my memory for neutral sentences, for a narrative that wounds no one and betrays no one, and I find myself stumbling between nostalgia and rage. Beirut was empty in a way that unsettles the heart. Not empty of people, but empty of the noise that used to fill it with meaning. Its alleyways that once hummed with voices seemed to be holding their breath, and the gleaming facades reflected a grey sky with no bottom. It is empty, except for what remains in my memory: from our repeated uprisings, with which we filled the streets with chanting and hope, to the August 4th explosion whose blast lingers still in the buildings, in the stained glass of churches, in the shops belted by iron doors half-closed. Every corner here carries an invisible trace: a small crack in a wall, or the shadow of a window whose glass will never again be what it was. I walked and saw, simultaneously, two superimposed images: the image of the city as it stands before me, and its image as it lived within me. In my memory, it was crowned with laughter that defied the weariness of days. The voice of music used to slip through narrow balconies, mingling sometimes with live gunfire, and we could not tell whether it was celebration or warning. Tear gas was part of our vocabulary, just as love was part of our small courage. I witnessed on its steps fleeting encounters, whispered confessions, and partings made in haste for fear of a breaking news alert. How do I describe to them what Beirut means to its children? How do I explain an obvious duality: a heavy exile and a restless longing? Those of us who live in it and yet sometimes feel like strangers to it, as though it were a city administered from behind thick glass we cannot reach. And at the same time, we cannot bear the thought of leaving it, because it inhabits us like the salt of the sea. I tell them that Beirut is not merely elegant buildings and a paved square, but a living memory and an open wound. In those moments, I felt that I was the real tourist. I was discovering my city as if meeting it again for the first time. Every corner pushed me toward the question: is this the city I knew, or a quieter version, less noisy, more tired? I searched the faces for a trace of what had been, for a gleam resembling the gleam I had known when we believed that tomorrow was possible. I remembered a distant day when I had believed we were as close as we would ever come to possessing this place. Then came the years when doors shut and the square became a distant image. Today, crossing it without barriers, I understood that a place is not possessed — it is lived. And that cities do not return as they were. I felt that this city, despite all it had been through, had not lost its capacity for waiting. I did not explain all of this to them. I contented myself with walking among them as a tourist seeing a city not without beauty, a city waiting to live again. I smiled when they took photographs, and pointed to the small details that the passing stranger might overlook. And within me, I hoped to return a third time — not as a tourist, but as a woman reconciled with her city, however long the waiting. We left the square. I turned back toward it the way one turns back toward an old house in which one has lived for a long time. I did not bid it farewell, because farewell implies an ending — and I understood that Beirut is a beginning that repeats itself, that has mastered the art of falling and rising, and that leaves to its children the task of loving it or of leaving it behind.

On the third day of the US-Israeli offensive against the Iranian regime (the joint operation "Roar of the Lions"), developments accelerated on the military front and spread to Lebanon. During the night of Sunday, March 1st, to Monday, March 2nd, and throughout Monday, the Lebanese front erupted in violence following missile attacks launched by Hezbollah against northern Israel, particularly the Haifa region. Brazenly disregarding the clear position of almost all local political factions and, above all, the central government, which explicitly warned the pro-Iranian party against any attempt to become involved in the Iranian conflict, Hezbollah nevertheless made the suicidal decision to drag Lebanon into this war (yet another pointless war) to avenge the death of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, killed last Saturday, February 28, during the first Israeli airstrike in Tehran. The reaction to this reactivation of the South Lebanon front was swift. Less than an hour after the missile strikes, Israel launched intense airstrikes, along with a naval bombardment, against the southern suburbs of Beirut and some towns in the southern part of the country. One of these raids targeted MP Mohammed Raad, head of Hezbollah's parliamentary bloc and deputy secretary-general of the party. This attack also left around thirty people dead. At the same time, the Israeli army published a list of some fifty villages in South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, emphasizing that residents should evacuate these localities. This call caused massive traffic jams on the outskirts of the southern suburbs and on the roads of South Lebanon throughout Sunday night and into Monday morning. On Monday morning and afternoon, the raids against the suburbs and villages of South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley continued. Israel announced that it had killed two senior Hezbollah officials, including the head of intelligence. The Shiite party's decision to become involved in the Iranian conflict has provoked an outcry in political circles, particularly within the government. President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam explicitly condemned Hezbollah's behavior, stressing that it was intolerable for Lebanon to be drawn into a war that did not concern it. The Government and Berri's Position On Monday morning, the Council of Ministers held an extraordinary marathon meeting at the Baabda Palace, at the end of which Mr. Salam read an official statement indicating that the government now considers Hezbollah's military and security actions "illegal" and "prohibited." The statement specifies that the Lebanese army has been tasked with taking all necessary measures to implement this decision, particularly regarding the surrender of the pro-Iranian group's weapons to the state and the arrest of violators. Speaking out against any missile or drone launches toward Israel, the government called on Hezbollah to henceforth limit its actions to purely political matters. This decision by the Council of Ministers clearly constitutes a fundamental turning point, as it formally recognizes the illegality of Hezbollah's military apparatus and, consequently, officially strips the Shiite party of the status of "resistance movement" that it has stubbornly claimed for itself and, above all, imposed on the Lebanese authorities for decades. In this context, it should be noted that, according to sources close to the Speaker of Parliament and leader of the Amal Movement, Nabif Berri, he has supported the state's position regarding the now illegal nature of Hezbollah's militia. These same sources assert that, in light of recent developments, Mr. Berri has decided to withdraw the political support he had been providing to the pro-Iranian group. If this information is confirmed, it would imply a break, or at the very least a chill, between Amal and Hezbollah. It is worth recalling in this regard that in the 1980s, a veritable war, which lasted for several months, pitted the two Shiite factions against each other. It ended in a defeat for the Amal movement, which has since aligned itself politically with the pro-Iranian party. If it is confirmed that Mr. Berry supports the Council of Ministers' decision to deem Hezbollah's military and security actions illegal, this would constitute a severe blow to the alliance between the two Shiite factions, an alliance that has hampered Lebanese political life since the late 1980s. This turning point would be all the more significant as it would occur within the context of the current decline of the Iranian mullahs' "empire" under the blows ofof the American-Israeli offensive (codenamed "Roar of the Lions"). American and British Positions Regarding the progress of Operation "Roar of the Lions," American and Israeli aircraft continued their intensive raids on Monday against Iranian military positions, including air defense systems and missile depots and launch sites. After securing and fully controlling Tehran's airspace, the Israeli Air Force gained control of western Iran. This air superiority allows the two allies to systematically destroy Iranian missile stockpiles. At the same time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continued its intermittent missile strikes against Gulf countries, even reaching the British base in Cyprus. On the political front, President Donald Trump indicated in an interview with a US newspaper that he did not rule out sending ground troops "if necessary." The White House chief also specified that the operation was ahead of schedule thanks to the elimination of several high-ranking Iranian officials in the first hours of the offensive. He further indicated that "the main operation has not yet been launched." For his part, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth outlined the objectives and scope of the offensive against Iran during a meeting with US military officers and soldiers. Mr. Hegseth explained that Iran's ballistic missile arsenal and the regime's nuclear program posed a real danger to the United States and its allies. The US Secretary emphasized the need to bring down the regime in Tehran. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer echoed this sentiment, stressing the need to destroy Iran's missile stockpiles and launch sites. He indicated in this context that his government had given a favorable response to the American request to use British bases to launch raids against Iranian military positions.

The dramatic circumstances the country is experiencing undoubtedly require the presence of statesmen! Lebanon has known them, and we miss them, especially since their number is limited. Certainly, a statesman must be in power to prove himself, and he can only assert himself in significant circumstances. Thus, since 1943, certain presidents of the Republic have risen to the occasion as head of state in the face of events. They have risen to the occasion either through their vision or through concrete decisions that have spared the country from catastrophe. They have also demonstrated their competence by firmly adhering to the Constitution and the laws in force, through force, diplomacy, or a wise and firm policy. Above all, they have assumed their responsibilities regarding the defense of the sovereign, independent state. Current events demand that those in positions of responsibility within the executive branch (for the legislative branch, one must refer to Mr. Nabih Berri) demonstrate that they are truly statesmen and not mere civil servants or administrators. There are statesmen in the government. The time has come for them to assert themselves and spare the Lebanese people the worst.