The War of the Two Narratives, or “The Sunni Hour Has Struck”

"Enough is enough!" cried three countries that had come together in Mecca on August 7th. Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia — three complementary powers — have just formed a Sunni NATO, one that other states seeking military protection or a diplomatic umbrella would inevitably join.

The announcement of this pact naturally came like a thunderclap. And simply following the Saudi press over recent days, one can detect a clear shift in tone toward the mullahs in Tehran. Gone are the days when Riyadh, the Saudi capital, swallowed its pride, stoically absorbed Iranian provocations, and opted for peaceful resolution of conflicts with its aggressors.

The ultimate argument!

Tehran could not have continued down this malicious and arrogant path toward its neighbors — the Arab states — were it not for the Palestinian cause it championed so fervently, a sacred cause that long granted it a degree of immunity. For it was indeed Iran and its proxy Hezbollah that tirelessly kept up the struggle against Israel and its expansionist agenda. Who can deny this, when the Arab Sunni states did nothing but rack up defeats on the ground — in 1948, 1956, 1967, and so on? Indeed, those same states would have been more than happy to normalize relations with Tel Aviv, had the Israeli capital been willing to make a few concessions — enough, at least, to give them a face-saving way out.

Standing in sharp contrast is the Shiite world, in Iran as in the Bilad ash-Sham. Was not Hassan Nasrallah hailed in 2006 as a new Saladin by an "Arab street" stretching from Mesopotamia to the Atlantic Ocean? Had he not supposedly forced the Israeli army to retreat? It was he, and no one else, who had held Islam's head high. And in doing so, by shedding the blood of his fighters, he was writing a counter-narrative that rehabilitated his Shiite community.

The Crusades narrative and the discourse of "muqawama"

Medieval history is never far from the memory of our peoples. It is worth recalling that the Arab mainstream tradition, drawing on the chroniclers Ibn al-Athir, Ibn al-Qalanisi, and Ibn al-ʿArabi, holds the Shiite Fatimids responsible for the fall of the Holy Land and Jerusalem into the hands of the Crusaders at the end of the 11th century (1). This deeply rooted tradition implicitly accuses the Fatimids of having sought to exploit the Frankish invasion to weaken the Seljuk Turks (2). Along the same lines, these three historians were quick to point out that it was the Sunni response — led by figures such as Zengi, Nur al-Din, Saladin, and ultimately the Mamluks — that would bring down the last Frankish strongholds in the 13th century and return them to Islam.

It was this narrative that would come to dominate, carried for four centuries by Ottoman ideology and then by Arab nationalism as a unifying story — until the day Khomeinism burst onto the Middle Eastern stage and proclaimed that Israel must be wiped from the face of the earth. The wilayat al-faqih would wage a relentless struggle against Israel, punctuated by certain successes, and never stop trumpeting them.

Two rival narratives, then — the latter seeking to refute the former. Against a less-than-glorious past, "political Fatimism" (al-Fatimiya al-siyassiya) could now hold up a radiant present woven from heroism and sacrifice. And Hezbollah, backed by the Iranian authorities, would make it their leitmotif across the airwaves.

A pact in Mecca! Yes — but what can be made of it?

The Arab street should always be taken seriously, especially since it is prone to self-delusion. Right now, it must be feeling encouraged by a Sunni resurgence, given that since Abdel Nasser, Yasser Arafat, and Saddam Hussein, it has lacked a leader capable of galvanizing the masses. The image of a hero has been sorely missing, while the Shia branch could point to a long list of martyrs for the cause, from Qassem Soleimani to Hassan Nasrallah.

And so, this Sunni street—known for its passion—has experienced a loss of momentum over the decades. Then came August 7th, when a new balance of power began to take shape in Mecca, now that Syria has broken free from the axis of resistance and Egypt has remained on the sidelines, perhaps waiting to see how things unfold.

But will a pact signed in Mecca, the holiest city in Islam, prove to be nothing more than a dead letter, like so many short-lived alliances that have dotted our contemporary history? Before answering that question, one observer pointed out that this is not about the reconstitution of a "religious Sunni front, but rather the reassertion of Sunni national powers seeking to reclaim the strategic initiative against Iran"—as well as against Israel.

Granted, if everything goes as planned, we will witness an exercise in "re-confessionalization," though one that will remain purely geopolitical in nature. For even if Sunnism provides the historical and sociological depth underpinning this alliance of sovereign states, the well-understood interests of those states will always take precedence over religious ideology and the solidarity it demands.

So what should we expect? Most likely, yet another retelling of the same age-old discord between the champions of Sunni orthodoxy and those of Shia dissent! (3)

1- An accusation that, on reflection, should be tempered.

2- On the eve of the Crusaders' arrival, a fierce struggle for dominance over the Arab-Islamic world was already unfolding between the Sunni Seljuks and the Shia Fatimids.

3- Hichem Djaït, La grande discorde, Religion et politique dans l'Islam des origines, Gallimard, 1989.