The big stick and the deterrent effect !

What if Iran were to yield in the face of the massive deployment of American force? What if it chose not to take up the challenge posed by the U.S. fleet now anchoring in what it considers its own waters, those of the Persian Gulf? It would lose face—after having so recently strutted and solemnly proclaimed that it controlled four Arab capitals!

Let us not be mistaken: Tehran is now faced with a choice between war and compromise—that is, a retreat that would bring back into fashion the much-criticized gunboat diplomacy, so often denounced in academic circles. This so-called diplomacy, which predates the First World War, consisted of firing from the sea at the coasts of a country deemed to have something to answer for, usually unpaid financial debts.

To make an adversary see reason, is it not preferable to resort to bluff or warning shots—that is, a threat not followed by execution—rather than to a military engagement that would be measured in casualties and large-scale destruction? This is precisely the dilemma confronting the ayatollahs today: to make amends, submit, attempt to save face—or otherwise be wiped off the map.

Historical precedents

The Americans did not invent the use of the “big stick.” In 1793, during the second partition of Poland, Catherine II of Russia surrounded the seat of the Polish Diet. With her cannons trained on the assembly, she imposed her will by force. “The vote was extorted in a silence of terror, as the occupation made any opposition impossible,” we are told. This coercive practice likely did not escape the proponents of the Monroe Doctrine in the United States, and President Theodore Roosevelt could declare, on two occasions in 1904 and 1905, that—even reluctantly—in clear cases of injustice or impotence, the United States had the right to exercise an “international police power.”

The New Jersey and the Weinberger Doctrine

To be sure, Donald Trump is not about to commit troops to support Iranian demonstrators demanding bread and freedom. That is the least of his concerns. In reality, his objectives are limited to settling the issues of nuclear weapons, missiles, and Iran’s support for proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis—and, behind the scenes, to controlling China’s hydrocarbon supply.

Nevertheless, we will not witness this time, as in 1984 off the coast of Beirut, a repeat of the pitiful retreat of the New Jersey. In this case, the Weinberger Doctrine applies—and it is unequivocal: if American troops are to be deployed only as a last resort, then “they must be deployed without reservation and with the clear intention of winning—or not deployed at all.”

Moreover, it is understood that the Iranian regime, despite its capacity for disruption, is in no position to withstand an assault by combined American-Israeli forces. It will have to yield, unless it is suicidal. At the end of the ordeal, if it concedes on the nuclear issue or any other point, it will lose its swagger—and might even have to eat humble pie to remain in power.

This is where the whimsical Donald Trump can step in and settle for a purely symbolic success—that is, a cheap triumph he can loudly proclaim at will. Hence the concern expressed by Saudi Defense, Minister Khalid bin Salman, who fears that the ayatollahs’ regime might actually emerge strengthened if the United States refrains from going on the offensive.

For there is no reason to declare victory if there is no regime change in Tehran. What is the point in taking the same people only to start all over again?

In short, without military intervention, Iran will once again have won the round.