

Thirty-nine days into the war, the question that now hangs over the Middle East is no longer whether the conflict will reshape Iran.
It already has.
The real question is whether we are approaching the moment when the war moves from its destructive phase into its political phase — the moment when wars historically reach their climax and the foundations of the post-war order begin to emerge.
Every war follows a brutal but recognizable trajectory.
First comes shock.
Then escalation.
Then devastation.
And finally — when the human, economic, and political costs become unbearable — the search for a new equilibrium begins.
After nearly six weeks of sustained military operations, the war between Iran, the United States, Israel and their respective allies appears to be entering precisely that stage.
The signals are becoming difficult to ignore.
The toll of the conflict has been immense.
Across Iran, large portions of military infrastructure have been damaged or destroyed.
Strategic facilities, missile bases, command centers, and elements of the energy system have been repeatedly targeted.
Civilian infrastructure has also suffered heavily.
Electricity networks, transportation hubs, and industrial complexes have been disrupted across several provinces.
The economic cost is already measured in tens of billions of dollars, in a country whose economy was already weakened by years of sanctions and structural inefficiencies.
The human cost has been even more devastating.
Thousands have been killed.
Many more have been injured.
Large numbers of civilians have been displaced internally as military operations intensified around key strategic zones.
Financially, the pressure is equally severe.
Iran’s currency has collapsed further, inflation has accelerated, and the country’s already fragile fiscal structure is now under extraordinary strain.
Wars of this intensity cannot continue indefinitely.
Sooner or later, the political calculus begins to change.
Behind the public rhetoric of total confrontation, quieter diplomatic channels appear to have opened.
According to Donald Trump and several regional sources, discussions have taken place between the United States and Iran.
But notably, these discussions do not appear to involve the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Instead, they seem to involve senior officers of Iran’s regular armed forces — the Artesh — with the Pakistani military reportedly acting as an intermediary.
If confirmed, this would represent a significant strategic development.
For decades, Iran’s military structure has been defined by a dual system.
On one side stands the IRGC, the ideological army created after the 1979 revolution to protect the Islamic Republic and its revolutionary doctrine.
On the other side stands the regular Iranian military, the traditional national army whose institutional culture predates the revolution and whose mission has historically focused on the defense of the Iranian state rather than the export of ideological influence.
The balance of power between these two institutions has long defined the internal architecture of the Iranian regime.
The emergence of negotiations that bypass the IRGC may therefore indicate something deeper than simple wartime diplomacy.
It may indicate that the political future of Iran itself is now being quietly discussed.
Wars often end not with a sudden ceasefire but with an ultimatum.
An ultimatum serves a precise strategic purpose.
It forces internal actors to choose.
It reshapes the internal balance of power within the losing side.
And it creates the conditions under which a political transition becomes possible.
The signals emerging from diplomatic channels suggest that the conflict may now be entering precisely such a phase.
The ultimatum is not simply directed at the Iranian leadership.
It is directed at the structure of power inside Iran.
In essence, it asks a fundamental question:
Who will control the Iranian state once the war ends?
The revolutionary guard — or the national military?
The Struggle Inside Iran
This internal struggle has existed for decades, though it has rarely been visible to the outside world.
The IRGC has grown enormously powerful over the past forty years.
It controls large segments of Iran’s economy.
It dominates major security institutions.
It oversees the country’s missile programs and regional proxy networks.
But the regular Iranian army remains a large and professional institution, with deep historical roots in the Iranian state and strong internal cohesion.
The war has inevitably shifted the balance between these forces.
When states face existential crises, institutional power structures often begin to evolve rapidly.
History offers many precedents.
Military establishments sometimes emerge from wartime crises as the only institutions capable of restoring order and stability.
The possibility that Iran could eventually move toward a military-led transitional authority is therefore no longer unthinkable.
Such a shift would also have profound ideological implications.
Since 1979, Iran’s political system has been built upon the doctrine of Velayat-e-Faqih — the rule of the Islamic jurist — established by Ayatollah Khomeini and centered in the clerical establishment of Qom.
This model fuses religious authority with state power.
But within Shiite theology itself, another tradition exists.
The Shiite religious establishment in Najaf, Iraq, historically developed a different doctrine — one that emphasizes the separation between religious authority and political governance.
For decades, Najaf’s scholars have advocated a more restrained political role for clerics. During the uprising, many Shia clerics and seminarists form the Najaf philosophy have actually participated with the Iranian people.
A post-war Iran dominated by the military could therefore mark a radical shift away from the revolutionary clerical model of Qom toward a form of governance closer to the Najaf tradition, where religion retains influence but does not directly govern the state.
Such a transformation would represent one of the most profound political changes in the Middle East since the Iranian Revolution itself.
Wars often appear chaotic while they are unfolding.
But the endgame usually reveals the deeper political forces that have been building beneath the surface.
Thirty-nine days into this war, the outlines of that endgame may now be emerging.
The conflict has devastated Iran’s infrastructure and economy.
Diplomatic channels appear to be opening behind the scenes.
The ultimatum phase is here.
And within Iran itself, the ultimatum, whether respected and its consequences if not, may be the trigger that will shift the balance between the IGRC and the national Army..
If these dynamics continue to evolve in the same direction, the war may not simply end with a ceasefire.
It may end with the reconfiguration of the Iranian state itself.
The fall of regimes rarely comes from external pressure alone.
More often, it comes when the internal pillars of power begin to realign.
If the signals now emerging prove accurate, Iran may be approaching precisely such a moment.
And when the guns finally fall silent, the Middle East may discover that the real transformation has only just begun.
A new Middle East where the destruction of the State of Israel is eliminated from the Iranian constitution, where Religion is separated form the running of the State, where peace agreements are signed between Iran and its Gulf Neighbours and where guarantees are give for the free circulation through the straits of Hormuz.