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Major economic crises almost never happen without warning. Long before markets collapse or economies contract, warning signs discreetly accumulate beneath the surface: financial excesses grow, geopolitical tensions escalate, technological disruptions accelerate, and the architecture of the global economy becomes increasingly fragile. For several years, many of these signs have been visible worldwide. Stock markets have reached historically high valuation levels. Public debt has reached unprecedented levels. Artificial intelligence is transforming industries at dizzying speed. And geopolitical tensions are beginning to disrupt some of the most vital arteries of global trade and energy. Taken in isolation, each of these developments would be manageable. But today, they are happening simultaneously . Across financial markets, geopolitics, technology, and global supply chains, a series of powerful structural forces are beginning to converge. Together, they are beginning to form what could increasingly resemble a perfect storm for the global economy . Fragile Financial Markets Modern financial markets are profoundly different from those of previous decades. The rapid expansion of passive management, the proliferation of online trading platforms, and the dominance of algorithmic trading have profoundly transformed market dynamics. When trillions of dollars automatically flow into global indices rather than individual companies, price discovery weakens. Capital is no longer allocated primarily based on company fundamentals, but increasingly according to index composition and momentum flows. This has created powerful feedback loops. The largest companies attract the most significant capital flows, driving up their valuations. Higher valuations increase their weight in global indices, attracting even more capital. The result is an extraordinary concentration of risk within a small group of multinational technology companies that now dominate the performance of global equity markets. History shows that such concentrations rarely end gradually. When market sentiment shifts, the adjustment is often brutal. It transforms into a violent re-evaluation of asset prices . The Artificial Intelligence Investment Boom The recent acceleration in global equity markets is closely linked to the extraordinary explosion of investment in artificial intelligence infrastructure. Around the world, technology companies and governments have launched massive spending programs to build data centers, semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, energy infrastructure, and high-performance computing clusters. The scale of this technology investment cycle is unprecedented. Yet, history suggests that major waves of technological innovation often contain the seeds of their own correction. Railway expansion in the 19th century, telecommunications infrastructure during the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s, or more recently investments in renewable energy, have all followed similar trajectories: rapid investment, intense competition, and, ultimately, overcapacity . Early signs are now appearing that the current AI investment cycle could be approaching a similar inflection point. When these cycles turn, markets that had been valued on the assumption of uninterrupted growth can adjust rapidly. A Global Economy Dependent on Asset Prices Over the past two decades, the global economy has become increasingly dependent on rising financial asset prices. In many advanced economies, household consumption and business confidence are heavily influenced by the perceived wealth created by rising stock markets and real estate prices. This dynamic, often called the wealth effect , has become a central driver of economic activity. However, this mechanism works both ways. When asset prices fall sharply, confidence deteriorates, and spending contracts. In a highly interconnected global economy, such shocks can spread rapidly across borders. Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work At the same time, the artificial intelligence that fueled financial market optimism is beginning to transform labor markets globally. Unlike previous waves of automation, AI technologies are increasingly capable of performing tasks traditionally associated with skilled service professions: analysis, programming, research, translation, or content creation. While technological innovation generally ends up creating new forms of employment, the transition period can be deeply destabilizing. Entire sectors of the labor market could be disrupted simultaneously. The paradox of the current technological moment is striking:   massive investments in artificial intelligence infrastructure coexist with growing concerns about the future of employment . Rising Debt and Fiscal Fragility Another structural vulnerability lies in the rapid accumulation of public debt in many major economies. In the years following the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, governments extensively used public spending to support growth. As a result, sovereign debt levels have reached historic highs in many advanced economies. At the same time, rising interest rates increase the cost of servicing this debt. For governments already facing significant deficits, rising borrowing costs can severely constrain their fiscal room for maneuver. This dynamic creates an increasingly delicate balance between the need to maintain economic stability and to preserve financial credibility. War and the Global Energy System Geopolitical tensions add another layer of uncertainty. The ongoing conflict in the Middle East has implications far beyond the region. The Gulf remains one of the most critical nodes in the global energy system. Disruptions to energy infrastructure, shipping lanes, or refining capacities can quickly affect global supply. The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz illustrates this vulnerability. Approximately one-fifth of global oil shipments transit through this narrow maritime corridor. Any prolonged disruption could have immediate consequences for global energy markets. And because energy prices influence transportation, agriculture, and industry, the economic effects would extend far beyond the oil sector alone. The Return of Inflation After several years of slowing inflation in much of the world, new pressures are beginning to emerge. Energy disruptions, geopolitical tensions, the fragmentation of global trade networks, and structural transformations in the labor market all point towards the possibility of a return of inflationary pressures. This creates a complex challenge for central banks. If inflation accelerates while economic growth slows, monetary authorities could be confronted with the difficult combination of inflation and stagnation ;— a scenario reminiscent of the stagflation episodes of the 1970s. Private Debt and Hidden Financial Risks Beyond public markets, another vulnerability has developed in the rapidly expanding private credit sector. Over the last decade, lending activity has gradually shifted from traditional banks to private debt funds and alternative lenders. This market has become a multi-trillion dollar ecosystem financing often highly leveraged companies. As long as economic conditions remain favorable, these risks largely remain invisible. But when financial conditions tighten, the first signs of distress often reveal deeper structural weaknesses. In financial markets, an old adage states that cockroaches never appear alone . Initial defaults in private credit could thus signal broader tensions in highly indebted sectors of the economy. Real Estate and Banking Fragility Another cause for concern relates to commercial real estate markets. In many countries, the combination of rising interest rates, evolving work patterns, and declining property valuations is exerting increasing pressure on developers and lenders. Banks heavily exposed to commercial real estate could see risks to their balance sheets increase if refinancing conditions deteriorate. Because financial institutions remain at the heart of the global economy's functioning, tensions in the real estate sector can quickly spread throughout the financial system. The Illusion of Liquidity Perhaps the most underestimated risk in the modern financial system is the widespread assumption that liquidity will always be available. For years, investors have grown accustomed to markets where assets seemingly can be bought or sold instantly. Yet, much of this liquidity is conditional. Many investment vehicles promise short-term liquidity while holding underlying assets that rarely trade: corporate loans, real estate assets, or complex debt instruments. As long as capital inflows exceed outflows, the system operates smoothly. But when investors simultaneously seek to reduce their positions, liquidity can disappear very quickly. History shows that financial crises are often triggered not by insolvency alone, but by a sudden disappearance of liquidity . When the Storm Breaks Economic storms rarely emerge from a single cause. They form when multiple vulnerabilities begin to interact and reinforce each other until the system reaches a tipping point. Today, many of these vulnerabilities are already visible. Financial markets remain under strain after years of exceptionally accommodative monetary policies. Technological disruptions are simultaneously transforming industries and labor markets. Public debt levels have reached historic highs in much of the world. Geopolitical tensions threaten crucial energy and trade routes. And beneath the surface, fragilities are appearing in private credit markets, real estate, and the liquidity structure of the global financial system. Taken in isolation, these factors could be absorbed. But when they converge, they can transform instability into crisis. The global economy has entered a period of profound transition — a period where technological revolution, geopolitical rivalries, and financial fragilities are unfolding simultaneously. Storms do not form overnight. They build up slowly, when pressure systems meet on the horizon. Today, clouds are gathering over the global economic landscape. And the question facing policymakers, investors, and societies is no longer whether turbulence is coming. It is to know how violent the storm will be when it breaks.

The death of the strongman of the Iranian regime, Ali Larijani, on Tuesday, March 17, and that of several other high-ranking officials and senior executives of the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, has not reduced the regime's involvement in the conflict, as it has just launched ballistic missiles for the first time outside the Middle East, towards Diego Garcia, 4000 kilometers away, and targeted Dimona, in southern Israel on Saturday evening. In Lebanon, it is on the Southern front that fighting is raging. The third week of the confrontation between the powerful American and Israeli armies on one side, and the Iranian regime on the other, was as full of twists and turns as the previous ones, and the state in which the Iranian regime now finds itself is more precarious than ever, even if its strike force remains not insignificant. The regime indeed lost this week, specifically on March 17, its main central figure since the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28, in the person of its powerful security chief Ali Larijani, one of the most experienced Iranian political figures, considered the strongman of the regime. He was killed during an Israeli strike against an apartment in Tehran where he had just arrived, accompanied by his son and other regime officials. A targeted assassination that was followed by that of other officials of the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, the repressive police under the supervision of the Pasdaran. Larijani's death, who had held the reins of power since the disappearance of the Supreme Leader, raised many questions about the regime's current leadership, especially since Ali Khamenei's successor, who is none other than his son Mojtaba Khamenei, has still not made a public appearance and his fate remains unknown. Wounded during the same strike that killed his father, many members of his family, and some forty senior regime officials, the new Supreme Leader is reportedly alive, according to a report by American secret services published in international media this week. The new Leader published a second message on Friday, in which he raised his tone and declared that "the enemy has been defeated." Militarily, Iran continues to show significant capabilities despite the destruction on its soil, with unprecedented attacks at the end of the week, which constitute a turning point in the war. Two intermediate-range ballistic missiles were thus launched towards the American-British base of Diego Garcia, on an island in the Indian Ocean more than 4000 kilometers from Iranian soil, and from which fighter jets depart on missions in Iran. Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir stated that this launch demonstrates the Iranians' ability to threaten European capitals. The other new military threat that emerged this week involves nuclear facilities: after Israeli-American strikes on the Natanz site in Iran, it was the turn of the city of Dimona in southern Israel, which houses a nuclear facility, to be targeted by Iranian missiles. The strike, which resulted in over 170 injured (in Dimona and Arad), did not cause an abnormal level of radioactivity in that area, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Do these attacks foreshadow a new phase of the conflict? Over the past week, the Strait of Hormuz and its closure to oil tankers continued to be a central concern. U.S. President Donald Trump ended the week with a threat to annihilate Iran's energy facilities if the Strait was not opened within 48 hours, which led to new Iranian threats against American facilities in the region. An Axios report two days earlier had mentioned a potential American plan to occupy the important island of Kharg, crucial for Iranian hydrocarbon exports, in order to pressure for the reopening of the Strait. This week, the American president blew hot and cold regarding intervention in Iran, sometimes stating, in a declaration on Friday, that he wanted to reduce the intensity of the war because its objectives had been met "weeks in advance," and other times threatening escalation, without being willing to negotiate with the Iranians. Meanwhile, the American army is expected to deploy 2000 new soldiers to the Middle East, according to official Reuters sources. For his part, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi made multiple statements this week, with the central idea being that the Iranians are not willing to negotiate a simple ceasefire, but a definitive end to the war. The Restructuring of Hezbollah by Iran Meanwhile, there has been no lull on the South Lebanon front, opened by Hezbollah against Israel, and which is the scene of numerous coordinated attacks between the party's militiamen and the Iranians. After an inflamed night between Tuesday and Wednesday during which the heart of the capital Beirut was targeted without prior warnings, which is a sign of targeted Israeli assassinations, and some sporadic attacks on the southern suburbs now emptied of their inhabitants, it seems that the bulk of the confrontation is now taking place on the ground in South Lebanon, at the border, between fighters from both camps. The names of the villages of Khiam and Tibé, in Marjayoun, were back in the media all week, as was Naqoura, in the Tyre region, which has just been incorporated into the front. Throughout the week, Hezbollah communicated extensively about its "attacks" against "enemy soldiers," both within Lebanese territory and in Israeli territory. The party remains silent about its own human losses, even as the Israeli army claims to have killed more than 500 Hezbollah militiamen. On the other hand, the extent of Israeli advances on Lebanese soil remains unknown. Officially, Israel approved new battle plans for Lebanon at the end of the week. This week was also marked by the publication of a report, mentioned by Reuters on March 21, on the restructuring of Hezbollah by the Revolutionary Guards since the signing of the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, and the end of the previous conflict, which demonstrates the futility of efforts to disarm the militia. Indeed, this highly documented report shows how, after the party's debacle during this conflict and the assassination of its historical leader in September 2024, the Iranians invested in restructuring the Shiite formation by secretly sending a hundred military officials to Lebanon. The Hezbollah fighting today would therefore be radically different from that of recent years. Its troops would be divided into smaller, autonomous groups on the ground, relying much less on communication among themselves. Dismantling of networks in Kuwait and the UAE Politically, Hezbollah remains very isolated on the internal scene, just as Iran is on the regional scene. A meeting of the foreign ministers of Arab and Islamic countries in the Saudi capital on Thursday resulted in a strongly worded communiqué on the right to self-defense of the Gulf States, which have been bombed by the Iranians since day one. Lebanon, through its Foreign Minister Joe Raggi, reaffirmed the importance of the Lebanese proposal for direct negotiations with Israel. This proposal, launched by Lebanese President Joseph Aoun since the opening of this new front on March 2, remains hampered by Israeli refusal on one hand, and Lebanese Shiite parties on the other, despite French efforts this week. France, which dispatched its Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot to Beirut and then to Tel Aviv, has apparently been unable to make any breakthrough so far. The official Lebanese position was reiterated by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam during a widely noted interview with CNN on Thursday, during which he called on the American president to intervene to encourage direct negotiations and end a war in Lebanon that has already resulted in over 1000 civilian deaths. This week also saw the dismantling of Hezbollah networks in Kuwait and then in the United Arab Emirates, which, according to these countries, were preparing to carry out "terrorist operations" on their soil. The Lebanese position is significant in this regard: despite Hezbollah's denial of any involvement in these two countries, Lebanese authorities, through President Joseph Aoun, condemned these actions, reaffirming official Lebanese support for the two Gulf States. However, Lebanese statements sound increasingly hollow, even as the war initiative remains in the hands of a militia whose presence has been declared outlawed by the Lebanese government since March 2; but the pro-Iranian party clearly doesn't care. The growing aggressiveness of Hezbollah's statements, including the particularly virulent one from the party's political council vice-president Mahmoud Comati, who threatened "traitors" with retaliation after the war, shows a hardening of the party's line, as well as a widening of divisions among Lebanese. And this, while more than a million South Lebanese are currently being cared for in different Lebanese regions.

From the moment French troops departed Syria in April 1946, the young republic became arguably the most coup-prone country in the Arab world for nearly a quarter century. By 1970, Syria had lived through ten successful coups. On 13 November 1970, Hafez al-Assad carried out a palace coup and installed himself as strongman. For Assad, Lebanon was not simply a neighbor; it is Syria’s backyard and a tool for a stronger regional posture. After the civil war erupted in Beirut, Syria intervened militarily in 1976 — initially against the Palestine Liberation Organization and Lebanese leftist groups, and later in support of these same pro-Palestinian forces against the self-organized Christian groups rallied to defend themselves. From that intervention onward, Syrian intelligence and military apparatuses integrated themselves into the Lebanese political fabric, brokering power by alternately backing, betraying, or preying on local groups. The October 1973 war — launched jointly with Egypt against Israel — was a turning point that transformed Assad from a local player into an indispensable interlocutor for Washington. The war ended in stalemate, but it was how Assad handled the aftermath that revealed his strategic genius. Henry Kissinger, who spent nearly a month shuttling between Damascus and Jerusalem in May 1974, was reportedly "astonished and surprised" when Assad accepted the disengagement framework. The agreement, signed in Geneva on 31 May 1974, created a UN-monitored buffer zone along the Golan, and froze the Israeli-Syrian frontier for the next five decades. No other Arab-Israeli front remained as quiet for as long. That stability became Assad's paradigm: as long as the Golan remained frozen, Syria remained necessary. No peace could happen without Damascus; no war could safely start without its consent. One of Assad's greatest diplomatic achievements was perhaps his management of the Cold War. The Syrian Arab Army became one of the most comprehensively Soviet-equipped and Soviet-trained forces in the Arab region. Its doctrine, its weapons systems, its officer training all ran through Moscow. Yet Assad never gave the Soviets what they truly wanted: exclusive influence. He maintained a back channel to Washington, met American officials regularly, and refrained from joining any formal Soviet alliance framework. Assad turned this ambiguity into operational leverage. He fought U.S. allies in Lebanon when it suited him, undermined Egypt’s Arab leadership after Camp David, and simultaneously extracted Soviet military hardware at preferential rates. Damascus was too valuable for Washington to isolate and too independent for Moscow to control. That was the sweet spot Assad occupied for two decades. When the Soviet Union collapsed and Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Assad faced a defining choice. Syria joined –albeit symbolically- the U.S.-led coalition to liberate Kuwait; a key decision that earned Assad a free hand in Lebanon as a reward from Washington and the Saudis. Syria's occupation of Lebanon would last another 15 years, the political umbrella for which was provided through a deal between Assad and the Saudis. Rafic Hariri, a self-made Saudi-connected billionaire became prime minister in 1992. Under this arrangement and almost until his assassination in 2005, Hariri controlled Lebanon's economy, reconstruction, and financial policy, while Syria controlled its military, security services and foreign policy. Upon his death in 2000, Hafez’s son Bashar inherited a finely calibrated domestic and regional portfolio he did not fully understand and could not preserve, let alone grow. Heavy international pressure, combined with a local popular backlash (aka the Cedar revolution) emerging in the aftermath of Hariri’s assassination in February 2005 drove a rapid Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, erasing three decades of influence in a matter of weeks. Within less than ten years of his presidency, Bashar Assad changed from being the favorite dictator of the international community to its black sheep. When the Arab uprisings reached Syria in March 2011, the regime's response — brutal, indiscriminate repression — triggered a civil war that killed hundreds of thousands, displaced half the population, and reduced Syria's military capacity to a fraction of its former self. Post-Assad Syria, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, once commander of the al-Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, rests on a power structure shaped by the rebel alliance that prevailed—one that functions more as a hegemonic factional state than as a genuine pluralist democracy. Al-Sharaa has achieved remarkable international legitimacy in a short time. In just over one year, he met Trump at the White House, addressed the UN General Assembly, and secured the removal of some Western sanctions. Yet his domestic control remains fragile: sectarian violence in the western coast, de facto Kurdish autonomy in the northeast, Druze resistance in the south, and the persistence of jihadist factions hostile to his pragmatism all continue to constrain central authority. By 2024, the Syrian Arab Army was already a shadow of the force Hafez had built. Hezbollah fighters, Iraqi Shia militias, Russian forces, and Iranian advisors effectively replaced the Syrian army as the backbone of regime defense — meaning Syria's own military did not possess significant capabilities. Furthermore, right after the Assad regime fell, Israel moved with extraordinary speed to ensure that whatever came next would begin from near-zero military capacity by targeting airbases, air defense batteries, weapons production facilities, missile stockpiles, radar systems, and research centers in Damascus, Homs, Tartus, Latakia, and Palmyra. By the IDF's own account, the campaign destroyed approximately 80% of Syria's remaining strategic military assets. What Syria has left is a coalition of armed factions rather than a professional military. Most fighters come from former Islamist militias — effective in terrorism, guerrilla warfare and civil war tactics, but with little training in conventional state warfare: border control, territorial defense, logistics chains, joint operations. Equipment is disparate, largely obsolete, and sparse in medium and heavy weapons. There are no meaningful air or naval capabilities left. Without the foreign fighters — the jihadist volunteers from Central Asia, North Africa, and elsewhere who had swelled rebel ranks during the civil war — Syria's armed forces are numerically insufficient to patrol, let alone project power across, a country the size of Syria. Syria's economy compounds its military weakness. Despite the decision to lift some sanctions, the US and EU are still moving cautiously. Investment has not materialized at any meaningful scale. Public wages are desperately low, feeding endemic corruption. Infrastructure is shattered. There is no economic base for a major military build-up, let alone a foreign military adventure. In 2025, some voices in the region and beyond began suggesting that Syria could or should move military forces into Lebanon, framing it as a counter to Iranian influence. The suggestion reveals a fundamental misreading of what Syria currently is. However, what Washington formally asked for was a border security question, not an occupation mandate. The US request to the Syrian government was specific: prevent the land movement of Iranian assets — weapons, fighters, funds — from Iraq to Lebanon through Syrian territory. That is why Syrian reinforcements were dispatched to both the Iraqi and Lebanese frontiers, not the Lebanese border alone. The goal is interdiction, not invasion. An occupation requires sustained logistics, reliable command chains, territorial administration, and force protection. Occupying and administering Lebanese territory is an undertaking that has historically required a force of 35,000–40,000 disciplined soldiers with intelligence services, checkpoints, political proxies, regional and international endorsement. The new Syrian leadership has none of that. Israel's position is an additional hard constraint. Tel Aviv does not trust the current Damascus government — regarding al-Sharaa, as a jihadist in a suit and a Turkish puppet. More fundamentally, Israel is deeply opposed to Turkish influence expanding into Syrian territory, and it categorically opposes its extension into Lebanon. On the other hand, U.S. interests in Lebanon center on stabilizing the Lebanese army and constraining Hezbollah, not on opening another front of uncertainty with an untested Islamist military structure. On the Lebanese side of the border, the U.S. equipped and trained Lebanese Army and armed border communities in the north and east of Lebanon would impose a serious cost on any incursion by disparate and lightly equipped Syrian Islamist forces. For pro-Iranian actors and Hezbollah-affiliated networks, the spectre of a jihadist army marching on Beirut is not an analysis but a political lifeline. Since December 2024, both have absorbed devastating losses including the Syria corridor severed. By stoking alarm about Sunni extremists massing on Lebanon’s border, they aim to rebuild, notably among Shias and Christians, the communal solidarity — the sense of shared existential threat — that long sustained their mobilizing power. The trap is cynical: a Syrian military operation, were it ever to occur, would hand them precisely the raison d’être they seek, confirming that Hezbollah’s weapons remain Lebanon’s indispensable shield. The invasion narrative, in short, should be read for what it is — not a security assessment, but a measure of how much these actors urgently need an enemy to sustain their relevance. Syria's century-long story is about the gap between ambition and capacity. Hafez Assad was extraordinary precisely because he closed that gap — he leveraged Syria's geographic and political position to punch well above his country's weight for three decades. His son deepened that gap again, catastrophically. The new Syria, under al-Sharaa, is still in the process of deciding what kind of state it wants to be. Lebanon, for now, is not a prize within reach.

Three major developments, undeniably strategic in dimension, have marked the last twenty-four hours of the war between the American-Israeli alliance and the Republic of the Mullahs in Tehran. Iran thus launched for the first time two intermediate-range ballistic missiles towards the American-British base of Diego Garcia, located in the Indian Ocean, some 4000 kilometers from Iran. The two missiles did not reach their target, but the importance of this launch lies in its geopolitical significance. The range of Iranian missiles was generally estimated at 2000 kilometers. The fact that these two ballistic devices had a range of nearly 4000 kilometers constitutes tangible proof that the Islamic Republic was genuinely working to acquire a missile arsenal potentially capable of reaching European capitals, including Paris and London, located respectively 4200 and 4400 kilometers from Tehran. Such data therefore delivers a stinging rebuke to certain Western circles and observers who campaign against the battle engaged against the Islamic Republic by claiming that the Iranian regime posed no threat to European countries and Western interests. Another major development on Saturday, March 21: the bombing by American aviation, for the second time in three weeks, of the Natanz nuclear power plant and its uranium enrichment facility. Bunker-buster bombs were used during this bombing to hit underground targets buried at great depths. No radioactive leak was reported following this operation, indicated the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On Saturday afternoon, American aviation was flying over the Isfahan area, where another important nuclear power plant is located. Twenty countries commit to unblock Hormuz The other issue that has focused the attention of Western chancellories and international economic circles manifests itself in the threats that the Islamic Republic poses to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. The new development on this front on Saturday is the commitment made by about twenty countries, including France, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, Canada, and the United Kingdom, to join efforts to ensure the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. President Donald Trump, it should be noted in this regard, had in recent days intensified his call for active participation of Western countries in the action advocated to guarantee the free movement of ships on this maritime route. As part of their contribution on this front, the United States deployed A-10 Warthog aircraft equipped with advanced military equipment capable of particularly effectively targeting vessels posing a threat to maritime traffic. Simultaneously, American and Israeli air forces intensified their pounding of missile warehouses and launch pads located in the Strait of Hormuz area on Saturday and over the past twenty-four hours. All these developments lend credence to the theory, reported for several days by various circles, that the American army is preparing a landing on the Iranian island of Kharg, whose highly strategic importance lies in the fact that 90 percent of Iranian oil exports transit through this island, which benefits from deep waters allowing the docking of giant supertankers. The Israeli army continues its advance in South Lebanon On the Lebanese front, the Israeli army continued its slow, and cautious, advance into Lebanese territory on Saturday, occupying new strategic positions that would allow it to consolidate its plan to establish a buffer zone between the Litani and the border with Lebanon. This territorial encroachment, particularly noticeable on Saturday in the Nakoura region, is accompanied by intensive shelling of several villages in the southern region. Simultaneously, clashes were reported Saturday in the locality of Khiam where the Israeli army is facing two pockets of resistance held by Hezbollah militiamen. Meanwhile, the Israeli air force continued its intermittent bombing of Hezbollah militia infrastructures in several southern Beirut suburbs, including Haret Hreik and Bourj Brajneh, during the night of Friday and throughout Saturday.

It is up to the Lebanese Shiites alone to disavow Hezbollah, to put an end to its hegemony and, consequently, to the Pasdaran's grip on our country *! The same scenario applies in Iran: no matter how much combined Israeli-American strikes pulverize Ali Larijani, his close guard and his repressive forces, only a citizen uprising can overthrow the tyranny of wilayat al-faqih . Astute observers will eventually admit it: there will be no resolution to the Persian tragedy, no solution to the Iranian crisis without a confrontation between compatriots, that is to say, without civil conflict. So it is up to the peoples to assert their right to life! Deliverance! In our battered country, neither the Lebanese army, nor a good offices mission, nor civil war, nor Israeli bombings, nor the landing of Arab, Turkish or Western troops are able to sideline the “divine party.” It is because the latter reigns over minds that its bastion is impregnable and that its physical relocation would not be enough to eradicate it. Torn from its ancestral land, thrown onto the roads, parked in makeshift camps, its “nurturing environment” that served as its matrix remains attached, loyal, faithful, and committed to it. A despairing observation when only the Twelver community is empowered to invalidate the Hezb and get us out of the impasse in which we are struggling. Is there a Twelver culpability? But if Lebanon is bogged down, its institutions blocked, and its population victimized, would we therefore blame all Shiites? Let's admit that the Party of God , now a regional actor, had flattered their feelings of pride and a taste for bravado and risk. But in doing so, it would lead them into the dangers of widespread escalation and delusions of power. Some exasperated minds would not hesitate to hold all Twelvers politically, if not criminally, responsible for the successive catastrophes befalling us. After all, Shiite voters have re-elected, from one legislature to the next, the same representatives to the National Assembly, just as they have approved the policies these representatives advocated at the suggestion of their Iranian mentors. In this sense, our compatriots in the South, the Beqaa, and the suburbs did what they should not have done. And what's more, by remaining passive, they did not do what they had to do: what we expected of them as Lebanese who have the exclusive interests of our country at heart. On two occasions, namely October 8, 2023, and March 2, 2026, they could not curb the Hezb that stubbornly pursued the path of confrontation with Israel! But were they able to prevent these utterly fateful decisions, to name but a few? It will long be argued that the senseless excesses of the “divine party” were the work of a small group, not the fruit of a specific culture or the logical outcome of a religious ideology that binds a community. Call for Mutiny and Incitement to “intifada” At this precise moment, a ground incursion is believed to be imminent. Rather than letting the Israelis relentlessly pursue the Hezb and evacuate the population from South Lebanon, the Shiite ecosystem could take the initiative that would ensure its own deliverance. An immense outcry from the displaced, numbering a million people, can lead the over-armed militia that has taken Lebanon hostage to abandon its heroic illusions and picaresque ventures. And primarily, to disassociate itself from its Iranian masters. West Beirut had indeed “renounced” Yasser Arafat during its siege by the Israelis in 1982. The PLO had promised to turn our capital into a new Stalingrad. The intervention of Saëb Salam, speaking on behalf of the outraged population, put our Palestinian guests in their place: they were embarked on French ships bound for Tunisia. That said, it is certainly not the waltz of hesitation, in which Nabih Berry engages, that will put an end to the self-immolation that continues before our eyes. Only an insurrection, only a grassroots movement, only demonstrations and sit-ins can force the hand of those who unduly monopolize power. It is up to the Shiites to wrest the weapons from the Hezb ! It is up to them to take risks for freedom, theirs and ours! * And as a reminder, the Christians rallied to state legitimacy in 1988-9, effectively rejecting the militias' stranglehold on the East zone!

Everyone has someone in the family who left to study abroad. A son, a daughter, a nephew, a niece. Tuition fees were paid, teeth were gritted, pride was felt. Degrees were earned. They went to work in the Gulf. We called it success. Today, that story is drawing to a close. Gulf countries have decided to prioritize employment for their own citizens. It is their right, and it is a deep-rooted trend, not a temporary measure. The major economic vision programs — Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 among them — are designed precisely to reduce dependence on foreign labor. Lebanese workers there have begun receiving termination letters, and many of those still in post find their contracts quietly unrenewed. Worse still, there is the war — or rather, chronic instability. The confrontation between Iran and the United States, the tensions in the Red Sea, the fragility of political equilibria throughout the region: all of this has sown uncertainty. Foreign companies are repatriating their employees as a precaution. Investors are leaving. The economy is slowing. The Gulf, once so open a market, is closing. Perhaps not forever, but for now, yes. And no one can predict when, or in what form, it will reopen. Europe is not a credible large-scale alternative. Unemployment there is high across many countries, and the barriers to entry for a non-European have become near-insurmountable. Landing a job there without European status is not individually impossible, but it is slow, costly, and uncertain. Above all, Europe has neither the capacity nor the will to absorb massive inflows from a single country. For thousands of young Lebanese at once, it is simply not a solution. So what do they do? We have an entire generation — intelligent, graduates of the finest universities, fluent in three or four languages, seasoned in multinationals or consulting firms — and that generation has nowhere left to go. Except one place. Lebanon. Lebanon with its power cuts that paralyze the working day, its banking collapse that vaporized a lifetime of savings, its political class we all know by heart, with its schemes and its stagnation. To suggest this might be good news sounds counterintuitive. But let us take a moment to think. For fifty years, every time the situation in Lebanon grew difficult — war, economic crisis, political assassinations — the best people left. And because they left, the pressure on the system eased. Emigration served as a corrective mechanism. Nothing truly changed, because the driving forces that might have demanded change were elsewhere. The Gulf, Europe, North America functioned as an immense safety valve. They absorbed our problems in our stead. Now, that valve is closing. Not abruptly, but through a slow and inexorable contraction. For the first time in decades, our young graduates have no real option but to turn their gaze toward Lebanon. Not out of sudden patriotism — though that can help — but because the other doors are closing one by one. And history shows that when there is no alternative left, people end up building where they stand. Not out of love of country, but out of sheer survival instinct and the drive for personal fulfillment. Because it is the only option on the table. Living in Lebanon today costs far less than Dubai, Doha, or Paris. A young person working for a foreign company, paid in dollars from Beirut, lives very well — comfortably, even. This model already exists, sustained by a handful of digital and services pioneers. It now needs to be developed and given structure. Remote work has changed everything. The pandemic accelerated a deeper shift: today, one can work for a company in London, New York, or Dubai from one's living room in Beirut. A stable internet connection, a manageable time difference, and the rest takes care of itself. The client is elsewhere, the money arrives in hard currency, life is lived in Lebanon — with everything that entails, both beautiful and bleak. Those returning from the Gulf do not come back empty-handed. They have savings — no fortunes, perhaps, but a cushion. They carry professional contacts spanning the globe. They have experienced what a functioning administration actually looks like, what efficient customer service means, what long-term planning requires. They can build companies here. Small ones at first. Sized for the local market or oriented toward the export of services. But real ones. And a generation returning with all of this, with nothing to expect or lose from the current political system, is a generation capable of voting differently, with sharper demands. They can get involved in municipalities, where daily life is genuinely decided. They can shift things politically, simply by refusing the customary arrangements and holding to one clear criterion: choosing people for their competence, not their connections. None of this is automatic. Nothing is, in this country. Returning alone, without a safety net, without a collective project, risks being swallowed by the system or leaving again quickly, more embittered than before. But returning as a group, organized, financially independent, with complementary skills — that is something else entirely. The difference between the two is a decision. A conscious decision to build something here. Not a promise handed down from above. We always ask the same question, in Lebanese families, around the tables of the diaspora: where will our children go? The question has become agonizing, because the traditional answers are disappearing. Perhaps it is time to ask the real question — the one that unsettles and liberates at once: what can they build here, those who have seen everything elsewhere, if they are given — and if they give themselves — a reason to stay? Who could have imagined that one day we would be calling family in Dubai, Doha, Kuwait, or Jeddah to ask how their night was? That image says everything. It tells the story of a complete reversal of perspective. For decades, it was we, in Lebanon, who received anxious calls from our parents, our brothers and sisters who had gone to work abroad. We were the source of worry. The fragile hearth that people called to verify was still standing. Today, it is they who must be called. Those we thought settled in the antiseptic comfort of glass towers and air-conditioned shopping malls. Asking them how their night was. Whether they slept. Whether anxiety left them in peace. Because the region is trembling. Because the equilibria we believed stable are cracking. Because no one is sheltered — not even inside the air-conditioned bubbles of the desert. And suddenly, we grasp the cruel irony of history. For fifty years, we sent our children to the Gulf to protect them from Lebanon. To shelter them from our wars, our crises, our chaos. We believed we were sending them into the future, into stability, into predictability. And now it is perhaps Lebanon that is becoming the relative refuge. Not because it is safer — God knows it is not — but because when the whole region burns, one goes home. One returns to where one understands the codes and the language, where one can read the air before it turns. Who could have said that one day it would be us extending a hand? Who could have said that the exile would become the one we comfort? That the roles would reverse so completely? The night is long across the whole region right now. But at least in Lebanon, we are accustomed to darkness. We know how to manage it. We know how to light candles, invent light, remain standing in the dark. So yes, we have the right to dream. We have the right to look at this returning generation and say: what if it is them? We have the right to imagine that this country, with its monstrous flaws, might hold a card it has never held before. Lebanon was never a regional hub because it had no need to be. The money came from the Gulf, from expatriates, from rentier income. Why fight to build something solid when one could survive in the disorder? Today, that rentier income is drying up. The money will no longer come to smooth over our imbalances. And that, perhaps, is the extraordinary chance this moment holds. Let us look at the assets of the situation, for once. A time zone that allows working with Europe in the morning and the United States in the afternoon. A cosmopolitan, multilingual culture that exists nowhere else in the region. A cost of living that has become competitive again. A pool of talent trained at the finest institutions, returning with a hunger to build that they never had before. And above all, above all: a youth that is no longer afraid. When one has lived through the collapse, the loss of savings, the disappearance of loved ones in an explosion, there is not much left to lose. And those with nothing left to lose are the most dangerous to the established order — and the most powerful in creating a new one. So yes, let us dream. Let us dream that Beirut becomes again what it once was: the crossroads of the region. Not the crossroads for dubious capital and suitcases full of cash, but for minds, for start-ups, for companies seeking talent they cannot find elsewhere. Let us dream that multinationals look at this trilingual, resilient, creative generation and conclude: this is where we need to be. Not for natural resources, but for human ones. The world is changing. Work no longer has a fixed address. Companies are seeking ecosystems where talent is abundant and the cost of living is attractive. Why not us? Why not now? This is not a prediction. It is a heading. Not a certainty, but an intention. The infernal cycle we have spoken of — the emigration of the best, the system's survival through absence — can stop. It stops when we decide it stops. When those who return say: we are staying. When those who never left say: we are building. We have the right to dream that tomorrow will be different. We even have the duty. Because in a country that no longer offers anything, the dream becomes the last resource that remains. And the Lebanese have been transforming nothing into something for centuries. That, perhaps, is our genius. Transforming absence into presence. Transforming departure into return. Transforming the end of one world into the beginning of another. So yes, we have the right. And for once, we even have the arguments.