Levant Time logo

Articles

News feature image
Opinion
Author portrait
By Jad Akhawi
Published Oct 22, 2026 - 22:12
We have finally discovered who made Lebanese people's bank deposits disappear: a legal challenge to a provision of a law. As for the preceding years, the policies that brought about the collapse, and the protections that prevented accountability, they can all be relegated to the background. Today's culprit has already been identified, and the accusation is too serious to require proof: a campaign led by the presidency on behalf of the banks. With such casual disregard, a case as vast as Lebanon's catastrophe is reduced to a narrative that claims to know people's intentions, identifies the beneficiaries, and reveals who is directing operations from Washington and who is pulling the strings from Beirut. All it lacks is evidence linking these people to the decision at issue.
Analyze
Author portrait
By Sanaa El Jack - Published Oct 22, 2026 - 21:01
News feature image
Photo: MAHMOUD ZAYYAT/AFP
The US ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, has awakened sleeping demons by proposing the repeal of the law boycotting Israel. Such a proposal is enough for the heavyweights of the Iranian axis to seize upon it, mobilize, and unleash storms of outrage, condemnation, appeals to visceral passions, and accusations of treason, far removed from any rational discussion of the law’s nature, usefulness, and relevance in light of the changes that have occurred since its adoption. As a reminder, the Israel Boycott Law is an Arab-Lebanese piece of legislation enacted on June 23, 1955. It criminalizes any economic, financial, or contractual dealings, as well as any form of communication, with Israel. Violators face prison sentences of three to ten years and fines ranging from 5,000 to 40,000 Lebanese pounds, in addition to the confiscation of goods and means of transportation.
Strategia

The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa: The Shifting Balance of Power in the Middle East (1/6)

Gulf rivalries, African vulnerabilities, and prospects for regional security
Author portrait
By Khalil Helou - Published Oct 22, 2026 - 14:59
News feature image
The Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa form a strategic space contiguous with the rest of the Middle East. Treating them as separate theaters obscures the mechanisms through which a local war, rivalry over ports or a maritime attack simultaneously affects the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa and international trade. Stretching between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, this corridor links, through the Suez Canal, economies whose interests are interdependent but whose means of protection and political priorities remain profoundly different. Local actors in this space include the states of the Horn of Africa and its surrounding areas—Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Sudan—as well as Yemen on the Arabian shore. They also include authorities and forces without state status, notably the breakaway territory of Somaliland, which claims independence from Somalia; the Houthis in Yemen, who see themselves as the state; the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan; and the armed group Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Regional powers—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Turkey, Israel and Iran—intervene through investment, diplomatic partnerships, and military and security support. Moreover, as coastal states, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are both directly affected and capable of projecting influence beyond their borders.
More Articles
Sort By: NewestOldest
Iran-US standoff: endless proposals, but no breakthrough

On a scale of 1 to 10, optimism regarding a breakthrough in the US-Iranian talks in Islamabad remains below average, with Tehran and Washington still at the stage of exchanging conditions and demands. The official Iranian agency, IRNA, revealed on Friday that the Islamic Republic submitted a new proposal for resuming negotiations to the United States on Thursday evening via the Pakistani mediator, which are supposed to bring a lasting end to the war. IRNA did not give details on the content of the Iranian offer while the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, got in touch with his Saudi, Qatari, Turkish, Egyptian, Iraqi, and Azerbaijani counterparts.

Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (4)

In a forthcoming series of articles, we intend to shed light on the current situation through the lens of history, steering clear of impassioned, ideological, or romanticized narratives that overlook the realities on the ground. Our aim is to give readers the tools to draw their own conclusions. In this context, it is high time to seriously challenge the sterile rhetoric of “resistance” – not with counter-rhetoric, but through a deeper approach that champions the rule of law, which can only be built on sovereignty. The first three articles presented a reinterpretation of the events surrounding Hezbollah's rise to power, from the Taif Agreement through Operation “Settling of Accounts” and the “July Agreement” (1993), up to the eve of its second war with Israel.

Iran’s Focus on Nabih Berri
By
Khairallah Khairallah
Published

It is striking to observe the persistence with which the “Islamic Republic” insists that it negotiates on Lebanon’s behalf and claims credit for the ceasefire in that country. This is attested by the declaration of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi who, in a phone call to President Nabih Berri, stated that “the cessation of Israeli aggressions against Lebanon is covered by our agreement with the Americans.” It is no coincidence that Araghchi chose to call Berri specifically, as if to signal that the Speaker of Parliament has become Iran’s last remaining refuge in Lebanon. This Iranian stance toward Lebanon reveals a bankruptcy without precedent, all the more so since there is in reality no genuine ceasefire. All that is happening is that Israel continues its war against Lebanon, a war that Hezbollah itself originally provoked. In this phase, Israel is concentrating its operations on territories south of the Litani River, occasionally extending them to the western Bekaa with targeted strikes. In short, what exists is not a ceasefire but the ongoing prosecution of a war that the Hebrew State is conducting while accommodating certain American demands.

Lebanon Is Not Gaza
By
Makram Rabah
Published

When Israeli officials threaten to treat southern Lebanon like Gaza, the statement is not only reckless but politically revealing, exposing the extent to which regional escalation has become entangled with domestic calculations inside Israel while simultaneously reflecting Lebanon’s own structural paralysis. Such rhetoric should be dismissed for what it is—electoral posturing dressed as strategic doctrine—yet it cannot be separated from a far more consequential reality: Lebanon has once again been dragged into a war it did not choose, by an actor that does not answer to the state and does not bear the costs of its decisions in any accountable way.

Washington and Tel Aviv threaten Iran with a decisive operation

The United States and its Israeli ally threatened yesterday to resume strikes against Iran in order to force the Islamic Republic to return to the negotiating table. Despite the truce and initial talks on April 11 in Islamabad, diplomacy is still struggling to prevail. According to the American site Axios , President Donald Trump was to be briefed by Centcom (US Central Command) commander Brad Cooper on possible new military operations against Iran. The goal is to carry out a decisive military action. The options presented to him by the Centcom chief include a wave of strikes targeting infrastructure, but also the possibility of taking control of the Strait of Hormuz, possibly with the participation of US ground forces, according to the site, which cites two sources close to the matter.

When Theft Becomes a “Gap”
By
Mona Fayad
Published

Lebanon did not collapse because of a flaw in the numbers, but because meanings and values fell apart. Suddenly, the money stolen from ordinary people was no longer called theft, but a “financial gap.” There were no longer any responsible parties, only “losses.” And there were no longer any victims, only “depositors” who were being asked to understand the circumstances and share in bearing the cost. This is not merely a matter of language. It is the very heart of the battle. When a crime is reduced to an accounting term, the debate becomes technical rather than ethical and legal. The issue is removed from the arena of justice and transferred to that of management, shifting from “who stole?” to “how do we distribute the loss?” And here begins the great slide: the victims gradually transform from rights holders into actors in the solution, rather than bearers of rights.