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Massive explosion caused by an Israeli strike near the town of Al-Mansouri in southern Lebanon. (AFP)
Weekly essentials
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By LevantTime .
Published Sep 6, 2026 - 23:27
While the United States had appeared to be relying solely on economic warfare against Iran, the US military abruptly carried out strikes on Iranian territory on Tuesday in retaliation for attacks targeting oil tankers, setting off a spiral of violence over the course of the week. In Lebanon, Israel released several civilians held in its prisons, while its army seized the strategic Ali el-Taher hill and continued its heavy strikes in the area it controls in the south of the country. The week from August 31 to September 6 was marked by a sharp acceleration of events in the Middle East, after the previous one had seemed defined by relative stagnation. On the Iranian front, the US military carried out targeted strikes inside Iranian territory as early as Tuesday evening, the first in nearly a month. This screen grab, made on September 6, 2026 from undated video footage released the same day by US Central Command, shows what CENTCOM says is one of the Iranian oil tankers it destroyed in response to attempted missile attacks on naval vessels. (CENTCOM via AFP) However, the relatively limited pace of the strikes suggests that the US administration has opted for an escalation that remains controlled, while continuing its blockade and economic pressure on Tehran. Even so, tensions continued to rise throughout the week. Explosions were heard on Saturday on the highly strategic island of Kharg, through which most of Iran’s oil exports pass. US President Donald Trump, for his part, threatened to strike the Kuh-e Kolang nuclear site — “Pickaxe Mountain” in Persian — a heavily fortified facility located deep underground, not far from Natanz, Iran’s main uranium-enrichment site. Earlier in the week, he had enshrined the “tanker for tanker” equation, pledging to target an Iranian vessel every time the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struck an oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. That is precisely what the US military did on Saturday, setting two Iranian vessels ablaze. Politically, Donald Trump further hardened his tone toward Tehran. After saying in an interview that talks had been permanently frozen “because an agreement with them is not worth the paper it is written on,” he said on Saturday that the “conflict” with Iran was not a “war,” but “something ordinary” for the United States. A way of rattling the Iranians while at the same time reassuring the US public ahead of the midterm elections. A port, along with storage facilities and warehouses, was damaged following a US military strike carried out on September 6, 2026 in Iran’s southern Hormozgan province, which borders the Strait of Hormuz. (AFP) At the same time, the US news outlet Axios published a report on Saturday suggesting that the United States is already looking beyond this conflict, which began on February 28. Citing US officials and other informed sources, the outlet said the Trump administration is developing a broader strategy for the post-war Middle East. According to the report, it would be based on creating a regional alignment aimed at containing Iran, bringing an end to the regional fallout from Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attacks in Gaza, and expanding the circle of normalization between Israel and countries in the region. The threat against Kuh-e Kolang, which brings the Iranian nuclear issue back to the fore, echoes an announcement by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which said on September 1 that Iran had still not reopened its sites to inspectors following the strikes of May 2025. It should be recalled that despite the scale of the Israeli-American offensive against Iranian sites, it is almost certain that the stockpile of enriched uranium remains intact and has been moved to a safe location by the Iranian authorities, which remain committed to what they consider their right to develop a nuclear program. Following the IAEA announcement, the United States, together with France, Britain and Germany, said they intended to submit a resolution to the UN Security Council condemning Iran’s failure to comply with its non-proliferation commitments. This display of unity stands in contrast to the chill that has prevailed between Washington and its European allies since the beginning of the conflict. For their part, the Iranians appear to be responding to the upheaval in much the same way as before: by striking neighboring countries, notably Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, without directly targeting Israel. Heavy strikes in southern Lebanon On the Lebanese front, Israel is intensifying its destruction operations in villages in the south, even using explosive barrels in some cases. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun urged Washington and the international community to “put an end” to Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory, which killed seven people on Sunday against the backdrop of a fragile truce. The strikes hit several localities in the Nabatiyeh region. Twenty people were also wounded, including children, according to the Health Ministry. One strike also destroyed the former Ghandour hospital, which had been out of service for years. Release of detainees and capture of Ali el-Taher But the major event of the week in the south was the Israeli capture of the strategic Ali el-Taher hill in the Nabatiyeh region. The site served as a major Hezbollah headquarters, consisting of an extensive network of tunnels from which fighters from the Shiite party operated, along with, according to some reports, Iranian fighters. On Thursday evening, the Israelis announced that they had taken control of the complex. On Sunday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said that tunnels still had to be blown up. This military “success” may not have come as a surprise after weeks of bombardment, but Hezbollah’s reaction was more unexpected. After long insisting that it would refuse to give up this strategic hill — as had the Iranians, who had also threatened to intervene — the Shiite party ultimately sought to play down the significance of the development through its media outlets and allied networks, without officially confirming the loss of the site, which it had refused to preserve by handing it over to the Lebanese army. The other major surprise of the week was Israel’s release of five Lebanese and Syrian civilians held in its prisons. The move came following a visit to Tel Aviv by US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa. According to the Israeli prime minister’s office, Thursday’s announcement “follows efforts by Israel and Lebanon to locate and repatriate the remains of leaders of the Jewish community who had been abducted and killed in Lebanon” between 1984 and 1986. Here too, Hezbollah’s reaction raises questions. While describing the move as positive but insufficient, the party once again turned on the Lebanese authorities, accusing them of “submission to the enemy” and holding them “responsible” for the disaster in the south. It even warned them against “internal conflicts.” Could the party’s military setbacks push it to turn increasingly toward the domestic front? Finally, the Israeli army made an important statement on Sunday, saying it was considering reducing its occupation zone in southern Lebanon, moving from the current “yellow zone” to a “grey zone.” Such a development would, according to this assessment, reflect a reduced threat from Hezbollah. The measure has not yet been approved by Israel’s political leadership. Yemen and Palestine The week was also particularly tense in Yemen, where clashes between Houthi rebels and government forces continued to intensify, culminating in an especially deadly Saturday in which more than 60 people were killed in a single day, bringing the death toll since Thursday to around 200. The Houthi offensive is aimed in particular at taking control of areas bordering the Bab el-Mandeb passage, which would give this Iranian ally additional leverage over another major strategic chokepoint after the Strait of Hormuz. In Palestine, particularly troubling comments by Israel Katz on Gaza marked the week. He claimed, without providing evidence, that most of the territory’s residents wanted to leave, stressing that Israel was “ready for such an evacuation” on a mass scale. A sign that the ordeal of Gaza’s residents may be far from over. Finally, it is worth noting that the IAEA announced on September 1 that facilities discovered in Deir el-Zor, Syria, indicate that Bashar al-Assad’s former regime had secretly been preparing an advanced nuclear program that could have led to the production of an atomic weapon with the help of North Korean experts.
Homage
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By Michel Hajji Georgiou - Published Sep 6, 2026 - 13:31
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The Argentine player, who brought his international career to an end on August 31, 2026, was nothing less than a magician of the stadiums. His journey, made of wonders, falls and redemption, may tell us something about our undiminished need for enchantment in a world that nevertheless claims to have rid itself of it. Announced a few weeks after the 2026 World Cup final lost to Spain, Lionel Messi’s international retirement inevitably stirred an emotion for which it is difficult to find many equivalents in the recent history of football. One would probably have to go back to Maradona, or perhaps to Cruyff or Pelé, to recover that sense that, with the retirement of a player, something disappears that extends far beyond the sport itself, as though a certain way of inhabiting football, perhaps even of believing in it, were also coming to an end. Far from the glacis of reason Enough of the endless statistics and the unbearable, tedious and sterile quarrels over “who is the greatest of all time.” The author of these lines has never been a fanatic of the round ball, nor, for that matter, of vertical rankings or hierarchies of merit in general, and consequently appreciates the talent of each player with the same sense of wonder as an eleven-year-old child. Besides, this particularly contemporary obsession with numbers ruins all the pleasure of the spectacle. And with good reason: the approach that consists in adding up goals, assists, Ballons d’Or, Champions Leagues, Copa América titles, World Cups… can only be reductive. On another register, it is not entirely unrelated to German-American philosopher Eric Voegelin’s critique of the modern Gnostic temptation: that of a form of knowledge convinced that it can imprison reality within a system and abolish whatever resists it. Records are probably one indicator of Lionel Messi’s genius. Yet so many other great players who made stadiums and hearts tremble, without achieving half of what he did, nevertheless remain eternal in our memories. What made them truly singular lies elsewhere, far from the glacis of reason. Something else was at work around them. Something belonging to a certain profound sense of transcendence that understanding can never fully grasp. This has been true of Lionel Messi for more than twenty years, since the day when, under the gaze of the “icon” Diego Maradona, he made his first appearance, in June 2006, on the World Cup stage in the colors of the Albiceleste against Serbia and Montenegro. That ineffable element that constitutes Messi’s genius, as it does that of others, may indeed touch upon one of modernity’s strangest paradoxes: the persistence of magic in a world that has constructed itself precisely against it. The disenchanted world Max Weber used the expression “disenchantment of the world” to describe the slow process by which Western modernity gradually subjected existence to rationalization, calculation, predictability and causal explanation. The world was no longer supposed to be traversed by obscure powers, signs, supernatural interventions or invisible wills; it was, at least in principle, to become intelligible. Unfortunately, modern sport, and more broadly the modern world inherited from globalization, fits perfectly within this dynamic. Today’s football, and not football alone, is probably one of the most quantified objects imaginable. The slightest gesture is measured, and everything is carefully calculated and modeled. From mathematics to artificial intelligence, raw talent now depends more on science than on enchantment. What is human in its spontaneous, even wild, relationship with the invisible that springs from the heart is disappearing before our eyes, in favor of the squaring of the VAR circle. It is, in a sense, the murder of sport in the name of greater rigor and fairness… even though the euthanasia of this share of sublime spontaneity ultimately produces glaring injustices of its own. One need only revisit some of the controversial decisions of the 2026 World Cup to see it. Paradox of paradoxes, Lionel Messi was himself, at the outset, a child of this technical modernity, to which he certainly owes part of his exceptional career. His body, too small by expected standards, was corrected through hormone treatment. Identified very early, his talent was taken in hand by an institution that organized his training, nutrition, physical development and integration into an already globalized sporting machine. Nothing, in appearance, could have been further removed from the old heroic narrative. At first sight, the story seems closer to dystopias in the vein of Gattaca than to myths and messianic narratives. And yet the old narrative did indeed return, and with an almost embarrassing insistence. Since the beginning of his career, Lionel Messi has been placed under the microscope. But the more people labored to explain and demystify him, the less they succeeded in entirely dissipating the impression produced by some of his gestures. The man simply cannot be circumscribed and reduced to an accumulation of data. At an age when most great players retreat into the shadows, he continues to surprise. To astonish, even, by bringing to sport that element of the senseless which escapes the quasi-robotic hypersystematization of the world. It is probably there that one must seek this elsewhere that characterizes Messi. In the survival of magic at a time when even the spaces that once allowed the positive expression of a humanity made of flesh and blood are gradually being “disciplined” by the hypnotic attraction of a new puritanical Gnosis in the name of modernity. The Messiah made by the machine Although he emerged, in a sense, from the machinery of the Matrix, Lionel Messi constitutes in himself a challenge to this ready-to-wear model. A kind of alter ego of Neo from The Matrix, thrown into a simulation governed by parameters that claim to calculate everything. The Argentine’s destiny gradually took on, almost despite himself, the form of a messianic narrative. The pun on his name would be too easy had it not been ceaselessly revived by his own story: that of the fragile child whose body seemed intent on denying him the fulfillment to which his talent destined him. Then that of exile at a very young age to Barcelona, adoption by a foreign city, an almost unreal ascent, worldwide recognition, followed by this strange difficulty in being recognized by his own… For a long time, Argentina maintained a relationship of hainamoration with its prodigal child. His results, his talent, his brilliance mattered little… he still had to answer one merciless question: why wasn’t he Maradona? The comparison was admittedly inevitable, but it was also profoundly unfair. Everything separated the two men in their way of being in the world. Maradona carried Argentina with everything in it that was passionate, contradictory, excessive and theatrical. He spoke, provoked, fought, fell, returned, mingled football with his private life, his anger, his political commitments… all the way to his own destruction. His very body seemed to become one of the places where the contradictions of his country were played out. Maradona was the very incarnation of what the world expected from football: a rebellious soul, sometimes pushing the game to the point of immorality, but within a kind of footballing gigantomachy. Maradona was epic. And, above all, he had placed his country at the summit of world football in 1986. Messi offered none of that. He was silent, at times almost absent from the story others were constructing around him, an absence long interpreted as a flaw. Almost erased, devoid of personality. That, moreover, was what the two giants Maradona and Pelé reproached him for: a lack of leadership, being too smooth. A kind of miracle test-tube baby of the stadiums. The boy from Rosario was also criticized for not singing the anthem loudly enough, for not being Argentine enough, for having been “manufactured” by Barcelona, and then, naturally, for failing to win with the national team what he won almost continuously with his club. The unfulfilled prophecy The dramatic loss to Germany in the 2014 World Cup final, followed by the Copa América finals of 2015 and 2016, had gradually transformed that suspicion into an accusation. When he missed his penalty against Chile in 2016 and subsequently announced that he was leaving the national team, he was nevertheless already one of the greatest players in football history. Yet his story remained strangely unfinished. The sense of incompletion had little to do with his honors. It concerned instead that quasi-archaic necessity continually imposed upon modern heroes: to bring their initiatory journey to completion. In Argentina’s colors, Messi shone, then fell heavily. But he did not rise again. He did not fulfill the prophecy. And, in the eyes of his people, this reinforced the sense of hainamoration: a fallen god remains a god, after all. But with the added burden of what his worshippers regard as an intolerable substratum of humanity and, therefore, something perfectly detestable: his flaws, his weaknesses. Argentines loved Maradona despite his spectacular downfall and his fallible humanity. But that was because he had “earned” the right to such a downfall, because it had somehow become acceptable after Mexico 1986. Messi, by contrast, did not yet have the right to fall, because he had not yet reached the summit. No, the prophecy had not been fulfilled. It was even becoming a caricature. So Messi returned. But he still had to wait for his redemption. It took the 2021 Copa América at the Maracanã for this relationship of suspicion, expectation and disappointment with his public and his people truly to begin changing. And above all it took the 2022 World Cup for the story to acquire that almost excessively perfect form that no one would have dared write without appearing to indulge in a screenwriter’s contrivance. Strangely, Maradona had died in 2020. It was as though a kind of oppressive national curse had been lifted. At the same time, the Argentine people needed a substitute father figure, and the pressure was thereby only redoubled. But perhaps mixed with a little tenderness this time? What happened in Qatar in 2022 is all the more interesting because Messi himself appeared slightly different. He protested more, answered provocations, lost his temper, spoke with a violence of which few had thought him capable, and even let slip that now famous “¿Qué mirás, bobo?” at the Dutch, to Argentina’s amusement. Buenos Aires finally discovered, belatedly, what it had always expected from him. A little Maradona in a great deal of Messi. But Messi did not become Maradona. And perhaps that was precisely where the true reconciliation occurred: Argentina stopped asking him to be. From 2022 onward, Messi no longer needed to embody another model of national genius. For his country too, he could finally become what he had already been everywhere else: Messi. Simply. The final act of the prophecy Granted, the triumph of 2022 could have constituted a perfect ending. But, as with Maradona, the final act of heroic prophecy is the fall. No one really expected anything extraordinary from Messi anymore in 2026. At 39, he was widely regarded as one of the “tired heroes.” The fall from the Capitol had come with the bitter episode of his departure from FC Barcelona and his misadventure at PSG. He was now playing only in the American league, in Miami’s colors… on the periphery of the footballing world, in the distant lands of soccer. And the new generation was already there, ready to send its ancestors off to Bicêtre. Yet this 2026 World Cup, which seemed destined to be nothing more than an epilogue, turned into one last sensational blaze of glory. Argentina reached the final once again, with Messi, at 39, restored as its “historic leader” and its recourse in decisive moments, achieving something not unlike what Roberto Baggio had done for Italy in 1994, at… 27: a perpetual deus ex machina. Baggio failed at the gates of triumph against Brazil after practically carrying Italy all the way to Pasadena. His penalty, sent over the crossbar, would leave behind one of the cruelest images in World Cup history: a man standing motionless, head bowed, hands on his hips, while Brazil celebrated its victory. The man who had “died standing.” The Italian imp never knew apotheosis. Yet this symbolic death, far from erasing his tournament, eventually became part of his legend. History was kinder to Messi, despite a campaign of hatred directed at him, mixed with accusations of cheating and favoritism, against a backdrop of controversial refereeing decisions and acts of unsporting conduct by his team, just as it had once been with Maradona. Kinder still, in fact. A final in a sixth World Cup on the verge of retirement, capped by an outstanding individual performance? That is precisely where the magic of the Messi phenomenon lies, and where it defies reason and its avalanche of statistics. Genius cannot be imprisoned within a sum of parameters and variables. Even optimal physical condition cannot by itself explain what the entire world witnessed. And what does it matter if his story reminds us that the hero, however mythical, cannot abolish the sinister influence of Saturn. The re-enchantment of the world For beyond the prophecy fulfilled, from ascent to fall, with its share of happiness and misfortune, the Argentine offered the world one final lap that belongs to art, if not to a form of Homeric poetry. With Lionel Messi’s withdrawal from the international stage, a little of the world’s magic disappears… until another providential hero returns to enchant the stadiums. For more than twenty years, Messi embodied the coexistence of two worlds we had thought incompatible: that of the extreme rationalization of modern sport and that, far older, of the hero, the sign, expectation and enchantment. When Messi leaves, something of this contradiction suddenly becomes visible. Other prodigies have already emerged, but perhaps, at the very moment when one of its last great representatives leaves the stage, we discover just how much we continue to need transcendence. The modern world has therefore probably not abolished enchantment. It has merely displaced it. For ninety minutes at a time, this man called Lionel Messi, who embodied it on football pitches, now leaves after having accomplished everything. And even more.
Analyze

Have We Become Stupider?

Or Are We Experiencing a Transformation in the Structure of Knowledge?
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By Mona Fayad - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 20:01
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The question “Has the world become stupider?” frequently returns in contemporary debates about digital media, search engines, and social networks. On the surface, it seems simple. Yet behind it lies a deeper issue concerning the very nature of knowledge: how it is produced, how it is transmitted, and how it is consumed. Perhaps “Have we become stupider?” is not the most accurate question. A better one might be: Is knowledge still being transmitted in a way that allows it to be understood and made productive? Do most readers still go back to the original texts? Or do they turn instead to summaries and to what is said about those texts through material circulating among readers? One key to understanding this phenomenon lies in the work of British psychologist Frederic Bartlett, who conducted a series of experiments in the 1930s on what he called “serial reproduction.” In these experiments, one person would be asked to hear a story and then retell it to someone else, who would in turn retell it to a third person, and so on. The results were striking: with each new transmission, the story was not conveyed as it had originally been told, but was reformulated. Some details were omitted, others were exaggerated, and still others were replaced by elements that better suited the recipient’s background, experience, and culture. By the time the chain had passed through enough people, the original story had become something entirely different. This simple model reveals a fundamental truth: memory is not a neutral container, but a mechanism of reconstruction. When knowledge passes through multiple intermediaries, it is not “preserved” but “reproduced.” Here we begin to see the resemblance to our contemporary world, and with it the fear that we may be becoming stupider. In the age of digital media, knowledge no longer travels through oral transmission, but through chains of mediation: an article is summarized, then quoted, then reposted as a short post, before being further reduced to a sentence or a headline. In this context, we might borrow a metaphor that appeared in a journalistic text: a library whose books are gradually replaced by summaries, then by summaries of summaries, until the reader is left facing layer upon layer of reduction. We might call this the “raccoon chain”: the raccoon does not read the original, but rummages through what remains of it. It is worth clarifying that the choice of the “raccoon” is not arbitrary. The metaphor symbolically condenses a cognitive condition that is becoming increasingly entrenched. This animal, which lives on the fringes of cities and rummages through garbage bins, does not produce its own food but feeds on the leftovers of what others have produced. Despite its practical intelligence and its ability to pry things apart, pick through them, and seize what is useful, it does not understand what lies before it. It treats things simply as material available for immediate use. This is what knowledge begins to look like in an age of serial reduction: texts are shortened, then shortened again, until all that remains are scraps of meaning, rearranged and circulated without any genuine connection to their source. At that point, we have not merely moved away from the original. We have entered a new phase in the production of information or knowledge, in which the cognitive actor is no longer a reader or a thinker, but a collector of fragments of meaning who redistributes them in forms designed for rapid consumption. “Raccoon culture,” then, is not merely a description of superficiality. It is an accurate description of the degradation of the knowledge chain itself: from creation to summary, from understanding to formal processing, from ideas to something resembling only their faded trace. Yet this phenomenon cannot be understood apart from the technological structure that governs it. Here Marshall McLuhan becomes relevant, with his famous formulation: “The medium is the message.” The problem lies not only in content, but also in the form through which that content is transmitted. Contemporary digital media do not simply convey information. They reshape it according to the logic of speed, condensation, and fragmentation. Long texts become unsuitable for consumption, while an idea becomes acceptable only if it can be compressed into a few shareable lines. This transformation produces a striking paradox: we live in a time when access to knowledge is no longer difficult. It is excessively easy. And with that excessive ease comes what might be called a “cognitive illusion”: reading a brief passage or a quick summary can be enough to make a person feel that they have grasped an idea. Yet this feeling of possession is not necessarily accompanied by deep understanding, or by the ability to reconstruct or critique that knowledge. This is where we encounter what might be called the “semi-educated”: people who possess the signs of knowledge but not its structure, its vocabulary but not its internal logic. The problem becomes even more complex when viewed through the lens of attention. Instead of remaining in a state of sustained concentration, as in traditional reading or prolonged reflection, the mind now exists under continuous informational bombardment: notifications, clips, headlines, and successive waves of content. This does not merely fragment attention. It reshapes it according to a logic of constant jumping between short units of meaning, rather than the gradual and cumulative construction of an idea. I am reminded here of a joke that we used to tell and that was widely circulated during the days of popular demonstrations. It vividly illustrates the process of reduction and reshaping of content. After the occupation of Palestine, many popular demonstrations took to the streets chanting, “Down with the Balfour Declaration!” The joke was that by the end of the demonstration, the slogan had become, in Arabic, “Let one fall from above,” a completely different phrase that retained something of the original slogan’s rhythm and sound. This image may help bring us closer to what happens in everyday language when knowledge is transformed into short messages that are collectively repeated. A demonstration begins with a precise political slogan. Through repetition, collective immersion, and sonic rhythm, it gradually turns into a completely different formula. The new version may preserve the rhythm and emotional charge of the original, while losing its meaning and original significance. What remains is no longer the meaning, but the emotional energy of the phrase. Here, in another form, we encounter what Bartlett observed: what matters is not merely what was said, but how it was retold and how it was reinterpreted within a changing social context. If we bring these strands together, we might say that what we are experiencing today is not so much a “collapse of intelligence” as a transformation in the conditions under which intelligence operates. The human mind has not changed radically, but the environment in which it functions has changed profoundly: from an environment that allowed slow accumulation to one that imposes the rapid and fragmented reproduction of knowledge. This transformation creates a permanent tension between two kinds of thinking: reflective thought, which requires time, and rapid thought, which demands an immediate response. Seen in this light, the question “Have we become stupider?” is partly misleading. It may be more accurate to say that we are increasingly exposed to conditions that make deep thinking less stable, or less possible, and knowledge more vulnerable to fragmentation and recycling. As for stupidity, if the term can be used, it may not be a quality of the mind at all, but rather a side effect and a characteristic of the cultural structure that has emerged. It is a technology that reshapes our relationship with the world. Thus, rather than seeing this as a decline in human capacities, we might understand it as a transformation in the “knowledge environment”: an environment in which it has become easy to know something, but harder to truly understand it in depth.
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Iran War: Diplomatic Tug-of-War Against a Backdrop of Military Escalation

Less than 24 hours before the expiration of the deadline given by US President Donald Trump to Tehran to respond to the 15 points of an American plan to end the ongoing war, diplomatic contacts aimed at fostering the start of a dialogue are intensifying, while the dynamic on the ground remains one of increasing pressure: violent Israeli-American strikes against Iranian military targets continue, while Tehran continues to target civilian and military infrastructure in Israel and the Gulf countries. More than ever today, the risk of a total large-scale regional conflagration seems high if Tehran continues its prevarications regarding its nuclear and ballistic program or its «sponsorship» of militias that destabilize countries like Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen, or even Gulf countries where terrorist cells, notably linked to Hezbollah, are regularly dismantled. Should Iran provide a lukewarm response to American demands, Washington would give its green light for a ground operation it had threatened, which would involve seizing strategic points, such as Kharg Island, and three others: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. These last three islands were under United Arab Emirates control until the early 1970s but are currently held by Iranian forces, which threaten commercial navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. On Thursday, Donald Trump issued a new warning to Tehran in a message on his social network, Truth Social , calling on it to «get serious before it's too late». «Iranian negotiators are very different and strange. They would do well to get serious very quickly, before it's too late, because failing an agreement, there will be no turning back, and it's not going to be pretty», he warned. A little later, during a press conference, he reaffirmed that the American army had almost entirely destroyed Iran's military capabilities and that it was «Tehran and not the United States that desperately seeks an agreement, contrary to what some media report», adding that he was «not sure if he wanted to sign an agreement» Mediators are still striving to find common ground for an initial way out of the crisis, as confirmed by the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Badr Abdelatty, and Pakistan, Ishaq Dar. They explained that their respective countries, along with Turkey, are acting as intermediaries and transmitting messages between Tehran and Washington. «Egyptian efforts are continuing to achieve de-escalation. Although we have not yet achieved concrete results, we remain optimistic», said Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, who was received on Thursday by Lebanese President Joseph Aoun at Baabda Palace. He also stated that his country was in contact with Israel, the United States, and France to also prevent a deeper Israeli ground incursion into Lebanon, while supporting the disarmament of Hezbollah and the extension of Lebanese state authority over the entire territory. The Strait of Hormuz, a barometer of the crisis The proliferation of intermediaries reflects the complexity of resolving a multi-dimensional crisis that has quickly gone beyond the bilateral framework of Iran, on the one hand, and Israel and the United States, on the other. This dimension is particularly evident in the tug-of-war over the Strait of Hormuz, an important lever of pressure for Iran, which today crystallizes all tensions. Not only between Iran and the Tel Aviv-Washington axis, but also between the United States and its European partners. On Truth Social , the American president renewed his criticism of the Europeans who, according to him, should engage in the war to ensure the smooth passage of oil tankers and cargo ships in the Strait of Hormuz. «NATO countries have done absolutely nothing to help against this crazy nation that is Iran, now militarily decimated. The United States needs nothing from NATO, but this very important moment should never be forgotten», he warned. A threat he repeated during his press conference and which fuels European fears, in particular, of a loss of American support for Ukraine in its war against Russia. While G7 countries began discussing the Middle East issue on Thursday in Brussels, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte indicated that more than thirty states are coordinating their efforts to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, where only ships flying the flag of countries deemed «neutral» by Tehran are allowed to pass. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim thus announced that his tankers were able to cross after discussions with the Islamic Republic, while the Gulf Cooperation Council, through Jassem Al-Budaiwi, accused Iran of demanding financial compensation to let ships pass. Donald Trump rejected this «Iranian blackmail» and stated during his press conference that 154 Iranian warships had been destroyed, while Israel had announced earlier the liquidation of the commander of the Revolutionary Guards' navy, Alireza Tangsiri, «directly responsible for blocking the Strait of Hormuz». His elimination can be considered strategic in the context of a possible military operation aimed at restoring freedom of navigation in this passage. Lebanon, another node of the crisis Another complicated node of the crisis: Lebanon. On the ground, clashes between Israel and Hezbollah are intensifying. The Israeli army, which continues to advance deeper into the south of the country, far from the border, announced the death of about thirty Hezbollah militants in close-quarters combat. Only one Israeli soldier was killed during this battle. At least three other people were killed in the southern part of the country in Israeli strikes, while an Israeli succumbed to his wounds in Nahariya, targeted in the afternoon by Hezbollah. The pro-Iranian party seems to be gradually expanding the spectrum of its targets, with its rockets having reached Acre on Thursday. Behind this escalation, however, lies a significant strategic divergence. Israel, as its leaders repeatedly state, always wants to dissociate the Lebanese front from the Iranian issue, in order to maintain its freedom of military action and to put an end to the permanent threat that Hezbollah poses to localities in the northern part of its territory. A deeper incursion to establish a security zone or a buffer zone is part of this logic. The Arabic-speaking spokesperson for the Israeli army, Avichay Adraee, renewed his call on Thursday afternoon to residents of localities south of Zahrani to move north. Conversely, Tehran seems to want to link the two issues, should negotiations be held with Washington, conditioning any de-escalation, among other things, on a halt to Israeli operations in Lebanon. He reportedly sent messages to this effect to his military arm in the country. This same condition was reiterated by the head of the pro-Iranian group, Naïm Qassem, in his message broadcast on Wednesday by the al-Manar channel, during which he reaffirmed his opposition to negotiations with the Hebrew state. But the most important remains the tug-of-war between the State, which wants to assert itself and distance itself from Hezbollah, and the pro-Iranian formation and its allies, who are always seeking to impose their will. One of the main facets of this tug-of-war remains the dispute over the State's decision to expel Ambassador Mohammad Reza Chibani, appointed by Tehran to Beirut. This decision, it is recalled, was announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following consultations with the Presidency of the Republic and the Presidency of the Council. The Shiite ministers, despite being servants of the State like their colleagues, align themselves in this context with the policy of Iran and the Amal-Hezbollah tandem. In protest against a decision they deem unjustified, they boycotted Thursday's cabinet meeting held at the Serail. Only Fady Makki, an independent Shiite minister, took part in the meeting. The position of his colleagues highlighted the vast chasm that exists today between two Lebanons: that of the loyalists of a foreign power that wants to maintain its grip on the country, and that of the Lebanese who want to free themselves from the forces that spoil their sovereignty and undermine their state, without compromising on the essentials. Faced with the risks of a new Israeli occupation of part of South Lebanon, due to Hezbollah, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam instructed Foreign Minister Joe Raggi to submit a complaint against Israel to the UN. At the same time, he denounced the presence of two Hezbollah militants in the terrorist cell dismantled last week by Kuwait, and also stigmatized Iranian strikes against Gulf countries. After years of isolation, always due to Hezbollah, official Lebanon is gradually reintegrating its Arab environment and moving away from the axis that has brought it a cascade of destruction over the years.

Nabih Berri: The Architect of Iran’s Occupation of Lebanon

At a pivotal moment in Lebanon’s trajectory, the decision to expel the Iranian ambassador cannot be treated as a routine diplomatic move. It is, quite simply, the first real test of whether the Lebanese state is capable of saying “no” to a regional project that has hollowed out its sovereignty for years. But as always, the problem is not only external—it lies within, and specifically with those who claim to be partners in governance. At the center of this stands Nabih Berri, our omnipresent Speaker of the House. Berri, who today attempts to present himself as a underwriter of stability, is in reality one of the chief architects of its collapse. The man who long branded himself as a “safety valve” has instead become a valve of obstruction, blocking any serious attempt to challenge Hezbollah’s dominance and Iran’s hold over Lebanon. Let us be clear: the issue is not merely the expulsion of the Iranian ambassador, but the system that allowed that ambassador to behave as a de facto ruler, openly bypassing diplomatic norms and speaking above the Lebanese state itself. And when a minimal act of accountability is finally taken, Berri emerges to question the decision—as if Lebanese sovereignty were a matter of negotiation. What Berri is doing today is not mediation. It is protection. He knows full well that expelling an ambassador will not remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from Lebanon. Yet he still refuses even this minimal political confrontation. Why? Because any serious challenge would inevitably dismantle the very system he is deeply invested in—a system of corruption and patronage that has, for decades, provided political cover for Hezbollah’s weapons. More dangerously, Berri—who once claimed he could “contain” Hezbollah and reintegrate it into the Lebanese state—has now all but disappeared. No leadership, no clarity, only a chorus of voices warning against “provoking the Shiite community,” as though sovereignty itself were a sectarian offense. This is the equation Berri is trying to impose: any attempt to confront Hezbollah’s weapons or Iran’s influence becomes an attack on an entire sect. It is a deeply cynical and dangerous formula—not one that protects the Shiite community, but one that holds it hostage to a regional project that has little regard for its lives or its future. What we are witnessing today is, in part, a belated rescue attempt—not just of the state, but of a large segment of Lebanese Shiites whose political agency has been systematically hijacked. The irony is unmistakable: the very forces that oppose Hezbollah and its allies are often the same ones providing refuge and dignity to displaced families, while their own areas in the South are turned into battlegrounds. As for the threats of ministerial withdrawal, they are little more than political theater. The issue is not two replaceable ministers, but an armed structure that operates above and beyond the state. If Berri believes that street pressure or the specter of civil war will reverse the current trajectory, he is gravely mistaken. Lebanon has changed. Hezbollah can no longer convincingly present itself as a “resistance” movement—not after turning its weapons inward, not after embedding itself within an Iranian regional agenda. Nor can Lebanese citizens be expected to accept that stability comes from endless compromise with those who drag the country into wars it neither chose nor can sustain. Yes, the risk of escalation exists. Yes, tensions are real. But the greater danger lies in continuing this collective denial—in a political logic that attempts to normalize the abnormal, to transform the aggressor into a legitimate partner in governance. Today, the Lebanese state faces a stark choice: continue down the path of complicity, as Berri and his allies prefer, or begin—however cautiously—to reclaim its authority. Expelling the Iranian ambassador may not be sufficient, but it is a message. A message to the Lebanese before the international community—that there are still those who refuse to let Lebanon remain a platform for other people’s wars. And a message, above all, to Nabih Berri: the era of balancing acts is over. Those who believe they can continue managing this collapse as if it were a political detail will soon discover that the ground beneath them is already shifting. Lebanon does not need wheeler dealers within the state. It needs a state. And a state cannot exist as long as those entrusted with protecting it are the very ones undermining it. If a reminder is needed, what we are witnessing today is nothing more than a distorted replay of February 6, 1984—when the slogan of “ending injustice” was used to justify a coup against the state, one that ultimately transformed weapons from a supposed tool of justice into an instrument of domination. Those who took up arms that day did not do so in defense of the state, but because they deemed it absent—and decided to replace it. The result was not the restoration of the state, but its burial. The irony is stark: those who claimed to be fighting injustice gradually became its greatest agents, monopolizing power, hijacking institutions, and reproducing the very system they once claimed to resist. Today, Nabih Berri and his allies are recycling that same failed experiment: the same pretext, the same weapons, and the same outcome—a captured state, and a people expected to applaud their own subjugation in the name of “dignity” and “rights.” Well think again.

Between Trump’s “Gift” and Iranian Denials, Talks Shrouded in Uncertainty

The past 24 hours in a Middle East at war offer a stark illustration of the uneasy coexistence between intensifying fighting and persistent reports of backchannel negotiations between the United States and Iran. Even as Israeli and US strikes on Iranian military and civilian infrastructure continue unabated – and as thousands of Marines are set to be deployed to the region in the coming days – reports in credible media outlets of a 15-point list of demands set by Washington as a basis for talks with Tehran have dominated headlines since Tuesday evening, with Pakistani, Turkish and other mediation efforts reportedly under way. Strikes on the Islamic Republic’s energy infrastructure, as threatened by US President Donald Trump on Sunday, appear for now to have been delayed. According to reports by outlets such as The New York Times and Israel’s Channel 12, the 15-point US proposal focuses primarily on the nuclear issue, calling for an end to uranium enrichment and the dismantling of nuclear facilities, as well as limits on ballistic missile production and the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. One provision, concerning Lebanon and other countries in the region such as Iraq, calls for Iran to halt its support for “proxies” such as Hezbollah and the Hashed al-Shaabi – an Iran-backed Iraqi militia that has been the target of the intensified US strikes in recent days. While these measures represent the stick, the carrot is a promise to lift international sanctions – provided they can be reinstated in the event of non-compliance – along with development assistance. In return, again according to media reports, Iran is said to have set its own conditions, including the lifting of sanctions, guarantees of a definitive end to the war, control over the Strait of Hormuz, the preservation of its missile program, and compensation for war damage. Notably, there is no mention of Iran’s nuclear program, and the only ally referenced is Lebanon’s Hezbollah, for which Iranian negotiators are reportedly seeking a halt to Israeli strikes. “Excessive” Conditions Beyond these media leaks, public statements suggest a degree of American “exuberance,” as reflected in remarks made Tuesday evening by the US president, who spoke of a “very big gift” the Iranians had allegedly offered, without specifying its nature. He also insisted that Iran was seeking a deal at any cost. However, these early hopes of negotiations were quickly dampened by comments from an “official Iranian source,” who told state television on Wednesday afternoon that the US conditions were “excessive,” that Iran “would not allow Trump to dictate the end of the war,” and that Tehran would continue to fight. Is this a firm rejection or a bid to raise the stakes ahead of potential negotiations? The fate of this initiative should become clearer by the end of the week – a deadline set by Trump himself. The Heated Home Front Meanwhile, in Lebanon, tensions remain at a peak, both on the southern front and in the political arena. Clashes and exchanges of fire continue south of the Litani River between the Israeli army and Hezbollah, which has launched hundreds of drones and rockets against Israeli forces in both Lebanese and Israeli territory. While Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has claimed to have approved a new plan to expand operations in Lebanon, these statements are being translated into action on the ground: the main development on the morning of Wednesday, March 25, was the advance of Israeli forces toward the Christian village of Debl in the Bint Jbeil district. Although Hezbollah fighters are battling on a front they themselves opened, they can increasingly count less on internal solidarity within Lebanon. The dispute over the order to expel Iran’s ambassador from Lebanon, issued by the government, continues to escalate, particularly among the Shiite parties Amal and Hezbollah. After a scathing statement from Hezbollah the day before, Amal issued its own communique on Wednesday, calling on “officials to reverse the order to expel the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to prevent a political and national crisis in the country.” This decision stems from suspicions of interference in the internal affairs of Ambassador Mohammad Reza Shibani, who has yet to present his credentials to President Joseph Aoun. The move echoes reports that members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are present in significant numbers in Lebanon, using false passports to directly oversee Hezbollah, which has been without its historic commanders since 2024. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam cited these details in a recent interview. Although welcomed by many voices in Lebanon and abroad, the measure risks destabilizing the government, which is scheduled to meet on Thursday at 3 p.m. at the Grand Serail (under the Prime minister’s chairmanship, rather than that of President Aoun). Environment Minister Tamara Zein set the tone Tuesday evening during a televised interview, saying she did not rule out “the withdrawal of Shiite ministers from the government.” According to MTV, discussions are ongoing to prevent the cabinet’s implosion, likely through a solution familiar in Lebanon: either a change of ambassador or an extension of the expulsion deadline, currently set to expire Sunday evening. Added to the recurring threats from Hezbollah officials, including Wafic Safa and others, alongside tensions triggered by the government’s decision to declare the party’s military operations illegal, and the controversy surrounding President Aoun’s proposal for direct negotiations with Israel, this latest dispute further strains relations between an armed militia and the rest of Lebanon’s political actors. The atmosphere is so tense that the specters of the civil war seem to be awakening, fueled by fears of a new Israeli occupation of large areas in the South, which has already caused significant population displacement. Addressing these concerns, President Aoun told the daily an-Nahar that “there is no new civil war” in Lebanon. Into this fraught environment came a new message from Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem on Wednesday. For the second consecutive time, he did not appear on camera, even in a recorded statement; instead, his (brief) message was read by a third party on the party’s al-Manar channel. Without directly addressing the issue of the Iranian ambassador’s expulsion, Qassem said that “any negotiation under fire is a capitulation,” calling for “national unity against the Israeli-American project that will lead to Greater Israel, erasing Lebanon.” Consistent with his usual stance, Qassem argued that the state’s monopoly on arms “weakens Lebanon,” warning the government “against decisions that serve Israel’s interests, even if the intention is otherwise,” and asserting that he “has no doubt for a second about the victory of the Resistance.”

South Lebanon: Christians in Border Villages Hold Firm Despite War

Along the front line at Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, several Christian villages lie directly in the path of the fighting. As violence intensifies in this area, the Holy See has not remained indifferent to the precariousness of the Christian presence under current conditions. Pope Leon XIV, deeply moved by the plight of civilians caught in the shadow of war, solemnly spoke of the death of Maronite priest Pierre Rai of Qlayaa – a symbol of a tragedy that strikes indiscriminately. According to retired General Khalil Gemayel, former commander of the southern Litani sector, the Christian border towns include Alma el-Chaab (Tyr district), Rmeich, Aïn Ebel, Debel, Qowzah and Yaroun (Bint Jbeil district), as well as Bourj el-Moulouk, Qlayaa, Jdeidet Marjeyoun, Ibl el-Saqi and Deir Mimas (Marjeyoun district). In the Hasbaya district, there are also Rachaya el-Foukhar, Kawkaba, Abou Qamha and Mazraat Serda. From there, these border areas – particularly exposed – remain vulnerable to both airstrikes and potential ground clashes. “The majority of these villages are on the front lines and face daily military developments that have caused the deaths of many residents,” General Gemayel notes. In this context, he adds that “the ongoing military activities of Israel and Hezbollah keep these areas under constant threat.” He describes a fragile security situation, marked by “great concern” and in need of enhanced protective measures. Staying Put Despite Everything In this climate of constant tension, reports from the ground underscore both the intensity of the pressure and the determination of residents not to succumb to exodus. According to Nawraj NGO president Fouad Abou Nader, “no fewer than 17,950 Christian residents currently remain in the Christian villages of southern Lebanon, out of 70,000 who lived there before the outbreak of the March 2026 war.” He adds that “these residents, on the front line, have decided to stay in their homes and on their land, refusing to abandon them despite the extremely difficult security situation.” From this perspective, Abou Nader stresses a central point: the need for an effective state presence. He highlights “the role of the Internal Security Forces, which, in the absence of a full military deployment, must maintain an active presence on the ground and in police stations.” According to him, “such a presence would preserve a vital link between the residents and the homeland.” Moreover, this presence is seen as “crucial” to prevent “populations from turning to Israel for supplies,” which could be mistakenly interpreted as an act of betrayal. At the same time, the most urgent needs are becoming clearer. They primarily include medicines, healthcare services, and job creation – all essential for enabling residents to stay and maintain a decent standard of living. Added to this are access to fuel, essential supplies, and the continued functioning of schools – all key factors in preventing an exodus to Beirut or other cities. From a broader perspective, Abou Nader warns of a strategic shift in the conflict. According to him, “the current situation differs from the previous war,” with Israel now pursuing “a scorched-earth strategy aimed at emptying the South of its residents to create a buffer zone.” Local and International Mobilization In response to this reality, action has not been slow. Several civil and community associations have coordinated their efforts to support the Christian border villages. On the ground, this mobilization takes the form of providing fuel, food, medicines, and reconstruction materials. “These initiatives aim to rehabilitate infrastructure, reinforce the legitimate presence of the state, and strengthen Lebanon’s diplomatic role,” explains Abou Nader, noting that they benefit all communities in the South – Christian, Druze, Sunni, and Shia – without distinction. In the same spirit, he emphasizes the importance of coexistence among the different components of Lebanese society. Nawraj is developing projects, including the “SAWA” program, designed to foster coexistence and strengthen residents’ attachment to their land. At the international level, efforts continue. The NGO focuses on fundraising and implementing long-term projects aimed at stabilizing the southern villages and preventing their depopulation. Finally, Abou Nader calls on the Lebanese state to “fully assume its responsibilities by ending the internal power struggles that have weakened the country and allowed foreign interference, particularly from Iran.” While he believes that “the current exodus is temporary,” he nevertheless warns that “Israel could create a buffer zone in the South.” A Humanitarian Response Takes Shape Building on these initiatives, church institutions have also organized their response. Michel Constantine, regional director of the pontifical mission CNEWA (Catholic Near East Welfare Association), notes that several meetings have been held – notably in Bkerké and at Caritas – to assess needs and map the aid available. In this context, a crisis committee has been established to coordinate the work of different organizations and avoid duplication. Through regular meetings and a shared monitoring system, information on funding, its use, and the beneficiaries is centralized and updated according to the evolving situation. Once this data is consolidated, a humanitarian convoy will be sent to southern Lebanon to assess conditions on the ground. It will include representatives from Caritas and other church organizations, under the coordination of APEC (Assembly of Catholic Patriarchs and Bishops of Lebanon), represented by its secretary-general, Father Jean Younes. To Stay or to Leave: A Fragile Balance On the ground, the situation remains precarious. According to Constantine, nearly 4,530 families still live in the southern villages, with a Christian presence maintained across 15 localities. At the same time, 960 families have left these villages. Of these, 200 have sought refuge in Rmeich and Deir Mimas, while nearly 750 others have settled elsewhere, primarily with relatives, notably in Beirut. The challenge is clear: enabling residents to remain. The pontifical mission focuses its aid on essential needs – food, fuel, and medicines – as well as on communication tools, which are crucial in the event of road closures. Within this framework, a system of vouchers or supermarket cards is being considered for displaced families, allowing them to purchase necessary goods directly. Finally, it is worth noting that this aid transcends religious affiliations. Some Muslim families have taken refuge in these villages, particularly in Rmeich, and are also receiving assistance. The Church on the Front Line Alongside humanitarian efforts, religious and diplomatic initiatives are multiplying. Apostolic Nuncio Paolo Borgia has visited several Christian villages, commending the resilience of residents and reaffirming the Church’s support. In the same vein, Maronite Patriarch Bechara Raï described the Christians of the South as a “bulwark on the borders,” while announcing that the Bishop of Tyre, Charbel Abdallah, would be stationed in Rmeich to represent him. On the diplomatic front, Foreign Minister Joe Raggi sought the intervention of the Holy See. In discussions with Archbishop Paul Richard Gallagher, the latter assured that “the Vatican is continuing its efforts to curb the escalation and prevent the displacement of populations.” Towards a South Emptied of Its Residents? Beyond the humanitarian emergency, a strategic concern is emerging. For General Khalil Gemayel, “the possibility of creating a buffer zone in southern Lebanon is today one of the main threats.” He says Israel is pursuing an undeclared objective aimed at establishing an area emptied of its residents along the border. This scenario would explain both the intensity of the attacks and the gradual exodus of the population. He recalls that during the previous war, “the presence of the Lebanese army provided a measure of security” – a guarantee that is now absent. From this perspective, several conditions appear necessary to enable residents to stay or return: security guarantees through the presence of the Lebanese army and UNIFIL, rehabilitation of infrastructure, sustainable economic support, as well as international guarantees, notably from the Vatican. Failing this, he concludes, “the risk of seeing these villages gradually emptied of their residents remains very real.”

Lebanon Caught in a Vice
By
Rami Rayess
Published

In times of war and crisis, the Lebanese scene divides between those who drag every division and grievance back to the surface in order to inflame and worsen them, and those who work to build a climate of national unity capable of carrying the country through the difficult period, waiting for calmer days in which the great national questions might at last be addressed. It is certain that this is not the moment to plunge into questions as deep and fraught as the validity of the Taif Agreement, the nature of the political system, or the abolition of political confessionalism. This is a phase for ending the war, for tending the wounds, for finding a way out of the impasse into which the country has sunk — an impasse that nothing, for now, suggests will be easy to escape in the near term. There are axioms that cannot be abandoned if the country is to pull itself out of the deep rut it is in — axioms whose abandonment has already proven, in practice, to carry a very steep price: — The exclusivity of arms in the hands of the Lebanese State. There is no alternative but to reach this reality, which is taken for granted in every country in the world. No state agrees to "outsource" the defence of its territory to an armed faction that does not answer to its authority and is bound, in its relationships, its financing and its weaponry, to a foreign state. The Lebanese government has made meaningful advances in this direction, but neither the unrelenting Israeli strikes have helped it accomplish its mission, nor has the very nature of implementing this difficult decision — that of the arms monopoly, which touches on numerous internal complexities and sensitivities — provided it the means to do so. As for those counting on Israel to take care of this, the experience of the fifteen months between the ceasefire and the resumption of hostilities should make it hard to believe in that option, however devastating the blows dealt to Hezbollah have been. — The decision of war and peace. If the conviction has taken root in the minds of the vast majority of Lebanese that the State must hold the monopoly on arms and the defence function, the same applies to the decision of war and peace, of which the State alone must be the holder. The irresponsible invocation of the refusal of this reality, on the pretext that it is Israel which today decides war and peace with Lebanon, does not remove the necessity of settling this question on Lebanese terms — this argument is just as unacceptable as the claim once made that Israel would have launched the war regardless, even had Hezbollah not fired its six rockets at the occupied territories. — A defence plan. It is impossible to look away from the necessity for Lebanon to think seriously, going forward, about how to protect its territory from Israeli aggressions that have never truly ceased on its soil since the Nakba of 1948, ebbing and intensifying according to political and military circumstances. While Lebanon will certainly never be able, with its official forces alone, to face an Israeli army guaranteed regional military supremacy by unlimited American backing, it is nonetheless essential to devise more flexible arrangements capable of protecting its southern border and the frontline villages, as they have come to be known. It remains the case that the political and military challenges now facing Lebanon call for an active diplomatic mobilisation, led by the Lebanese government, to place the proposals of the President of the Republic on the table — through the intermediary of Lebanon's friends — even if those proposals have been met with an Israeli political coldness that stands in sharp contrast to the blaze on the Lebanese front. It is clear that the diplomatic paralysis that set in days after the start of the war stems from Israel's rejection of all proposals and its complete lack of urgency in extinguishing this front — all the more so as Hezbollah, driven by the anger provoked by the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, has recovered something of the initiative, launching salvos of rockets that deprive the inhabitants of northern Israel, along the Lebanese border, of all security and stability, forcing them to seek refuge in underground shelters. If Israel shows no sign of haste in bringing the war against Lebanon to an end, the greater danger remains its intention to reoccupy large swathes of southern Lebanon — which would represent a major reversal of the liberation of 2000, wrested at the cost of great sacrifice, honour and defiance, and the loss of a considerable achievement that set Lebanon apart at the time as the only Arab country to have compelled Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied, not only without a peace agreement, but without restriction or condition of any kind. Lebanon today faces a bitter truth: it is Lebanon that is offering negotiations to Israel, and Israel that is refusing them — whereas in the past it was Israel that repeatedly sought to conclude a peace treaty with Lebanon, and Lebanon that would not consent. Between that moment and this one, what matters is that the country not lose itself in the incendiary rhetoric coming from both sides: on one side, those who boast of their strength despite the strikes and ceaselessly threaten to descend on the Lebanese interior when the time comes; on the other, those ready to absolve Israel of all its aggressions and all its targeting, who seem barely capable of registering that more than a thousand martyrs have fallen in Lebanon in the space of two weeks alone!

For the First Time Since Taif, Beirut Asserts Its Authority in the Face of the Iranian Axis

Following the official ban on the military activities of Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon, the decision to expel Iran’s ambassador to Beirut and recall the head of Lebanon’s diplomatic mission in Tehran undoubtedly marks the most consequential step taken by Nawaf Salam’s government since Hezbollah drew the country into the military confrontation opposing Iran to Israel and the United States. And for good reason: for the first time since Taif (1989), the Lebanese authorities are setting clear limits and seeking to shield the country from foreign interference in its internal affairs – interference that has often proved damaging, even devastating. On Tuesday, Lebanon’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the chargé d’affaires at the Iranian embassy to inform him that Lebanon had decided to withdraw the accreditation of Ambassador Mohammad Reza Shibani, ordering him to leave the country no later than Sunday. Appointed in mid-February to head Iran’s diplomatic mission in Beirut, Shibani arrived in the Lebanese capital just one week before the outbreak of the war. The decision to expel him was immediately welcomed in Tel Aviv and Paris, while figures within Hezbollah’s orbit decried it as a scandal. Why does it matter? Because it allows the Lebanese state to demonstrate that it is serious about restoring its sovereignty and putting an end to armed groups and their backers, at a time when its (in)action following the initial decision taken in early March had drawn criticism both domestically and internationally. Beirut is thus signaling that, while it remains, for now, unable to halt the destructive course into which Hezbollah has drawn the country or to initiate the disarmament of a militia that continues to threaten the Lebanese authorities, it nonetheless retains room for maneuver on the political and judicial fronts – arrest warrants have, in fact, been issued against a group of militiamen apprehended while transporting rockets to southern Lebanon. Hezbollah and Amal’s Rebellion The big question remains how far the government will go, politically and judicially, against Hezbollah, whose leaders and close associates have denounced the expulsion of Iran’s ambassador. According to multiple consistent sources, Hezbollah and the head of the Amal movement – who also serves as Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri – contacted the ambassador to urge him to remain in his post and ignore the Lebanese government’s order to leave the country. Some sources further reported that the ambassador regards the expulsion order as “void.” By the end of the day, Hezbollah issued a statement sharply attacking Foreign Minister Joe Raggi and rejecting the government’s decision. Alongside Hezbollah and Nabih Berri’s defiance of the government, the vice-president of the Supreme Shiite Council, Ali Khatib, who operates within Iran’s orbit, denounced the measure as “hasty, reckless, illegitimate, and unjustified.” In reality, however, the decision was long overdue. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam himself confirmed just a few days ago what has long been evident: Revolutionary Guard operatives are present in Lebanon in force, tasked with coordinating the war against Israel and, well before the outbreak of hostilities, organizing and training the leaders and fighters of the Iran-aligned group. The most serious aspect of the religious leader’s remarks is that he described an official government decision as “a provocation against a Lebanese community” – referring to the Shiite community, which Hezbollah claims to represent exclusively. The expulsion of the Iranian diplomat, at the government’s request, is justified in particular by the fact that Ambassador Shibani violated the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and failed in his obligations by interfering in Lebanon’s internal affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained in a statement. The ministry emphasized that the measure does not constitute a break in diplomatic relations with Iran, but follows, according to the statement, a series of the ambassador’s actions – including his public comments on Lebanese domestic politics and his assessments of government decisions – all of which contravene established diplomatic norms. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also criticized Mohammad Reza Shibani for meeting with unofficial Lebanese groups without coordinating with the ministry – a clear reference to Hezbollah. The precedent of Albert Moukheiber with the Egyptian ambassador It is worth recalling in this regard the precedent, in the contemporary history of Lebanon, of the expulsion of the Egyptian ambassador from Beirut in the context of the 1958 civil war. Albert Moukheiber was then acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and decided to expel the Egyptian ambassador, who was accused, as in the current case of the Iranian ambassador, of destabilizing interference in Lebanese internal affairs. Escalation of Strikes This development comes as tensions on the ground have intensified – violent exchanges of fire have resumed between Israel and Hezbollah, in the context of a wider regional escalation. One striking element on Tuesday was the entanglement of Iraq, like Lebanon, in the ongoing conflict: fifteen fighters of the pro-Iranian Hashed al-Shaabi militia, including a senior commander, were killed at dawn in an airstrike on western Iraq – the deadliest attack against this alliance of former paramilitaries, which denounced it as “an American strike.” Among the victims was “the Al-Anbar operations commander for the Hashed al-Shaabi, Saad Dawaï.” The strike in the Habbaniya area occurred during a command meeting, according to an alliance official who spoke to AFP. Al-Anbar, a predominantly Sunni region, is Iraq’s largest province by area and borders the strategically important frontiers with Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Illustrating the spiral into which Iraq is being drawn amid the regional conflict, the autonomous Kurdistan region in the north accused Iran of firing ballistic missiles at its armed forces, killing six Peshmerga soldiers. In both cases, these are the deadliest attacks since the war began on 28 February. In the past, Iran has fired ballistic missiles at the autonomous region, but in recent years relations had warmed. With the war, Kurdistan’s leaders are exercising caution and seeking to maintain a degree of neutrality. In a statement, the Peshmerga Ministry denounced “an act of aggression (…) far from any principle of good neighborliness” – adding, “We reiterate our sovereign and legitimate right to respond to any aggression against our people and our territory.” Iran, which has just appointed Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr – a former Revolutionary Guard commander and loyalist of the late Ali Larijani – to replace him as head of the Supreme Security Council, has continued its attacks against Israel. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait announced that they, too, were facing drone and missile attacks. In response, the Israeli army struck around a hundred targets, including a series of airstrikes on Isfahan. According to Fars News Agency, two Iranian energy facilities were hit in joint Israeli-American strikes, just hours after the unexpected announcement by U.S. President Donald Trump to spare certain power plants for five days – the deadline he had set for Tehran to respond to the conditions laid out for negotiations. In Israel, around ten Iranian missiles targeted the north and central regions of the country, wounding several people in Tel Aviv – once again underscoring the intensity of a confrontation that threatens to escalate, despite the prospect of upcoming negotiations between Tehran and Washington. Talks and Skepticism In this context, it is worth noting that in Israel, a degree of skepticism persists regarding the potential outcome of U.S.-Iranian talks, announced on Monday by Donald Trump. The president has set himself a five-day window to advance discussions with “a senior Iranian official,” whom he did not identify, before resuming bombings and targeting, in particular, Iran’s power grid. On the diplomatic front, unconfirmed reports of bilateral discussions continue to emerge, while media outlets report that the U.S. military is preparing to deploy additional troops and assets to the Middle East. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose war objectives do not always align with those of his ally, revealed that Trump considers it possible “to reach an agreement that would preserve Israel’s vital interests.” But “at the same time, we continue to strike both Iran and Lebanon.” In response, the Revolutionary Guards stated that they would continue launching missiles at Israel if it “persists in its attacks against Lebanon and Palestine.” Iranian missiles in Lebanese airspace were intercepted Tuesday afternoon, amid conflicting reports about their intended target – the U.S. embassy in Awkar or Cyprus. In any case, debris fell across several areas of Kesrouan without causing casualties. From Tehran, the Foreign Ministry only acknowledged receiving, through “friendly countries,” “messages conveying an American request for negotiations.” Whatever the real scope of these diplomatic initiatives, Qatar, Egypt, and Pakistan said they support “all efforts” to promote dialogue. While Doha indicated it does not wish to participate directly, Islamabad expressed willingness to host potential U.S.-Iran talks, stating that it had been approached for this purpose. Doha also suggested that Iran’s neighbors should collectively review their security arrangements. “The Gulf states, which have worked in close coordination (…) to ensure their security, need to reassess (…) a common regional security framework,” said Majed al-Ansari, spokesperson for the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Washington, White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt did not deny reports of Pakistani diplomatic initiatives but urged that these “speculations” not be “taken as confirmed” until officially announced by Washington. The involvement of Islamabad would make sense, says Michael Kugelman, South Asia expert at the Atlantic Council. “Pakistan is one of the few countries that maintains warm relations with both Tehran and Washington” and “it represents Tehran’s diplomatic interests in Washington,” where Iran has no embassy. Egypt, for its part, appears to be pursuing its own agenda. Its Foreign Minister, Badr Abdelatty, has held talks in recent days with representatives from Iran, the United States, Türkiye, and Pakistan, according to official statements. Rubio in Europe In any case, with the deadline set by Donald Trump for Iran expiring on Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is expected to be in France for a G7 meeting, where he is set to discuss the war in Iran and the broader situation in the Middle East with his European counterparts. This will be his first foreign trip since the United States and Israel attacked Iran on 28 February.