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Lebanon did not collapse because of a flaw in the numbers, but because meanings and values fell apart. Suddenly, the money stolen from ordinary people was no longer called theft, but a “financial gap.” There were no longer any responsible parties, only “losses.” And there were no longer any victims, only “depositors” who were being asked to understand the circumstances and share in bearing the cost. This is not merely a matter of language. It is the very heart of the battle. When a crime is reduced to an accounting term, the debate becomes technical rather than ethical and legal. The issue is removed from the arena of justice and transferred to that of management, shifting from “who stole?” to “how do we distribute the loss?” And here begins the great slide: the victims gradually transform from rights holders into actors in the solution, rather than bearers of rights. What happened in Lebanon was not a passing financial storm. It was the result of a conspiracy orchestrated by an entire system: a state that borrowed without limit, a central bank that engineered illusions, and banks that accumulated extraordinary profits before slamming their doors in the faces of their depositors. And yet, the solutions being proposed today start from the pockets of ordinary people, not from the sources of the dysfunction. Plans are presented under “realistic” or “escue” headings, while in essence they amount to nothing more than a redistribution of losses, rather than a treatment of their causes. Depositors are being asked to accept the write-off of a portion of their assets, or their conversion into shares in entities whose value remains undefined. Even the proposals that appear less harsh — such as the idea of a sovereign fund into which state assets would be placed — are not without danger, not because of the concept itself, but because of those who would manage it. That is why this idea remains ambiguous and perilous as long as it is not tied to a basic condition: who guarantees transparency, and who is held accountable? The fundamental contradiction is that whoever calls for transparency and judicial reform is simultaneously proposing to hand state assets over to a system that has so far demonstrated no capacity for transparency or accountability. For my part, the problem lies not only in the solutions themselves, but in the ordering of priorities: do we begin with accountability, or do we leap over it? How can one speak of “governance” and “sound management” of state assets in a country that has yet to succeed in conducting a single serious audit, or in holding any actual official accountable for the collapse? How can one trust that what was not preserved in the banks will be preserved in a fund? Is this not simply a transfer of losses from the balance sheets of banks to the body of the state itself — that is, to society as a whole? More dangerous still is the leap over a fundamental principle: no lasting solution can be built on a foundation that ignores responsibilities. At that point the debate is no longer merely economic; it is also legal. For Lebanon is not outside the world, and it is bound by international anti-corruption conventions, including UNCAC, which unequivocally places the recovery of looted assets and accountability at the heart of any reform process. If there has been corruption, it is not enough to manage its consequences; it must be exposed, those responsible must be held accountable, and the stolen funds must be recovered. States are obligated to pursue the recovery of assets that have been stolen or transferred by illicit means, and it is not possible to bypass the determination of responsibilities: who made the decisions? who benefited? who provided cover? What is required is transparency: any reform must pass through genuine auditing, an independent judiciary, and clarity in the figures. I am not a financial expert, but I know that there is a difference between treating losses and treating their causes. In other words: before people are asked to absorb the losses, a serious effort must be made to recover what was transferred or benefited from through illegal means. And before restructuring the banking system, those who abused it must be identified. But perhaps the most dangerous thing is not the substance of these proposals, but their timing. At a moment of war, existential anxiety and crucial negotiations open onto long-term contingencies, the depositors’ file is being reopened. Not because the timing is right, but because it may suit those who wish to push through what would not survive a broader public debate. In moments of widespread distraction, the capacity for resistance weakens, discussions are cut short, and what was once unacceptable becomes passable under the banner of “necessity.” Existential questions require collective awareness, not collective exhaustion. They require open debate, not the pressure of time and fear. For solutions imposed in moments of weakness are rarely just. This does not mean the file can be postponed indefinitely. But there is a great difference between raising a fundamental issue within the framework of an open national debate and slipping it into the crush of fear and fatigue, where citizens are transformed from engaged participants into passive recipients. Major questions do not require only solutions, but equitable conditions under which to be raised. They need collective awareness, not collective exhaustion. For otherwise, any solution — however technical or balanced it may appear — will carry within it the distortion of the moment that gave it birth. The problem does not lie in the search for solutions, but in the nature of those solutions and in the ordering of priorities. When any plan begins by erasing rights rather than securing them, and by protecting the system rather than calling it to account, it does not address the crisis: it reproduces it in another form. What is being demanded today is not a financial miracle, but a minimum of justice. That things be called by their proper names. That responsibilities be determined. That a genuine attempt be made to recover the funds. Otherwise, we will be faced with a familiar spectacle: New language, new terminology, a new formula… but the same result. Not a “gap,” but a plain story: funds that were stolen, and a system attempting to convince their rightful owners to accept the loss as fate.

Mali has been traversing a multidimensional crisis since 2012, one whose roots plunge into the Libyan collapse, which flooded the Sahel with weapons and fighters, durably transforming the entire region’s security balance. That year, Tuareg rebels had proclaimed the independence of the country’s north before being rapidly supplanted by their Islamist allies linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. France then intervened militarily in 2013 to contain the jihadist advance, without ever managing to eradicate it. The following decade was, for Mali, one of continuous deterioration. The 2015 Algiers peace accords between Bamako and the northern armed movements were never fully implemented. Terrorism spread into the centre and south of the country, and intercommunal violence intensified. In 2020 and again in 2021, two successive coups brought Colonel Assimi Goïta to power, whose military junta named itself the “Transition” — pending a return to constitutional order — yet this supposedly provisional arrangement has now persisted for five years without any credible electoral horizon in sight. The Shadow of Putin over Africa The junta immediately set about breaking with its former partners. France was asked to withdraw its forces. The United Nations saw its peacekeeping mission curtailed then expelled. In their place came Wagner, the Russian private militia since rebranded as the “Africa Corps,” deployed on Malian soil with several thousand men. Mali then joined Burkina Faso and Niger — both also governed by coup-born juntas — to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which broke with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the fifteen-member regional organisation, and turned to Moscow for its security backing. Russia’s presence in Mali is certainly not an exercise in security philanthropy. It rests on a model already proven in the Central African Republic, Sudan and Libya: trading military protection for access to natural resources. In this specific case, Malian gold — the Africa Corps having been documented at the country’s main artisanal mining sites. Beyond that, Moscow pursues broader objectives: validating the narrative of a neocolonial West, securing proxy votes at the United Nations, monitoring French and American military and diplomatic movements in the Sahel, and opening new markets for its weapons. Morocco and Algeria The Malian conflict, at first reading, pits a weakened military government and its Russian allies against two types of armed adversaries: Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist groups, of which the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM, known by its French acronym GSIM) is the principal operational structure across the Sahel, and the separatist movements of the North, grouped within the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA, a reconfigured heir to the 2012 Tuareg separatist movements). But this reading of the de facto forces is insufficient without the regional geopolitical dimension, where two competing influence projects are in reality at play: that of Algeria, which has long weighed on the Malian file through its mediation and networks, and that of Morocco, which has patiently built an African foothold grounded in economic, religious and security cooperation. Mali’s diplomatic about-face of 10 April 2026 — the withdrawal of recognition from the Sahrawi Republic backed by Algiers — abruptly brought this rivalry into the open. The 25 April Offensive It was in this context that the 25 April 2026 offensive unfolded, as the JNIM and the FLA launched a series of coordinated attacks on Bamako, Kati, Mopti, Sévaré, Gao, Bourem and Kidal — covering the entire north-south axis of the country, from the Saharan desert to the capital. A systemic offensive whose reach extends far beyond the usual front lines into the fields of regional geopolitics, revealing fractures that diplomacy had tried to conceal. The attack simultaneously targeted the regime’s political heart in the south and its military strongholds in the north. Sévaré/Mopti, for example, is the country’s nerve centre and main road hub, and its capture cuts the north off from the south. Gao, the northern capital, is the army’s main operational hub in the region and commands a strategic bridge over the Niger River. Bourem is a crossroads between Gao and Timbuktu. Kidal, finally, 1,500 km from Bamako and on Algeria’s doorstep, is the historic heartland of Tuareg rebellions. The very fact of briefly reaching Bamako — JNIM fighters having penetrated the capital’s outskirts and occupied the approaches to the Modibo Keïta International Airport — constitutes an unprecedented political statement. The gravity of the situation is without precedent since the events of March 2012, when Tuareg rebels, quickly ousted by their Islamist allies linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, had seized control of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. The Nature of the Offensive According to the Malian government, the jihadist attacks aimed, beyond mere terror, to shatter national cohesion and overthrow the institutions of the Transition. The heaviest symbol was undoubtedly the death of General Sadio Camara, the Defence Minister, killed by a suicide car bomb at his own residence in Kati, just fifteen kilometres from the capital — and the country’s main military base. Kidal then passed entirely under the control of the FLA and the JNIM, after Russian Africa Corps forces — the institutional successor to the Russian Wagner group, deployed in Mali since 2021 — concluded a withdrawal agreement and were evacuated to Tessalit, while the Malian soldiers who remained were taken prisoner. This last point deserves dwelling on, as it is arguably the weightiest strategic fact of the week. In November 2023, the Africa Corps had presented its capture of the city as the junta’s founding victory. In less than thirty months, this “founding myth” has been erased. Beyond that, the loss of Kidal reveals an operational defeat of the security model the Malian junta has chosen since 2021: an armed sovereignty resting on the partnership with the Russian Africa Corps, in place of the multilateral frameworks it had dismissed. Yet this partnership, on which Bamako had built a substantial share of its internal legitimacy and international posture, did not hold against a coordinated offensive on a nodal point in the North. The result of the offensive is cataclysmic: roads to Bamako blocked, central cities ensuring north-south connectivity placed under control or fire, and the front line shifted from the north and centre of the country to the very gates of Bamako. The junta staked its bet on a security model whose limits 25 April exposed, and the vulnerabilities revealed by the attack stem as much from internal governance failures that no sincere partner of Mali has an interest in passing over in silence, as from the manoeuvres of external powers. What is also now clear is that the coordination between the FLA and the JNIM transcends the purely military context. The long-held notion of an Azawad rebellion confined to identity-based demands distinct from jihadist structures has been shaken; all these files now appear difficult to keep separate. The signals of this entanglement had been accumulating for years. The Moroccan Response In this context, Morocco’s position had the merit of clarity and coherence. In a communiqué, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the direction of Nasser Bourita, expressed its firm condemnation of the terrorist attacks in Mali and reaffirmed its total solidarity with the Malian authorities and people, conveying condolences to the victims’ families. It recalled that Morocco has long warned of the gravity of the situation in several Sahel countries and of the need to strengthen their governments and institutions against terrorist and separatist threats. This stance inscribes itself within a constant doctrine, articulated over years around the respect for state sovereignty, the unequivocal rejection of terrorism, and support for national institutions confronting fragmentation. A doctrine all the more convincing for also serving Rabat’s very real strategic interests in a region where its influence has considerably expanded — the coincidence of national interest and principled consistency conferring upon it precisely the durability that mere tactical calculation could never produce. A Moroccan diplomatic source had specified, as early as 25 April, that Morocco had followed with deep concern the terrorist and separatist attacks targeting Bamako and other cities, emphasising that they had deliberately targeted both civilian and military zones. This responsiveness was the product of an intense strategic rapprochement between Rabat and Bamako, which had reached a remarkable point of diplomatic consecration just weeks before the offensive. The 10 April Turning Point On 10 April 2026, Mali officially withdrew its recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), an entity proclaimed by the Polisario Front — a Sahrawi independence movement backed by Algiers since the 1970s — and historically supported by several African states as a pressure lever against Rabat. This was a position Bamako had maintained for decades. This diplomatic reversal reflects the transitional Malian authorities’ desire to assert an independent and pragmatic foreign policy, grounded in alliances dictated by mutual interests and concrete benefits. The fallout was immediate: the forthcoming abolition of the Electronic Travel Authorisation for Malian nationals travelling to Morocco, as well as the doubling of study grants for Malian students, raised to three hundred per year. This partnership itself inscribed within a broader international dynamic, carried by UN Security Council Resolution 2797, adopted on 31 October 2025 by eleven votes, which renews the MINURSO mandate — the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara — while fully supporting negotiations based on Morocco’s autonomy plan, Algeria having again, as in the previous year, chosen not to participate in the vote. For Algiers, Mali’s 10 April reversal amounts to far more than a diplomatic rebuff. The Malian decision further isolated the Polisario entity on the African scene and sealed a strategic partnership between Bamako and Rabat that deprives Algeria of one of its historic levers of influence in the Sahel. The 25 April attacks come barely fifteen days after this rupture, in a country where the objective conditions for a major JNIM and FLA offensive existed independently of the diplomatic calendar. The progressive blockade of road arteries in the North, documented since autumn 2025, had already constituted a prelude to escalation. Admittedly, reducing causality to the diplomatic sequence alone would be intellectually reductive; yet the chronological correlation supports a more limited and more solid conclusion — namely, that the 25 April attacks were exploited, and no doubt precipitated, in a context where certain regional actors had fresh and powerful reasons to want to demonstrate the fragility of Mali’s choice. The Battle of Narratives The battlefield of arms is not the only terrain on which this crisis is being fought, and it may be on the other terrain that the long-term stakes are most revealing. Several indicators point to the existence of a coordinated information offensive aimed at exploiting the attacks to undermine Mali’s image and sow doubt about its strategic choices — manifesting in sustained activity across social media and certain para-media platforms relaying often unverified content, rumours of Malian officials in flight, exaggerated casualty figures, mass-disseminated institutional collapse scenarios — with the twofold objective of weakening internal confidence in Mali and altering its international perception. On this point, it is necessary to distinguish what is verifiably established from what is interpretation. That disinformation campaigns flourished in the hours following the attacks, on social networks where accounts supporting one side or the other engaged in exchanges mixing disinformation, nationalist outbidding and incitement to violence, is a documented fact, predating the April events and embedded in a longer sequence of Algerian-Malian tensions. That a centralised coordination is responsible: the thesis is entirely plausible, consistent with mechanisms typically observed in other theatres of regional competition. It would, however, require greater proof to be affirmed without reservation. The logic of interest, by contrast, needs no further demonstration: the narrative destabilisation of Mali, in this precise context, only benefits those who have an interest in demonstrating the failure of the 10 April diplomatic turn. The architecture of some of these campaigns rests on a carefully maintained distinction between measured official discourse and more aggressive actions carried out by indirect relays — anonymous accounts, militant influencers, unofficial media — a configuration that allows aggressive narratives to be disseminated while maintaining a form of plausible deniability at the state level. Algerian diplomacy thus chose the path of official clarification, with Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf reiterating the absolute rejection of all forms of terrorism and recalling Algeria’s historic mediation role in Mali through the 2015 accords — which are precisely those that the junta broke in 2021. Their invocation as proof of good faith reflects a selective reading of recent history that the facts struggle to support. Azawad Is Not the Sahara Among the most revealing rhetorical manoeuvres of recent days is the attempt, observed in several media spaces, to establish an equivalence between the Azawad question and that of the Moroccan Sahara. The comparison is constructed from whole cloth — either to disqualify the Moroccan position by dressing it in Sahelian violence, or to confer on Azawad claims an international legitimacy that the events of 25 April have durably stripped away. The Moroccan Sahara inscribes itself in an international dynamic oriented towards a political solution around autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, supported by a growing number of actors. This framework remains subject to legal contestations — and Algeria is not alone in formulating them — but it enjoys a now-solid UN anchorage, extensive Western recognition and an active diplomatic process. The situation in northern Mali, by contrast, involves an internal problem marked by armed violence, entanglement with jihadist structures, and the absence of any comparable process. The 25 April offensive demonstrated, irrefutably, that separatism and terrorism no longer constitute separate operational bodies in this theatre. The AES’s Silence One fact deserves noting without equivocation. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a confederation grouping Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger since 2023, remained discreet and offered no explicit support to Bamako at the time of the attacks. According to Le Monde, the clearest condemnations of the jihadist offensive against the junta came from its geopolitical adversaries, notably ECOWAS. ECOWAS firmly condemned the 25 April attacks, calling on all states and regional mechanisms to unite in a coordinated effort against terrorism. The solidarity between Sahel states, so often invoked as the ideological foundation of the Alliance, proved more rhetorical than practical at the precise moment when it was most expected — an irony that the Malian junta, in its structural rejection of ECOWAS, will one day have to reckon with in the lucidity that extreme situations always eventually impose. What the Crisis Reveals Beyond the immediate circumstances, the Malian crisis appears more than ever as a revelator of regional competitive dynamics, where security stakes are compounded by informational confrontations and deep geopolitical rivalries. It also reveals the limits of a security governance model that has substituted ideological allegiances for partnerships built over time — and which finds itself, in the hour of trial, more alone than it believed. Countries like Morocco or the United Arab Emirates, engaged in forms of cooperation with Bamako, find themselves at the heart of campaigns aimed at discrediting them or challenging their role — which betrays, precisely, the strategic importance of these partnerships in the eyes of those who are troubled by them. The lesson that emerges from these days concerns the nature of the choice that Sahelian states are called to make: between a sovereignty backed by partnerships founded on mutual respect, unambiguous commitment against terrorism and a long-term vision for regional development, and a dependence on logics of manipulation that exploit their vulnerabilities without ever resolving them. In finding its way back to Rabat, Bamako made a choice whose terms and limits can be debated, but whose underlying coherence withstands scrutiny — and which other actors found sufficiently threatening for the coincidence of dates, in this specific case, to lose much of its innocence. For Mali is as much a geopolitical testing ground as a partner. And what 25 April revealed is the structural limit of that model. The most striking example is Russia — a power that presents itself as the guarantor of its African partners’ security, but whose credibility is directly put to the test every time that security fails. The question now posed, to which no answer is yet possible, is this: if the junta falters for good, will Moscow defend its partner, or its mines? Such is the perennial and painful question that history poses, from time immemorial, to all those who have the misfortune of being at once coveted and fragile — and who, carried away by the intoxication of power and believing themselves invincible, come to forget their primary condition.

The standoff between the Lebanese presidency and Hezbollah – and President Joseph Aoun’s resolve to press ahead with direct negotiations with Israel under Washington’s auspices – is reportedly placing his life at risk. The warning surfaced over the past 24 hours from an unlikely source: Israeli intelligence services. A report aired by Israel’s Channel 12 cited a military intelligence briefing indicating that “the involvement of the Lebanese president in direct negotiations with Israel could endanger his life.” According to local broadcaster MTV Lebanon, the information is being taken seriously at Baabda Palace, the seat of the presidency. Even so, Aoun appears unwilling to back down from his commitment to pursuing an agreement with Tel Aviv aimed at ending the conflict into which Hezbollah has drawn the country. Did these warnings weigh on the meeting that the head of state, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam were due to hold on Wednesday in Baabda to discuss the framework for negotiations? Early in the day, reports circulated of Berri’s “hesitation”. It later became clear that he would not be heading to the presidential palace, under the pretext of “Israeli escalation in southern Lebanon.” The three leaders had spoken by phone the previous day. The reasons the tripartite meeting in Baabda – postponed indefinitely – failed to take place on Wednesday remain unclear. To what extent did the security threat play a role? Was it the real motive behind the pretext of Israeli escalation invoked by Berri? A more plausible reading is that the speaker’s hesitation stemmed primarily from his reluctance to take a clear position on direct negotiations, a stance that could place him in an awkward position. Berri, who also heads the Amal movement, an ally of Hezbollah – even if he occasionally distances himself through his statements – has already signaled his preference for indirect rather than direct talks. Any meeting with the president could therefore be interpreted as a marked departure from the militia ally, potentially undermining the delicate balancing act maintained by the veteran Lebanese politician since the outset of the conflict, particularly amid preparatory Lebanese-Israeli talks in Washington. Another notable development on Wednesday was a report by local broadcaster MTV Lebanon of “coordination between Baabda and the U.S. Embassy regarding the tripartite meeting at the presidential palace.” If confirmed, it would point to yet another sign of U.S. involvement in managing this delicate phase in Lebanon. “Antoine Lahd,” Once Again For his part, President Joseph Aoun continues to be the target of a smear campaign seeking to hold him responsible for the apparent failure of the ceasefire in southern Lebanon. This comes even as supporters of the so-called “axis of resistance” had attributed its establishment, on April 16, to Iran. It would therefore appear that, for Hezbollah and its allies, success is necessarily credited to Iran, while failure is laid at the door of the Lebanese state. So-called “resistance” voices are increasingly openly labelling Lebanese officials – and the president in particular – as “traitors who have ceded land to the Zionists,” a phrase frequently circulating on social media. Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah, who has increasingly acted as the movement’s spokesperson in its attacks against the head of state, once again on Wednesday compared him to Antoine Lahd, the former commander of the South Lebanon Army in the 1980s until Israel’s withdrawal in 2000. A particularly humiliating statement, suggesting that Israel is seeking to install a puppet in Lebanon, despite the stated intention of the president and the Lebanese government to pull the country out of Iran’s sphere of influence. Meanwhile, Hezbollah continues to lose ground in southern Lebanon, even if it has managed – notably through the use of drones – to inflict losses on its Israeli adversary. The defining image of the past 24 hours is a video released by the Israeli army showing the detonation of a large tunnel belonging to the Lebanese militia in the village of Kantara. The blast was strong enough to trigger a slight seismic tremor recorded in Lebanon. The Israeli escalation in southern Lebanon has been increasingly evident over the past few days. Other areas, particularly Beirut, have remained spared since the ceasefire. However, particularly deadly strikes were carried out over the past 24 hours. Three Civil Defense rescue workers in the Tyre region, entire families, as well as a soldier and his brother, were killed. “No More Mr. Nice Guy!” On the Iranian-American negotiations front, there have been no major breakthroughs over the past 24 hours. Statements from U.S. President Donald Trump – still numerous – have continued to escalate, culminating in a thunderous “no more Mr. Nice Guy” on Wednesday at midday. Speaking alongside King Charles III, Trump claimed that “the United States has clearly won the war against Iran.” On his Truth Social platform, the U.S. president posted an image of himself mimicking a rifle shot and accused Iran of being “unable to make decisions or sign a non-nuclear agreement.” He added: “It would be better for them to get smart soon.” The explanation for Iran’s slow response to U.S. demands may lie in a major report published by Reuters on Wednesday. The document suggests that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has taken control of war-related decision-making, with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s role limited to endorsing their decisions. The issue, therefore, is not only the lack of unified positions and decision-making in Iran, but also the irreconcilability between U.S. demands and the concessions the Pasdaran are willing to make. According to Pakistani sources – the main mediator – Reuters reports that even the simplest response from Tehran now takes two to three days, with Ahmad Vahidi, a commander of the Revolutionary Guards, currently playing a central role. Reuters also cites Alan Eyre, a former U.S. diplomat and Iran expert, who argues that neither side is truly willing to engage in dialogue: the Revolutionary Guards fear appearing weak in the eyes of the Americans, while Washington is constrained by considerations ahead of the midterm elections. This helps explain the ongoing delays. The prospects of the war in Iran remain uncertain. According to the Wall Street Journal , the U.S. president convened his national security officials to make clear that the military must remain prepared for “a long blockade.” The newspaper also reports that he expressed frustration with Tehran’s latest proposal, which seeks to end the war, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and defer nuclear negotiations to a later stage. President Trump, for his part, believes he can compel Iran to suspend uranium enrichment for 20 years, followed by strict limitations thereafter. As for the war’s objectives and possible trajectory, divisions between the United States and Israel are increasingly coming into the open – although they have long existed. While the Trump administration is focused on pressuring the Iranian regime, Israeli officials have not abandoned the prospect of regime change. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar made his position clear on Wednesday, saying: “If we find a way to change the regime in Iran, we will act.” Meanwhile in Iran, arrests of dissidents continue at an accelerated pace, as if to compensate for the regime’s growing paralysis. According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 21 people have been executed and more than 4,000 detained since the start of the conflict.

A growing number of Western analysts contend that the United States has failed to achieve its objectives in the war with Iran. This assessment is largely driven by the surge in global oil prices, which has rippled through the global economy and is being felt acutely in the rising cost of everyday goods in the United States – a recurring theme in the American press. For these same observers, Iran appears to hold the stronger hand in ongoing negotiations. But how accurate is that view? A Closer Look at the War’s Underlying Motives George Friedman, a geopolitical analyst, says he is not convinced that Benjamin Netanyahu was able to draw Donald Trump into the war. Not only, he argues, is the latter difficult to persuade, but Iran’s nuclear program is of far greater concern to the United States than to Israel. Moreover, the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS 2025) suggests that Washington’s priorities lie primarily at home and within the Western Hemisphere. Trump has sought to scale back the United States’ role in the Middle East, shifting greater responsibility to its regional allies among the signatories of the Abraham Accords. Iran, however, remains a significant obstacle, given its expanding arsenal and its interference across the region. U.S. Strategy: Weakening Iran Washington’s objective, then, is to weaken Iran and its allied militias. With the fall of the Baathist regime in Syria, the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas, and the U.S.-British strikes against the Houthis between March and May 2025, the mullah regime has lost much of its hegemonic reach. The strikes carried out in June 2025 against Iran subsequently destroyed its air defenses, severely damaged its nuclear program, and inflicted significant losses on its missile production capacity. Once those strikes ceased, however, Iran moved quickly over the following eight months to repair part of the damage. The current war has nevertheless deprived the Islamic Republic of a large share of its arsenal and curtailed its ability to support its regional allies. With the Iranian economy in ruins, the mullah regime’s most serious challenges may still lie ahead – particularly if ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran conclude without any lifting of sanctions. The list of those dissatisfied within the country is long, particularly among marginalized minorities (Kurds, Azeris, Baluch, Turkmen, among others), the merchant class, students, women, pragmatists, and possibly even the Artesh – the Iranian army – given that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continues to be favored at its expense. However, the timeframe for any change in Iran’s behavior or regime remains uncertain. Airstrikes have not forced Tehran to back down, as it continues to possess sufficient asymmetric capabilities to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, destabilize the global economy, and carry out attacks across the region. Moreover, Hamas and Hezbollah retain both the capacity and the intent to rebuild over time. The Gaza peace process remains fragile, while efforts toward a settlement in Lebanon are still in their early stages. In short, the United States has moved forward in pursuing its objectives in the Middle East, though they remain unfulfilled. For Washington, however, other priorities are now more pressing. The Iranian Nuclear Program: A Real Threat Following the June 2025 strikes, Iran’s nuclear program was significantly damaged. However, Tehran retained the capacity to reactivate it, as it continued to possess 430 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, which could be readily further enriched to 90 percent. The centrifuges required for this process remained intact at their production facilities; they had not been deployed to the bombed nuclear sites, while Iranian universities continued to transmit the relevant technical expertise. In short, within a few years, Iran could have been in a position to restore its nuclear capabilities and acquire a nuclear weapon. With the current war, the damage inflicted on this program is undoubtedly more significant, but no credible assessment is available at this stage. The United States is determined to prevent Iran from reactivating its nuclear program, not so much out of concern that the Islamic Republic might acquire nuclear-tipped missiles – a prospect that does not appear to be Washington’s primary fear – but because of the alleged connections between the mullah regime and al-Qaeda, the organization behind the September 11, 2001 attacks, some of whose leaders are said to have been hosted in Iran. US security officials fear a possible “second nuclear 9/11”: a scenario in which a small Iranian nuclear device could be transferred to al-Qaeda, concealed within a commercial shipment, and then transported to a major port such as New York, where its detonation could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths. This scenario is not imaginary, since al-Qaeda has already struck in the United States and in other countries. Similarly, Iran’s own “long arm” – already responsible for attacks in Argentina, Gulf states, and Bulgaria – is seen as potentially capable of carrying out comparable operations. How Might This War End? The Iranian regime remains firmly in place, and its behavior has not changed. Its nuclear potential, as well as its missile and drone capabilities, though significantly reduced, remain a reality. The Strait of Hormuz is still being blocked by the IRGC, while the US Navy is enforcing a naval blockade. Sanctions against the Islamic Republic continue to intensify, including from European countries. Iran’s economy lies in ruins, negotiations in Islamabad are dragging on, and the war is not yet over. The Islamic Republic cannot claim a Pyrrhic victory, except in the eyes of credulous, indoctrinated supporters. At the same time, a U.S. victory achieved through airstrikes alone remains unlikely. A ground operation by the United States is still possible, but Trump is reluctant to launch one, as it would be costly. Pressure is mounting on the US president because of the toll the war is taking on the global economy. Time is not on his side. Iran is indeed being strangled, and time works far less in its favor, although this does not prevent it from betting on this factor to sway American public opinion against Trump, as the communists did during the Vietnam War with Presidents Johnson and Nixon. The difference is that U.S. casualties in this war have so far been negligible compared with those of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. By contrast, the Pentagon’s military successes are significantly greater than in those other conflicts. If Iran continues to play the time factor, a swift, large-scale and short US ground operation against specific targets inside Iran cannot be ruled out, although it would likely come at a high cost.

The philosophical question of what comes first, the chicken or the egg, appears almost simple when set against the issue the country now faces: a (peace) agreement whose signing is made conditional on the disarmament of Hezbollah. This condition – set by our government, imposed by Israel, and desired by a growing majority of the Lebanese population – cannot, however, be met within a set timeframe. Moreover, whether through the Lebanese army or through strikes on Hezbollah positions, the militia’s arsenal remains operational. The problem is not only the presence of weapons, but also the infiltration of the militia into certain segments of the state apparatus. The militia paralyzes any measures taken against it and, worse, triggers internal unrest, while also raising the specter of mutiny aboard a drifting vessel that has already begun to sink. Whether it is a former prosecutor derailing an investigation, a judge imposing only a nominal fine for serious wrongdoing, senior officers infiltrated within the army acting as informants, or a general in a security service deploying squads against civilians, examples abound, demonstrating that Hezbollah has spread across multiple tiers of the system. When curare is injected into a body, all limbs and muscles relax, including the respiratory system, leading to asphyxiation. Either an antidote is administered to the patient, or the poison is extracted through a purge. Purge. A term with strongly negative connotation, recalling the Soviet era. Yet, in the face of grave problems, only equally decisive measures may suffice. Only a purge of the state – even if limited to certain key positions – would represent a first outline of a viable solution, internal rather than externally imposed, unlike recourse to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The suspension of senior officials, both military and civilian, and even prosecutions against those who have obstructed the course of justice or used public institutions to inflame internal tensions – thereby fueling the threat of civil war – appears necessary. This would likely constitute the first step, if not the only one, capable of restoring the state’s credibility in the eyes of international institutions. Such credibility would, in turn, serve as leverage to secure assistance aimed at strengthening the sovereignty of legitimate public authority over the entire territory. Hezbollah’s allies and dependents will argue that dialogue must be prioritized as the only solution to the problem. Yet in the past, “national dialogues” have followed one another, serving only to further entrench Hezbollah’s grip on the state. “You can get much farther with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone.” The author of this phrase knew what he was talking about and made it his credo. It was Al Capone. Early retirements, immediate suspensions, dismissals – whatever term is used, what is required is a genuine overhaul of the state apparatus, at whatever level or rank. For it is only when the poison is extracted from the body that its organs and limbs can begin to move again. The task is certainly not an easy one. If President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam truly wish to prevent the Lebanese ship from capsizing and bring it back to port, without resorting to privateers or external assistance, this will likely be the only option. It is certain that powerful political actors will lay mines in their path in order to obstruct any possibility of disarmament and, of course, any agreement with Israel. But there comes a point when the choice between safeguarding a nation and protecting private interests is no longer a real choice at all. A kind of modern-day Augean stables in political form, far more arduous than Hercules’ labor, but necessary if the Lebanese phoenix is to gather its ashes and rise again.

Tuesday, April 28 in Lebanon was still shaped by the starkly opposing speeches delivered a day earlier by President Joseph Aoun on the one hand, and Hezbollah secretary-general Naïm Qassem on the other. The former’s address was, in effect, a response to the latter. The president argued that the real “treason” of which he has been accused by the pro-Iranian camp since the launch of direct negotiations with Israel – aimed at ending the war triggered by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon – should instead be attributed to those driving the country into a spiral of destruction and violence. Unsurprisingly, the unprecedented response of a sitting president to the leader of a militia – one that, until the end of 2024, maintained a firm grip on the Lebanese state – has divided the country along its familiar political fault lines. Joseph Aoun continues to draw the ire of Hezbollah supporters on social media, as well as criticism from figures such as MP Ali Ammar, who accused him of “selling the country to the Zionists.” Underscoring the group’s stance, a Hezbollah official, quoted by the Qatari broadcaster Al Jazeera on Monday evening, said the group was prepared to return to suicide attacks against the Israeli army. At the same time, the president is receiving messages of support not only from those supportive of his approach, but also through the positions taken by several political figures, including former president Michel Sleimane and Beirut MP Fouad Makhzoumi. As a result, Hezbollah, appears increasingly isolated on the domestic stage. Internationally, attention has focused on remarks by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who emphasized what he described as the “unprecedented” framework of the Lebanon–Israel ceasefire, given that the two countries are “not in a state of war.” He argued that Hezbollah is not only at war with Israel, but also with the Lebanese state itself. He added that both countries agree on the role of an army that could disarm Hezbollah, while noting that the Israeli military has the right to intervene where the Lebanese authorities are unable to act. The US official also insisted that Israel has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon, a point later echoed on Tuesday by his Israeli counterpart, Gideon Saar. While the American official appears to support the Lebanese authorities in their standoff with Hezbollah, his remarks also reflect – and in some ways amplify – the deepening divisions within Lebanon that have now come into the open. The country is undoubtedly entering a delicate phase in its history, as political polarization hardens into open hostility amid a wider regional war. How far this trajectory will go remains an open question. Trump Reportedly Refused Expansion of Operations in Lebanon Meanwhile, the situation on the ground in southern Lebanon remains highly volatile. Israel has acknowledged casualties, while Hezbollah continues its operations without disclosing its own losses. The ceasefire appears to apply only to areas outside the south. In a serious development on Tuesday, the Israeli army called for the evacuation of several villages in Bint Jbeil that had previously remained outside the so-called “yellow line.” Israeli threats against Hezbollah have continued, including remarks the previous day by Defense Minister Israel Katz, who warned that statements by Naïm Qassem could “burn” Lebanon as a whole. Such rhetoric has fueled fears of a further widening of the conflict to other parts of the country. However, this may not reflect the full reality on the ground. According to a report by Israeli Channel 12, widely picked up by local media, US President Donald Trump reportedly rejected an expansion of Israeli operations in Lebanon during a phone call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, urging restraint. He also reportedly asked him not to jeopardize the ceasefire and, by extension, the ongoing negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. The account, if confirmed, would suggest once again that the US president, aware of Lebanon’s fragile balance, remains keen to secure a swift diplomatic breakthrough. Will the Israelis adhere to this near-American red line, or will escalation on the ground – which could also serve Hezbollah’s interests – once again be used as a pretext to disregard it? The Iranian Proposal Under Review On the US-Iran negotiation front, the main development over the past two days has been the Iranian proposal that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, during visits to Moscow after stops in Oman and Pakistan, delivered to US authorities. According to The Wall Street Journal , citing officials familiar with the matter, the proposal is “aimed at breaking the deadlock in the talks.” It outlines “a three-stage peace plan beginning with an end to what it describes as the Israeli-American war on Iran, accompanied by guarantees that strikes will not resume. Iranian authorities would then work with mediators on resolving the issue of closing the Strait of Hormuz, as part of a broader agreement on the matter.” Still according to the newspaper, the Iranians suggest that negotiations on the nuclear file and on the financing of Tehran’s regional armed groups would only resume after an agreement is reached on ending hostilities and on the Strait of Hormuz – an area Tehran continues to insist it must control. It is also noteworthy that this proposal was reportedly delivered to the Americans while Araghchi was in Russia, where he was received by President Vladimir Putin, and as “he placed responsibility for the failure of previous rounds of negotiations” on the United States, insisting that the Iranian system had demonstrated its “strength.” This comes as internal Iranian divisions continue to resurface through leaks to the media. Later on Tuesday (overnight in the United States), reports also carried by The Wall Street Journal indicated Donald Trump’s “discontent” with the Iranian proposals. According to sources cited by the newspaper, “the US president has so far rejected them,” while stressing that “negotiations are continuing.” Trump, the sources added, “does not rule out resuming strikes against Iran if he judges that the talks are not being taken seriously by the Iranian side.” “We will present a counter-proposal in the coming days,” the same sources said. The same tone was echoed by The New York Times , which added that the US president believes the Iranian proposal fails to reflect the current balance of power and contains no major concessions – particularly on the nuclear issue, which remains “essential” for Washington. Will US-Iran negotiations continue at this slow pace, as the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz continues to weigh on the global economy and energy prices? Or are we instead witnessing the prelude to a renewed escalation? In both scenarios, Gulf countries remain on edge, with Qatar warning on Tuesday against what it described as a simmering, low-intensity conflict.