Articles

The Muslim Brotherhood moved from preaching and proselytizing to political and jihadist activity in Palestine by restructuring its organization, which took the form of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. This transformation was accompanied by a considerable expansion of its popular base. The movement then sought to impose its own conception of the Palestinian interest, as discussed in the first part of this analysis. In its declared political stance, Hamas relied on two main pillars: overturning the Oslo Accords and denouncing the Palestinian Authority’s governance failures and corruption. At the same time, it promoted the slogans of reform and change, targeting the Authority, its ministries and agencies, as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the institutional framework of Palestinian representation endowed with official status and international legitimacy.

As social media rediscovers the modesty and integrity of Fouad Chehab, a personal memory brings back the image of a president who sought to replace political fiefdoms with the authority of the state – and whom Lebanon fully recognized only after his death. In recent days, photographs of President Fouad Chehab have proliferated across social media. Many users now celebrate his modesty, his honesty and his sense of the state. One of these images shows him attending a Mass held in honor of the Virgin Mary in the early 1960s, on the esplanade of the Shrine of Our Lady of Lebanon in Harissa, overlooking Jounieh Bay. This photograph stirs a particularly moving personal memory.

The 60-day truce during which Tehran and Washington were supposed to pursue talks toward a lasting peace ended Monday on a bellicose note, with both sides maintaining their positions. Tensions have flared anew between the two sides, who agree on just one thing: neither intends to give ground. Applying the old adage that the best defense is a good offense, Iran has apparently opted for an “entirely” offensive strategy, going so far as to give Washington an “ultimatum” (!) of “a few weeks” to “honor the terms of last June’s memorandum of understanding,” Reuters reported Monday, citing a senior Iranian official.

In April 2026, Wissam Saadé delivered four lectures at the University of Bologna. The first, given at the invitation of Professor Giovanni Giorgini and entitled “The Prophet and the Philosopher: The Hierarchy of Knowledge between Avicenna’s Falsafa and al-Kirmānī’s Ismaili Neoplatonism,” is presented here in a revised and expanded version, published as a series of ten articles. This series explores the intellectual landscape of Islamic Neoplatonism through a comparative reading of Avicenna and al-Kirmānī. Although both thinkers share a broadly Neoplatonic horizon, shaped by a metaphysics of emanation, a hierarchy of being, and a synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic thought, they develop distinct philosophical projects: Avicenna within the tradition of Peripatetic falsafa , and al-Kirmānī within the framework of Ismaili theology. Despite these different intellectual settings, their systems remain in sustained dialogue over the nature of knowledge, the relationship between reason and revelation, and the ascent of the soul. Their respective projects also embody contrasting conceptions of the political, illuminating different ways of understanding the place of philosophy in relation to authority, law, and the organization of the community. This article is the sixth installment in the ten-part series.

The saying “All roads lead to Rome” is one of the most famous expressions in political history and the history of civilizations. It was not merely a literary metaphor, but a description of the reality of the Roman Empire, which built an extensive road network that made Rome its political, military and economic center, with all the major roads leading to the capital. From the Middle Ages onward, the phrase became a proverb meaning that a variety of means does not necessarily alter the final outcome, and that different paths may lead to the same destination. Lebanon today may offer a contemporary political illustration of that saying. Since the end of the latest war, speeches and slogans have multiplied, as have the options being proposed. Yet one question remains: does Lebanon truly have several strategic choices, or do they all, one way or another, ultimately lead to the negotiating table?

At a time when countries across the region are seeking mechanisms and alliances that would allow them to reduce their total security dependence on the United States, if not move entirely out from under its umbrella, with the Turkish-Saudi-Pakistani alliance offering a clear example of this trend, official Lebanon is moving in the opposite direction, toward ever greater reliance on Washington in most areas of its foreign policy. This is not limited to the issue of direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, which began in Washington and are continuing in Rome, rather than Paris, for instance, and that is no coincidence.