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Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan came under fresh Iranian attacks on Friday, in retaliation for American airstrikes carried out on Iranian soil. For the sixth consecutive day, Washington's Gulf allies are directly bearing the cost of this military escalation. The damage inflicted on civilian infrastructure on both sides points to a further intensification of the conflict. Late Friday evening, US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the US military had launched, for the seventh consecutive night, a new wave of strikes against Iranian military positions and infrastructure. Iran's official state media reported powerful explosions shortly before midnight in several areas of southern Iran, including Bandar Abbas. Communication routes have been a particular focus of US military strikes over the past 48 hours. Meanwhile, Tehran continues to ratchet up its rhetoric. Mohsen Rezaei, military adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader, threatened on Friday that Iran would enter "a phase of all-out offensive" if American strikes continue beyond "two or three days." He also declared that "Iran will no longer limit itself to retaliating, and no border will be safe." Power grid restrictions Iranian authorities reported damage to the electricity grid in the south of the country. They also noted bombings targeting bridges, a port, an airport, telecommunications infrastructure, and a train station. In a statement, the relevant ministry urged residents to turn off their air conditioners during peak hours "in order to help ensure a stable electricity supply in the southern provinces, which are currently facing extreme heat and attacks on power facilities." In Kuwait, a power plant and a water desalination facility were struck in an Iranian attack, according to the emirate's authorities, who also called on residents "to reduce their electricity consumption during this exceptional period," as temperatures reach 48°C. Iranian strikes on all fronts The armed forces of Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar — all close US allies — announced they had faced aerial attacks at dawn on Friday. In Kuwait, the military reported several injuries. In Qatar, which is serving as a mediator in the conflict, a child was wounded by debris. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed to have targeted the American Al-Udeid Air Base, stating they had destroyed radar systems and military aircraft in order to "punish the aggressor." US President Donald Trump had threatened earlier this week to strike Iran's bridges and power plants if its leaders refused to return to the negotiating table. The Revolutionary Guards, the Islamic Republic's ideological army, warned that strikes "will continue until calm is restored on the southern coast and in the Strait of Hormuz." Trump 'open to talks' Donald Trump "remains open to diplomacy at the same time," White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt said. According to her, the Iranians "have signaled to the president that they still want to reach a deal. We are talking to them, but, again, the president is not going to let them fire on ships in the strait without consequences." In the Strait of Hormuz — through which nearly one-fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas exports flowed before the war — maritime traffic continues to dwindle. Iraq-Syria oil pipeline In Washington, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's visit has yielded its first results. The United States welcomed on Friday an agreement between Iraq and Syria to restore the oil pipeline linking the two countries, which has been closed for decades, ultimately facilitating oil transport amid renewed hostilities between Iran and Washington. The pipeline is intended to connect Iraqi oil production to Mediterranean export markets and beyond. A genuine windfall, as crude oil prices surged following the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The price of oil continues to rise, but remains at around $87 per barrel — still well below the peak of $126 reached at the height of the conflict. The United States announced that it is leading an international consortium to handle the technical and financial aspects of the project, which, once restored, will have "an initial transport capacity of 2 million barrels of crude oil per day." Speaking last week in Damascus, on the sidelines of a visit by French President Emmanuel Macron, TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné said he believed Syria could become an "important transit country for oil flowing from Iraq to the Mediterranean," offering "alternative routes" to the Strait of Hormuz. In Southern Lebanon Regarding the Lebanese front, a Lebanese diplomatic source cited by the Arabic-language channel Al-Hadath, indicated on Friday that the Israeli army is expected to begin its withdrawal this weekend from the pilot zones set to be handed over to the Lebanese army, in accordance with the framework agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel on June 26. On the military operations front, Israeli forces present in the South continued destroying the underground military infrastructure built by Hezbollah over the course of decades. At the same time, targeted air strikes were carried out by the Israeli army across multiple sectors of the country's southern region.

In keeping with the great Maronite tradition, Patriarch Howayek addressed annual "messages" to his community throughout his patriarchate. The most celebrated of these, and rightly so, is the one he sent in 1930, titled "The Love of the Homeland." This text stands as his spiritual testament. In the twilight of his life — he died at the age of 88 — he revealed, among other things, his pastoral obsession with Lebanon, a country he had helped bring into being, and whose ruling classes seemed to have developed an alarmingly deficient sense of civic duty. The pamphlet is a passionate lesson in civics, opening with the love of the homeland and closing with elaborate and carefully worded recommendations on distributive justice — a cornerstone of the social justice so dear to Leo XIII. Drawing on the Latin etymology of the word "homeland," the Patriarch writes: "The Westerners are right to choose the term Patria , derived from Father , to express what we call in our language al-Watan , as if a man's love for his homeland were the same as his natural love for his parents." In the straight tradition of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Patriarch Howayek emphasizes that, just as one owes honor to one's parents, one owes piety and devotion to one's homeland. Yet reading the message, it becomes immediately apparent that the Patriarch's passionate plea reflects the birth pangs of a nation, as seen through the eyes of a man determined to correct the flaws of its infancy and guide it toward a full understanding of public service. Why did Patriarch Howayek feel the need to send the Maronites such an exhortation, a mere ten years after the birth of Greater Lebanon? It is not hard to guess. In a nation still taking shape, a nation emerging from its prehistory and taking its first steps into history, this love needed to be understood, internalized, and allowed to mature. From these fundamental reflections on love of the homeland, the Patriarch went on to develop a lengthy and impassioned civics lesson. "It is clear that those in positions of responsibility were not living up to his vision of citizenship," confirms Sr. Marie-Antoinette Saadé, Superior of the Maronite Sisters of the Holy Family Congregation. "Contemplating the current situation — the divisions and the misery — weighs the soul down with dejection. We often find ourselves speaking of despair regarding the reforms that must be made, and this breeds indifference: a disposition wholly at odds with the virtue of patriotic love. This virtue calls for a genuine desire to see our homeland more glorious, more civilized, and more devoted to God," the Patriarch wrote. A "more civilized" homeland "More civilized." The word was out. In his message, Patriarch Howayek would press the need to cultivate within the Lebanese elite a sense of the common good. He urged those aspiring to public office not to accept positions beyond their actual competence. Like a mirror, his exhortations reflect the alarming distortions and failings of the political and economic society of those early days. Candice Raymond: "Mission and Identity" Why so much disorder? The answer lies in part in a 2013 study, Life, Death and Resurrection of the History of Lebanon, or the Vicissitudes of the Phoenix , by historian Candice Raymond (IFPO). She writes: "In the aftermath of the First World War, when the territorial question arose, the proponents of creating a Lebanese state developed both an economic and a historical argument to secure the annexation to Mount Lebanon — which had enjoyed autonomous sanjak status since 1861 — of various surrounding territories (Tripoli and the Akkar in the north, the Bekaa Valley to the east, Sidon and Jabal Amel in the south), and above all Beirut, which they wished to make the capital of the new state." The rhetoric of perpetual struggle against oppression was then replaced by a teleology of state power that distinguishes Maronite communal historiography from Maronite Lebanist historiography. The latter effectively reverses the relationship between the Maronite community and Lebanese territory. It is no longer the community that, through its fight for freedom, bestows a particular identity upon the territory it inhabits, but rather the territory that, by virtue of its morphological and geographical characteristics, imposes a mission and an identity upon its inhabitants. The geographical parallel between the coastal shoreline and the Lebanese mountain finds its counterpart in a dual functionality of the territory: that of Lebanon as a place of exchange, between the sea and the continent, between East and West, and that of Lebanon as a refuge, a sanctuary of freedom and independence. The State thus draws its roots from the political experiences that brought these two missions together into unity, while the nation grounds its distinct identity in them.» These lines are crucial. The history of Lebanon is a weak point in our national education. Lebanese people in 1920, just as those of 2026, have not fully grasped the "reversal" identified by Candice Raymond. The message of Patriarch Howayek was undoubtedly aimed at drawing a connection between this shift and the need for a new set of values — between the transition from a responsibility toward oneself to a responsibility toward oneself and others; or, more philosophically, the passage from Lebanon's prehistory into its entry into history. This passage is the one from John Paul II's "Lebanon-message" to "Lebanon-mission," to develop an image that all Lebanese people understand today. Greater Lebanon was in reality a true "sending forth on a mission," and not a "free-for-all" or a "grab-what-you-can" affair, as unfortunately many Lebanese of that era seem to have experienced it. Read also: Patriarch Howayek, prophet of living together (1/4)

Will Donald Trump have better luck with Iraq than he has had with Iran? The question naturally arises after the exceptionally warm welcome the U.S. president extended to Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in Washington. Trump lavished praise on al-Zaidi, overlooking the fact that, until not long ago, he owned a bank that had been placed under U.S. sanctions on charges of laundering money for the benefit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Trump received the Iraqi prime minister at the White House at a time when intermittent clashes between the United States and Iran have resumed, with particular focus on the Strait of Hormuz. The American president discovered, rather belatedly, that the memorandum of understanding he signed with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian was, in reality, worth very little. A wide gulf still separates Washington from Tehran. Each side continues to interpret the memorandum according to its own interests. On the American side, the agreement had been negotiated by Vice President J. D. Vance, accompanied by special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The renewed confrontation between Washington and Tehran is ultimately a reflection of Trump’s profound disappointment with the outcome of the Islamabad process and the failure of Pakistan’s mediation efforts. Ali al-Zaidi has succeeded in rehabilitating his political standing and rising to the office of prime minister, the most powerful position in Iraq, after the U.S. president vetoed the return of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the leading Shiite figure within the so-called Coordination Framework. So far, al-Zaidi has demonstrated genuine resolve through his government’s anti-corruption campaign. Yet that campaign remains incomplete because it has not reached the major figures who have stood at the heart of Iraq’s corruption since 2003, when the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, with all its flaws, before effectively handing this strategically important country over to the Islamic Republic of Iran. What Iraq is now expected to do under Ali al-Zaidi’s government is to chart a course independent of Iran. That, however, appears highly unlikely, for one simple reason: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps still controls the country’s principal levers of power. The clearest evidence of this remains the continued prominence of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization comprising several sectarian militias loyal to Tehran that continues to serve as one of the main centers of gravity in Iraqi political life. The PMF even assumed a security role during the funeral ceremonies for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Karbala and Najaf, attended by influential figures such as Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi al-Amiri, and Qais al-Khazali. Even more telling, the day of Khamenei’s funeral was declared an official public holiday in Iraq. Sooner or later, Iraq will face its moment of reckoning. The issue extends far beyond an anti-corruption campaign that is unlikely to progress much further than it already has. The real challenge lies in the weapons held by the various factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces, as well as by other Iraqi militias affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Contrary to what President Trump appears to believe, neither Ali al-Zaidi nor any other Iraqi leader will find it easy to free Iraq from Iran’s grip so long as Tehran continues to hold the real keys to power in Baghdad. How does al-Zaidi explain the launch of drones from Iraqi territory toward Kuwait? How does he account for the continued attacks on the Kuwaiti consulate in Basra, while the Islamic Republic persists in targeting the Arab Gulf states and Jordan under the pretext of retaliating against American strikes? Equally revealing was the seizure by the Syrian authorities, at the Iraqi border, of a shipment of weapons that included 150 drones and missiles en route to Baniyas, home to an oil refinery. The weapons were reportedly destined for Hezbollah, which the Syrian authorities described as a terrorist organization. Who carefully packed these weapons in Iraq before sending them through Syria to Hezbollah and into Lebanon? Is the mere formation of an Iraqi investigative committee enough to ensure that no one in Iraq continues to sympathize with Hezbollah? There is no doubt that the Iraqi government’s decision to designate the Lebanese Hezbollah as a terrorist organization is a step of the utmost importance. Yet one fundamental reality remains: at least for now, Ali al-Zaidi’s government has proven incapable of making a complete break with Hezbollah, which has managed to penetrate more than one Iraqi militia that continues to sympathize with it. But who knows? Perhaps, through its position on the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iraqi government is merely throwing dust in people’s eyes rather than confronting the reality of what might be called the “Iraqi Hezbollah.” Trump spoke at length about the importance of Iraqi oil and what it represents for American companies. One cannot help but fear that his bet on Iraq may fare no better than the one he placed on Iran and on the memorandum of understanding that a faction within his administration reached with the Islamic Republic. Questions of this kind will continue to linger so long as no profound change takes place in Iran. Such a change may come… or it may never come. Until then, the entire region, Iraq included, will remain hostage to that uncertainty, whether Ali al-Zaidi is in power… or not.

Tensions in the region are continuing to escalate, increasingly resembling a volcano on the verge of erupting at any moment. Iran turned up the heat further on Thursday, once again wielding the Houthi card in response to American warnings. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, Hezbollah took its defiance of state institutions a step further, with some of its MPs launching a fierce attack on the President of the Republic to challenge the enforcement of Israel's partial withdrawal from pilot zones in the south of the country and the planned disarmament of the group. Just hours before the highly anticipated address by US President Donald Trump, scheduled for 1:00 AM GMT on the night of Thursday to Friday (4:00 AM Beirut time), Tehran announced that its military would target infrastructure across the region if the White House chief followed through on his threats to strike Iranian civilian infrastructure. The warning came from the spokesman for Iran's military high command, quoted by Reuters, who stated that Tehran 'would not tolerate any American interference in the Strait of Hormuz.' The issue, he said, represents 'a red line' for the Islamic Republic, whose ports have once again been subject to a US naval blockade since it closed that strategic waterway. Also according to Reuters, citing three sources, Iran reportedly asked the Yemeni Houthi movement to stand ready to 'close the Red Sea oil route through Bab el-Mandeb if the United States strikes Iranian energy infrastructure,' posing a significant new threat to global energy supplies. The idea was said to have been discussed within the leadership of the Islamic Republic, and the message was conveyed to Iran's Houthi allies, according to two senior Iranian sources and one regional source familiar with the matter, who, Reuters notes, spoke on condition of anonymity. Iran appears intent on getting ahead of Donald Trump's speech and is betting on a broader escalation of its conflict with the United States in the event of 'enemy strikes.' The Islamic Republic, long a master of proxy warfare, once again played the Houthi card on Thursday. The leader of the Yemeni group, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, launched a fierce attack on Saudi Arabia in an audio-visual message, threatening to strike Riyadh should the kingdom attack Houthi targets 'again.' He condemned what he called an 'unjustified' Saudi strike on Sanaa airport — even though it was his own group that had first launched missiles at an airport in southern Saudi Arabia on Monday evening, drawing a powerful Saudi response. President Trump's address is expected to mark a turning point in the conflict's trajectory, according to various international media outlets, who note that his last major speech, on April 1st, was filled with 'bombshell' announcements. The White House occupant has billed it as 'a very big announcement.' It is expected to touch on matters related to the US elections scheduled for November, as well as talks with Iran, which are currently deadlocked. The Pakistani mediator who had been shuttling back and forth to bridge the gaps now appears to be out of work. On Thursday, Islamabad limited itself to calling on Washington and Tehran to return to the negotiating table. That appeal, issued by the spokesman for Pakistan's Foreign Ministry, largely reflects Islamabad's current inability to halt the escalating tensions. On the ground, the confrontation continues along the same lines: CENTCOM is launching waves of strikes, mostly at night, against Iranian installations. The Islamic Republic is retaliating by striking American targets in countries across the region, including Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait. U.S. strikes were carried out early Thursday evening against sites near Bandar Abbas, on the Strait of Hormuz. Weapons for Hezbollah in Lebanon Meanwhile, tensions are also escalating in Lebanon, where the Lebanese army and Israel are preparing to implement a mechanism for a partial Israeli withdrawal from pilot zones in the south of the country. This is a move to which Hezbollah remains fiercely opposed, as it continues to reject the framework agreement reached between Beirut and Tel Aviv and to violently contest the principle of direct negotiations between the two capitals, which share a common goal: to reduce the pro-Iranian group's capacity for harm and impose a weapons monopoly in Lebanon. But this prospect is unfolding in a particularly tense climate. Hezbollah still refuses to surrender its weapons, as one of its MPs, Hassan Fadlallah, reaffirmed on Thursday, while Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz was reminding his American counterpart, Pete Hegseth, that Tel Aviv intends to maintain its troops indefinitely in the 'security zones' established in Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza Strip in order to protect its borders. The announcement by the Syrian Interior Ministry, which reported the interception at the Syrian-Iraqi border of a truck carrying sophisticated weapons and rockets destined for Hezbollah, has nonetheless lent weight to Israel's argument for justifying the continued presence of its forces in Lebanon. This latest seizure, far from being an isolated incident according to Damascus, reinforces accusations that Iran is continuing to rearm its primary military proxy in the region, despite international pressure. It comes as Donald Trump had once again raised the possibility of giving Syria an expanded role in the fight against Hezbollah, which denied 'conducting any activities whatsoever in Syria' in a brief statement worded in very vague terms. The statement was published after the weapons seizure was announced, but makes no mention of it. It merely refers to 'fabricated information designed to harm [the group] and serve American-Israeli interests.' Hezbollah MPs, meanwhile, lashed out at President Joseph Aoun and the Lebanese-Israeli framework agreement, which 'Tel Aviv will not succeed in imposing on those who oppose it.' Hassan Fadlallah sharply criticized the decision by Lebanese authorities to disarm the group he belongs to, 'when the weapons it possesses are what worries Israel.' In the meantime, the Lebanese army has begun reinforcing its presence in the south of the country, patrolling around a dozen villages, including Bint Jbeil, where Israeli forces had previously entered. On the ground, Tel Aviv continues its limited military operations: an Israeli raid killed two people in Nabatieh el-Faouka during the day, while sporadic bombardments and demolitions of homes were also reported.

This series of articles is intended to shed light on the current situation through the lens of the past, far removed from passionate, ideological or romantic narratives that overlook the underlying realities. It is up to the reader to draw the appropriate conclusions. The previous eleven instalments revisited the events surrounding Hezbollah’s rise to power, from the Taif Agreement to the severely incomplete implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006. From the very first Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, Lebanese President Emile Lahoud (1998-2007) and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah reached a fundamental understanding: the Lebanese state would legitimize Hezbollah, and in return, the movement would formally commit to respecting the country’s institutions and refrain from using its weapons in domestic political disputes. It would later become clear that the pledge was not only short-lived – it collapsed on May 7, 2008, when Hezbollah seized Beirut by force – but that its arsenal had, all along, exerted decisive influence over national decision-making. Militarily, the Lahoud-Nasrallah understanding translated into close coordination between the pro-Iranian party and the upper echelons of Lebanon’s security apparatus, where Lahoud loyalists, along with officials approved by Hezbollah and/or its ally, the Amal Movement, occupied key positions. Control of the Army Following the Syrian invasion of October 13, 1990, and the occupation of the presidential palace and the Lebanese Ministry of Defense by Assad regime forces, the Lebanese Army was subjected to a systematic purge and a campaign of repression orchestrated by the Lebanese-Syrian security apparatus. The objective was to crush any resistance to the Syrian occupation within the military. On the day of the invasion alone, more than 100 Lebanese soldiers were summarily executed, dozens more were humiliated and captured, and around 20 senior officers were transferred to Syrian prisons. The following years (1991-1992) were marked by the army’s forced restructuring. Officers and noncommissioned officers suspected of hostility toward Damascus or loyalty to the sovereigntist opposition were relentlessly targeted, summoned by Lebanese and Syrian intelligence services, terrorized, forced into retirement, or brought before the Military Tribunal on charges of “undermining relations with a brotherly state.” Many of these military personnel were held incommunicado at the Ministry of Defense in Yarzeh or in Syrian detention centers in Lebanon, such as the one in Anjar. They were subjected to systematic torture and ultimately joined the ranks of the hundreds of Lebanese missing persons held in Syrian prisons. From his appointment as commander of the Lebanese Army in 1990 to his accession to the presidency in 1998, Émile Lahoud maintained decisive influence within the military, where he enjoyed the loyalty and support of senior officers occupying key positions. As president, he had the authority to sign their promotion decrees and continued to wield considerable influence over their assignments to these key positions. Alongside officers loyal to Lahoud, others were under the influence of Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal Movement, speaker of Parliament, and a Hezbollah ally, as well as other Syrian-aligned politicians. It was during this period that the army’s sovereigntist ethos – one of its defining characteristics since Lebanon’s independence – began to erode. It was gradually replaced by a culture that accepted shared sovereignty with the Syrian occupation army, then officially described as a “sister” army, and with Hezbollah. Although this new culture encountered resistance within the ranks, it prevailed for more than two decades. The Decapitation and Marginalization of Sovereigntists (1990-2005) From 1990 onward, sovereigntist politicians were entirely sidelined from the political process and excluded from appointments to state institutions. The electoral system introduced in 1992, imposed by the Syrians, along with intimidation tactics, forced them either to submit or to withdraw from political life. At the same time, following the 1992 parliamentary elections, Hezbollah entered Parliament with 12 seats, while the sovereigntist camp was completely absent. An intimidation campaign began with the assassination of Dany Chamoun, leader of the National Liberal Party, just days after the Syrian invasion in October 1990. It was followed by the forced exile of General Michel Aoun in 1991, who at the time opposed both the Syrian occupation and illegal militias, including Hezbollah, before aligning himself, fifteen years later, with the pro-Iranian militia. Former president Amine Gemayel (1982-1988) had already voluntarily gone into exile in France after the end of his term. Between 1990 and 2005, the Lebanese-Syrian security apparatus systematically suffocated the anti-Syrian opposition through successive waves of persecution under the presidencies of Elias Hraoui (1989-1998) and Emile Lahoud (1998-2007). This period of repression was marked by several defining events, including the abduction of Kataëb Party political bureau member Boutros Khawand on September 15, 1992, followed by the unresolved bombing of Our Lady of Deliverance Church in Zouk Mikael on February 27, 1994, which killed 11 people. The attack provided an immediate pretext for the pro-Syrian government to dissolve the Lebanese Forces and arrest its leader, Samir Geagea, on April 21, 1994. He was later sentenced to life imprisonment and spent more than 11 years in prison. A few days later, on April 27, 1994, terrorism struck the Kataëb Party’s political bureau in Saifi, killing one of its officials, Tony Baaklini. Meanwhile, student movements affiliated with the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM, founded by Michel Aoun), the Lebanese Forces, the National Liberal Party, and the Kataëb Party were subjected to repeated mass arrests. These culminated on Thursday, August 7, 2001, when more than 250 sovereigntist activists were violently detained following the historic Chouf reconciliation between Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, then a symbol of anti-Syrian resistance, and Walid Joumblatt, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). This campaign of political repression also included the forced closure of the MTV television station in 2002 and the harassment of journalists such as Gebran Tueni. The Assassination of Rafic Hariri and the Syrian Withdrawal Following the assassination of Rafic Hariri on February 14, 2005, and the subsequent Cedar Revolution, Damascus withdrew its troops on April 28, 2005. This paved the way for Michel Aoun’s return from exile fifteen days later, on May 7, 2005, followed by Samir Geagea’s release under an amnesty in July 2005. President Amine Gemayel, for his part, had returned as early as 2000. The State-Hezbollah Division of Sovereignty Despite the Cedar Revolution and the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, followed by Israel’s second withdrawal in 2006 in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, President Lahoud continued to oversee intelligence-sharing between Lebanese security services and the pro-Iranian militia. The primary objective was to delineate the Lebanese Army’s operational areas, effectively giving Hezbollah free rein to operate in southern Lebanon, Beirut’s southern suburbs, and the North Bekaa, while securing the pro-Iranian party’s supply lines from Syria. This coordination also aimed to track down Israeli espionage networks. Read more on this topic: Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (11) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war in whose interest? (10) Hezbollah-Israel: An Endless War in Whose Interests? (9) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (8) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (7) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (6) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (5) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (4) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (3) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (2) Hezbollah-Israel, an endless war serving whose interests? (1)

For more than three decades, Lebanese politics has been closely associated with the name of Nabih Berri. Since assuming the speakership of Parliament in 1992, Berri has outlasted presidents, prime ministers, regional wars, international interventions, and profound geopolitical transformations. He has become far more than the head of the legislative branch. He established himself as one of the principal architects of post-Taif Lebanon and the undisputed political leader of the Amal Movement. Yet politics inevitably raises the same question whenever a leader remains in power for so long: what comes next? The issue is not whether Berri will step down tomorrow or years from now. Nothing suggests that his departure is imminent. The real strategic question is whether Lebanon is genuinely preparing to move from a political system centered on individuals to one built upon institutions. This debate extends far beyond the Amal Movement and the Shiite community. In many respects, it is a test of Lebanon’s own capacity to evolve toward a more institutional political order. The End of an Era Few politicians in the Middle East have maintained such influence for so long. His longevity was no accident. Berri mastered the art of balancing Lebanon’s competing domestic forces while maintaining working relationships with Damascus, Tehran, Riyadh, Paris, Washington and, whenever necessary, international mediators. Within Lebanon’s Shiite political landscape, an unwritten division of labor gradually took shape: Hezbollah became the dominant military and ideological force, while Berri positioned himself as the institutional face of Shiite political participation within the Lebanese state. This division of roles helped preserve a relatively stable internal balance for decades, while simultaneously contributing to the gradual weakening of state institutions. History, however, rarely allows political formulas to endure indefinitely. The regional environment that sustained this balance is now undergoing profound change. Iranian influence is facing growing challenges. Arab states are re-engaging with Lebanon under new conditions. The United States continues to emphasize strengthening state institutions and reforming the security sector. Debate over Hezbollah’s future role has become increasingly frequent, while pressure continues to mount on the Lebanese state to restore its monopoly over legitimate authority. Against this backdrop, the question of succession inevitably becomes part of a much broader conversation. Beyond the Familiar Names Media discussions often reduce the succession question to the search for a single heir. The reality, however, is far more complex. Among the names most frequently mentioned within the Amal Movement is Ali Hassan Khalil, one of Nabih Berri’s closest political associates and a former finance minister. His experience and longstanding proximity to Berri make him a natural heir within the movement’s traditional hierarchy. Yet international sanctions, corruption allegations, and deep political polarization significantly complicate his prospects of emerging as a broadly unifying national figure. Another name that regularly surfaces is Jamil Hayek, head of Amal’s Political Bureau. Hayek possesses extensive organizational experience and enjoys considerable credibility within the movement’s institutional structure. But organizational leadership does not automatically translate into political authority on the national stage. Other senior Amal figures, such as Qabalan Qabalan and Hani Qobeissi, also possess substantial parliamentary and organizational experience. Yet none currently appears capable of replicating Berri’s unique combination of political legitimacy, negotiating skills, regional relationships, and institutional authority. That alone suggests Lebanon is unlikely to witness the emergence of “another Nabih Berri.” Could the Next Leader Come from Outside Amal? The more intriguing possibility is that Shiite leadership in the post-Berri era may no longer remain confined to Amal’s traditional hierarchy. One name frequently mentioned is retired Major General Abbas Ibrahim, the former Director General of General Security, whose career stands apart from that of conventional politicians. Throughout his years in office, he built an extensive network of relationships across Lebanon’s political spectrum while maintaining communication channels with Arab governments, Western capitals, and influential regional actors. Unlike traditional politicians, his reputation rests on crisis management, hostage negotiations, intelligence diplomacy, and a deeply pragmatic approach to dialogue. Whether those qualifications can evolve into political leadership remains uncertain. Experience in the security services does not automatically translate into electoral legitimacy. Yet during periods of transition, states often turn to consensus figures capable of bridging competing political camps. Another name occasionally put forward is MP Jamil El Sayyed. Despite his long career in the security establishment, El Sayyed has sought to project an image of independence from Lebanon’s traditional party structures. His criticism of the country’s established political elite has earned him support among those seeking an alternative discourse within the Shiite community. At the same time, he remains one of Lebanon’s most controversial public figures. His confrontational political style may energize his supporters, but it also makes the pursuit of broader national consensus considerably more difficult. Neither Abbas Ibrahim nor Jamil El Sayyed currently represents a clear succession project. Their significance lies elsewhere: they illustrate that the next chapter of Shiite politics may not be written exclusively within Amal’s organizational framework. The Real Question Is Institutional Focusing exclusively on personalities risks overlooking the far more significant transformation already underway. Modern political systems do not simply ask who will succeed a leader. They ask whether institutions themselves are capable of producing new leadership. This is where Lebanon faces its greatest challenge. For decades, political parties across the country’s sectarian spectrum have revolved largely around personal authority rather than internal democratic mechanisms. Leadership transitions have generally been shaped by individual influence, family networks, or exceptional political circumstances, rather than by transparent institutional processes. The Amal Movement is no exception. The real opportunity presented by the post-Berri era lies in transforming Amal from a movement identified with a single historic leader into a fully institutionalized political party, governed by internal elections, regular leadership renewal, policy debate, and meaningful accountability. Such a transformation would strengthen the movement rather than weaken it. Strong institutions outlive their leaders. Political systems built primarily around individuals rarely do. A Test for Lebanon’s Shiite Community Lebanon’s Shiite community itself now stands before a historic opportunity. For decades, its political representation has been dominated by two major organizations whose legitimacy was forged in the context of war, the “resistance,” and regional conflict. The years ahead, however, may require an entirely different political vocabulary. Economic recovery. State-building. Institutional reform. Foreign investment. Judicial independence. Administrative modernization. These priorities call for political leaders capable not merely of mobilizing supporters, but of governing. Ultimately, the next generation of Shiite leaders will be judged less by their wartime credentials than by their ability to rebuild the Lebanese state. The Post-Berri Era In the end, Lebanon’s future should not be measured by whether anyone succeeds Nabih Berri by reproducing his extensive control over state institutions, along with the patronage networks and indiscriminate public-sector hiring that produced widespread disguised unemployment. No one is likely to replicate that model. The more fundamental question is whether Lebanon can finally free itself from its chronic dependence on supposedly indispensable leaders. If the post-Berri debate is reduced to selecting another “strongman,” Lebanon will merely reproduce the same political culture under a different name. If, however, the transition encourages stronger political parties, transparent leadership selection mechanisms, institutional governance, and broader political pluralism within the Shiite community, then Berri’s departure, whenever it comes, may mark not the beginning of instability, but the beginning of genuine political maturity. Lebanon does not need another indispensable man. It needs indispensable institutions. And more than any succession battle, that is what will shape the country’s next political chapter.