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Lebanese President Joseph Aoun arrived in Washington on Saturday, ahead of a scheduled meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump on Tuesday. On the regional front, the United States intensified its strikes throughout the past week against Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) positions and infrastructure, prompting retaliatory attacks by the latter against Gulf countries (!), while the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen once again entered the fray. As the week drew to a close, attention in Lebanon was firmly fixed on the long-awaited visit of President Joseph Aoun to Washington. The head of state, who arrived in the U.S. capital on Saturday accompanied by his wife and advisors, held a meeting on Sunday afternoon (Beirut time) at the State Department with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. He is set to meet with several other U.S. officials before his appointment on Tuesday with President Donald Trump at the White House. President Joseph Aoun's meeting with the Secretary of State lasted an hour and a half. During the talks, the Lebanese president stressed the importance of swiftly establishing the pilot zones that Israel should evacuate, in order to allow the Lebanese army to deploy in those areas. Rubio reaffirmed the United States' commitment to working toward implementing the framework agreement concluded between Lebanon and Israel. The U.S. Secretary of State also praised the efforts of President Aoun and the Salam government in restoring Lebanese state sovereignty and dismantling the Hezbollah militia. In this context, sources cited by the al-Hadath channel reported on Sunday that the Trump administration is seeking to establish "an alliance between Lebanon and Iraq in order to reduce Iranian influence in the region." Regardless, this official visit by a Lebanese president to the United States — the first in many years — carries particular significance given the current context, not only in terms of domestic developments, but especially at the regional level. The sixth round of direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, held this week in Rome, did make progress regarding the initial implementation of the framework agreement signed on June 26 in Washington. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar announced on Tuesday from Jerusalem that the Israelis "are ready to move forward" with implementing the pilot zones in southern Lebanon. The two-day talks in Rome between Lebanese and Israeli negotiators were described as "productive and positive" on Wednesday by the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon. However, the devil remains in the details, which were to be discussed on Friday during technical exchanges between the Lebanese and Israeli sides. Those consultations were postponed, as Lebanon insists that the pilot zones must clearly consist of villages currently occupied by Israel, while Tel Aviv is demanding stronger guarantees regarding the systematic destruction of all Hezbollah infrastructure in areas handed over to the Lebanese army. The Israelis have submitted requests to that effect to the Americans. In any case, the Lebanese are not the only ones facing a "mixed" situation. Relations between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump are reportedly not on solid footing. Israeli media reported this week that Netanyahu would soon travel to Washington to meet with the U.S. president, but American officials denied that any appointment had been secured. What's more, U.S. pressure on Netanyahu is mounting, according to Axios , who revealed that President Trump asked Israeli PM, during a phone call on Thursday, to redeploy his army in Syria and Lebanon. Escalation with Iran On the ground in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah has still not resumed fighting, though this appears to be only a brief respite. Indeed, judging by statements from its leadership, the pro-Iranian militia "has no intention of returning to the situation that existed before March 2." In other words, Hezbollah will not indefinitely absorb Israeli attacks without responding; yet the airstrikes and the blowing up of tunnels and militia infrastructure have not stopped. Another significant indicator: Syrian armed forces seized, this week, a large shipment of drones originating from Iran and destined for Hezbollah. The Shia party appears, in this context, to be increasingly stretched to its limits, with a popular base that is either displaced or left in uninhabitable villages. Moreover, funerals for fighters have been taking place by the dozens in southern villages since the relative lull of the latest ceasefire. However, it cannot be ruled out that Hezbollah may once again drag its popular base and Lebanon into a new conflict if Iran finds itself, once more, at the center of a major escalation. Indeed, American strikes on Iran have continued relentlessly throughout the week, and nothing appears to be stopping them, especially as the U.S. military deploys 50,000 troops in the region and has airlifted aircraft as reinforcements from Europe. According to information reported by media outlets this week, President Trump notified Congress on July 10 of the resumption of U.S. military operations against Iran, describing them as "defensive" and "limited" strikes, planned in a way to minimize civilian casualties. Since this notification comes after an interruption due to a ceasefire and the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the Iranian side in June, the ongoing escalation can be considered a new conflict, which gives the American president 60 days of freedom to act before needing to seek congressional approval, analysts note. On the Iranian side, the Revolutionary Guards now appear to be clearly running operations. Even the statements of the chief negotiators — Parliament Speaker Mohammad Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi — have become more aggressive in tone, yet they seem to be fading into the background as the voices of hardliners grow louder. Iran accordingly took the initiative on Friday of announcing the suspension of its memorandum of understanding with the United States. Divisions within the Iranian regime It is against this backdrop that rumors of deep internal divisions within the Iranian regime are multiplying, particularly as Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei remains more elusive than ever — a situation reflected in the fact that messages are attributed to him without any certainty as to their true origin. The latest such message issued threats toward the Americans, promising them on Saturday "a lesson they would never forget." The week's most notable anecdote came in the form of a statement from an "Iranian source" to the Russian news agency TASS on Saturday: according to this source, Khamenei has no plans to make any public appearance until the war with the Americans is over (!), and when he does, it would be a phone call or a meeting… with Russian President Vladimir Putin. For now, it is the Revolutionary Guards who are issuing communiqués reporting strikes against Gulf countries, targeting the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and now Jordan. These countries have become daily targets of Iranian missiles and drones, much like the vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Increasingly, American strikes inside Iran and Iranian strikes on neighboring countries are hitting civilian targets, including energy infrastructure. Gulf states condemned these Iranian strikes on Saturday, labeling them "war crimes." Appearing to keep Hezbollah on the sidelines for now, Iran is attempting to draw Yemen's Houthis into the fight, with its trump card being a potential closure of another maritime chokepoint — the Bab el-Mandeb strait — should Iranian infrastructure be targeted on a large scale. An incident occurred in this context on Monday: the legitimate Yemeni government struck Sanaa airport, controlled by Houthi rebels, targeting a plane that had arrived from Iran carrying passengers who had attended Ali Khamenei's funeral. The Houthis retaliated by striking an airport in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the Houthi front has not yet truly ignited. The Iraqi PM's visit to Washington Against this grim backdrop, some nuances are nonetheless emerging. On one hand, the Americans have not completely shut the door on negotiations, as President Trump emphasized on more than one occasion this week, giving the impression that he prefers talks "in the heat of the moment" over an endless war. That said, any misstep under such circumstances becomes far more dangerous. On Saturday evening, two American soldiers were killed in an Iranian strike on Jordan, bringing the situation dangerously close to a point of no return. On the other hand, despite what appears to be a suicidal stance, Iran seems intent on avoiding the worst-case scenario — which would explain why it has not yet launched any attacks against Israel since hostilities resumed. And it is not for lack of Israeli willingness to enter the fray: media leaks on Saturday evening reported that Israel had requested to join in the strikes against Iran, a request that was reportedly rejected by the Americans. It is worth noting in this context that President Trump returned this week to his demand that Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa intervene in Lebanon against Hezbollah. For the time being, these statements have not translated into concrete action — but how long can President al-Sharaa hold out against American pressure? That said, it is Iraq that has truly dominated the news in recent days. New Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi was given a high-profile reception by President Trump at the White House this week, with numerous lucrative agreements reached between the two sides following their meeting. The press also reported an Iraqi willingness to impose banking restrictions on militias sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury, including Hezbollah. For now, Iraq appears to be skillfully playing both sides — meeting American pressure to the bare minimum while avoiding antagonizing Iran and its affiliated militias, including those operating on Iraqi soil.

The war in Ukraine continues to be at the center of a wide-ranging debate, fueled in part by near-daily bombardments targeting key nerve centers on both sides—most notably the Russian and Ukrainian capitals. To better understand the various dimensions of this long-standing conflict, it is necessary to revisit the background and origins of what has led to this (fratricidal?) war, by examining the motivations and aspirations of the different parties involved—particularly the West (the United States and Europe, extended to all NATO member states with the exception of Turkey)—and by recalling the early stages of the Russian offensive and the failed attempts to achieve peace, or at least negotiations, bearing in mind that responsibility in this context is shared by many. To fully grasp the ins and outs of the various aspects of the war in Ukraine, some fundamental questions should be raised from the outset. What do Russia and Ukraine represent for the West? What could be the concrete consequences of a clear-cut victory by either of the two protagonists? And by extension, what would the implications be for the West and the Middle East? In a series of five articles, our contributor Jean-Patrick Dayras, a rear admiral in the French Navy, presents his vision and analysis of the issue. Jean-Patrick Dayras, Rear Admiral (ret.) On the very day Russia invaded Ukraine, February 22, 2022, many French and European citizens displayed Ukrainian flags (including in the Azores!) and volunteered to take in refugees or even offer language classes to help them learn to speak the language of their host country. It would have been interesting to ask these people, who were making a political statement, to locate Ukraine on a map and explain what had happened over the previous ten years (2013–2022) among Europe, Ukraine, and Russia. Such remarks, however, are not welcome in certain circles in France. EU Membership Just a few days after the Russian invasion, Ukraine officially applied for membership in the European Union. On June 17, 2022, the European Commission recommended granting Ukraine the status of candidate country. For what reason? To what end? No one will ever truly know. On June 23, 2022, the heads of state and government of the 27 member states, meeting at the European Council, unanimously decided to grant Ukraine official candidate status for membership in the European Union. On December 14, 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations, and on June 25, 2024, those negotiations were officially launched. What civil servant or corporate employee wouldn't have dreamed of a promotion bringing such a rapid and advantageous change in status? This wouldn't just be climbing the social ladder—not even a social elevator—but a social interplanetary rocket! Compare this with other candidate countries that are not yet members of the European Union. Opening of negotiation processes: Turkey 1999; North Macedonia 2005; Montenegro 2010; Serbia 2012; Albania 2014; Moldova 2022; Bosnia-Herzegovina 2022; Georgia 2023. Kosovo applied for membership in 2022 but has not yet been granted official candidate status. Why such haste? Was it not possible to support Ukraine without rolling out such a promising—perhaps overly promising—red carpet? The least one can say is that candidate countries are not being treated equally. Ukraine is a country that was highly corrupt and remains so. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranked Ukraine 142nd in the world in 2014 and 116th in 2022 (Russia's scores are similar). In the Western press, Russia is portrayed as a corrupt state. Ukraine's corruption, meanwhile, goes largely unmentioned. The peace project under Turkey's auspices In spring 2022, peace was not far off. The door was left ajar from the very start of the war. Turkey played an important diplomatic role, even though it did not manage to secure a lasting peace agreement. Turkey held a unique position: a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it maintained good relations with Ukraine (drone sales and military cooperation) while keeping close ties with Russia on geopolitical (Syria) and economic grounds. Turkey was one of the few states able to speak simultaneously to Moscow and Kyiv. It hosted the main peace negotiations in March 2022 and facilitated the grain export agreement. The March 2022 negotiations Turkey hosted a meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers in Antalya on 10 March 2022, as well as more substantial negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Istanbul on 29 March 2022, which outlined: A neutral status for Ukraine (renouncing NATO membership). Security guarantees provided by several states in exchange for this neutrality. The withdrawal of Russian forces from certain areas. The deferral of discussions on the status of Crimea. Research by historians and scholars shows that a draft agreement existed, but that many essential issues remained unresolved, including the status of occupied territories, security guarantees, the timetable for military withdrawals, and the future size of the Ukrainian army. Ukraine's military successes around Kyiv led Ukrainian leaders to believe a stronger position could be achieved on the battlefield. For its part, Russia maintained demands that Ukraine considered unacceptable. Boris Johnson's role Boris Johnson allegedly discouraged Ukraine from concluding an agreement. This claim remains disputed. Nevertheless, it was clearly reported by numerous newspapers and by well-informed, credible commentators. Boris Johnson has not denied it. His role in the failure of the peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, conducted under Turkish mediation in spring 2022, is one of the most debated topics of the war. On 9 April 2022, Boris Johnson traveled to Kyiv. According to anonymous sources cited by the Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda, he reportedly conveyed two main messages: that Vladimir Putin should not be considered a reliable negotiating partner; and that Western powers were not prepared to guarantee any agreement reached with Russia on the terms then being discussed. This account is the basis for the claim that Johnson sabotaged the prospective deal. He was publicly expressing skepticism about the possibility of negotiating with Putin and advocating for the continuation of Western military support for Ukraine. There is no established proof that a final peace agreement was ready to be signed and was called off solely because of his intervention. Nonetheless, President Zelensky's position changed dramatically. The strengths of both countries What can these two countries bring to Europe? Ukraine has some of the most productive agricultural land in the world, growing wheat, corn, barley, sunflowers, and rapeseed. It also holds significant mineral resources, including some that are critical for the development of modern technologies: iron, manganese, titanium, uranium, graphite, and lithium. Its industry is highly capable in sectors such as steel, metallurgy, railway construction, aeronautics, space, and shipbuilding. On top of that, Ukraine has a remarkable nuclear power generation capacity, natural gas resources, and an extensive pipeline network connecting Russia to Europe. Furthermore, Ukraine is a strategically vital territory bridging Europe and Russia, with access to the Black Sea — essential for grain exports and of major military significance. As for Russia, it is endowed with vast natural resources, including oil and natural gas, as well as mineral wealth such as coal, nickel, palladium, platinum, gold, diamonds, copper, and aluminum. Beyond holding the world's largest forested area, it also benefits from an agricultural sector that gives it a major export advantage, producing wheat, barley, and vegetable oils. Next article The War in Ukraine: Russian Strategic Blunders and Western Missteps (3/5) Also read on the same topic How the West Chose Ukraine (1/5)

The situation in Iran continues to escalate on every front. Tensions are rising both in the political and media spheres and on the battlefield. The U.S. military is continuing its strikes against the Revolutionary Guards’ strategic facilities and transportation networks, while the Guards are retaliating by targeting—not Israel—but Arab countries, primarily the Gulf states. In recent days, Revolutionary Guard attacks have extended to Jordan, where two American soldiers were killed, four others wounded, and a seventh remains missing while participating in air defense operations aimed at intercepting missiles and drones. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claims that its attacks on Arab countries are intended to strike U.S. military bases located there. However, recent events contradict that claim, as Iranian strikes over the past two days targeted, among other sites in Kuwait, a power plant and a seawater desalination facility. Meanwhile, over the past 48 hours, a U.S. air bridge has been detected transporting dozens of aerial refueling aircraft as well as F-16 and F-35 fighter jets from Europe to Israel. These aircraft had been redeployed to Europe following the signing of the memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran but have now been sent back to the Middle East. At the same time, the U.S. military is reinforcing its naval blockade of Iranian ports. On Saturday, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that five commercial vessels attempting to bypass the blockade had been forced to turn back. The impact of the blockade has become even more severe as it has been accompanied by the destruction of key land transportation infrastructure, including seven bridges and railway lines, particularly around Bandar Abbas. New Message Attributed to Khamenei This renewed military activity has been accompanied since the end of the week by a sharp escalation in rhetoric. In a written message attributed—without independent verification—to the elusive Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, the United States was threatened with "a lesson it will never forget" should it continue its attacks against Iran. The statement also declared that "Donald Trump's signature on the memorandum of understanding has no value." This echoes remarks made on Saturday by a senior Iranian official, who warned that "if U.S. attacks continue over the next two or three days, Iran will move from the defensive phase to the offensive stage." He added that Iran had decided to "suspend all of its commitments under the memorandum of understanding." Politically, the message attributed to Khamenei is significant because it calls on Iranian leaders to tone down their internal disputes while urging the population to moderate its criticism of the authorities. This dual appeal comes as signs of growing divisions between the regime's hardline faction and its so-called pragmatic camp have become increasingly visible, according to American and Pakistani officials. Aoun in Washington Against the backdrop of these mounting regional tensions, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun began an official multi-day visit to Washington on Saturday. On Sunday, he is expected to meet Secretary of State Marco Rubio. On Tuesday, July 21, he will be received at the White House by President Donald Trump to discuss ways to implement the framework agreement signed with Israel on June 26. The two presidents are expected to focus particularly on southern Lebanon, where the Israeli army continues its targeted raids and the demolition of Hezbollah infrastructure.

The trilateral framework agreement, negotiated under U.S. auspices and signed in Washington, introduced an ambitious mechanism to demilitarize southern Lebanon: the creation of "pilot zones." The initial phase of this project encompasses six key villages spread on both sides of the Litani River, namely Zawtar al-Gharbiyah north of the river, and Froun, Ghandouriyeh, Qalaouiyeh, and Burj Qalaouiyeh to its south. Under this framework, the Lebanese Army is tasked with deploying, establishing full control, and ensuring that these zones are entirely cleared of militia weapons. In return, Israeli occupation forces are required to carry out a gradual withdrawal. Yet this local security experiment proves to be an outsized geopolitical ambition — even if it represents a glimmer of hope. The project is being structurally sabotaged, caught in a vice between Hezbollah's internal resistance, Israel's intransigence, and Iran's broader regional strategy. Hezbollah's Structural Veto and Internal Resistance The most immediate domestic obstacle to implementing the pilot zones remains Hezbollah's outright refusal to lay down its arms. The group has publicly branded the framework agreement a failure, explicitly warning that any state-enforced disarmament in these villages could trigger a devastating civil war. Lebanese MPs have accused Beirut's negotiators of capitulating to American and Israeli demands at the expense of national unity. Although the Lebanese Army has already begun reinforcing its presence on the ground — setting up checkpoints and conducting patrols around unoccupied villages such as Srifa and Froun — it is operating under enormous operational constraints. Joseph Aoun has had to contend with the serious reservations expressed by the Amal Movement and Hezbollah. The army cannot dismantle the underground rocket-launch networks and military infrastructure buried in the Litani valleys without triggering a direct and bloody confrontation with the group. Hezbollah argues that accepting a localized surrender of its arsenal in Ghandouriyeh or Zawtar al-Gharbiyah would set a precedent, undermining its very identity as a resistance movement. Israeli Intransigence and Strategic Overreach At the same time, Israel is actively blocking the pilot plan through tactical delays and aggressive on-the-ground demands. Military coordination talks, which were meant to formalize maps and withdrawal timelines, were abruptly postponed due to deep disagreements over the exact boundaries of the zones in question. The Lebanese delegation has accused the Israeli state of seeking to expand the boundaries of the pilot zones to include villages not physically occupied by Israeli forces, as well as territories north of the Litani. Furthermore, Israeli officials have reiterated that their forces will not withdraw from their new 10-kilometer-deep "security zone" until Hezbollah is fully dismantled. The entrenchment of this "yellow line" imposed by Tel Aviv creates a deadlock: Israel refuses to withdraw as long as weapons remain in the area, yet the Lebanese Army cannot safely enter to demilitarize it as long as Israeli troops remain positioned there. Moreover, the Israeli military is waging a scorched-earth campaign, systematically destroying neighborhoods and carrying out targeted airstrikes. This sustained pressure signals that Tel Aviv intends to maintain long-term security control rather than cede genuine authority to the Lebanese government. Iran's Regional Lock The pilot zones are also hostage to the collapse of the broader regional dynamics between Washington and Tehran. The Middle East is currently being shaken by intense US-Iranian military clashes, marked by American strikes on Iranian infrastructure and sharp maritime tensions in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran does not view southern Lebanon as an isolated border issue, but as a crucial geostrategic front line. Hezbollah has explicitly stressed that only direct intervention from Tehran could dictate a genuine ceasefire or withdrawal. In Iran's strategic calculus, a consensual disarmament of Hezbollah in the pilot zones would weaken its primary deterrent shield against Israel, at a moment when American pressure on the Islamic Republic is reaching a peak. Accordingly, Tehran is actively directing its allies in Beirut to obstruct the implementation of the Washington agreement, ensuring that Lebanon remains anchored within the Iranian axis. Joseph Aoun's last-chance mission to the White House It is against this backdrop of internal and regional deadlock that President Joseph Aoun is traveling to Washington for a critical meeting with Donald Trump. This visit — the first by a Lebanese leader to the White House in years — aims to salvage the faltering framework agreement and secure the survival of the pilot zones. The two leaders come to the negotiating table with sharply opposing agendas. On the Lebanese side, President Joseph Aoun is calling on the United States to pressure Israel into halting airstrikes and carrying out verifiable withdrawals. To equip the Lebanese army for its mission, he is seeking substantial American assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces, including financial support. He will also very likely request advanced drone technologies and border sensors to curb arms smuggling along the Lebanese-Syrian border. On the American side, President Donald Trump is demanding concrete, verifiable proof of Beirut's willingness to disarm Hezbollah. His administration is pushing for a restructuring of Lebanon's economy by dismantling Hezbollah-linked informal financial institutions, with the ultimate goal of permanently pulling Lebanon out of Iran's geostrategic orbit. Joseph Aoun's diplomatic gambit faces major obstacles. Analysts point out that the Lebanese president has very little real leverage on the ground. While Washington is pushing for a direct meeting between Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Beirut continues to firmly reject any trilateral talks as long as Israeli troops occupy even a single inch of Lebanese territory. Ultimately, the pilot zones of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah and Srifa cannot survive as a mere technical military arrangement. Without a comprehensive regional de-escalation between the United States and Iran, coupled with a binding internal political settlement in Beirut, the deployment of the Lebanese army will remain extremely difficult to achieve. Caught between Hezbollah's arsenal, Israel's defensive expansion, and Iran's proxy war, the pilot zones face an uphill battle.

When we have been driven back by enemy fire; when the adversary has stormed our cities, razed so many towns and villages, and forced our fellow citizens from their homes; when it has demonstrated that it can keep advancing until it encircles our capital; and above all when, weary of war, those who clamored for battle finally pleaded for a ceasefire, it stands to reason that, at the negotiating table, one cannot afford to be overly fastidious and may have to compromise on certain principles, such as national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Defeated France had to cede Alsace-Lorraine to the Kaiser's Empire in 1871; likewise, Germany, upon signing the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, was compelled to accept, among other humiliating terms, the demilitarization of the Rhineland and the reduction of its army to one hundred thousand men. Has Hezbollah won a resounding victory over Israel? Not that I am aware of. There is little point in swaggering merely to buy time, or in sacrificing oneself in a futile rearguard action simply to strengthen Iran's hand in its negotiations with Washington. More than four thousand Lebanese have already given their lives to provide Tehran with greater diplomatic leverage. The facts are undeniable: we have suffered a severe military defeat, and Lebanese of every political persuasion must acknowledge it and draw the necessary conclusions. Had our forces captured Metula, Nahariya, or Haifa, had they advanced far enough to threaten Dimona, then I would readily believe that we could have imposed our terms on Israel. That would have been perfectly logical: if the enemy wished to recover its territorial integrity, it would have had to relinquish certain attributes of its sovereignty. But that is not what happened. Quite the opposite. To accuse the Lebanese delegation of seeking to liberate Lebanese territory in exchange for the disarmament of the pro-Iranian Hezbollah* is therefore nothing more than reckless one-upmanship. Profitable One-Upmanship... Yet So Pernicious Passion can cloud even the soundest minds. Hence the reactions of certain "research associates" and political commentators—these self-appointed champions of territorial integrity—when the framework agreement was announced in Washington on June 26*. These latter-day sovereigntists accuse the Lebanese state of capitulation. Like Caiaphas during Holy Week, they rend their garments and cry "treason!" Yet this outcry conceals a rather sordid game that does little credit to those who claim the mantle of patriotism. If the Shiite tandem and those within its orbit seek to torpedo the trilateral agreement, it is because they want to place the Lebanese file in Tehran's hands and fold it into a broader negotiation—one that would be conducted by the belligerents of the Persian Gulf, whether in Islamabad or somewhere in Switzerland. And, in the height of cynicism, the critics of the June 26 agreement claim that their only concern is to defend national sovereignty and its supposedly inviolable principles. Let Us Take Abu Ammar as Our Example For Hafez al-Assad, beginning in the 1970s, the primary target was not the Lebanese Christian who defied his rule, but the Palestinian. The PLO was the first enemy to be crushed, long before the Lebanese Front or the Lebanese Forces. In the grand geopolitical reshaping of the Levant, should an international conference ever be convened to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, the tyrant of Damascus was determined that the "Palestinian card" should never escape his grasp. In his eyes, the Palestinians were merely Southern Syrians, and it was for him alone to decide their fate. Yasser Arafat, however, intended to remain master of his own cause. He played a prolonged game of cat and mouse with the autocrat on the banks of the Barada. Tossed from one country to another—from Jordan to Lebanon and finally Tunisia—Abu Ammar refused to surrender his prerogatives. In the end, it was he who signed the Oslo Accords on behalf of his people. He was not about to allow a coup-born officer from Qardaha, whose legitimacy was dubious at best, to represent his nation of exiles. Shall We Surrender the "Lebanese Card"? We Lebanese now face much the same predicament. Shall we hand over the Lebanese card to Iran in order to strengthen its bargaining power in negotiations with Donald Trump? Which course better serves our sovereignty: confronting Israel directly in Washington or Rome, or gratuitously entrusting that card to the empire of the mullahs, which some insist would defend our national interests more effectively than we ourselves can? Let us remember that with the fall of the Assad father-and-son regime, fortune briefly smiled upon us, allowing Lebanon quietly to reclaim the card that Damascus had long confiscated. And now an Iranian-controlled militia, with astonishing brazenness, seeks to assign us to Tehran and reduce Lebanon to a mere agenda item in negotiations conducted exclusively between Iran and the United States. The Lebanese card is not meant to be surrendered, nor to be endorsed at the command of a patron from the Gulf of the Achaemenids. And, if truth be told, the Lebanese card has never brought good fortune to freebooters. *Let us recall that the framework agreement signed on June 26 by Lebanon, Israel, and the United States has as its ultimate objective the liberation of Lebanese territory from every form of occupation, whether Israeli or Iranian. Is it to be condemned simply because it proceeds in stages? Let us see what emerges from the forthcoming talks in Rome, where the delegations are meeting.

Salman Rushdie’s The Eleventh Hour is not a novel in the conventional sense, but a collection of five interconnected stories published after the assassination attempt against him in 2022. It stands among his most contemplative works, exploring old age, mortality, identity, and freedom. The “eleventh hour” is more than a moment in time. It is a sign. It evokes a civilization that senses it has reached its final test: the rise of populism, the erosion of democratic values, violence against free expression, and the identity crisis unsettling a globalized world. In this sense, the eleventh hour becomes a metaphor not merely for an individual stage of life, but for an entire civilization confronting itself. Two years after Knife , in which Rushdie reflected on the attempt on his life, this new book marks a return to fiction through stories haunted by the inexorable passage of time in a new era. The eleventh hour is the hour before sunset. In everyday language, it also signifies the last possible moment to act before it is too late. In the opening story of the collection, the phrase becomes a metaphor for the late stage of life reached by “Junior” and “Senior,” two neighbors who are almost brothers: inseparable, yet unable to endure one another. Both are eighty-one years old. If a long life resembles a twilight destined to fade into midnight, they have already entered their eleventh hour. “You look dreadful,” Junior tells his companion. “Just as you do every morning. You look like a man waiting only for death.” Senior shakes his head solemnly, faithful to the ritual that has long defined their friendship, and replies: “At least I look better than a man who’s still waiting for life.” Senior, who had been a railway executive, a mathematics professor, and a singer of Vedic hymns celebrating the passage of time, had lived a rich and accomplished life. Junior, by contrast, had found little beyond disappointment. Yet they are united by the same bitterness, born of regret for having lived either too intensely or not intensely enough. Life and death have become nothing more than two neighboring balconies. The final story in the collection, “The Old Man in the Square,” can be read as a defense of disagreement within society, of that spirit of argument that upholds every individual’s freedom to think differently. It suggests that little now binds people together except argument itself, elevated into a form of artistic expression in an age of perpetual “yes,” where any debate becomes suspect the moment it fails to command unanimous approval, however absurd that approval may be. Through this allegorical tale, Salman Rushdie condemns the global temptation toward simplification. “We are not melodramatic creatures,” he writes, before concluding the collection with the bitter observation that “words fail us.” Yet the book itself proves precisely the opposite. Words have not failed Rushdie, nor has the wit that animates his narrators, who bear witness to characters struggling to come to terms with their own destinies. Thus, in the story “Kahani Musical,” a couple separates after the birth of their daughter. The father chooses to leave for the Moon, not Earth’s satellite itself, but an experimental community where he hopes to discover meaning by serving soup to the followers of what appears to be a new sect, a fellowship of fellow dreamers and eccentrics, while humanity continues its existence as a population of castaways on planet Earth. Whether written in a richly baroque style or in striking simplicity, the stories collected in The Eleventh Hour weave together imagination and melancholy in a manner reminiscent of Victory City (2023), Quichotte (2020), and The Golden House (2017). They read like the closing movement of a vast literary composition and, as several Anglo-American critics have suggested, perhaps foreshadow a final major novel inspired by both Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain and Franz Kafka’s The Castle , two “great books about strange miniature worlds” akin to the one Rushdie himself has long dreamed of creating as a politically engaged Anglo-American writer. This is what makes literature the most interactive of all art forms. It bears little resemblance to artificial intelligence, which, Rushdie argues, has already “created new religions” by feeding exclusively on what already exists, while remaining incapable of bringing into being something no one has ever imagined before. Its lack of a sense of humor, he adds with characteristic irony, is another of its major shortcomings, one that causes more than enough trouble on its own. In an interview with the French weekly Le Point , Salman Rushdie acknowledges a profound sense of helplessness in the face of the world’s trajectory. Yet he finds solace in the adventure of imagination. Remaining faithful to his convictions, he believes that humanity is passing through a moment of grave danger, that the world’s fault lines are growing ever deeper, and that literature alone still offers a place of reconciliation, in those “places where we do not die.” “People today are far too certain of what everything is,” he observes. “Literature, by contrast, is the kingdom of doubt and questioning.” That reflection resonates powerfully with today’s polarization, at a time when growing segments of the public are rejecting the Trump administration’s conduct of war. Yet, Rushdie argues, that is far from the whole story. As he tells the French magazine: “I don’t even think he really knows what he’s trying to do. If he were genuinely interested in bringing about regime change in Iran and restoring democracy there, that would be a good thing. But is that really what serves his interests? We are confronted with a slightly mad American president waging war against a fascist theocratic regime. I am on no one’s side except that of the Iranian people, who are never consulted.” In his view, everyone today is expected to choose between competing narratives that seek less to persuade than to crush one another. “I reject catastrophe. The world can change in another way. Look at what has just happened in Hungary with Viktor Orbán. In America, too, the winds of change are beginning to blow. We will not know what is really happening until the midterm elections in November, but we can already see a powerful public rejection of the Trump administration. The end of the Trump phenomenon may well trigger the fall of other dominoes. But let us be cautious. I am a very poor prophet.” These remarks acquire a deeply symbolic meaning when Rushdie speaks of the world we inhabit, a world in which divisions have become so profound that they now define the age itself. Here one can discern a striking intellectual affinity between Salman Rushdie and the late Edgar Morin, despite the different fields in which they worked, literature in one case, philosophy and sociology in the other. That affinity lies in a shared philosophy of complex identity and a common rejection of reductionist thinking. Morin’s fundamental question was: “Can we be all of these things at once?” His answer was that identity is inherently multiple and composite. Rushdie gives literary form to that very idea in works such as Midnight’s Children , The Satanic Verses , and his memoir, refusing to be confined within a single religious or national identity. His fiction embodies this complexity through characters who fully inhabit multiple affiliations, a vision that also finds an echo in the writings of Régis Debray. The eleventh hour is not the moment of the end. It is the moment of the final test. What is being tested is not so much the strength of states as their ability to generate a new meaning for the international order. Great wars do not merely redraw maps. They also transform the language through which power, legitimacy, and identity are understood. Every major conflict produces more symbols than victories. What appears on the battlefield as a military event is transfigured in public discourse into a symbol that reshapes the collective imagination: the name of a historical moment in which an old meaning collapses before a new one can take root. Caught between resentment toward geography, the burden of history, and the world’s deepening fault lines, humanity nevertheless continues to nurture an almost utopian longing: the dream of living on the Moon.