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The war in Ukraine continues to be at the center of a wide-ranging debate, fueled in part by near-daily bombardments targeting key nerve centers on both sides, and more specifically the Russian and Ukrainian capitals. In order to better understand the various dimensions of this long-standing conflict, it is necessary to revisit the background and origins of what led to this (fratricidal?) war—by examining the motivations and aspirations of the different parties involved, including the West (the United States and Europe, extended to all NATO member countries with the exception of Turkey), and by recalling the early stages of the Russian offensive and the failed attempts to achieve peace, or at least negotiations, bearing in mind that responsibility in this context is shared by many. To fully grasp the ins and outs of the various aspects of the war in Ukraine, some fundamental questions should be raised from the outset. What do Russia and Ukraine represent for the West? What could be the concrete consequences of a clear-cut victory by either of the two protagonists? And by the same token, what would the repercussions be for the West and the Middle East? In a series of five articles, Jean-Patrick Dayras , a rear admiral in the French Navy, presents his vision and analysis of the issue. The consequences of the war in Ukraine for the Middle East depend largely on the outcome of the conflict, and more specifically on how it ends (a negotiated agreement, a ceasefire, or a clear military victory). If Ukraine wins For Iran Iran, which has supplied Russia with drones and strengthened its military cooperation with Moscow since 2022, would see its regional partner weakened. This could limit certain technological or military cooperation efforts, though Iran would retain other partners and its own capabilities. For Israel Israel might view a weakened Russia as reducing Russian influence in Syria, but this could create new uncertainties if other actors seek to fill that void. For Syria A Russia less capable of projecting power could reduce its military or financial involvement in Syria, potentially shifting the balance between the Syrian government, Iran, and Turkey. For the Gulf states Countries such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates would likely seek to maintain relations with all major powers. A weakened Russia could, however, carry less sway over certain energy or diplomatic matters. If Russia wins Strengthening of the Moscow-Tehran axis A Russian victory would deepen cooperation between Russia and Iran across military, energy, and diplomatic spheres. Syria Russia could be in a position to maintain, or even strengthen, its support for the Syrian government, depending on the resources available to it after the conflict. Israel Israel would need to continue managing Russia's military presence in Syria. It will seek to preserve its coordination mechanisms with Moscow while maintaining its strategic partnership with the United States. Turkey Turkey will in all likelihood continue its balancing act between Russia and Western nations. For several years now, it has demonstrated its ability to cooperate with Moscow on certain issues while remaining a NATO member. Other consequences Energy Regardless of who prevails, the impact on oil and gas markets will depend primarily on: The evolution of sanctions, or the costs and allocation of responsibility for reparations. Production and export capacities. The decisions of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its partners (OPEC+), in which Russia plays a significant role. Near Eastern oil-producing countries will continue to adapt their strategy based on global prices and demand. U.S. Influence A Ukrainian victory could reinforce U.S. credibility with certain regional allies, while a Russian victory could fuel questions about the willingness or ability of the United States to provide sustained support to its allies. However, these perceptions will also depend on other factors, particularly U.S. policy (post-Trump) in the region. It is worth noting that a Russian victory coupled with a favorable deal for Iran would almost certainly reshape alliances and partnerships across the Near and Middle East in profound ways, particularly for all countries in the Arab-Persian Gulf. It is too early to map out every contingency, but one can already sense growing anxieties in various Gulf states that would lead them to reassess their partnerships and their sense of security. A major upheaval is on the horizon! A Region Shaped by Its Own Dynamics It is important to emphasize that the Near East is influenced by many factors that do not directly depend on the war in Ukraine: relations between Iran and Arab states; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the situation in Syria; rivalries between regional powers; and energy markets. A Russian or Ukrainian victory would have repercussions on the diplomatic and military balance in the Near East, but it would not by itself determine how the region evolves. The most likely effects would concern Russia's role in Syria, relations with Iran, the strategic calculations of Turkey and the Gulf states, and perceptions of the U.S. role. These consequences would be significant, but they would unfold within a broader set of regional dynamics already in motion. More upheaval ahead! And Africa? Forgotten? All of Africa will be affected by either outcome. The influence of China, India, the UAE, and Turkey, in particular, will be altered to varying degrees — but especially in the event of a Russian defeat. Yet another upheaval in the making… The Winner China, which for the time being is increasingly backing Russia. As long as this war continues, Western attention is diverted away from Asia. Meanwhile, the United States is putting on the sorry spectacle of an already-failed negotiation with Iran. The weapons that would be most needed to defend Taiwan against China are depleted, and it will take at least three years to replenish stocks. The Loser If China wins, the United States can only lose. One fears that someday people will say: 'What changed starting in 2022 was the United States. They stopped mattering.' Looking Back The first missed opportunity lies in the post-Maidan period. Engaging with Russia, allowing it to see the possibilities for Ukraine — and perhaps for itself — to become one or two states associated with Europe, with NATO staying well clear of the negotiations. It would certainly have taken time, but time was not in short supply between 2014 and 2022. What was needed was a discussion among all EU member states and with the British, the defining of a common position, and the adoption of a credible collective stance. No secret talks with the United States, whose track record is far too murky and short-sighted: the abandonment of the Interposition Force in Beirut in 1982 without reaching any resolution, followed by the Italians, while the French were left alone; the withdrawal from Afghanistan without any warning or path to a solution. One can only question American geopolitics, riddled as it is with failures, errors, and outright blunders. This country is driven solely by its economic interests — now more than ever. Throughout history, they have done nothing but make mistakes, with the sole exception of the Kissinger era, and even that was only a brief window. It is, of course, naive to believe this could ever have happened. One must not forget that the former Soviet states joined the EU primarily to gain entry into NATO, and secondly to benefit from the subsidies offered by Europe — funded by European taxpayers. It would have required the Western European countries (France, the Benelux nations, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal) and the British to make a once-and-for-all decision not to behave as vassals of the United States — though, naturally, this applies less to France. It would therefore have required France to be strong and resolute enough to bring all these countries on board. That was not the case. This counterfactual could only have become reality under a de Gaulle, perhaps a Pompidou, a Mitterrand, or a Chirac — not the others. It would have demanded a long-term, very long-term strategic and geopolitical vision from the heads of state of the aforementioned countries. It therefore had no real chance of coming to fruition. Yet it would have been good — even excellent — for peace, and for the economic and military power of the European Union, while preserving the sovereignty of each of its members, with genuine security guarantees. The second counterfactual could have come about if the heads of state and government of the European Union and the British had committed to a role of cooperation and facilitation, enabling Turkey to broker a peace acceptable to both belligerent nations and securing their shared interests. The Europeans lacked the courage and the foresight the situation demanded, and they allowed Boris Johnson — most likely acting on instructions from the United States — to torpedo the early stages of a peace agreement. All these heads of state and government bear responsibility for the millions of dead, wounded, missing, bereaved families, and shattered lives. Who will tell the people this before they cast their next vote? The future of Europe as a community of sovereign nations lay with Russia and, of course, Ukraine — but certainly not with Ukraine to the exclusion of Russia. Ultimately, was this war really ours to fight? There are so many wars that go unnoticed — so many conflicts that are none of our business. Was this one more ours than the others? On what grounds? Because a handful of 'thinkers' dislike Putin? There are plenty of heads of state who deserve to be disliked. Should we therefore go to war with all of them? These brilliant 'thinkers' would do well to remember our stance on Kosovo and what followed. That story is not over. Nor is the one concerning the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

At pivotal moments in history, a nation’s strength is measured not only by its military capabilities, but also by the caliber of those who represent it. High-stakes negotiations are not merely technical discussions about maps or security arrangements. They are a test of a state’s ability to defend its historical narrative while shaping its future. It is in this context that Ambassador Simon Karam stands out as one of the leading figures of Lebanese diplomacy. His authority rests neither on eloquence nor media visibility, but on quiet composure, rigor, and the integrity of a statesman who measures success by what he accomplishes for his country rather than for himself. Throughout his career, Karam has demonstrated genuine independence in both judgment and conduct. He has never regarded public office as a personal privilege, nor has he hesitated to relinquish it when it conflicted with his convictions or with what he believed to be consistent with his principles. This was reflected at several stages of his political and institutional career, culminating in his resignation as Lebanon’s ambassador to Washington, affirming that principles must always take precedence over office. The significance of that decision becomes even clearer when viewed alongside comparable diplomatic careers, where many diplomats choose to remain in office despite political disagreements. By contrast, Karam’s resignation sent a clear message: office is not an end in itself, but a means of serving the national interest. That choice has since afforded him greater freedom in any advisory or negotiating role, as he operates neither under the constraints of career considerations nor personal ambitions. This background lends him additional credibility in negotiations. A negotiator who is not bound to his position enjoys greater freedom to defend the national interest and is less constrained by concerns over preserving office. Similar forms of independence have been evident in numerous international experiences, where former diplomats have played decisive roles in sensitive negotiations after leaving official positions, drawing on their expertise without being subject to direct administrative constraints. In addition, Ambassador Karam possesses an extensive knowledge of southern Lebanon, particularly the history of Jabal Amel. That knowledge extends well beyond geography or historical documentation. It encompasses a deep understanding of Ameli society, its social and political history, and the role played by its elites and leading figures in shaping an important part of Lebanon’s national identity. The value of this expertise lies in the fact that it is not merely theoretical. It is grounded in decades of close observation of southern Lebanon’s evolution through a series of defining moments, from the period following the Israeli invasions to the profound political and security transformations the region has undergone over recent decades. This long experience enables him to grasp the dynamics of both the land and its people with greater depth, an essential asset in any discussion concerning borders, security arrangements, or the future of regional stability. For example, in any discussion of the Blue Line or disputed border points, familiarity with international legal texts alone is not enough. Understanding the reality of border villages, the extended families whose lives span both sides of the frontier, and the lived experience of communities shaped by successive conflicts becomes indispensable to building a negotiating position that is both realistic and sustainable. It is precisely here that the value of Karam’s background becomes apparent, allowing him to bridge legal principles and social realities on the ground. This interest in southern Lebanon is not a recent development. It is an integral part of his intellectual and cultural formation, leading him to view its history as a living component of Lebanon’s national memory rather than as a mere account of the past. This knowledge assumes particular importance in negotiations concerning borders, security, and the future of southern Lebanon, where the land cannot be reduced to lines on a map, but embodies a history, rights, and experiences accumulated over generations. Comparable experiences elsewhere have shown that negotiations which overlook the historical and social dimensions often produce fragile agreements, whereas incorporating those dimensions helps lay the foundations for more durable and lasting settlements. International experience has likewise shown that the most effective negotiator is one who combines law, history, geography, and politics, rather than confining the discussion to technical considerations alone. It is this tradition of diplomacy that Simon Karam represents, viewing profound knowledge not simply as an intellectual asset, but as a genuine source of negotiating strength. This dimension becomes even more significant at a particularly sensitive regional moment that could reshape the balance of power in southern Lebanon and open the way to new approaches to regional relations, where a nuanced understanding of both the territory and its people becomes an integral part of the broader equation of security and stability. From this perspective, the Lebanese delegation does not represent a particular political camp, but the Lebanese state in its entirety, together with its institutions and its history. The presence of experienced and independent figures such as Ambassador Simon Karam strengthens the delegation’s credibility and reinforces its negotiating position, particularly on issues where historical awareness must go hand in hand with legal precision. Whatever the eventual outcome of these negotiations, one fact remains constant: if Lebanon is to play an active role in shaping its own future, it needs statesmen who combine integrity, experience, and a profound knowledge of the country’s history. In this respect, Simon Karam embodies the convergence of independence, experience, knowledge, and commitment. His presence in any negotiating process reflects more than personal stature. It expresses a broader vision of the state itself: a state rooted in its history, represented by those who place principle above office, and one that sees diplomacy first and foremost as an instrument for defending rights before it becomes a means of managing balances of power.

Some people submit to fate, while others take their destiny into their own hands. That is all the more difficult when the person is a woman in a world dominated by men. And yet… some women refused to yield. They chose to fight, breaking the taboos and conventions of their time. Throughout history, countless women have refused to be mere footnotes in the story of humanity. Whether they wielded a paintbrush, a pen, science, or their voice, they left their mark on their era with a boldness that was sometimes considered scandalous. Society wanted them to be muses; they became creators. It demanded obedience; they chose freedom. It sought to silence them; they spoke even louder and with even greater conviction. From Artemisia Gentileschi, who defied Italian society and its courts five centuries ago, to George Sand, who traded the corset for the freedom to write; from the tormented Camille Claudel to the rigor and genius of Marie Curie, and the universal voice of Umm Kulthum… these women did not merely circumvent the conventions of their age—they shattered them. Sometimes they succeeded, sometimes they failed, but they never gave up. This series of articles is a journey through time to meet these extraordinary women, driven by an unshakable determination and whose lives continue to inspire us today. Artemisia Gentileschi: Revenge Through Art In seventeenth-century Florence, painting was an exclusive male domain. Women were tolerated only as passive models or frozen allegorical figures. Yet Artemisia Gentileschi broke every barrier, armed with nothing but her paintbrush against injustice and misogyny. The Shadow of Trauma Born in Rome in 1593, Artemisia grew up in the workshop of her father, the painter Orazio Gentileschi. From an early age, she displayed an exceptional talent for painting. While Caravaggio's dramatic chiaroscuro seemed to flow through her veins, she infused it with an unprecedented emotional intensity and striking realism. Recognizing her remarkable gift, her father entrusted her artistic training to the painter Agostino Tassi. At the age of seventeen, Artemisia's life changed forever. She was raped by Agostino Tassi—the very man her father had chosen to mentor her. At a time when the overwhelming majority of rape victims remained silent to avoid the disgrace of a public trial, Artemisia chose to fight. She agreed to testify before the courts, exposing herself to a double ordeal: the physical and psychological violence of the assault, followed by the humiliation of a months-long public trial during which she was subjected to examination and even tortured with thumb screws to "verify" the truthfulness of her testimony. Where Renaissance society expected women to bury themselves in shame and silence, Artemisia confronted her attacker—and, through him, society itself. To fully appreciate her courage, one need only observe that even today, five centuries later, many women still hesitate to report rape. The Paintbrush of Justice The guilty man, protected by powerful connections, never served the sentence to which he had been condemned. But Artemisia refused to be defeated. Her response to injustice was neither tears nor shame, but an unwavering determination to succeed as an artist—a determination that gave birth to masterpieces of extraordinary power and virtuosity. Her paintbrush became her weapon. One of her most celebrated works, Judith Slaying Holofernes , stands as an act of absolute catharsis. Unlike traditional depictions of Judith, often portrayed as repulsed by her own deed despite carrying out God's will, Artemisia infused her heroine with her own physical strength and consuming rage. As Judith severs Holofernes' head, her movements are precise, the blood gushes forth with astonishing anatomical realism, and her face reflects an unyielding determination. "I will show you what a woman can do," Artemisia wrote in one of her letters. She was not simply painting a biblical episode—she was symbolically executing her own tormentor. From that moment on, her canvases would repeatedly portray women endowed with the same strength, resolve, and courage. A Queen Without a Crown Artemisia Gentileschi transformed her deepest wound into an artistic celebration of female power. Armed only with her paintbrush, she has continued, through the figure of Judith, to symbolically execute her attacker for centuries. Her tragedy could have destroyed her. Instead, she became the first woman admitted to the prestigious Academy of Drawing in Florence. She rose to stand alongside the greatest painters of the Renaissance, while kings and the Medici competed to acquire her works. She did not merely survive her era or overcome its hardships—she took control of her own destiny. She dominated her time with remarkable brilliance, engraving her name forever into the history of Art through light, talent, and courage. Bravo, Artemisia!

False alarm or calculated bluff? Several alarming statements were made Saturday evening about the imminent threat of a large-scale American attack on Iran. The resumption of fighting in early July derailed the memorandum of understanding signed in mid-June, which was meant to pave the way for peace talks. On Thursday, Pakistan, acting as mediator, stated that the warring parties were in negotiations aimed at de-escalation, particularly regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Iran and the United States resumed their exchanges of overnight strikes this week after several days of relative calm, but no attacks have been reported since the night of Friday to Saturday. But faced with the stagnation of the situation, and in the absence of any genuine willingness to negotiate on Tehran's part, the Trump administration wants to put an end to a tense political and security situation whose economic consequences are being felt worldwide. The most serious warning came from U.S. embassies in several Middle Eastern countries, which cautioned American citizens on Saturday about a possible "escalation" of the regional conflict and urged them to be prepared to leave, as President Donald Trump threatened to strike Iran with force. According to American media outlets, Washington is considering new large-scale bombings this weekend, targeting energy infrastructure in particular, but according to U.S. network CBS, citing multiple anonymous sources, Donald Trump has not yet given the green light. The U.S. president again threatened on Friday to strike Iran "very hard," as the country, since hostilities resumed in early July, has resumed targeting Washington's allied nations and American installations in the region. The alerts directed at U.S. nationals — versions of which were posted Saturday on the social media accounts of embassies in Amman, Abu Dhabi, Jerusalem, Muscat, Kuwait, Baghdad, Riyadh, Doha, and Beirut — urge American citizens to check information regarding their flights and to follow local authorities' security guidelines. "Americans in the Middle East should currently exercise caution and heightened vigilance, and prepare for possible flight cancellations, periodic airspace closures, and potential travel disruptions," the alert states. In Lebanon, non-essential embassy staff have been relocated. "The Iranian regime is unpredictable, as demonstrated by its recent decisions to attack areas of the region without warning or provocation, as well as to extend its attacks to areas that had not previously been targeted (such as Egypt)," reads a message posted on embassy websites. On Wednesday, a drone struck a gas tanker owned by an American company while it was docked at an Egyptian port. Egypt is conducting an investigation but has, at this stage, not accused any group of being responsible for the attack. The Iranian military, for its part, accused Washington of "stoking tensions" in the region and warned: "Any country serving as a defensive shield for criminal and aggressive America will be engulfed in the flames of war."

One could almost believe that Lebanon has lived only according to the rhythm of foreign capitals: there was the Egyptian era under Nasser, the Palestinian era under the PLO, the Syrian era under the republican dynasty of the Assads, and, of course, the Iranian era, when Hezbollah took control through intermediaries. What makes the Lebanese experience particularly distinctive is that whenever the influence of one Arab or foreign regime began to fade or disappear, another quickly stepped in to replace it. As though it were only natural, since nature abhors a vacuum and our politicians have never wished to renounce servitude. A Fate and a Curse From one period to the next, the degree of constraint varied, for there is naturally a difference—not merely in degree but in nature—between military occupation or political subjugation on the one hand and simple diplomatic coordination on the other. The balance can tilt upward or downward depending on circumstances, unforeseen events and the unpredictable. Yet beyond these changing situations, one fact remains undeniable: our small country has had—and will unfortunately continue—to adapt to uncomfortable realities and bend to the wishes of states larger and more powerful than itself. "Finlandized" by the combined weight of history and geography, could Lebanon realistically aspire to anything more ambitious than the status of a client state or a satellite state? That being said, let us imagine that time were to stand still and grant us, if only briefly, a respite from this far-from-fraternal foreign entanglement. Suppose Abdel Halim Khaddam had lost interest in our fate and allowed us a moment's breathing space. What would have become of us, poor souls, and what would we have done? Our political elites would almost certainly have rushed, by sheer atavistic reflex, to another Arab or Western capital to beg for immediate intervention, financial assistance or even military support. They would have accepted every form of subordination that might enable them to settle scores with their local—or even municipal—rivals. In this game, no one was innocent: neither the party that sought assistance nor the one that provided it; neither the benefactor nor the beneficiary. Abdel Hamid Ghaleb: A Reminder A country's sovereignty can be measured by its willingness to expel an ambassador. On July 21, 1958, The New York Times reported that Abdel Hamid Ghaleb, ambassador of the United Arab Republic accredited to Beirut, had been declared persona non grata and ordered to leave Lebanon. He was accused of fomenting rebellion and supplying arms to the opposition against President Camille Chamoun's government.(1) Indeed, Ghaleb had encouraged insurrection and civil disobedience throughout various parts of the country. Order was restored only after the landing of U.S. Marines and the election of General Fouad Chehab on July 31. The controversial ambassador did not resume his duties until early November of that same year,(2) after the new authorities embarked on a policy of genuine cooperation with the all-powerful Nasser. Abdel Hamid Ghaleb normalized relations between Beirut and Cairo and strengthened Egypt's influence over Lebanese political life, prompting renewed accusations of direct interference in Lebanon's internal affairs. While remaining firmly within the Western orbit, Beirut nonetheless accommodated Nasser's regional interests. Following Nasser's defeat in 1967 and his disappearance from the political scene in 1970, Lebanon moved from bad to worse. The years that followed became years of sorrow and suffering, during which the armed Palestinian resistance, the Syrian occupation and later Iranian domination each, in turn, violated Lebanon's sovereignty on a daily basis. Thus, in absolute terms and for a very long time, Lebanon has been neither free, nor independent, nor sovereign, even if life in Beirut remained preferable to life in Damascus or Baghdad, where the Baath Party ruled in all its splendor, or in Tehran and Isfahan, where the mullahs could comfortably bask under the umbrella of Wilayat al-Faqih . Will the Syrian Replace the Iranian? It is generally accepted that a country is sovereign only if it is capable of slamming the door in the face of a foreign ambassador. In that respect, one could argue that the Aoun–Salam leadership asserted itself by "throwing out the window" the envoy of the Islamic Republic—that is, by withdrawing the accreditation of Mohammad Reza Shibani, the head of Iran's diplomatic mission. But has anyone ever asked who is supposed to replace him? Distancing Lebanon from the Islamic Republic is certainly commendable, but who is expected to fill the vacuum it leaves behind? The welcome extended to the Syrian foreign minister in the city of Tripoli leaves room for doubt. Has Lebanon's Sunni community, after years of wandering, finally found a patron worthy of its expectations? Some believe so. The problem is that Ahmad al-Sharaa has other priorities, foremost among them consolidating his authority in Damascus and across his fragmented country. It would be unwise for him to succumb to the temptation of opening a new Lebanese front. Even with Ankara's backing, he simply lacks the means to pursue an ambitious regional policy. Let us find another solution! (1) Sam Pope, "Envoy from Cairo Ousted by Beirut; Lebanese Say He Had Been Plotting with Rebels," The New York Times, July 21, 1958. (2) Le Monde, "The UAR Ambassador to Lebanon Resumes His Duties," November 6, 1958.

Sohmor. A town located in the western Bekaa, home to fifteen hundred households and between five and eight thousand residents. Given its size and population, the term "village" is the most geographically appropriate way to describe Sohmor. Sohmor has been repeatedly targeted by Israeli bombardments, as if it were routine for them. If this village and its successive mayors have been a magnet for the Israeli army, its municipality has proven to be a true lightning rod. Among the top ten worst electricity bill defaulters listed by EDL are: the Southern Water Authority, the Bekaa Water Authority, and the municipality of Sohmor… Indeed, according to a report published by EDL detailing unpaid bills between November 2022 and December 2025, the modest municipal building carries an outstanding balance of $1,599,205. A quick calculation based on a unit cost of 25 cents per kilowatt shows that during the aforementioned period, the municipality consumed 6,396,820 kWh — or 170,430 kWh per month. Since numbers can be dull, a practical illustration helps: that monthly consumption is enough to continuously power 560 households in France — with emphasis on the word "continuously," a concept sorely lacking in the local electricity supply, which is even more elusive than the latest B-2 stealth bomber. A municipal building that blazes so brightly it consumes three times more electricity than the Beirut headquarters itself — which already owes $530,000 in unpaid arrears. When you discover that a modest town hall consumes more electricity than a dedicated artificial intelligence center — unless it has quietly decided to supply power to its own residents and surrounding villages — the question is no longer whether the figures published by EDL are false, but rather what story they are telling. The real challenge, of course, is understanding the source of this electrical black hole. What if the answer lay, quite literally, underground? Buried beneath the surface, where Hezbollah has long made its home of choice. In recent months, underground networks have been coming to light — proving that the famous slogan "we build, we protect" was no empty campaign promise, even if the infrastructure in question lies not above ground, but well below it. A contemporary version of The Time Machine by H.G. Wells, in which the local Morlocks have spent the past two decades busily creating not just a state within a state, but an entire country beneath the country. For years, political officials and relevant ministers — even those who chose to bury their heads in the sand — were perfectly aware of what was going on. After all, having your head buried in the ground does give you a rather clear view of what lies beneath. Historians broadly agree that Lebanon possesses an exceptionally deep civilizational heritage. Today, more than ever, that description should be taken quite literally. It becomes easier to understand why the State struggles to reassert its authority over Lebanese territory: it has simply been looking for it at the wrong level.