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The ICRC convoy carrying the released civilians left the area occupied by Israel in southern Lebanon and traveled to the point marking the start of the zone controlled by the Lebanese authorities. (AFP)
Today's Essential
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By LevantTime .
Published Sep 5, 2026 - 00:55
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced on Friday that it had transferred four more people released by Israel to Lebanon, a day after the release of a first civilian. They are three Lebanese nationals and two Syrians, according to the ICRC. This is the first time such an operation has taken place since negotiations between Lebanon and Israel began in April under US auspices. During the last round of talks in August, Beirut had requested the release of a first group of its nationals captured by Israel in southern Lebanon, where Israel is at war with the pro-Iranian Hezbollah. Their relatives estimate their number at around thirty, including fighters from the Islamist movement. In a statement, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun thanked the United States and the ICRC, saying the release "confirmed the soundness of the position" taken by Lebanon, which is engaged in negotiations with Israel that Hezbollah rejects. On Thursday, the United States praised "the government of Israel and the government of Lebanon for demonstrating good faith through these initial steps," expressing hope that this would "serve as a foundation for broader discussions on other civilian matters." The two countries are set to hold another round of negotiations in September, though the date has not yet been set. According to the Israeli prime minister's office, Thursday's announcement "follows efforts by Israel and Lebanon to locate and repatriate the remains of Jewish community leaders who were kidnapped and killed in Lebanon" between 1984 and 1986. Israeli strikes intensify On the ground, Israeli strikes killed three people and wounded 23 others on Friday in southern and eastern Lebanon. Israel stepped up its strikes in the region on Friday, after announcing Thursday evening that it had taken control of the Ali Taher mountain ridge, which had served as a strategic position for the pro-Iranian Hezbollah and overlooks Nabatiyeh, among other areas. The army will now reinforce its positions there in order to "prevent the enemy from retaking the area," said Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz. A strike also hit the Tyre region, particularly the village of Rmadiyé, according to the National News Agency (NNA). For Trump, the war in Iran is "small potatoes" Regarding the war in Iran, US President Donald Trump sought on Friday to downplay its impact on the United States ahead of the crucial midterm elections. "A lot of people aren't calling it a war. I call it a military conflict, because it's small potatoes for us. It's not a big deal. We did Venezuela, and we did that," he told reporters in the Oval Office when asked about his vice president, JD Vance, who had said the day before that he didn't want to call the conflict a war. With fuel prices surging because of the war and threatening to cost Donald Trump's Republicans their majority in Congress in November's midterm elections, his administration is working to downplay the scale of the conflict. According to the president, the United States is carrying out "targeted strikes," insisting that it is "not currently engaged in fighting." He also claimed that the United States controlled the Strait of Hormuz and had wiped out Iran's armed forces. "What we've accomplished is remarkable. We took control of Venezuela, and we've essentially taken control of Iran," he said.
Homage
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By Michel Hajji Georgiou - Published Sep 4, 2026 - 23:28
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What remains of Hassan Rifai is the image of a respected, composed jurist, an authority on administrative and constitutional law, arguing in a calm, quavering voice as he pointed out the deviations and failings of politicians in relation to the parliamentary democratic system and the Constitution. And yet, the former MP and minister, who died on September 3, 2025, was also a man in revolt. A dissenter. Even at one hundred. Especially at one hundred! He had been one as a child, haranguing crowds in Baalbeck against the Mandate, and remained one throughout his career as a lawyer and parliamentarian. At one hundred, utterly disillusioned with the Republic and its buccaneers, his quiet anger had not subsided. “Lebanon is an impossible country!” he told the author of these lines in an interview conducted a few years before his death and never published. But make no mistake. Hassan Rifai was neither a nihilist nor someone who rejected everything outright. He had fought all his life for a certain idea of Lebanon. More specifically, for Greater Lebanon, united and plural. And he appreciated the Lebanese experience for what it was worth, including all that was positive in it. But human beings had disappointed him. And yet it was precisely the human being he was seeking. He never found that person on the Lebanese public stage. At least not in the service of the Republic. Rifai was a man of law, always elegant, irreproachable, everything one would expect of a man of his moral and intellectual stature. But he was also uncompromising. Merciless, even. No doubt his attachment to his country and its democratic system had led him to acknowledge only one loyalty: a certain code of values and a certain idea of the Republic. That was why he was critical of every mistake and every abuse, beginning with those committed by his own political friends. He spared no one. Neither communities nor clans, neither religious leaders, he was secular himself, and certainly not political officials. No one escaped his scrutiny, and Rifai took a certain pleasure in dismantling the myths and received ideas that portrayed this or that president of the Republic or prime minister as an exceptional leader. His yardstick was objective: the consistency of actions with democratic principles. As a result, no one truly found favor in his eyes. The conclusion was devastating: none of the country’s leaders, throughout its history, had genuinely respected Lebanese parliamentary democracy. None. That did not mean he placed everyone on the same footing. He had enough critical distance to recognize the qualities and shortcomings of each. He liked to quote Léon Duguit: “Constitutional law has no safeguard other than the good faith of those who apply it.” He had almost made it his republican credo. And his verdict was merciless: that good faith, quite simply, he had not found. Too many politicians, and not enough statesmen. And above all, a great deal of lying and hypocrisy. One day, a senior political figure advised him: “Do not build roads for people. Otherwise they will stop coming to you.” Despite the respect he had for this political ally, the remark left him bewildered and shocked. It contained an entire conception of power: never permanently solve the problem of those one claims to represent, because once their need disappears, so does the very reason for their dependence. The project of the state was thus postponed indefinitely. Or, at the very least, whenever good people did exist, the system prevented them from reaching positions of responsibility. Rifai was a rebel, yes, but one armed with the rigor and precision of a master craftsman of administrative and constitutional law. That was undoubtedly what set him apart within Lebanon’s political milieu. He was rebellious enough, in any event, to pay a price for it. In August 1982, he survived an assassination attempt after opposing the Israeli diktat. At Taif in 1989, he was almost cast out for having immediately discerned the existing flaws and the traps added to the constitutional reforms. From 1992 onward, under the Syrian occupation, he endured political ostracism for opposing the security apparatus underpinning Syrian tutelage and Rafic Hariri’s policies. But he was fair. He could oppose political confessionalism while acknowledging that abolishing it at the present stage would be disastrous for Lebanon, and that a system of majority rule based purely on numbers would once and for all toll the death knell of the Lebanese formula and of the Christian presence in Lebanon. He could agree that Christians had been wronged by the constitutional reforms of Taif, Sunnis too, he maintained, while at the same time recalling the excesses committed in the exercise of power by presidents of the Republic between 1943 and 1990, and warning against a nostalgic return to those practices under the refrain of “Christian rights.” A drift toward a presidential or semi-presidential system would, in his view, endanger Christians. The importance of the parliamentary system inherited from the French Third Republic lay precisely in the fact that the president of the Republic was not politically accountable to the Chamber of Deputies. That placed him, according to Rifai, in a privileged position. Above the fray, he could steer the ship of the Republic safely into port without becoming bogged down in struggles for power. That moral responsibility to preserve the Constitution and the Republic was, in his eyes, far more important than any political responsibility. But the principal parties concerned still had to be persuaded of that. Rifai could recognize the importance of administrative decentralization while refusing to allow that demand to become an ideological slogan concealing separatist ambitions. In this regard, he recalled that Beirut and Mount Lebanon had been favored in the construction of Greater Lebanon, while the peripheral regions, particularly his own, Baalbeck, had been neglected. That had contributed to weakening Lebanese national sentiment, which ultimately depended on well-being grounded in respect for human dignity. Commitment to citizenship presupposed that everyone be treated equally in terms of development. Without equality among citizens, sovereignty could only falter. That, indeed, was the meaning of his first speech in Parliament in 1968. The events that followed gave that warning a singular gravity. Economic, social and territorial imbalances contributed to fueling the demands of the left and of part of the Muslim street in a country already strained by sectarian tensions, foreign interference and the growing power of armed organizations. They thus contributed to the gradual weakening of the state, before the war, successive occupations and the emergence of para-state structures. Ultimately, Hassan Rifai embodies something of that Lebanese model of the cosmopolitan, complex personality who stands outside communal and partisan trenches, enjoys almost unanimous respect, especially beyond political circles, yet is consulted within those same circles only when needed and for self-interested reasons. Lebanon does not like minds that are too independent and too unruly, even if its system still contains cracks through which such people can exist and make themselves heard. They are tolerated, but they must remain on the margins. The survival of the state of zaamat and the state of jamaat depends on it: a system that invariably prefers turning to foreign patrons rather than to people capable of generating, proposing and implementing solutions from within. Lebanon’s political system and its protagonists detest the notion of responsibility, which they find profoundly anxiety-inducing, and prefer dependence or, worse still, servility. Yet Rifai repeatedly said, once again quoting Léon Duguit: “Where responsibility lies, there lies power.” Should it then come as any surprise that in Lebanon, where responsibility is nowhere to be found, power is nowhere to be found either? Or, more precisely, that it is always elsewhere?
Analyze
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By Jad Akhawi - Published Sep 4, 2026 - 15:00
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The battle of Ali al-Taher was not merely a military confrontation over a strategic hill in southern Lebanon. Despite its limited size, the site became a point where military, political, and regional calculations converged, exposing one of the core issues at the heart of Lebanon’s ongoing conflict: who controls the territory, who holds the weapons, and who decides on war and peace? What is most striking is not only Israel’s entry into the site, but Hezbollah’s insistence on refusing to hand it over to the Lebanese Army, even though the Army is the only legitimate institution supposed to assume responsibility for Lebanese territory, particularly in border areas directly tied to the country’s security and sovereignty. Why Did Hezbollah refuse? Because handing Ali al-Taher over to the Army would not have been understood as a limited measure on the ground. It would have carried a political meaning extending far beyond the hill itself. Such a move would have amounted to a de facto recognition of the Lebanese state’s authority over security and military decisions in the South, and of the principle that no other armed force can act as though it exercises effective authority on the ground. The site therefore became a test of state authority, rather than merely an advanced military position. Who Killed the fighters? This remains the most obscure episode in the account of the battle. The Israeli version speaks of fighters being killed and others fleeing, while independent information about how many people were present at the site, the nature of their mission, and what ultimately happened to them remains incomplete. The conflicting accounts also raise numerous questions that cannot be resolved through military statements alone. And this is not merely an operational detail: Were most of the fighters killed inside the site? Did they manage to withdraw through tunnels and passageways? Or had they been evacuated before the Israeli operation began? Each of these scenarios carries a different significance. If the fighters remained until the final moments, that would mean the site witnessed a direct confrontation that ended in clear Israeli military superiority. If, on the other hand, they were evacuated beforehand, the questions would concern who made that decision, why it was taken, and whether the evacuation formed part of a broader understanding or was simply a precautionary military measure. And if it were established that a significant number of them had left before Israeli forces entered the site, the central questions would then be: how did they leave, who facilitated their departure, and did it take place with the knowledge of local or international actors? At this stage, there is insufficient public evidence to determine which of these scenarios is correct. But the absence of information does not make these questions any less important. On the contrary, it deepens the uncertainty surrounding what occurred in the hours preceding the capture of the site. What About the U.S. Ambassador’s Visit to Israel? The timing deserves attention. The escalation around Ali al-Taher coincided with U.S. diplomatic moves involving Israel, while reports emerged of discussions concerning the site and the possibility that it might eventually be handed over to the Lebanese Army. This does not necessarily mean that the decision was made outside Lebanon, nor that a fully developed agreement was reached between Washington, Tel Aviv, and Beirut. But it does suggest that the site is no longer being viewed as a purely local military issue. There is no basis for asserting that the U.S. ambassador’s visit was part of a secret deal concerning Ali al-Taher. Nor can it be stated with certainty that everything that happened resulted from a prior understanding among the parties involved. What is clear, however, is that Washington views the future of the site as part of a broader file involving the ceasefire, the stabilization of the border, the prevention of any military presence outside the authority of the Lebanese state, and efforts to ensure that border areas do not become permanent platforms for confrontation. Ali al-Taher thus becomes part of negotiations that extend far beyond its geography. The site may be small on the map, but it is connected to major questions concerning arrangements in the South, the role of the Lebanese Army, the future of weapons outside state control, and the limits of Israeli influence in the region. The Paradox That Embarrassed Hezbollah The central political paradox is that Hezbollah refused to hand the hill over to the Lebanese Army, yet ultimately failed to retain it. If the Israeli operation were to end with the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the handover of the site to the Lebanese Army, the outcome would be very different from the situation Hezbollah sought to impose or preserve: Hezbollah refused to hand the site over to the state, Israel forced it out, and the state then returned to assume responsibility. In other words, Hezbollah refused to establish the Army’s authority voluntarily, but may find itself confronted with a reality that establishes that authority by other means. This is what makes the situation politically embarrassing, because the final outcome may appear to have achieved indirectly what Hezbollah refused to do directly. This raises an obvious question: why was handing the site over to the Army not considered the least costly option for Lebanon? Such a move could have been presented as a strengthening of the state’s role, a means of protecting the South, and a way of preventing Israel from using Hezbollah’s presence as a pretext to remain on the ground or advance further. The refusal to hand the site over to the Army instead kept it within the zone of confrontation and allowed Israel to present its operation as a response to a military presence outside state authority. Ali al-Taher Encapsulates Lebanon’s Problem The issue goes far beyond this hill. Lebanon cannot recover its sovereignty as long as two military authorities coexist: that of the Army and that of weapons outside state control. Nor can it ask the international community to respect its borders while military decision-making within those borders remains divided between state institutions and an armed organization possessing capabilities independent of them. At the same time, Lebanon cannot demand that Israel withdraw from its territory while security decisions concerning that same territory remain the subject of an internal dispute. As long as weapons remain outside state control, the Israeli argument will persist, and the South will remain exposed to further rounds of escalation. Sovereignty cannot be shared. Either the Lebanese Army is the sole military authority, or Lebanon will remain an open arena for regional conflicts in which Iranian, Israeli, and American calculations intersect, while the state and society pay the price of confrontation. This is why the real question after Ali al-Taher is not: Who won the hill? But rather: Who will control it once the battle is over? If the answer is the Lebanese Army, Ali al-Taher could mark the beginning of a transition in the South from the logic of “resistance” to the logic of state responsibility. It could constitute a first step toward redefining national security so that defending the borders becomes the responsibility of state institutions rather than that of any party acting independently. If Israel remains, however, Lebanon will once again have lost part of its sovereignty, regardless of the narrative each side puts forward to justify what happened. In either case, one essential truth remains: Hezbollah cannot substitute itself for the state, and Israel cannot serve as the guarantor of its sovereignty. Lebanese sovereignty can only be restored by the Lebanese state, protected by its Army, and upheld by a clear political decision that puts an end to the duality of arms and authority.
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In Nicaea, the Pope Preaches the Creed of Christian Unity

The city of Iznik, ancient Nicaea, marked a key stop on Pope Leo XIV’s visit to Turkey, as the pontiff led a service dedicated to Christian unity on the shores of Lake Iznik, south of Istanbul. The ceremony brought together Orthodox and Protestant leaders for a prayer service among the ruins of a submerged 4th-century basilica. The Mass commemorated the 1,700th anniversary of the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea, convened in 325, twelve years after the Roman Empire legalized Christianity. Standing beside Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople and other church leaders, Pope Leo XIV recited the Nicene Creed — a statement of faith still recited by millions of Christians worldwide. The creed was first adopted at the very council that gathered in Nicaea almost 17 centuries ago. “We are all called to overcome the scandal of the divisions that, unfortunately, still exist, and to nurture the desire for unity,” the Pope said in English, emphasizing “the pursuit of fraternity.” The ceremony, presided over by Patriarch Bartholomew I, featured prayers in several languages as well as a cappella polyphonic and Byzantine chants. Representatives from the Coptic, Greek, Armenian, Syriac, and Anglican Churches attended, underscoring the event’s ecumenical character. Non-acceptance to use religion to justify violence The Patriarch urged participants to “follow the path of Christian unity laid out for us,” despite the “divisions” created over the centuries. The Pope also called for “a forceful rejection” of attempts to use religion to justify war or violence, condemning “all forms of fundamentalism and fanaticism,” without naming specific leaders or conflicts. Submerged for centuries, the Iznik Basilica continues to shed light on early Christianity and its martyrs. The ruins were discovered in 2014 by Turkish archaeologist Mustafa Sahin, head of the archaeology department at Uludag University in Bursa, using aerial photography. The remains lie about 50 meters from the shore and two meters below the lake’s surface. “I realized it was an unknown church,” Sahin said. He explained that the Basilica of the Holy Fathers was built around 380 AD on the site where a 16-year-old martyr, Neophytus, was executed for his faith in 303, during the Roman persecution of Christians. Due to climate change, the lake’s water level has gradually fallen, revealing large sections of the basilica, which collapsed after earthquakes in the 11th century and was submerged two centuries later. Basilica of Martyrdom An earlier church erected in Neophytus’s memory hosted the Council of Nicaea in 325 before being destroyed by a powerful earthquake in 358. The later Basilica of the Holy Fathers was named in honor of the 318 bishops who convened to draft the Nicene Creed. The church once held a sarcophagus believed to contain the remains of Neophytus and other martyrs. Their bones now lie just beneath the lake bed. “We have already found about 300 graves,” Sahin said, describing the site as “a cemetery of martyrs.” His team has unearthed evidence of violent deaths — broken limbs and skulls bearing holes and fractures. “These traces show that those buried here were tortured and executed,” he said. Several smaller tile graves, believed to hold the remains of children, have yet to be opened. Each set of bones is excavated, analyzed, and reburied after documentation. “This was not an ordinary cemetery,” Sahin explained. “It was a place of martyrdom, a church of great significance for Christians.” The archaeologist emphasized Turkey’s central role in early Christian history. “Christianity emerged around Jerusalem,” he said, “but without Anatolia, there would be no Christianity,” referring to the missionary journeys of the Apostle Paul and other foundational figures of the faith.

From Leo XIII to Leo XIV (Open Letter)
By
Amine Jules Iskandar
Published

By treating borders and constitutions as sacred and untouchable, today’s Lebanese politics forget that these tools exist for one purpose: the well-being of the human person — the one Your Holiness came to listen to in their suffering. Most Holy Father, During your visit to Lebanon, a grand national scene will be prepared to show prosperity and joy, where the splendor of religious sites will outshine that of state institutions. But has Your Holiness come to see the life of palaces, or the life of a people worn down by fifty years of conflict, poverty and exodus, with no light on the horizon? Allow us, Holy Father, to share words that you will not hear in official halls. Lebanon is exhausted. No society can survive endless wars and crises by treating only the symptoms without ever diagnosing the cause. There is, undoubtedly, corruption at the national level, and the expansionist ambitions of our neighbors at the regional level. But there is also a structural problem rooted in the very formation of our state. Diversity When Greater Lebanon chose to become, like France, a Jacobin republic, it denied the existence of its ethnic components. Turning away from the Mount Lebanon Constitution of 1864, Greater Lebanon misinterpreted in 1926 the Ottoman term millets (“nations”), translating it as “religious communities.” This removed the cultural dimension and erased the need for a governance model adapted to diversity. From that moment on, the differences among Lebanon’s populations could only be described in terms of religion and ritual practice. Through a centralist Jacobin ideology, the state erased historical identities. Confident that it respected belief and freedom of worship, the Lebanese state made no effort to legally recognize its cultural groups — their history, heritage, and allegiances. These groups, wrongly labeled “sectarian communities,” gradually turned toward foreign protectors in a race to control the central state, where both the national treasury and the definition of national identity are concentrated. Minorities Yet the Church and the international community recognize the right to diversity. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities affirms the right of national, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups to exist, to preserve their identity, culture, and language. These are collective identities that must be protected — not dissolved in the name of false inclusivity. The 1864 Constitution, written by Richard von Metternich and known as the “Organic Regulations,” described Lebanon’s groups as “nations.” Its governance model was based on demographic realities, not imported ideologies. Inspired by this wisdom, Robert de Caix de Saint-Aymour later proposed a federal system adapted to Lebanon’s demography. But once millet had been translated as “religious confession,” the cultural dimension was lost. The Teaching of Leo XIII Federalism, which protects diversity, is rooted in the Church’s principle of subsidiarity, developed in Quadragesimo Anno under Pius XI in 1931. But the first form of subsidiarity had already appeared forty years earlier in Rerum Novarum under Pope Leo XIII, who insisted on the importance of the individual and the family — values that must never be absorbed by the state. Subsidiarity means governance built from the bottom up. This system protects every entity from abuses by higher authorities. It stands in clear contrast to the model of “enhanced administrative decentralization” promoted by the Taif Constitution, which is managed from the top of the state. Coexistence Subsidiarity and federalism do not contradict the values of coexistence. Under John Paul II, the Church warned against misusing the principle: denying subsidiarity in the name of equality or democratization, it said, destroys freedom and initiative. The Church also notes that national borders often do not match ethnic borders, creating minority groups whose rights must be protected. Minorities, it adds, have the right to preserve their culture, language and religious convictions — and may legitimately seek greater autonomy or even independence. Most Holy Father, In a federal model rooted in respect for religious and cultural diversity, the struggle for control of the central government would likely diminish. Subsidiarity would help preserve national unity through flexible structures capable of adapting to regional diversity. It would also reduce the absurd gap between the “legal country” and the “real country.” State structures must be flexible, built for human beings and centered on human dignity. Laws should serve human flourishing, not submission. No authentic solution can place borders and constitutions at the center of its mission. Their sacralization marginalizes real people — their needs, affinities, and identity. Lebanese politics too often forgets that nations and constitutions exist for the well-being of the human person — the one Your Holiness came to hear in their pain. Any search for Lebanon’s future must place this truth at its core. The ultimate goal remains the human being, “autonomous, relational, and open to transcendence,” as the Church teaches.

The Levant in Turmoil: An Elusive Peace (1/3)
By
Jean-Patrick Dayras
Published

The Levant unmistakably reached a crucial tipping point on 7 October 2023, as Hamas launched a deadly attack on Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip. The circumstances and repercussions of this swift and bloody offensive sent a seismic shock through Gaza and Israel, of course, but also across other key centers of the Levant, notably Lebanon and Syria, and, by extension, Iran and Yemen. The devastating impact of Hamas’s attack on Gaza and its population has once again brought the entire Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the forefront. Some had hoped that the events of 7 October 2023 might lead to a breakthrough in the longstanding Middle Eastern conflict, which has blighted the region for over seven decades. At this stage, this is far from being the case, at least in appearance. It is particularly regrettable that the Palestinian Authority has been unable to regain the initiative and embark on a swift and promising dialogue with Israel. On the opposing side, it is legitimate to ask whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is willing to envisage and accept an end to these recurring regional conflicts, even if doing so risks triggering his own legal troubles. Whether he genuinely has the will to do so remains uncertain. After a military victory, does he foresee his defeat on the battlefield of communication? The signs suggest he does not. It is true that as long as the Palestinians publicly assert that their goal is the elimination of the Israeli state, Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies will continue to pursue their deadly objectives. Let us not hide from the truth: on one side, there is a population that suffers and dies – but who elected Hamas? – and on the other, a people and a nation whose enemies seek not merely unconditional defeat, as Germany faced in 1945, but total annihilation. This is no longer about avenging the unbearable acts of 7 October 2023. This is about survival. Yet, despite everything, a glimmer of hope appears on the horizon. Voices – and not insignificant ones – are being heard within Israel itself, calling for an end to the slaughter in Gaza. These voices recognize that Israel, born out of inhumanity, cannot pursue the same objectives, and that global opinion can shift at any moment and abandon the Israeli state. In the age of social media, public opinion can pivot quickly and irreversibly. Contemporary history shows just how impossible it is to sustain a battle without the moral backing of both the population and key allies. The examples are particularly telling: the French in Indochina never fully had the support of the French population or certain key countries; later, in Algeria, they lacked the wholehearted backing of their own citizens and numerous other nations. The United States, too, was forced to abandon the government of South Vietnam, and later withdrew from Afghanistan in a humiliating manner – for both themselves and the countries that had supported them from the outset, ten years earlier. Their withdrawal left behind a heavy toll of human lives. Benjamin Netanyahu must recognize that the stars are aligned for him to radically change his approach. Nothing is worse than not speaking – or refusing to speak – to one’s enemies. Perhaps this is even worse for him and for Israel than confronting domestic justice. Yet he will face it, and if he continues down this path, he will have even have, to defend himself, the stature of a statesman who saved his nation. Germany until April 1945, Japan until July 1945, and other countries in different circumstances, refused to engage with their enemies. Even today, many states shun dialogue with adversaries, with the result that civilians die every day, fueling resentment and hatred. By contrast, the well-known Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates that dialogue can avert unnecessary and cataclysmic confrontation. True, negotiations and concessions were involved in some cases, but is that not a small price to pay for peace? Israel must conduct itself as a normal state, even if it feels besieged and threatened. An Israeli state that respects its neighbours would gain substantial support across the Near and Middle East, as well as in the Western world and far beyond, making it unlikely to be annihilated by Hamas – which, if not already moribund, is at least significantly weakened. Such a course of action should clearly be adopted without naivety, taking care to ensure the hydra does not awaken. Next article: The Levant in Turmoil: Lebanese and Syrian Perspectives

Baptized a “message-country,” Lebanon awaits the communion of peace

Pope Leo XIV has chosen Lebanon – baptized by his predecessor, Saint John Paul II, as a “message-country” – for his first apostolic trip outside Italy. Under the theme “Blessed are the peacemakers,” the visit pierces through Lebanon’s war-scarred history like a ray of light. “Blessed are the peacemakers”: four words that set the tone. They leave their mark on the unfolding events and the course of history itself, as well as on the schedule of the visit, which is packed with official and ecumenical meetings, culminating in the solemn Mass to be celebrated along Beirut’s seafront. Yet, one must ask: does Lebanon truly need a communion of peace? Lebanon is a complex society, yet one enriched by its diversity and multi-confessional makeup. For this reason, its social contract – aligned with the Lebanese model and ensuring national unity – rests on a key principle: neutrality, enshrined in international law. It is an essential condition for preventing the polarizations that divide Lebanese society. In its positive sense, neutrality is not a retreat into isolation. On the contrary, it requires active engagement in regional and international affairs, while remaining free from political alignments and partisanship. It allows, for example, the pursuit of independent economic policies and the strengthening of preventive diplomacy, thereby separating the country’s religious communities from regional and international power axes. Hezbollah’s case stands in stark contrast to the structure and specificities of Lebanese society. The group has monopolized “resistance,” framing it as an Islamic resistance linked to Iran and the export of the Islamic Republic’s revolution. It has pulled Lebanese Shiites away from their communities and their country, subordinating them to the cross-border influence of the Wilayat al-Faqih. Hezbollah has drawn both Shiites and other Lebanese into a perpetual war, without clear objectives or prospects. Resist for the sake of resistance! Arming only to defend the arms! Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, yet Hezbollah’s arsenal remained a symbol of subordination to Iranian influence and its regional agenda. The group has fought in Syria and Yemen and has threatened Arab security, including in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. Ultimately, its policies have left Lebanon trapped in a deadly isolation. After the liberation, Hezbollah was responsible for a return of occupation, and following reconstruction, for a return of destruction in South Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, as well as in Beirut and its southern suburbs. However, major shifts have occurred in the regional geopolitical landscape following Hamas’s military operation, “Al-Aqsa Flood,” against Israel. Tel Aviv’s response weakened the role of Iran’s proxies and, with the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, curtailed the influence of the Wilayat al-Faqih, which had extended to the Syrian coast. Hezbollah suffered a military defeat after opening the southern front to support Hamas, as part of Iran’s so-called “unity of fronts” project. All of these events have brought Lebanon to a moment of truth. And the truth is that, for Lebanese society as a whole, Hezbollah’s misfortunes represent opportunities for the state to reclaim what it had lost due to the group’s actions. Restoring the state’s role in defense, security, the economy, and social development, however, depends on conditions set by Lebanon’s neutrality project and the pursuit of peace with all its neighbors. The Pope’s visit thus comes at a pivotal moment, offering an act of peace grounded in Christian values at their most noble and humanist, for the benefit of every individual. It arrivers on the threshold of a new phase, within a regional and international context favorable to Lebanon, this “message-country.” It should be emphasized that the hoped-for peace poses no threat to Lebanon’s national identity or its security. On the contrary, its establishment helps reduce violations of the law and legal norms. In a multi-confessional country like Lebanon, the common identity that underpins the unity of the people is a composite one, built not on a single or dominant culture, but on ongoing intercultural dialogue and a shared commitment to coexistence. This commitment alone is enough to bring such an identity to life. Coexistence does not mean imposing one way of life on another community, nor attempting to shape individuals according to a single model. Peace also promotes the development of a national security diplomacy. This allows for the strengthening of legitimate security institutions – namely the army, security forces, and the police. Militias and parallel security systems can no longer coexist with the state or circumvent its exclusive right to monopolize arms. However, a national security strategy is not limited to the role and function of weapons alone: Lebanon cannot be protected by arms alone. Lebanon, this “message-country,” is not Sparta, and the communities that compose it – including the Shiite community – are not made up solely of soldiers, fighters, and martyrs! Peace, grounded in national security considerations, requires the development of the economy as an essential component of a comprehensive security system, ensuring internal stability, civil peace, and national unity through equitable development. The political system must strengthen the concept of citizenship rather than obstruct it or rise against it under the pretext of sectarian dominance. National security diplomacy also entails reinforcing all of Lebanon’s international relations, not just those with its neighbors. It calls for the restoration of ties severed with its regional and global environment through a policy that safeguards the country’s highest national interests. How can peace automatically strengthen the mechanisms of the rule of law and judicial independence? In this long-awaited period of peace, the transfer and stockpiling of weapons are no longer necessary, nor are the pretexts used to justify ideological mobilization and the parallel economy, which leads to sanctions. The survival of Lebanon, this “message-country,” depends on the project of national neutrality and the embrace of peace. The Pope is therefore warmly welcomed, along with his message: “Blessed are the peacemakers.” Let the Lebanese Parliament adopt Lebanon’s neutrality and enshrine it in the preamble of the Constitution, while working to have this principle recognized internationally. Let Lebanon engage in peace negotiations with Israel, in pursuit of national interest, the country’s security, and… its vocation, which gives meaning to its very existence.

Leon XIV and the Lebanese Exception
By
Youssef Mouawad
Published

What a source of concern—and even of irritation—for Roman authorities, these Eastern Catholics do indeed generate! Had they vanished from the Levant, diplomatic relations between Rome and the Muslim countries of the Eastern Mediterranean would have been far smoother. That being said , things were never simple for Vatican diplomacy, on dealing deal with the Maronite community. Very early on, the Maronites asserted themselves politically as an autonomous entity rooted in a mountain stronghold, and what is more they never hesitated in insisting upon their distinctiveness. This set them apart from the other Christian communities of Syria and Iraq, which had long submitted to the rule of the majority and produced, for the most part, quiet individuals and compliant citizens. No genuflection A source of irritation, yes—but also of a source of pride for Rome. Listen to what Pope Pius IV wrote in September 1562 to the Maronite Patriarch Musa Saadeh al-Akkari: “From the bottom of our heart, we congratulate you and your nation, giving thanks to divine mercy, which has preserved in these distant lands so many thousands of men ‘who have not bowed the knee to Baal.’” (1) This passage, written some five centuries ago, remains strikingly relevant today: neither the Maronites nor their patriarch bowed before the Baal of Damascus—whether Hafez al-Assad or his son Bashar (2). Yet this defiance carried a heavy price. These Eastern Catholics endured, for decades, the blows of the Syrian occupation army and its intelligence services. How much longer will Lebanese Christians—of all denominations—be able to preserve their project of national independence and cultural liberalism, they who, long before their Muslim compatriots, had enrolled in the “school of the West”? A shrinking presence If Pope Leo XIV is visiting his flock in Turkey and Lebanon as a shepherd, then he should be reminded that, on the eve of the First World War, 20% of the population of Asia Minor and Bilad al-Sham was Christian. Today, there are no more than 100,000 left in the Republic of Turkey—less than 0.5% of the population. In Syria, the followers of Jesus, the qawm ‘Issa , who numbered two million before the civil war, are now down to about 500,000 souls. And in Iraq, they barely reach 300,000, whereas they were 1.5 million before the American invasion (3). As for Lebanon—well, counting stopped the day Hariri declared it would stop. Who is to be the rescuer? Christians of the East, you are living under siege in what has become nothing more than the backyard of Christianity. Who today could still wear the obsidional crown, and from where could deliverance come, when in Turkey you were crushed, and in Syria and Iraq slowly eaten away? In 1994, Jean-Pierre Valognes asked the question: “Will there still be Christians in the East in the third millennium?” He added: “Without the foothold that Lebanon represented—where they once walked with their heads held high—they will be forced to conform to the dominant values and, merely to survive, cease to assume their Christian identity.” (4) Walking with one’s head held high means preserving one’s human dignity and freeing oneself from religious or political servitude. And whatever certain Curia diplomats may think—those enamored with interreligious dialogue and intellectual contortions—walking with dignity does not mean bending the knee before Baal, whether he sits in Damascus or in Tehran. 1-I owe this citation to Professor Mireille Issa, author of Bullarium Maronitarum. Bullaire Maronite , Paris, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 2019, pp. 102-107. 2-To the exception of certain individuals and for short periods of time. 3- These are but rough figures! 4-Jean-Pierre Valognes, Vie et mort des chrétiens d’Orient , Fayard, 1994.

The Pope in Lebanon: Without Peace, the “Message-Country” Will Not Survive

Pope Leo XIV is set to bring a powerful message to Lebanon: “Blessed are the peacemakers.” A unifying call, with deep religious resonance, that resonate cross its religious communities, while carrying a clear political weight for a country exhausted by decades of conflict – a nation for whom the time has come to leave the tunnels of violence behind and step into the light of peace. Firstly: Supporting the Christian Presence and Affirming Its National Role This message stems from the Holy See’s careful attention to what Lebanon has endured – and continues to endure – particularly its Christian population. For the Vatican, Lebanon is the most sensitive “laboratory” in the Middle East for Muslim–Christian coexistence, and a potential model of what John Paul II, three decades ago, described as a “message-country.” In this context, the Pope’s visit represents a clear show of support from the Vatican for the Christian presence in Lebanon. It underscores the Holy See’s role as a guiding authority, both in nurturing the community internally and advocating for it on the international stage. Lebanese Christians are not an isolated minority; they belong to a spiritual and political structure that spans from East to West. The visit reaffirms that their role within the Lebanese state cannot be marginalized. Yet the papal message goes beyond mere reassurance. It carries an appeal to all internal factions to rise above sectarian fanaticism and commit to the national project. Christians, the papal message suggests, are more than just a community – they are bearers of a universal human message within this country. Secondly: A Message to Iran… and the World The Pope’s call for peace is more than a moral exhortation – it is a public political statement. From Beirut, the Vatican sends a clear message to Iran: Lebanon cannot survive as long as it remains a theatre of conflict, war, and both regional and international rivalries. The slogan “Blessed are the peacemakers” is not merely a theological mantra. It is a pointed, if subtle, rejection of the logic of arms and violence, a reminder that only diplomatic and political solutions can rescue Lebanon from its downward spiral. Thirdly: Lebanon, a “Message-Country” Between Past and Present In 1997, John Paul II presented Lebanon with a historic document entitled Lebanon, a Message-Country , aimed primarily at the nation’s internal communities, with the goal of strengthening coexistence and affirming the state’s pioneering role. Today, Pope Leo XIV’s message can be seen as an international extension of that document. Lebanon can only truly be a “message-country” if it restores peace, distances itself from regional conflicts, and rebuilds its relationships with neighbours, the wider world, and even its adversaries. Peace is not merely a moral choice – it is the sine qua non condition of the Lebanese state’s very existence: a prerequisite for reviving the economy, defining national priorities, and asserting sovereignty across its territory. Peace, ultimately, is the path to the “message.” The Pope’s visit is far more than a ceremonial occasion. It is a high-level political intervention, a reminder to the Lebanese people that their state can only recover if it breaks free from the axes of war, restores its neutrality, and chooses to be a force for peace rather than a battleground for conflict. Lebanon – the “message-country” – can only be born from a Lebanon at peace.

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