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At a time of rising regional particularisms, under the effect of the war in Gaza, the Pope's recent visit to Lebanon, particularly to Annaya, takes on a special dimension for Maronites. It should be an opportunity for this community to activate its historical research on an academic level and to refresh its memory on the "missionary" nature of its presence in Lebanon as a historical core of Lebanese identity. Pope Leo XIV's recent visit to Annaya on December 1, 2025, should be the first groundbreaking of a Maronite historical project “revisited.” Beyond the person of Saint Charbel, the Pope indeed went to the source of the Lebanese Maronite Order (OLM), which encapsulates the essence of the Maronite Church. In Annaya, we are also at the source of Greater Lebanon, of which John Paul II affirmed that “its historical roots are religious in nature.” Here we touch upon its genesis. In the first paragraphs of the post-synodal apostolic exhortation “A New Hope for Lebanon” (1997), John Paul II writes: “During the Eucharistic celebration concluding the synodal assembly, I said: ‘We know how much Lebanon needs to build and rebuild (…). I also emphasized that the commitment of Christians is important for Lebanon, whose historical roots are religious in nature. And it is precisely because of these religious roots of Lebanese national and political identity that, after the hard years of war, a synodal assembly was desired and made possible, in order to jointly seek the path of faith renewal, better collaboration, and more effective common witness, without forgetting the reconstruction of society.’ (Cf. also John Paul II, Homily at the closing Mass of the Special Assembly for Lebanon of the Synod of Bishops, December 14, 1995).” The Pope's visit goes in two directions: it should first be an opportunity to revive and popularize one of the most exciting sequences in Maronite history: that of the human and spiritual adventure of three laymen from Aleppo who founded, in the Holy Valley, the Kadisha, the Lebanese Maronite Order (1695); and particularly of that extraordinary figure of sanctity that Abdallah Carali, the heart of this undertaking, must be. One could easily imagine the University of Kaslik founding a historical study center for the Maronite Church, in the immediate vicinity of the tomb of such a great miracle worker. The popularization of Carali's life should also be possible, perhaps initially in a comic strip. The Pope's presence in Annaya should then be an opportunity to refresh the memory of the Maronites on the “missionary” nature of their presence in Lebanon as an Eastern Church, in communion with Rome and a historical core of Lebanese identity. Given the geopolitical upheaval affecting the Middle East, it is high time to awaken from our intellectual and relational lethargy and realize that Greater Lebanon was a turning point where, from self-responsibility, the Maronites transitioned to a historical responsibility for others, and that this transition had important consequences that they have not yet fully measured. “The Vicissitudes of the Phoenix” The French historian Candice Raymond, associate researcher at the IFPO (Beirut), masterfully retraces the historical course of the Lebanese project in a study published in the Revue Tiers Monde (number 216 - 2013, Armand Colin editions). Titled “Life, Death, and Resurrection of the History of Lebanon, or the Vicissitudes of the Phoenix,” the study “retraces the history of ‘the history of Lebanon,’ a historical discourse consubstantial with the formation of the State, the very relevance of which was initially disputed and its main statements contested. It then reports on the processes by which this historiography reconfigured itself, so as to be able to form, after the civil war, the basis of a national history at a minimum and by default, but which testifies to an unprecedented tightening of positions within Lebanese society and a desire for consensus more widely shared than the persistence of intercommunal divisions would suggest.” Candice Raymond's entire study is fascinating, but particularly the section concerning the “creation” of Greater Lebanon. The author writes: “In the aftermath of the First World War, when the territorial question arose, proponents of the creation of a Lebanese state developed both economic and historical arguments to obtain the addition to Mount Lebanon, which had enjoyed an autonomous sanjak status since 1861, of various peripheral territories (Tripoli and Akkar to the North, the Beqaa plain to the East, Sidon and Jabal Amil to the South) and especially Beirut, which they wished to make the capital of the new state. The rhetoric of perpetual struggle against oppression was then replaced by a teleology of state power that distinguishes Maronite communal historiography from Maronite Libanist historiography. The latter effectively reverses the relationship uniting the Maronite community to Lebanese territory. It is no longer the community that, through its struggle for freedom, attributes its particular identity to the territory it occupies, but this territory which, due to its morphological and geographical specificities, imposes a mission and an identity on its occupants. The geographical parallelism of the marine coast and the Lebanese mountain indeed finds its counterpart in a dual functionality of the territory: that of Lebanon of exchange, between the sea and the continent, between East and West, and that of Lebanon-as-refuge, a sanctuary of freedom and independence. The State therefore plunges its roots into the political experiences that achieved unity between these two missions, while the Nation bases its specific identity there.” Our Historical Determinisms Every Lebanese should deepen this knowledge which, ultimately, is self-knowledge and knowledge of one's historical determinisms. We must put an end to the timid retreat into "little Lebanon" advocated by some. There was a time when "Greater Lebanon" was put at the service of "Little Lebanon". That time is no more. Certainly, one can understand it, the history of Greater Lebanon, whose centenary we celebrated, has not been easy. The last fifty years of our existence as a State have been painful from all points of view. But they must be assumed in the very name of our “religious” roots. As Maronites, we are inseparably, but without confusion, Church and community. But it is the Church that founds the community. Ontologically, we are first and foremost Church, with the responsibility that every Church must assume; that of being “catholic” in the original sense of the term, that is to say, inclusive and “universal.”

The year 2025 was a pivotal year in the Middle East, as it shattered a project that had been in gestation since the early 1980s - including the al-Daawa party in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Assad regime in Syria - Michel Seurat had been one of the first to discuss it in his articles. Later, in the 2000s, Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen joined this dynamic, which also attempted to establish itself in Bahrain during the Arab Spring of 2011. It was, incidentally, in 2005-2006, after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the assassination of Rafic Hariri, the July 2006 war, and the gradual subjugation of Fatah by Hamas in Gaza, that the Iranian “Shiite crescent” project truly took shape… before receiving de facto legitimacy in 2015 through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iranian nuclear, a golden “gift” from Barack Obama that benefited the imperialist ambitions of the mullahs. For a quarter of a century, Tehran's regional policy has followed a crystal-clear logic: to establish itself on the bottlenecks and corridors of the Middle East, transform straits, land routes, and enclaves into instruments of strategic blackmail, and build around Iran a defensive depth composed of militias, captive regimes, and fragmented states. On one side, the straits: Hormuz to the east, Bab el-Mandeb to the south of the Red Sea, and, on the other, the land corridors: Tehran – Baghdad – Damascus – Beirut. Then a third level, long underestimated: Gaza, an internal pressure point on Israel, but also on Egypt. Finally, a little-understood tectonics because never sufficiently explained: “the alliance of minorities” that structured the Levant for half a century — and which Israel accommodated as long as it guaranteed a predictable order. And then… on October 7, 2024, in a suicidal gesture, a certain Yahya Senouar plunged this project into the abyss, taking with him the senior leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas. And, in December 2024, the Iranian Empire awoke to the coup de grâce - the fall of Damascus, with the flight of Bashar al-Assad, abandoned by his soldiers and allies. The collapse of the axis naturally led to the heart of the empire itself being attacked, the Pasdaran high command itself being eradicated by Israel, and the nuclear program being crushed. A look back at the Iranian imperialist project, now fragmented, but still capable of harm, through a geopolitical approach. Bab el-Mandeb: the other throat of the world Scholarly analyses generally begin with the Strait of Hormuz, the access route and easternmost part of the Persian Gulf. Hormuz is indeed a vital strategic point, as it represents an essential commercial route for international traffic, used by more than 30% of global oil trade. In addition to Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran, the strait controls access to other equally important hydrocarbon-producing countries such as Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar. No fewer than 2,400 oil tankers transit through it each year, carrying approximately 17 million barrels of oil per day. It is therefore a fundamental trade corridor, as the only satisfactory exit route for Saudi, Iranian, and Emirati oil (representing a quarter of the world's crude oil production). Options for exporting oil bypassing the strait are limited, and these exports can only be in limited quantities. Iran, bordering the strait, can block access to it. It is no coincidence that on June 29, 2008, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Mohammad Ali Jafari, stated that if Iran were attacked by Israel or the United States, it would close the strait. However, the focus on Hormuz somewhat obscures the fact that the system functions in some ways like an hourglass: Hormuz in the northeast, Bab el-Mandeb in the southwest. Bab el-Mandeb is a strait in the Red Sea connecting it to the Gulf of Aden, and separating Djibouti and Eritrea in Africa from Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula. The strait is also an important strategic choke point and one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, as it lies on the route through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. It accounts for more than 10% of global maritime traffic, including 75% of European exports; it constitutes an energy corridor between the Gulf, Europe, and Asia, and the point where oil routes, grain flows, and containerized logistics converge. For trade between Northern Europe and Asia, the alternative is via… the Cape of Good Hope, a detour of 6,500 km! Therefore, when Bab el-Mandeb closes… Suez ceases to exist. For Iran, the equation is clear: if there is a second Hormuz, it is indeed Bab el-Mandeb. Next article: In Yemen, the Houthi gamble

Is the mullahs' regime loosening its grip on the mandatory wearing of the Islamic veil, or is it granting a temporary relaxation to appease an exasperated population? One thing is certain: in recent years, women have increasingly defied the strict rules of the Islamic Republic, and a wind of freedom is blowing through the streets of Iran. Women dancing at parties or chatting in cafes... without headscarves. Images unimaginable until recently are multiplying. Braids, curly hair, or bleached hair are now making their mark in public spaces, alongside more traditional women wearing the hijab or the chador. This phenomenon, more visible in recent months in Tehran and other major cities, is now affecting all generations to varying degrees. Some women are also increasingly wearing tighter clothing or revealing their shoulders, legs, or navels, much to the dismay of some conservatives who condemn what they call their "nudity." Yet, a growing number of women are appearing bareheaded in public, despite the repression that struck the "Woman, Life, Freedom" protest movement in 2022 and 2023, following the death in custody of the young Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini, arrested by the morality police for violating the strict dress code. A Divided Power This relative relaxation comes as Iran emerged weakened from the 12-day war against Israel last June, and as the succession of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has been in power since 1989 and is 86 years old, looms. The wearing of the veil, however, remains a divisive issue, even within the government. President Massoud Pezeshkian believes that women cannot be forced to wear the veil. Last year, his administration refused to enact a law, passed by Parliament, that would have drastically increased penalties for women who do not wear the veil or wear it improperly. While Iranian authorities have indeed relaxed their stance on wearing the veil in public, they are not yet ready to abandon this pillar of the Islamic Republic, analysts and activists point out, warning that a sudden backlash is possible. According to Arash Azizi of Yale University in the United States, "the regime has abandoned strict enforcement of the mandatory veil, but it has not abandoned the principle itself." "That would be a huge ideological concession that it is not prepared to make. But it knows it will be very difficult to put the genie back in the bottle," the researcher adds. The Supreme Leader's office itself was criticized by some ultraconservatives after publishing a photo in November of Niloufar Ghalehvand, a Pilates instructor killed during the war with Israel, showing her without a headscarf, wearing only a baseball cap. During Design Week at Tehran University in November, women without headscarves could be seen walking through the exhibitions. However, the event had to close earlier than planned after protests from religious dignitaries. Intensified repression The head of the judiciary, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, stated that intelligence agencies should report "networks promoting immorality and the failure to wear the headscarf," promising that his department would take action. In early December, the Supreme Leader defended the hijab in a speech, stating that women who wear the headscarf "progress more than others in all fields and play an active role in society and in their homes." While images of unveiled and joyful women may give an impression of widespread freedom, repression has intensified in recent months following the war with Israel, activist organizations warn. More than 1,400 executions have already taken place this year, according to NGOs, and groups, notably the Baha'is, Iran's largest non-Muslim religious minority, are facing increased persecution. 2023 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi, who had been out on bail since December 2024 and never covers her head, was arrested again on December 12 in Mashhad after speaking at a ceremony honoring a lawyer found dead in early December.

In Lebanon, politics is no longer measured by results or the extent to which national interests are protected, but rather by the loudness of one's voice, the intensity of one's rhetoric, and the ability of an official to appease the instincts of a divided and exhausted public. In this climate, any minister who chooses calm, cool-headed thinking, and working without grandstanding becomes a potential target of constant accusation. This is precisely what Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi is facing, as he is subjected to a campaign of criticism inseparable from a deeper crisis afflicting the very concept of the state. Since assuming the foreign ministry portfolio, Raggi has not acted like a "populist" minister, nor has he sought to transform his position into a platform for rhetoric or a tool for scoring domestic points. He has treated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a sovereign ministry that is supposed to protect Lebanon's position at a highly dangerous regional juncture, not as a platform for political posturing. This choice, which should be self-evident, has become grounds for accusation in Lebanon, because the prevailing political culture now considers shouting a stance, recklessness a form of courage, and diplomacy a sign of weakness or complicity. The attack on Youssef Raggi does not stem from an accurate assessment of his performance, but rather from an unfair comparison between what he does and what his opponents wish he would do. He is criticized for not making inflammatory statements, for not raising expectations he knows are unattainable, and for refusing to embroil Lebanon in conflicts beyond its capacity to withstand. But what is presented as "weakness" is nothing more than a realistic understanding of Lebanon's true size and the balance of power that governs the region. Lebanon today is a near-collapsed state: a devastated economy, weak institutions, deep political divisions, and weapons outside state control that restrict sovereign decision-making. In this reality, foreign policy becomes the last line of defense for what remains of the state. Any miscalculation, any ill-considered statement, could open the doors to further international isolation for Lebanon, or plunge it into a confrontation for which it lacks the tools and the means to withstand. Youssef Raggi understands this reality and deals with it with diplomatic acumen, not populist sentiment. It is unfair to hold the Foreign Minister responsible for the accumulation of thirty years of failed policies. Raji did not inherit a stable state or a sound network of relations. Instead, he inherited the image of a state lacking credibility, viewed with suspicion by the international community, which thinks twice before engaging with it. Within this narrow margin, he is trying to repair what can be salvaged, maintain a minimum level of communication with the international community, and prevent a complete break in relations, the cost of which would be catastrophic for Lebanon. Most importantly, Youssef Raggi did not use his position to settle internal scores, nor did he transform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into an extension of a local political battle. He did not speak the language of axes, nor did he present Lebanon as a tool in a regional conflict. Rather, he tried to establish a discourse that reflects the concept of the state, even if that state is weak and fragmented. This behavior, which should be the standard for any foreign minister, is met with suspicion and accusation in Lebanon, because those accustomed to the logic of dominance are not reassured by the logic of balance. Defending Youssef Raggi does not mean claiming that he is infallible, nor that his performance is above criticism. Criticism is a right, and accountability is a duty. But what is happening today goes beyond criticism to a trial of intentions, an attempt to dismantle any model of an official who doesn't engage in populist rhetoric. The foreign minister is expected to be an echo of the angry street, not a guardian of the national interest, and to appease a fleeting public, even at the expense of the country's future. In such a bleak moment for Lebanon, calm becomes an act of resistance, and diplomacy a courageous choice, not a sign of weakness. Defending Youssef Raji is defending the idea that Lebanon is still capable, despite everything, of producing officials who operate with the mind of the state, not the logic of sectarianism, and with the calculations of the national interest, not the language of instinct. This choice may not be popular, and it may not garner immediate applause, but it is the only option capable of protecting Lebanon from further collapse. And in a country accustomed to punishing reason and rewarding madness, defending diplomacy becomes a battle in itself.

For the past two years, investors have watched gold and silver climb relentlessly — at times with disbelief. Since December 2023, gold has more than doubled, rising from roughly $2,000 to around $4,300, while silver has surged from about $26 to $63, with momentum accelerating sharply in the second half of 2025. If current levels hold into year-end, both metals are on track to register their strongest annual performance since 1979 — the opening chapter of the last great precious-metals cycle. And the “shiny metals” have not been alone. Platinum and palladium have also rallied sharply, copper is up roughly 50%, and a broad range of strategic minerals is enjoying a banner year. As retail investors rush into the space — fearful of missing the move — and as capital floods into gold and silver tracker funds, two fundamental questions naturally arise: What is driving these spectacular advances? And is this cycle fundamentally different from the ones that came before? Every commodity analyst with a few cycles behind them will say they have seen this movie before. From the stagflationary shock of the 1970s to the China-led supercycle of the 2000s that peaked in 2011, commodity booms have historically followed a familiar script: demand accelerates, supply responds with a lag, prices overshoot, and the cycle eventually turns. Commodities, in this view, are ultimately captive to macroeconomic conditions and classical supply-demand dynamics. The 2024–2025 cycle does not fit that pattern. What distinguishes the current metals cycle is the simultaneous convergence of structural forces that have never before operated together at this scale. These forces are not cyclical. They are political, financial, and systemic — and they are reshaping the foundations of commodity markets. De-Dollarization and the Deterioration of U.S. Public Finances The first pillar of this new architecture is monetary and geopolitical. The United States’ pivot away from globalization toward protectionism has profoundly altered global perceptions of American economic leadership. A more transactional — and at times confrontational — approach to international relations has weakened long-standing alliances and encouraged nations to reassess their dependence on the U.S. as both a geopolitical anchor and a financial counterparty. At the same time, persistent fiscal deficits and a rapidly expanding public-debt burden have intensified concerns over the long-term credibility of U.S. public finances. For many central banks, the combination of geopolitical unpredictability and fiscal deterioration has raised uncomfortable questions about the durability of U.S. Treasuries and the dollar’s role as the unquestioned reserve asset. The response has been decisive: diversification away from the U.S. dollar and toward gold. According to the World Gold Council, central banks purchased over 1,000 tonnes of gold in 2023, followed by 1,044 tonnes in 2024, and are on track for 750–900 tonnes in 2025 — far above the pre-2022 average of 400–500 tonnes per year. This is not tactical buying. It is a structural reallocation of sovereign balance sheets. And it marks the first cornerstone of a commodity cycle driven not by growth alone, but by a loss of confidence in the financial architecture that underpinned our world in the last four decades. The Weaponization of Supply Chains For decades, globalization rested on the assumption that economic interdependence reduced conflict and improved efficiency. Supply chains were optimized for cost and scale — not resilience or sovereignty. That assumption no longer holds. In the aftermath of trade wars, sanctions, export bans, and the freezing of sovereign assets, nations have come to a sobering realization: control over physical resources is power. As a result, commodities — particularly metals critical to energy, technology, and defense — have moved from the realm of market economics into that of national security. China has been the most explicit in operationalizing this shift, using export controls on critical minerals and processing technologies to transform resource dominance into geopolitical leverage. These measures are not designed to maximize short-term revenue. They are designed to maximize strategic optionality. The consequence is profound: price is no longer the sole clearing mechanism. Even when supply exists, access is no longer guaranteed. What were once unified global markets are fragmenting into regional and political blocs. In such an environment, scarcity is not always visible in inventories — it manifests in who is allowed to buy, when, and on what terms. The arbitrage mechanisms that once equalized global markets are breaking down. The Physical Limits of Substitution In past cycles, rising prices triggered substitution, efficiency gains, and material thrifting that capped prices. In today’s critical metals, those margins are disappearing. In solar photovoltaics, silver loadings are already near physical limits, and newer high-efficiency technologies are actually increasing silver intensity per panel. In automotive catalysts, substitution between platinum and palladium has largely been exhausted and is constrained by chemistry and regulation. In batteries, material intensities are approaching theoretical minimums, leaving little room for further reduction without performance trade-offs. At the same time, mining supply has lost elasticity. Ore grades continue to decline, permitting timelines stretch toward decades, and environmental constraints limit rapid expansion. The result is a system in which demand can rise faster than supply can respond, regardless of price. This is not a temporary bottleneck. It is a structural ceiling. Taken together, these three forces — monetary realignment, geopolitical fragmentation, and physical constraint — form a new architecture for commodity markets. In a world where supply chains are weaponized, currencies are questioned, and substitution has reached its limits, commodities no longer behave like cyclical assets. They behave like strategic assets. It is a new rulebook. This supercycle — targeted, uneven, and political — is fundamentally different. Where Do We Go From Here? Gold: The Ultimate Investment Metal Gold occupies a unique position among commodities. Its demand is overwhelmingly financial, whether through central-bank reserve accumulation or portfolio investment. Unlike industrial metals, gold does not depend on economic growth to justify its role. It depends on confidence — or, more precisely, on the erosion of it. Investment demand for gold is theoretically unlimited, while supply is structurally constrained. For that reason, articulating precise price targets is largely futile — particularly in an environment of surging demand from Chinese retail investors, whose participation has added a powerful new layer to the global bid. History offers perspective. During the 2000–2011 bull market, gold rose from approximately $250 per ounce in March 2001 to a peak of $1,921 in September 2011 — a 768% appreciation. In the 1970s, gold climbed from around $100 per ounce in March 1976 to $873 in January 1980, representing an 873% gain in less than four years. In the current cycle, gold bottomed near $1,046 in December 2015 and has since advanced to roughly $4,300 — an appreciation of about 411% so far. Measured purely against historical precedents, the current move is significant — but not exceptional. The more important question is not whether gold has risen too far, but whether the structural forces driving demand are exhausted. On that front, the evidence suggests the opposite. Fiscal imbalances remain unresolved. Geopolitical fragmentation is intensifying rather than receding. And the credibility of fiat systems is being tested in ways not seen in decades. Although the financial markets are notably irrational, taken together, these forces argue that the current gold cycle is incomplete. Silver: The Leveraged Metal If gold is the investment anchor, silver is the accelerant. Silver combines monetary demand with industrial necessity, making it structurally more volatile — and historically more explosive — in late-cycle phases. Its supply is uniquely constrained, with roughly 70% of global production coming as a by-product of other metals. Higher prices do not translate into rapid increases in output. At the same time, silver sits at the heart of electrification, solar power, and advanced electronics — sectors that governments are actively promoting and subsidizing. As a result, the physical market has now been in deficit for four consecutive years. When financial and industrial demand rise together, silver does not adjust smoothly. It moves violently. History again provides perspective. In the 1970s cycle, silver rose from roughly $1.50 per ounce in 1971 to nearly $50 in January 1980 — an appreciation of more than 3,000%. During the 2001–2011 cycle, silver advanced from around $4 to just under $50, delivering gains in excess of 1,100%, far outpacing gold over the same period. In the current cycle, silver bottomed near $13.60 in early 2016 and has since climbed to approximately $63 — a move of roughly 460% to date. By historical standards, this phase appears early rather than late. Conclusion A Regime Change, Not an Economic Cycle The metals market of late 2025 is not cyclical. It is structural. For four decades, investors assumed open trade, elastic supply, functional arbitrage, and technological substitution. All four assumptions are now failing — simultaneously. Geography matters more than geology. Policy matters more than price. Physical availability matters more than paper contracts. This is not bullish or bearish. It is a regime change.

From the past tragedies to the dramatic arts. The infamous locations from the era of the Assads, father and son, are now hosting cameras and other film equipments. Whether in Saydnaya or Mazzeh, actors and directors have replaced the torturers who zealously served the interests of the former Syrian regime. Many series currently in production have chosen to film scenes at military sites or security service headquarters that symbolized the reign of terror. Like the Mazzeh airfield, which housed a detention center for the Air Force intelligence service, notorious for its cruelty. The Air Force's "Mukhabarat" were the main pillar of the regime of former pilot Hafez al-Assad, who became president of the Syrian Arab Republic for several decades. Returns from exile At the air base once off-limits under Bashar al-Assad, a crew films a TV series about the final months of the ousted leader's rule as seen through the eyes of a Syrian family. "It's hard to believe we're filming here," director Mohamad Abdul Aziz said from the Mazzeh base, which was once also a notorious detention centre run by Assad's air force intelligence branch, known for its terrible cruelty. The site in the capital's southwestern suburbs "used to be a symbol of military power. Now we are making a show about the fall of that power," he told AFP. Assad fled to Russia as an Islamist-led offensive closed in on Damascus, taking it without a fight on December 8 last year after nearly 14 years of civil war and half a century of Assad dynasty rule. The scene at the Mazzeh base depicts the escape of a figure close to Assad, and is set to feature in "The King's Family" filmed in high-security locations once feared by regular Syrians. The series is to be aired in February during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, primetime viewing in the Arab world, when channels and outlets vie for the attention of eager audiences. Dozens of actors, directors and other show business figures who were opposed to Assad have returned to Syria since his ouster, giving the local industry a major boost, while other series have also chosen to film at former military or security sites. "It's a strange feeling... The places where Syria used to be ruled from have been transformed" into creative spaces, Abdul Aziz said. "This was impossible to do before," he said. Elsewhere in Damascus, his cameras and crew now fill offices at the former military intelligence facility known as Palestine Branch, where detainees once underwent interrogation so brutal that some never came out alive. "Palestine Branch was one of the pillars of the security apparatus -- just mentioning its name caused terror," Abdul Aziz said of the facility, known for torture and abuse. Outside among charred vehicles, explosions and other special effects, the team was recreating a scene depicting "the release of detainees when the security services collapsed", he said. Thousands of detainees were freed when jails were thrown open as Assad fell last year, and desperate Syrians converged on the facilities in search of loved ones who disappeared into the prison system, thousands of whom are still missing. Assad's luxurious, high-security residence, which was stormed and looted after he fled to Russia, is also part of the new series. Abdul Aziz said he filmed a fight scene involving more than 150 people and gunfire in front of the residence in Damascus's upscale Malki district. How long it would last ? The series' scriptwriter Maan Sakbani, 35, expressed cautious relief that the days of full-blown censorship under Assad were over. The new authorities' information ministry still reviews scripts but the censor's comments on "The King's Family" were very minor, he said from a traditional Damascus house where the team was discussing the order of scenes. Sakbani said he was uncertain how long the relative freedom would last, and was waiting to see the reaction to the Ramadan productions once they were aired. The seizure of power by current Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa continues to fuel fears and questions. The jihadist past of the man formerly known as "Abu Mohammed al-Julani," and especially the massacres of civilians belonging to religious minorities, contribute to the controversy surrounding him. But for the moment, both the government and the population seem to be hoping for an economic recovery to rebuild a country ravaged by civil war since 2011. "Human slaughterhouse" Several other series inspired by the Assad era are also planned for release at that time, including "Enemy Syrians", which depicts citizens living under the eyes of the security services. Another, "Going Out to the Well", directed by Mohammed Lutfi and featuring several prominent Syrian actors, is about deadly prison riots in the infamous Saydnaya facility in 2008. Rights group Amnesty International had called the facility a "human slaughterhouse". "The show was written more than two years ago and we intended to film it before Assad's fall," Lutfi said. But several actors feared the former authorities' reaction and they were unable to find a suitable location since filming in Syria was impossible. Now, they plan to film on site. "The new authorities welcomed the project and provided extensive logistical support and facilities for filming inside Saydnaya prison," Lutfi said. As a result, it will be possible "to convey the prisoners' suffering and the regime's practices -- from the inside the actual location," he said.