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The Louvre Abu Dhabi sits at the heart of a deliberate strategy to establish the Emirate as an international cultural hub. The museum embodies Abu Dhabi’s ambition to position itself as a bridge between civilizations, aiming to transcend the image of an Emirati society seen as “purely oil-driven” and to assert an identity firmly oriented towards global culture. It is a major art institution, conceived as a universal museum, highlighting the interactions of human creativity across cultures, civilizations, religions, eras, and prejudices. Layout and Scenography At the Louvre Abu Dhabi, artworks are displayed according to a distinctive curatorial approach that emphasizes universal narratives – such as creation, religion, power, and exchange – rather than rigid geographic divisions. This represents an unsual approach for an art museum. The galleries are organized into thematic and chronological chapters, allowing works from the East and West to be displayed side by side, fostering an intercultural dialogue grounded both in Abu Dhabi’s vision of openness and in French museological expertise. As the first universal museum in the Arab world, it offers a global and comparative reading of art history, rather than a strictly national or western narrative. The Collections The museum houses a constantly expanding collection of more than 600 exceptional artworks and artifacts, spanning the history of humanity across all categories. A portion of these works come on loan from the Louvre in Paris and more than thirteen other French institutions. Exhibits are regularly rotated to maintain public interest, making the museum a dynamic and particularly engaging space. The Louvre Abu Dhabi operates on a long-term partnership between the Abu Dhabi government and the Louvre in Paris. This collaboration encompasses loans of artworks, scientific expertise, and support for programming, as well as the organization of complex temporary exhibitions curated in collaboration with various European museums. Iconic Loans Around 300 major works were loaned by thirteen French institutions for the museum’s early years. Among them are “ La Belle Ferronnière ” by Leonardo da Vinci, “Napoleon Crossing the Saint Bernard Pass”, a masterpiece by Jacques-Louis David’s masterpiece, “ The Gare Saint-Lazare ” by Claude Monet, Van Gogh’s self-portrait, and works by Manet, Kandinsky, Matisse, Rothko, Andy Warhol, Dürer, Titian, to name only the most renowned. The collection also includes historical objects, such as a golden bowl from the Achaemenid Empire and a caravel. By 2025, the museum further expanded its collection through new acquisitions and international loans, notably including Christian sarcophagi and modern paintings. Acquired Artworks by the Museum Between 2023 and 2025, the museum strengthened its academic credibility through new permanent acquisitions. These include, among others, a two-headed statue from Ain Ghazal dating back 8,000 years, and a colossal bust of Ramses II from the Pharaonic era. The museum also acquired one of the jewels of Baroque art, “The Little Girl with a Brazier” by Georges de La Tour, alongside several sculptures by Rodin and various works by Kandinsky, Giacometti, and paintings by Picasso. Educational Services, Training, and Academic Partnerships Beyond a simple cultural visit, the museum serves as a pedagogical center and offers continuing education for schools across the Emirates. A variety of educational programs and training courses are provided for teachers, helping them to use the museum space as a complement to the school curriculum and fostering the development of critical thinking among students. The Louvre Abu Dhabi has also developed university partnerships, including a memorandum of understanding with NYU Abu Dhabi (via an MoU), as well as a collaboration with Sorbonne Abu Dhabi/École du Louvre to offer a professional master’s degree in “Museum Professions”, the first program of its kind in the Gulf. Moreover, it is worth highlighting the inclusive mission of the museum, which, through its “Louvre Abu Dhabi for All” program, offers special performances accessible to people with special needs. In conclusion, the Louvre Abu Dhabi stands as a globally significant satellite museum that combines culture, education, academic research, and soft power. It occupies a central role as a heritage institution, an educational hub, and an international showcase for the United Arab Emirates.

Following the deployment of the impressive American armada near the Iranian coast, several military options are emerging should the White House decide to intervene. For the time being, the standoff with the mullahs' regime remains essentially verbal: communiqués, warnings, and displays of force punctuate the escalation. With each hardening of Donald Trump's tone, Tehran responds with threats of massive retaliation. On the American side, one thing seems certain: no ground intervention is planned. Several observers, however, believe that the American president will first seek a diplomatic solution before resorting to force. On the Iranian side, uncertainty remains total: how long can the regime resist new American demands? At what point might it back down? Hardened US Demands, Iranian Refusal Confirmed On Thursday evening, the US president stated that he "hopes not to have to use this military force," after having called the previous day for a "fair and equitable agreement – ​​no nuclear weapons." But since the June 2025 strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, "the price demanded of Iran for an agreement has increased considerably," according to Farzan Sabet, an Iran specialist at the Geneva Graduate Institute, interviewed by AFP. Washington is now demanding a total ban on uranium enrichment, limitations on Iran's ballistic missile capabilities, as well as "the dismantling or severe restrictions imposed on its 'Axis of Resistance,'" which includes the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, he explained. For Tehran, such an offer would amount to “a form of capitulation,” emphasizes David Khalfa, co-founder of the Atlantic Middle East Forum (AMEF). According to him, Donald Trump “will opt for the military option,” particularly to demonstrate his ability to enforce his red lines. The American military resources deployed Claiming to follow his “own morality” as his sole compass, Donald Trump warned last week that a “huge armada” was en route to the Gulf. This announcement came after his public support for Iranian protesters, whose movement has been violently repressed, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths according to NGOs. This force includes the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, its 80 aircraft, as well as an escort of three destroyers equipped with anti-missile capabilities and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The carrier strike group is generally accompanied by an attack submarine, also capable of striking land targets. The Option of Limited Strikes Donald Trump could target ships exporting Iranian oil, as he did against Venezuela, in order to cripple the country's economy and secure a deal, says Farzan Sabet. He could also conduct "either targeted strikes or a limited war with restricted objectives, allowing him to claim he has enforced his red line without engaging in another war in the Middle East, and he could then declare victory," he explains. These operations would primarily target air defense systems, missile launch sites, and drones, similar to the Israeli strikes in June. According to Eva Koulouriotis, an independent Middle East analyst, these strikes could target the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij militias involved in the repression. "American intelligence services, with the support of the Israeli Mossad, have a clear understanding of these forces," she states. The Hypothesis of Massive Strikes A more radical scenario would involve decapitation strikes targeting “all the pillars of the Iranian regime, starting with the top of the pyramid, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,” then the armed forces, the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard, and top political officials, according to Eva Koulouriotis. “This would also include neutralizing key military bases, the missile program, and what remains of the nuclear program,” she adds. “The American objective is to destabilize the regime. Therefore, there is a strategy aimed at paralyzing it and disrupting the chain of command,” explains David Khalfa. This approach “involves eliminating Khamenei, his close advisors, and the key figures in the Revolutionary Guard command.” He adds, however, a note of caution: “The regime is relatively solid and resilient; this will be no easy task,” especially since “the Revolutionary Guard has anticipated this scenario.” In this context, “Washington’s implicit assumption is that the ‘boots on the ground’ would be provided by Iranian society itself,” he adds. Farzan Sabet nevertheless emphasizes that nothing indicates, at this stage, that Washington explicitly favors a change of regime. Iranian Retaliation Capabilities Although significantly weakened by the strikes of autumn 2024 and June 2025, Iran's retaliatory capabilities remain. Tehran reportedly still possesses 1,500 to 2,000 medium-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Israel, according to Farzan Sabet. Iran also possesses shorter-range ballistic missiles, "much more precise," as well as cruise and anti-ship missiles capable of severely disrupting navigation in the Gulf, not to mention its missile-launching fast attack craft. The head of the Iranian army also announced that combat regiments had been equipped with "1,000 strategic drones." For Eva Koulouriotis, Tehran's decision to retaliate or not "will depend on the nature and scale of the American strike." The Key Role of US Military Bases In addition to the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, significant US military deployments are present in the region. In response to US threats, Iran has pointed out that numerous US bases are within range of its missiles. Bahrain is home to the Naval Support Activity, which houses the US Fifth Fleet and the headquarters of the US Naval Forces Central. Kuwait hosts several major facilities, including Camp Arifjan, the forward operating base for the ground component of CENTCOM. The emirate also houses pre-positioned equipment depots, as well as Ali al-Salem Air Base, home to the 386th Air Expeditionary Wing. Drones, including MQ-9 Reapers, are also deployed there. Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar houses CENTCOM's forward operating base, its air force, and its special forces. It hosts the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing and is the largest U.S. base in the region, with over 40,000 American, British, and French military personnel. Finally, Al-Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates hosts the 380th U.S. Air Expeditionary Wing, composed of ten squadrons and also incorporating MQ-9 Reaper drones.

An analytical focus on the war in Sudan which, since 2023, has already resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and millions of displaced people, with a particularly overwhelming human cost in Darfur, where mass violence, sieges, and forced displacement have taken on a dimension that many international actors now qualify as genocidal. Sudan did not collapse all at once. It unravelled in successive layers, to the rhythm of a war that aims neither at the lasting seizure of power nor the reconstruction of a political order, but the gradual exhaustion of what still remains of the state. Since April 2023, violence has established itself there as a regime in itself, transforming the country into a fragmented space where the long duration of the conflict counts more than any specific military victory. The confrontation between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo's Rapid Support Forces (RSF), known as Hemedti, is only the visible surface of a deeper process that erupted in the political vacuum left after the fall of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, when the alliance of convenience between the regular army and the RSF broke down over the issue of control of the military apparatus, the integration of militias, and the real sharing of power in an already deeply delegitimized state. It should be recalled in this context that the RSF have their direct origin in the Janjaweed, the Arab militias of sinister memory, mobilized by the al-Bashir regime in the early 2000s to crush rebellions in Darfur. The regime had transformed militia violence into a state tool, legitimizing the Janjaweed as auxiliaries for counter-insurgency, restructuring them from 2013 under the name of RSF, and legally integrating them into the Sudanese security apparatus, while granting them exceptional autonomy. The RSF are therefore the product of a deliberate strategy by the Bashir regime, aimed at delegating extreme violence to peripheral forces, socially and geographically detached from the center, in order to preserve the regular army from direct exposure to mass crimes. One could say, without circumlocution, that it is the dictator's last poisoned gift to his country. No structured political project It would, however, be illusory to read the current confrontation as a strictly internal mimetic duel between another « Tapioca » and another « Alcazar ». Behind the classic scheme of the two « mad generals », each of these armed apparatuses only endures and projects itself because it is part of distinct external support configurations, which condition both the conduct of the war and its entrenchment. The conflict thus pits a state military apparatus supported mainly by Egypt and Saudi Arabia – with opportunistic capacity support from Iran – against a paramilitary force largely dependent on financial, commercial, and logistical networks attributed to the United Arab Emirates. What nevertheless favors the classical reading of the mimetic duel between two megalomaniacs in camouflage is that neither side carries a structured political project. But isn't that the prerogative of the entire region? On both sides, there is no question of governing a refounded state, much less rebuilding a social contract. The stake is elsewhere. It is about holding exploitable spaces, securing flows, preserving nuisance capabilities, or preventing the other from transforming a military advantage into exclusive domination. In this context, Khartoum has lost its function as a political capital. Its conquest or reconquest has not changed the general logic of the conflict; it has simply shifted tactical balances without touching the deep architecture of the war. The RSF understood very early on that international recognition was not decisive. Therefore, their strategy relies more on duration, on integration into regional arms and funding networks, and on the use of extreme violence aimed at producing irreversible effects. Darfur, and particularly the el-Fasher region, illustrates this logic. Prolonged sieges, systematic destruction of displaced persons' camps, organized obstruction of humanitarian aid, and mass sexual violence are less a matter of uncontrolled chaos than a method aimed at permanently dislocating local societies, breaking community solidarities, and causing population displacements that are difficult to reverse. A war designed to last It should be noted in this context that reports from international organizations indicate hundreds of rapes committed against children, women, and girls in the context of raids. In this sense, the violence exercised is not only punitive but structuring, in that it redraws the human balances of the territory, modifies local power dynamics, and transforms war into a tool of demographic engineering. Darfur, for example, is not a forgotten periphery of the conflict; it is its dark heart, the place where the most radical forms of a war designed to last are experimented. Consequently, faced with such dynamics, we must not delude ourselves: the Sudanese army is far from embodying a project of state restoration. It represents nothing more than the survival of an apparatus withdrawn into its traditional strongholds in the north and east and refocused around Port Sudan, which has become the wartime capital and an indispensable facade for international recognition. The partial recapture of Khartoum in 2025 thus allowed for relative military stabilization, but it neither re-established state authority nor reversed the country's fragmentation dynamic. What we observe, in reality, is the transformation of Sudan into a space administered by war, with the transformation of the state into a disputed label, an institutional shell emptied of any capacity for sovereign projection. The war has not replaced the state; it has simply unsubstantiated it. In this context, de facto partition progresses without ever being formalized. In the west, the RSF consolidate their territorial control, while in the east and north, the army retreats to a coastal and Nilotic Sudan reduced to its minimal functions. Between the two lies a space of diffuse violence, trafficking, and trapped populations, where political affiliation offers no protection. The Sudanese conflict thus illustrates a broader mutation of contemporary wars: wars without a political horizon, without a decisive victory, where the objective is not to close the conflict but to control its rents. And as long as this predatory economy remains solvent, the war is destined to continue indefinitely. Next article: Red Sea, Gulf and Horn of Africa: the regionalization of the Sudanese conflict

The Louvre Abu Dhabi is a universal art museum located on Saadiyat Island, the aptly named 'Island of Happiness', which aims to become the new cultural center of the UAE. With its temporary exhibitions co-organized with major French museums and its 'universal' discourse, the museum contributes to the soft power of the United Arab Emirates and to the redefinition of the Arab world's place in international art and heritage circuits. The origins The Louvre Abu Dhabi is the result of an intergovernmental agreement between France and the United Arab Emirates, which allows the latter to use the name "Louvre" until 2047. The Museum, poetically nicknamed “The Louvre of the Sands”, tells the story of humanity through works from various civilizations, spanning a period from prehistory to contemporary art. From the outset, the idea of branding the name of the world's largest museum had provoked an outcry in France. It took a lot of effort and no less than a billion euros to convince the most reluctant. In return for this colossal sum, the contract provides for the use of the Louvre label for 30 years, as well as the loan of works from various French museums, alongside temporary exhibitions and cooperation in museum management and on-site staff training. The Museum officially opened its doors to the public on November 11, 2017, after a decade of work, with approximately 600 works presented at the inauguration. The design of the museum T he Louvre Abu Dhabi was designed by Jean Nouvel, the star architect of the last fifty years. Nouvel used the serenity created by the interplay of shadows and light to create a welcoming space that integrates with the country's history and geography. A typical UAE Museum that would have no place in Paris, London or New York. He absolutely did not want a museum with purely European architecture installed in Abu Dhabi. Inspired by the architecture and traditions of the Emirates, Nouvel created a remarkable setting for the Louvre Abu Dhabi that respects the essential technical constraints of modern museums. To do this, he built a museum-city spanning approximately 24,000 m², including 8,000 m² of galleries, which seems to float on water. The different rooms of the museum are typical low white buildings of the region between which visitors can stroll. Designed as an Arab medina, accessible both by sea and land, the Museum features spaces dedicated to a multitude of activities (kayaking, film screenings, conferences, etc.) in addition to art galleries. The dome An immense silver dome of steel and aluminum, a true architectural masterpiece, covers the various buildings. Despite its apparent lightness, the dome weighs approximately 7,500 tons (the same weight as the Eiffel Tower) and measures 180 meters in diameter. Inspired by the characteristic cupola of Arab architecture, the dome is a complex geometric structure of 7,850 stars of different sizes, with the pattern repeating across eight superimposed layers. These patterns allow the sun to filter through their perforations and layering. This is an ode to nature and the elements that echoes the palm trees of Abu Dhabi. Just like palm leaves in oases, the dome intercepts the dazzling sunlight, diffuses it, and scatters it to the ground, creating a "rain of light" that changes with the hours. This steel giant is inspired by traditional Arab mashrabiyas and offers visitors a visual and thermal climate. Despite its imposing size, it seems to float on water because it rests on four invisible support points. Natural air conditioning The main technical challenge for the Louvre Abu Dhabi is the climate, as strict light and temperature conditions must be maintained for the conservation of priceless works. Beyond its beauty, the dome creates an environmental microclimate thanks to passive design techniques inspired by traditional regional architecture. The roof perforations allow natural lighting without excessive heat or airflow, and the floor and wall materials help retain cool air at all hours of the day. The Museum also uses passive water and energy saving techniques, as well as advanced HVAC and lighting systems. Next article: The Louvre Abu Dhabi, a bridge between civilizations

Who did not welcome the removal of Nicolás Maduro, the dictator who forced eight million of his compatriots, or a quarter of Venezuela's population, into exile? But does this mean that the American administration was within its rights in carrying out this audacious raid in the vicinity of Caracas? According to the 1945 United Nations Charter, which enshrines national sovereignty and guarantees peace between nations, a country can only resort to armed force in two cases: self-defense and the adoption of a Security Council resolution authorizing it. A country can, however, intervene in the territory of another to respond to the urgent request of its legitimate government: Wasn't it that US Marines landed on our shores in 1958 at the request of President Camille Chamoun? Self-defense according to Article 51 Another perspective: Bruno Retailleau, a French senator, approved the January 3 camisade on the pretext that the Venezuelan president had become an accomplice to drug traffickers. In his eyes, the capture of Maduro and his wife by the United States was merely an act of self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It is difficult to subscribe to such a thesis: drug trafficking does not constitute, in the eyes of international jurisprudence, an act of “armed aggression” that would justify said self-defense. The Republican leader would have done better to invoke humanitarian intervention, as a Donald Trump, horrified by the repression raging in Iran, would not fail to do. Is there an obligation for states to intervene? Humanitarian intervention cheerfully transgresses the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of a third country, as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-95) and Kosovo (1999). Military operations were carried out there, not at the request of a legitimate government as in Lebanon in 1958, but AGAINST said government. Jean-Baptiste Vilmer defines this “war in the name of humanity” as: “The use of force by a state with the aim of stopping serious human rights violations against individuals who are not nationals of the intervening state and without the consent of local authorities.” Proponents of this doctrine justify it in the name of urgency. And the United States could proceed in this way in Iran; they could argue the denunciation made by the UN Human Rights Council on January 23 of the “unprecedented repression” exercised in the land of the ayatollahs. As of that date, more than 5,000 deaths and 25,000 arrests led High Commissioner Volker Türk to call on Tehran to reconsider its position and to end its “brutal repression, including summary trials and disproportionate sentences.” However, since then, the death toll has risen and we are talking about more than 30,000 dead! A 'humanitarian strike' in the name of freedom! Can the extent of fundamental rights violations justify humanitarian interference by the American war machine? In theory, intervention is only necessary in the face of massive and uninterrupted human rights violations. If this is not the case, should one refrain from acting until the horror has reached a certain ceiling, for example, 50,000 victims? It is understood that if a “humanitarian strike” were to assist Iranian demonstrators, it would be tainted by some breaches of the rule of law, breaches that punctilious jurists would not hesitate to decry. But what, it is about deliverance and we do not mince words! We do not grant the benefit of the doubt to those who trample on the law, no more than we grant freedom to the enemies of freedom!

The brutal repression unleashed by the mullahs and the Pasdaran to neutralize the courageous revolution of Iranian citizens bears the hallmarks inherent to every dictatorship. More than 30,000 dead, 40,000 imprisoned whose fate remains unknown, an incalculable number of missing persons—and the figures will only rise as the macabre truth gradually comes to light. Very quickly, terror replaced the long-awaited hope for change. Order seems to reign once again, but at what price—and above all, for how long? In the absence of a united opposition, the medieval and corrupt dictatorial regime has free rein to set fire to and spill the blood of anything that moves. Methodically, viciously, savagely, without the slightest scruple. The only lifeline to which the majority of Iranians cling remains a possible American intervention, though no one knows in advance what its consequences might be, either internally or regionally. Admittedly, the fire continues to smolder beneath the ashes, but the blaze will reignite only if the regime, battered by American blows, begins to falter. In the meantime, victims are counted daily, yet the world still does not move. No demonstrations in the streets of major capitals, no student uprisings on university campuses, few forceful interventions by politicians on international television channels—just reproaches, half-hearted condemnations, sterile mood swings. Yet not long ago, the entire world was vibrating for Gaza, also the victim of systematic carnage. Enough to scratch one’s chin and ask questions: double standards? Are there repressions that must be condemned loudly, and others that are acceptable and do not provoke universal rejection? But let us turn to Lebanon. By closely examining the Iranian revolution, let us ask whether the term “thawra” truly fits the events that shook our country in 2019. Is it really appropriate? Is it not somewhat exaggerated? Disproportionate? Even out of context? Certainly, the exasperation of a population worn down by an unbearable cost of living, the immeasurable waste of the state, the glaring absence of justice, creeping corruption, the undeniable lack of services at all levels, and pervasive insecurity fully justified the near-general refusal to be trampled day after day by a failed state. But upon closer examination of those October 2019 days, was it not simply an uprising, a spasm, a jolt that ultimately proved to have no consequences? True, clashes between protesters and security forces—and above all the frenzied, impetuous savagery of Berri’s praetorian guard—caused numerous injuries, some very serious. But unlike the Iranian bloodbath, blood did not flow in torrents. There were no deaths, no massive destruction, no disappearances or arbitrary convictions. In short, a spasm that turned every evening into a popular and musical fair, and that soon fizzled out. One is therefore entitled to ask why Lebanese dissent ran out of steam and went off the rails. To address this, a host of questions come to mind. Does the existence of our local Leviathans depend on our acquiescence in being dominated by them? Are we, for the most part, destined to remain the victims of a pyramidal mafia that cheerfully makes the rain and the sunshine? Do we suffer from Stockholm syndrome? One may advance every possible pretext to explain the failure of 2019 and thus soothe one’s conscience by invariably invoking nepotism, clientelism, confessionalism, the absence of the notion of citizenship, individualism, partisan and communal affiliation, the non-existence of a national narrative, illegal militia armament, the lack of a clear objective, the absence of unified leadership, etc. Yet, in my view, one essential ingredient was missing to overthrow the tyranny of a minority and achieve the change to which every civilized society aspires. The answer may well be provided by La Boétie in his Discourse on Voluntary Servitude , written between 1546 and 1548: “Be resolved to serve no more, and you are free.” A sentence of implacable clarity. According to the author, tyranny is only possible because the people consent to a servitude whose reason does not lie in a lack of courage, but in an absence of WILL. This severe indictment, still relevant in Lebanon, should give us pause. To defend our freedom, it suffices to stop serving this minority. By ceasing to obey it, it loses its power. As one cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs, the risks of violence cannot be ruled out. We paid little price for it six years ago, but a harsher and bloodier recurrence must be envisaged if popular will decides to take its destiny into its own hands. To the cynics who would sneer at such remarks, I would reply with an example. We have the opportunity to rally the majority of the people around a common cause, dear to all, that transcends religious and political affiliation. I refer here to the financial scandal that stripped the majority of savers, across all categories. In any other self-respecting country, the street would have delivered a radical verdict had the state not promptly resolved the matter—which is far from being our case. In parliament, a veritable Palace of Shame, we have been lulled with bombastic promises for six years. In government, humiliating and unjust proposals are put forward that disregard our self-respect and our intelligence. If there were a genuine popular and national will to change the situation, we could then speak of a revolution that, this time, should no longer be affected, threatened, or stifled by Hezbollah and other militias that have lost their aura and power to harm. Despite the dangers incurred, armed only with their will, Iranians who have nothing left to lose have courageously embarked on the revolutionary path, thus deserving our consideration and respect. True, they have been temporarily muzzled, but it is only a postponement. Every dictatorship, however ferocious it may be, is doomed in advance to end up in the dustbins of History. In Lebanon, we missed the boat in 2019, and we are still not out of the woods. But it is never too late to do the right thing.