Economy

For the past two years, investors have watched gold and silver climb relentlessly — at times with disbelief. Since December 2023, gold has more than doubled, rising from roughly $2,000 to around $4,300, while silver has surged from about $26 to $63, with momentum accelerating sharply in the second half of 2025. If current levels hold into year-end, both metals are on track to register their strongest annual performance since 1979 — the opening chapter of the last great precious-metals cycle. And the “shiny metals” have not been alone. Platinum and palladium have also rallied sharply, copper is up roughly 50%, and a broad range of strategic minerals is enjoying a banner year. As retail investors rush into the space — fearful of missing the move — and as capital floods into gold and silver tracker funds, two fundamental questions naturally arise: What is driving these spectacular advances? And is this cycle fundamentally different from the ones that came before? Every commodity analyst with a few cycles behind them will say they have seen this movie before. From the stagflationary shock of the 1970s to the China-led supercycle of the 2000s that peaked in 2011, commodity booms have historically followed a familiar script: demand accelerates, supply responds with a lag, prices overshoot, and the cycle eventually turns. Commodities, in this view, are ultimately captive to macroeconomic conditions and classical supply-demand dynamics. The 2024–2025 cycle does not fit that pattern. What distinguishes the current metals cycle is the simultaneous convergence of structural forces that have never before operated together at this scale. These forces are not cyclical. They are political, financial, and systemic — and they are reshaping the foundations of commodity markets. De-Dollarization and the Deterioration of U.S. Public Finances The first pillar of this new architecture is monetary and geopolitical. The United States’ pivot away from globalization toward protectionism has profoundly altered global perceptions of American economic leadership. A more transactional — and at times confrontational — approach to international relations has weakened long-standing alliances and encouraged nations to reassess their dependence on the U.S. as both a geopolitical anchor and a financial counterparty. At the same time, persistent fiscal deficits and a rapidly expanding public-debt burden have intensified concerns over the long-term credibility of U.S. public finances. For many central banks, the combination of geopolitical unpredictability and fiscal deterioration has raised uncomfortable questions about the durability of U.S. Treasuries and the dollar’s role as the unquestioned reserve asset. The response has been decisive: diversification away from the U.S. dollar and toward gold. According to the World Gold Council, central banks purchased over 1,000 tonnes of gold in 2023, followed by 1,044 tonnes in 2024, and are on track for 750–900 tonnes in 2025 — far above the pre-2022 average of 400–500 tonnes per year. This is not tactical buying. It is a structural reallocation of sovereign balance sheets. And it marks the first cornerstone of a commodity cycle driven not by growth alone, but by a loss of confidence in the financial architecture that underpinned our world in the last four decades. The Weaponization of Supply Chains For decades, globalization rested on the assumption that economic interdependence reduced conflict and improved efficiency. Supply chains were optimized for cost and scale — not resilience or sovereignty. That assumption no longer holds. In the aftermath of trade wars, sanctions, export bans, and the freezing of sovereign assets, nations have come to a sobering realization: control over physical resources is power. As a result, commodities — particularly metals critical to energy, technology, and defense — have moved from the realm of market economics into that of national security. China has been the most explicit in operationalizing this shift, using export controls on critical minerals and processing technologies to transform resource dominance into geopolitical leverage. These measures are not designed to maximize short-term revenue. They are designed to maximize strategic optionality. The consequence is profound: price is no longer the sole clearing mechanism. Even when supply exists, access is no longer guaranteed. What were once unified global markets are fragmenting into regional and political blocs. In such an environment, scarcity is not always visible in inventories — it manifests in who is allowed to buy, when, and on what terms. The arbitrage mechanisms that once equalized global markets are breaking down. The Physical Limits of Substitution In past cycles, rising prices triggered substitution, efficiency gains, and material thrifting that capped prices. In today’s critical metals, those margins are disappearing. In solar photovoltaics, silver loadings are already near physical limits, and newer high-efficiency technologies are actually increasing silver intensity per panel. In automotive catalysts, substitution between platinum and palladium has largely been exhausted and is constrained by chemistry and regulation. In batteries, material intensities are approaching theoretical minimums, leaving little room for further reduction without performance trade-offs. At the same time, mining supply has lost elasticity. Ore grades continue to decline, permitting timelines stretch toward decades, and environmental constraints limit rapid expansion. The result is a system in which demand can rise faster than supply can respond, regardless of price. This is not a temporary bottleneck. It is a structural ceiling. Taken together, these three forces — monetary realignment, geopolitical fragmentation, and physical constraint — form a new architecture for commodity markets. In a world where supply chains are weaponized, currencies are questioned, and substitution has reached its limits, commodities no longer behave like cyclical assets. They behave like strategic assets. It is a new rulebook. This supercycle — targeted, uneven, and political — is fundamentally different. Where Do We Go From Here? Gold: The Ultimate Investment Metal Gold occupies a unique position among commodities. Its demand is overwhelmingly financial, whether through central-bank reserve accumulation or portfolio investment. Unlike industrial metals, gold does not depend on economic growth to justify its role. It depends on confidence — or, more precisely, on the erosion of it. Investment demand for gold is theoretically unlimited, while supply is structurally constrained. For that reason, articulating precise price targets is largely futile — particularly in an environment of surging demand from Chinese retail investors, whose participation has added a powerful new layer to the global bid. History offers perspective. During the 2000–2011 bull market, gold rose from approximately $250 per ounce in March 2001 to a peak of $1,921 in September 2011 — a 768% appreciation. In the 1970s, gold climbed from around $100 per ounce in March 1976 to $873 in January 1980, representing an 873% gain in less than four years. In the current cycle, gold bottomed near $1,046 in December 2015 and has since advanced to roughly $4,300 — an appreciation of about 411% so far. Measured purely against historical precedents, the current move is significant — but not exceptional. The more important question is not whether gold has risen too far, but whether the structural forces driving demand are exhausted. On that front, the evidence suggests the opposite. Fiscal imbalances remain unresolved. Geopolitical fragmentation is intensifying rather than receding. And the credibility of fiat systems is being tested in ways not seen in decades. Although the financial markets are notably irrational, taken together, these forces argue that the current gold cycle is incomplete. Silver: The Leveraged Metal If gold is the investment anchor, silver is the accelerant. Silver combines monetary demand with industrial necessity, making it structurally more volatile — and historically more explosive — in late-cycle phases. Its supply is uniquely constrained, with roughly 70% of global production coming as a by-product of other metals. Higher prices do not translate into rapid increases in output. At the same time, silver sits at the heart of electrification, solar power, and advanced electronics — sectors that governments are actively promoting and subsidizing. As a result, the physical market has now been in deficit for four consecutive years. When financial and industrial demand rise together, silver does not adjust smoothly. It moves violently. History again provides perspective. In the 1970s cycle, silver rose from roughly $1.50 per ounce in 1971 to nearly $50 in January 1980 — an appreciation of more than 3,000%. During the 2001–2011 cycle, silver advanced from around $4 to just under $50, delivering gains in excess of 1,100%, far outpacing gold over the same period. In the current cycle, silver bottomed near $13.60 in early 2016 and has since climbed to approximately $63 — a move of roughly 460% to date. By historical standards, this phase appears early rather than late. Conclusion A Regime Change, Not an Economic Cycle The metals market of late 2025 is not cyclical. It is structural. For four decades, investors assumed open trade, elastic supply, functional arbitrage, and technological substitution. All four assumptions are now failing — simultaneously. Geography matters more than geology. Policy matters more than price. Physical availability matters more than paper contracts. This is not bullish or bearish. It is a regime change.

On December 7, 2025, Emmanuel Macron did something no European leader had openly done in three decades of carefully managed relations with Beijing: he spoke plainly. Hours after returning from his fourth official visit to China, the French president stated in an interview with Les Échos that Europe’s trade relationship with China had become “unsustainable.” China, he warned, was “killing its own customers.” European industry, he said, was facing a question of “life or death.” This was not the language of diplomacy. It was the language of strategic alarm. For thirty years, Europe had wrapped its relationship with China in carefully chosen euphemisms: strategic partnership, mutually beneficial trade, win-win cooperation. Macron’s words marked a rupture. They acknowledged what had long been visible in the data but absent from political discourse: Europe has become the adjustment variable in a global economic system increasingly shaped by Chinese overcapacity and American protectionism. The numbers explain the urgency. In 2024, the European Union recorded a €305 billion merchandise trade deficit with China, importing €519 billion of goods while exporting only €213 billion. The deficit now exceeds the GDP of several EU member states. More importantly, it is accelerating. From €197 billion in 2019, it is expected to approach €320 billion in 2025. This is not a cyclical imbalance; it is a structural shift. That acceleration intensified in 2025 as the United States sharply restricted Chinese access to its market through tariffs and sanctions. Chinese exports did not disappear; they were diverted. Europe absorbed the shock. Every container that could no longer land profitably in the United States sought entry through European ports. With its open market and fragmented political authority, Europe became the path of least resistance in the unfolding Sino-American confrontation. Trade flows tell only part of the story. Foreign direct investment reveals a deeper asymmetry. European firms hold more than €230 billion in investment stock in China. Chinese firms hold less than a third of that amount in Europe. Yet the nature of these investments differs fundamentally. European capital expands Chinese productive capacity and feeds its export machine. Chinese capital, by contrast, embeds itself directly into Europe’s strategic industries, acquiring technology, brands, and long-term market access. Nowhere is Europe’s vulnerability more visible than in electric-vehicle batteries. China controls roughly 80% of global battery cell production and dominates nearly every upstream chokepoint — from graphite refining to lithium and cobalt processing. This dominance is not accidental. It is the result of decades of state-directed industrial policy. Europe, by contrast, relied on market forces and fragmented initiatives. The bankruptcy of Northvolt, despite massive public support, exposed the scale of the competitiveness gap. Faced with mounting evidence of subsidized overcapacity, the European Commission imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in late 2024. Yet exemptions, regulatory loopholes, and rapid adaptation by Chinese manufacturers blunted their effectiveness. Production shifted. Assembly moved inside Europe. Market penetration continued. Europe addressed a political problem without resolving a strategic one. The deeper issue is internal. Europe’s exposure to China is unevenly distributed, producing paralysis. Germany’s industrial model remains deeply dependent on Chinese demand. Hungary has positioned itself as China’s manufacturing gateway into the EU. France, less exposed, has greater political latitude to advocate protection. These divergent interests make a unified European response exceedingly difficult. China understands this constraint. Division ensures inaction. What Macron’s intervention revealed is not merely a trade dispute, but a structural imbalance of power and political governance. Europe’s weak political construction — a union of 27 nations with limited centralized authority — finds itself caught between China’s highly centralized and disciplined industrial governance on its eastern flank and the United States’ increasingly unilateral, power-driven approach under Donald Trump on its western flank. China has spent decades building powerful industrial policies, investing trillions of yuan into sectors that were initially loss-making but ultimately yielded global dominance: automobiles, EV batteries, solar panels, rare-earth refining, electronic components, and low-end semiconductors. Europe, by contrast, relied on private corporations to deliver industrial capacity, while delegating strategic vision to EU institutions without meaningful implementation powers. The United States relied on entrepreneurship and deep capital markets to dominate profitable sectors such as oil and technology, leaving it dangerously exposed in traditional industries and critical sectors such as rare earths. Donald Trump is now using an expansive interpretation of presidential power — tariffs, sanctions, and forced reshoring — to correct imbalances that markets alone failed to address. Europe is now trapped between a rock and a hard place, with limited political tools to mount a coordinated response. It faces a narrowing set of choices. Confrontation carries retaliation risks. Inaction carries irreversible industrial decline. What is no longer viable is denial. Ultimately, Europe’s trade imbalance with China is merely the visible edge of a much larger iceberg. It exposes the central strategic weakness of the European Union’s construction — a weakness that allows two superpowers to shape a bipolar world on their own terms, while Europe’s economic weight fails to translate into commensurate political power. The question is no longer whether Europe understands the challenge. It is whether Europe can seize the urgency created by rising geopolitical tensions and accelerating deglobalization to strengthen its global governance — before its room for maneuver disappears.

In our two previous articles, we examined Syria’s various assets as well as the numerous challenges it faces. Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the country has entered a new era, bringing with it huge opportunities. The formation of a new government led by Ahmad al-Charaa, and Donald Trump’s announcement of the lifting of U.S. sanctions, has triggered Syria’s reconstruction. Since then, donations, investments, and capital have poured into the country. It is therefore worth looking at the sectors that would benefit most from these capital inflows and the impact they could have on Syria’s future economic development. The Energy Sector, a government priority With electricity production limited to just a few hours per day, it is imperative for the new government to rehabilitate its energy network. Accordingly, Syria signed a $7 billion agreement with UCC Holding, a Qatari energy consortium, to build new power plants based primarily on natural gas and solar energy. Together, these plants aim to produce nearly 5,000 megawatts, roughly half of Syria’s pre-war electricity consumption. In addition, during the Syrian-Saudi summit in July 2025, Saudi Arabia pledged $150 million for energy projects. American firms, such as Baker Hughes, Hunt Energy, and Argent LNG, plan also to modernize Syria’s oil and gas infrastructure in order to improve hydrocarbon extraction and refining, thereby strengthening the country’s energy independence and paving the way for potential hydrocarbon exports. Infrastructure, the backbone of trade flows Thanks to its geographical position, Syria is destined to become a major regional trade hub. It is therefore crucial to rehabilitate and modernize land, sea, and air transport infrastructure to ensure the smooth flow of goods and people. It is in this context that the country signed an agreement of $800 million with DP World, the Emirati logistics heavyweight, to expand the Port of Tartus. Latakia is also being developed, with the Syrian government signing a $262 million agreement with CMA CGM to modernize its port. As for Damascus International Airport, Qatar has committed to modernize it with a $4 billion investment. On another level, a $2 billion agreement was signed to develop a metro line linking the eastern and western districts of the Syrian capital. Real Estate: everything must be rebuilt At the Syrian-Saudi Forum of July 2025, nearly $3 billion were allocated to the real estate and construction sectors. Saudi Arabia, in partnership with Khashoggi Holding and Radiant Structures, announced the construction of a plant capable of producing more than 6,000 tons of cement per day which is the amount needed to build a 15-story residential tower. A $2 billion partnership with the Italian company UBAKO was likewise signed to build the “Damascus Towers,” a complex of several dozen residential high-rises, to rival the skyscrapers of New York and Dubai. In a country devastated by years of war, Syria faces a severe housing shortage that will only grow as refugees return. This surge in demand creates pressing urban planning challenges. The government must follow a rigorous development plan that integrates housing, infrastructure, public services, and thorough city planning to create livable urban spaces. Next article: Digital and Banking Modernization (4/4)

In our previous article, we explored Syria’s various economic assets. Thanks to its fertile land and strategic location, Damascus holds major—yet largely untapped—economic potential. Moreover, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, the rise of Ahmad al-Shareh to power, the lifting of U.S. and European sanctions, and the Syrian-Saudi summit held in July 2025 have launched a new dynamic of reconstruction and reintegration into the Arab sphere and international trade. But not everything is rosy in post-Assad Syria, and many challenges still lie ahead. Security The new leadership’s first and enduring challenge remains security. After more than 13 years of civil war, during which sectarian and ethnic factions fought relentlessly, the country is still plagued by sectarian-driven unrest, particularly along the coast and in Sweida. Added to this are recurring clashes along the Lebanese border with groups affiliated with Hezbollah, as well as Israeli airstrikes. The government is gradually consolidating its authority and working to restore order and security nationwide. The road is long, and sustained efforts are needed to ensure lasting stability—without which many investors may hesitate to engage. Everything Must Be Rebuilt The IMF estimates that nearly 50% of Syrian housing has been destroyed or requires major renovation. Nearly half of the population is now outside the country, and the return of displaced Syrians will only increase demand for housing. Much of the country’s infrastructure has been destroyed as well—factories, hospitals, water-pumping stations, power plants, wells, and oil refineries—all essential components for reconstruction. Gulf investments aim to fill this infrastructure gap and help the country recover. But several years will be needed before these new production capacities become operational. In the meantime, reconstruction is expected to generate nearly 200,000 jobs, according to the World Bank, and bring billions of dollars into the country, boosting the Syrian central bank’s foreign-currency reserves. Major Structural Economic Challenges After more than 13 years of civil war, Syria’s economy is in ruins. GDP fell from nearly $60 billion in 2010 to just over $20 billion in 2022. In 2018, the UN reclassified Syria from a developing country (like India, Mexico, or Indonesia) to a low-income country (such as Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, or Angola). According to UN data, nearly 90% of the population lives below the poverty line, on less than two dollars a day. The Syrian pound has lost almost 99% of its value—from 47 pounds per US dollar in 2010 to nearly 22,000 in late 2024. Since the fall of Assad, it has recovered slightly to around 11,000 pounds. But the central bank holds only $200 million in foreign-currency reserves, making it ill-equipped to handle another monetary shock. On the other hand, the central bank reportedly holds around 26 tons of gold—nearly $3 billion at a price of $3,700 per ounce. This gold could be used as collateral to unlock vital credit lines. Syria’s government owes around $23 billion to various creditors—nearly 115% of its GDP. Most of this debt is owed to Iran ($17 billion) and Russia ($1.2 billion). Servicing this debt absorbs nearly 30% of the state budget—funds that could otherwise support reconstruction or public services. The current leadership is considering refusing repayment of debts owed to Iran and Russia, deeming them “odious”—contracted without the consent or benefit of the population. But although these debts were incurred by the Assad regime to buy weapons and fuel used against its own people, international law does not provide a clear mechanism for managing odious state debts. A default on all or part of the debt would contradict the principle of “state succession,” whereby a new government inherits the rights and obligations of its predecessor. The Need for a Robust Institutional Framework Reforming public institutions, combating corruption, and improving governance and transparency are essential to restore the trust of citizens and investors. Without a reliable rule of law, all economic initiatives risk being undermined. Strengthening judicial, administrative, and economic institutions is a prerequisite for placing Syria on a path of sustainable growth. Moreover, reforms aimed at privatizing parts of the economy are necessary. Under Bashar al-Assad, the state controlled most production capacities and exercised direct control over the economy. It is therefore crucial to privatize key sectors and allow more companies to compete, stimulating innovation through competition. Social Reintegration and Managing Population Movements Millions of Syrians have been displaced internally or have taken refuge abroad. Their return represents a major social and economic challenge that must be accompanied by reintegration programs. Without such efforts, the country risks deepening social fractures, fueling communal tensions, and prolonging precarious living conditions—factors that could seriously hinder reconstruction and development. The challenges ahead are many and complex, but not insurmountable. Security, infrastructure reconstruction, economic stabilization, social reintegration, and institutional reforms must be addressed in a coordinated manner to establish a stable and attractive environment. By overcoming these obstacles, Syria could build lasting peace and finally harness its considerable economic potential for the benefit of the Syrian people and the entire region.

On December 8, 2024, the regime of Bashar al-Assad fell in Syria. After more than fifty years of bloody dictatorship and thirteen years of civil war that left more than 600,000 dead and displaced more than a quarter of the population, a new wind is blowing across Syria, bringing with it a wave of optimism. As in every country left in ruins after a civil war, in Syria, everything needs to be rebuilt. Thanks to its geographical location, its wealth of natural resources, and the support of the Gulf states, the new Syria of Ahmad el-Sharaa presents numerous opportunities. But at the same time, the country must face many challenges, particularly in terms of security and socio-political stability. The Richness of the Soil One of Syria's major assets lies in the richness of its soil. The country possesses significant hydrocarbon reserves. Syria's oil reserves are estimated at around 2.5 billion barrels, equivalent to the five-year consumption of a country like the United Kingdom. Furthermore, Syria is believed to hold approximately 700 billion cubic meters of natural gas in its territorial waters. This would place it third among gas-producing countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, behind Egypt (2,130 billion cubic meters) and Israel (1,090 billion cubic meters). These figures are not yet definitive, however. Further exploration and analysis are needed to confirm them. Syria also possesses significant mineral deposits, such as iron, limestone, and marble, but also, and perhaps most importantly, considerable phosphate reserves. Before the start of the civil war, the country ranked fifth in the world among exporters of this mineral. A strategic geographical location Another of the country's advantages is its geographical location. Indeed, the ports of Tartus and Latakia on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean possess the potential to establish themselves as regional hubs for global trade. Furthermore, Syria, situated at the crossroads of Asia, Africa, the Arab world, and Europe, could, through its rehabilitation and reintegration into international trade, complement major trade routes. Syria would thus position itself at the center of the trade circuit linking the Gulf States, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Europe. This route would pave the way for supplying Europe with hydrocarbons, thereby offering an alternative to Russian gas. It would also allow goods to transit by land, as road transport is a more economical option than air freight and faster than maritime freight. This new route would also allow Syria to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, a strait rife with geopolitical tensions between Iran and its neighbors, as well as the Gulf of Aden, south of Yemen, where transiting ships are regularly targeted by Houthi and Somali pirate attacks. In doing so, the country would become the missing link in a new trade route connecting India, Saudi Arabia, and Europe. In this context, a potential normalization of relations with Israel would establish a new trade route between Turkey, Syria, Israel, Egypt, and Africa, thus creating new economic and commercial opportunities for the countries involved. A diversified and resilient agriculture Although nearly two-thirds of Syria's land is arid, the country possesses numerous fertile regions suitable for agriculture. Among them are the regions of Aleppo and Barada (near Damascus), as well as the Syrian coast, particularly Tartus and Latakia, which benefit from a Mediterranean climate, ideal for growing olives, citrus fruits, and various vegetables. In the northeast of the country, the Syrian Jazira and the Euphrates Valley, both irrigated by the river of the same name, allow for significant cereal production (wheat and barley). The country also produces industrial crops, such as cotton and tobacco. Before the war, agriculture represented a significant share of Syria's GDP (approximately 15%), and agricultural exports were valued at over $400 million annually. Rehabilitating agricultural land and modernizing infrastructure would significantly increase agricultural yields and incomes. Furthermore, and most importantly, Syria's reintegration into the Arab world would open up new export markets. A Multipurpose Industry Beyond the richness of its soil, Syria does not simply extract natural resources. It also processes them. Industry represents a significant portion of the country's GDP. Hydrocarbon refineries and food processing plants employ a large part of the population. A significant portion of production is destined for export. Furthermore, Syrian industry is a significant player in the production of construction materials, such as cement, as well as textiles and mechanical parts. In a completely different sector, Syria was, before the war, a major center for pharmaceutical production, supplying 85% of the local population's needs for medicines. By modernizing its infrastructure and forging partnerships with major pharmaceutical companies, Syria could become a regional, or even global, player in pharmaceutical production. In conclusion, thanks to its rich soil and strategic geographic location, Syria possesses numerous advantages. With the improvement of the security situation, the return of skilled nationals and workers, the lifting of sanctions, and investments from numerous countries, particularly those in the Gulf, Syria could quickly become a leading regional economic player.