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Yemen's Houthi rebels, allies of Tehran, targeted Saudi Arabian oil facilities on Saturday in retaliation for strikes by Riyadh, marking a further escalation of hostilities on yet another front of the war engulfing the Middle East. While Saudi authorities have so far remained silent on the matter, the Greek air force — tasked with operating an air defense system in Saudi Arabia — announced it had intercepted two missiles and a drone launched from Yemen toward Yanbu. Having stepped up strikes against Gulf states in recent months in retaliation for American bombardments, Tehran now appears to be opening a new front through its Houthi allies against the Riyadh-led coalition. These new clashes in the strategically vital Red Sea region — while the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked at the other end of the Arabian Peninsula — are deepening concerns about the global transport of hydrocarbons. In response to this latest escalation, Donald Trump threatened the Houthis and Iran this week with "major military punishment." The American president said he was keeping diplomatic channels open and continuing dialogue with Iranian leaders, while also stating he could inflict a "far worse level" of strikes on the Islamic Republic. On Friday, several American media outlets reported discussions about a possible large-scale military operation. Bahrain and Kuwait: a rare Gulf counterstrike For several weeks, Iran has been focusing its retaliatory strikes on Bahrain and Kuwait — two countries that host American military bases. Both Gulf states, equipped with relatively modest air forces fielding American and European aircraft, are no longer willing to let Tehran strike them with impunity. According to Friday's Wall Street Journal, Bahrain and Kuwait secretly sent fighter jets to strike military sites in Iran, marking their first direct retaliation against the Islamic Republic. Carried out earlier this month, these operations reflect a growing awareness among Arab states of a conflict that threatens to draw them in ever deeper. The strikes reportedly targeted drone depots, missile stockpiles, and other military infrastructure. The United Arab Emirates, which had already taken part in several operations against Iran at the outset of the conflict, is said to have provided targeting intelligence and defensive air cover — a sign of increasingly close Arab military cooperation against Tehran, according to the same sources. Repression continues in Iran Despite the ceasefire reached in April, executions of protesters, members of banned groups, and alleged spies continue in Iran. Human rights organizations say this amounts to an attempt by the authorities to prevent the emergence of a new protest movement similar to the one seen last January. The recent resumption of hostilities is causing even greater concern among these organizations, which fear a further tightening of repression aimed at silencing any dissent. Iranian authorities accuse those executed of having taken part in deadly attacks against security forces or of targeting public buildings. However, NGOs denounce arbitrary and summary trials, as well as acts of torture. These cases are said to represent only the tip of the iceberg. According to Iran Human Rights (IHR), nearly 400 people have been executed since the beginning of the year, mainly in murder or drug trafficking cases. With 2,150 executions recorded last year, Iran once again ranked second in the world behind China, according to Amnesty International. Tensions spread to new fronts Avec 2150 exécutions recensées l'an dernier, l'Iran occupait une nouvelle fois la deuxième place mondiale derrière la Chine, selon Amnesty International. Les tensions gagnent de nouveaux fronts Crisis hotspots continue to shift across the Middle East, where fears persist that war between Washington and Tehran could resume at any moment. Both sides say they are ready for a new round of confrontations, while the prospects for a return to dialogue appear increasingly slim given the hardening of their respective positions. Israel, for its part, says it is ready to resume strikes against the Islamic Republic if Iran attacks its territory or if Washington gives the green light for a large-scale military operation. Against this backdrop, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Washington early next week takes on particular significance. The Israeli prime minister's office announced on Friday that Netanyahu would be received at the White House by Donald Trump on Tuesday, putting an end to weeks of speculation about a deterioration in relations between the two leaders. The meeting is expected to give them an opportunity to explore the various options that could bring an end to a grinding conflict, while preventing Tehran from rebuilding its military capabilities or regaining the diplomatic initiative from a position of strength. In another sign that hostilities could resume, the U.S. Embassy in Israel urged American citizens in the country to "closely monitor the evolving situation and prepare for possible disruptions to air travel." Deadly clashes in the West Bank In the West Bank, residents of the Palestinian village of Tell buried four men on Saturday who had been killed the previous day during clashes with Israeli settlers. The violence erupted on Friday after around twenty settlers from the nearby Havat Gilad outpost entered the village. According to the Israeli army, a Palestinian seized a settler's weapon before killing one of them. A gunfight then broke out, leaving four Palestinians and a second Israeli dead. Israel immediately launched a large-scale security operation, sealing off the area and closing roadblocks throughout the West Bank, a Palestinian territory occupied since 1967. Violence in the West Bank has escalated sharply since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. Settler attacks and Israeli army raids on Palestinian villages have become nearly daily occurrences. These acts are regularly documented in videos shared on social media, sometimes by the perpetrators themselves. Following what he described as a "deadly terrorist attack" that killed two Israelis, Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to act "firmly" and announced "the accelerated legalization of settlement outposts." These outposts, typically consisting of a few trailers or prefabricated structures built without official authorization, are intended to create facts on the ground. Two sites granted emergency World Heritage in Danger listing On a separate note, the fortresses of Jabal Amel in southern Lebanon and the archaeological site of Sebastia in the West Bank were granted emergency inscription on both the UNESCO World Heritage List and the List of World Heritage in Danger on Friday. The five Jabal Amel fortresses are located in a region of southern Lebanon that has been regularly bombed by Israel since the start of the conflict. The "constituent elements" of these fortifications, dating from the 12th century and built on hills overlooking the surrounding area, have sustained damage and remain exposed to threats linked to the ongoing armed conflict — threats "serious enough to warrant the use of an emergency procedure," UNESCO emphasized. Gradual return to Zawtar el-Gharbiyeh In Lebanon, a tentative sign of calm has finally emerged in the South. Residents of Zawtar el-Gharbiyeh have begun gradually returning to their village under the supervision of the Lebanese army, which has deployed there in accordance with the framework agreement reached on June 26 between Beirut and Israel. This return suggests that the implementation of the agreement is moving forward, despite the Israeli army continuing demolition operations in other parts of southern Lebanon. The gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces remains contingent, however, on the full deployment of the Lebanese army and the dismantling of Hezbollah's paramilitary infrastructure. In Syria, Guterres calls for international support On the diplomatic front, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, making his first visit to Syria, called on the international community on Saturday to support the country as it navigates a transitional phase following more than a decade of civil war and the establishment of new authorities. Standing alongside President Ahmad al-Sharaa, he also advocated for respect for Syrian sovereignty, in reference to Israeli incursions into the south of the country. This visit marks the first by a UN Secretary-General to Syria since Ban Ki-moon's trip in 2009. It comes more than a year and a half after the fall of President Bashar al-Assad in late 2024, who was overthrown by a coalition of rebel groups.

The confrontation now shaking the Middle East is no longer simply another chapter in the conflict between Iran and its adversaries, nor can it be reduced to a struggle between Tehran, the United States, and Israel. Recent developments point to a reality that extends far beyond the war itself. They raise a more fundamental question: what regional order will emerge from this confrontation, what place Iran will occupy within it, and what future awaits the network of armed groups through which Tehran has built a substantial share of its influence across the Arab world. For many years, Iran’s strategy rested on a relatively straightforward equation: safeguarding its own territory while extending its influence and deterrent capability beyond its borders through a network of allies and armed groups stretching from Iraq to Yemen, via Lebanon. This model provided Tehran with what it regarded as a “strategic depth,” enabling it to exert pressure on its adversaries from multiple theatres without necessarily turning Iranian territory itself into the primary battlefield. Yet the current war is exposing the limits of that equation and may well mark the beginning of its reversal against those who devised it. The issue is no longer confined to the actions of Iran’s allies. Iran’s neighbouring states have themselves become an integral part of the theatre of operations, while several Arab countries have come under direct attack from Iranian missiles and drones. On February 28, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain announced that they had intercepted Iranian missiles, while Jordan also intercepted missiles after they entered its airspace. In the weeks that followed, the attacks and their repercussions spread to other Gulf states. On March 11, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2817, condemning Iranian attacks against countries in the region and demanding that Tehran bring them to an end. Here lies the first paradox that deserves careful consideration: how can Iran demand respect for its own sovereignty while treating that of its neighbours as something that may be disregarded whenever its military calculations require it? There is no doubt that Iran itself has been subjected to significant military attacks and has justified its response on the grounds of self-defence. That reality cannot be ignored in any objective analysis of the conflict. Yet a state’s right to defend itself does not automatically grant it the right to turn other countries into geographical extensions of the battlefield, particularly when those countries are seeking to remain outside the conflict or to contain its escalation. From Exporting Influence to Exporting the Cost of War One of the defining features of Iran’s regional policy is that, over the past decades, it has not merely expanded its political influence. It has also tied part of its national security to the construction of military capabilities beyond its own borders. From Tehran’s perspective, the logic was straightforward: confront adversaries far from Iranian territory in order to gain greater strategic flexibility and stronger deterrence. Yet this strategy has another face: transferring the costs of Iran’s conflicts onto other states and other societies . That is what gives the current developments their broader significance. The Gulf states, for example, are no longer what they were twenty years ago. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain are now investing in economic models increasingly built on stability, foreign investment, aviation, tourism, technology, logistics, and deeper integration into global markets. For these countries, security is no longer confined to protecting national borders. It has become one of the foundations of their economic model and of their ability to pursue their long-term development projects. Consequently, when their airports, critical infrastructure, airspace, or maritime routes become part of a confrontation between Iran and a third party, the issue extends well beyond an isolated military incident. It directly challenges the very concept of sovereignty that is supposed to govern relations among the states of the region. More importantly still, this policy is not expressed solely through the Iranian state itself. This is where the second dimension of the problem begins: Iran’s armed proxies and allies. The Houthis: When an Armed Group Decides Relations Between Two States Recent developments in Yemen provide perhaps the clearest illustration of the dilemma now confronting the region. The Houthis have announced what they describe as a “naval blockade” of Saudi Arabia and have threatened vessels linked to Saudi ports, thereby taking the confrontation far beyond the confines of Yemen’s internal conflict. These threats have already prompted tankers carrying Saudi oil to alter their routes, demonstrating that their consequences extend well beyond political rhetoric to affect trade, energy markets, and international shipping. The question should not simply be: why are the Houthis acting this way? The more important question is another one altogether: who has granted an armed group operating in Yemen the authority to take decisions capable of shaping relations between that country and a neighbouring state as significant as Saudi Arabia, while simultaneously exposing Yemen itself to potentially severe military and economic consequences? This is not merely a Yemeni issue. It lies at the heart of the crisis created in several Arab countries by the model of armed groups operating alongside the state. The problem is no longer simply that Iran possesses armed allies across the region. Some of those allies are now capable of redefining their own country’s relations with its neighbours outside the framework of state institutions. That is a fundamental distinction. A political party is free to adopt whatever regional position it chooses, to support Iran or oppose it, and to express its views regarding the United States, Israel, or Saudi Arabia. That is the normal course of politics. But when a party or organisation possesses an independent military capability enabling it to transform its political position into a war that draws an entire state into the conflict, an altogether different reality emerges. From Yemen to Lebanon and Iraq What Yemen is revealing today is not without echoes of Lebanon’s own experience, even though the circumstances and contexts are different. Over recent years, the Lebanese have experienced what it means for the decision to go to war to slip beyond the authority of state institutions and become subject to calculations that lie outside their control, turning a country already burdened by a profound economic and political crisis into one of the theatres of a much wider regional confrontation. The debate, therefore, is not simply about the Lebanese position towards Israel, nor about the legitimacy of resisting occupation during particular periods of history. It raises a far more precise question: who today holds the authority to take Lebanon to war? The State, or an organisation operating within the State? Iraq faces a similar dilemma, although in a different form. Baghdad seeks to preserve its relations with Iran on the one hand, and with the Arab world, the United States, and the wider international community on the other, even as the actions of certain armed factions can leave the Iraqi state dealing with the consequences of decisions that its own government never made. The current confrontation has also shown that the calculations of some Iraqi armed factions do not necessarily coincide, in every instance, with those of Tehran. According to several reports, groups with which Iran has cultivated close ties over many years have expressed reservations about becoming involved in a large-scale war in which Iraq itself would be the first to bear the cost. That is a development worthy of close attention. For the question now beginning to emerge within these circles may no longer be: are we with Iran or against it? It may instead be this: Does Iran’s interest in this war necessarily coincide with the interests of Iraq, Lebanon, or Yemen? Armed Groups: From “Strategic Depth” to Strategic Burden This may well be where the greatest paradox of Iran’s strategy lies. For decades, Tehran invested in building a network of relationships with armed groups across the region, regarding that network as an essential component of its deterrent capability and national security. Yet what was long viewed as a source of strategic depth may, in today’s regional environment, become a strategic burden . Each time an armed group uses the territory of an Arab state to threaten another state, pressure increases not only on that group, but also on the country from which it operates. And as missiles, drones, and maritime routes increasingly become instruments employed by actors operating outside official state institutions, it becomes ever more difficult to regard the weapons held by such groups as merely an internal matter for the state in which they are based. Iran and its allies could be making a major strategic mistake if they assume that the Middle East emerging from the current war will continue to accept the same rules that prevailed before it. The Region Is Changing, and So Are the Rules of the Game A deeper transformation is now underway across the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are redefining their priorities. Other Arab countries are striving to rebuild their institutions after years of war and internal division. There is a growing recognition that economic stability, regional security, and national sovereignty are no longer separate issues, but closely intertwined interests. In such an environment, it is difficult to imagine a stable regional order that would indefinitely tolerate the existence of armed organisations capable of independently taking military decisions against other states. No state can demand that its neighbours respect its sovereignty if it does not itself hold a monopoly over the use of force and the decision to wage war within its own borders. Nor can an armed organisation claim to be part of the political system when it suits its interests, only to behave as an independent state whenever questions of war and peace arise. Such an arrangement may remain viable as long as the costs of confrontation are limited. But it becomes far more fragile when a single drone or missile is capable of striking critical infrastructure, paralysing an airport, threatening a maritime route, or dragging two states into a broader confrontation. That is why what is unfolding today may amount to far more than a simple rebalancing of power between Iran and its adversaries. It may ultimately redefine what will henceforth be regarded as acceptable or unacceptable within the regional security system itself . Iran’s Greatest Miscalculation Tehran’s greatest strategic miscalculation today may be the belief that broadening the scope of confrontation will invariably strengthen its deterrent capability. That may be true from a purely military perspective, at least for a time. But a strategy is not measured solely by the number of fronts an actor is capable of opening. It must also be judged by the political and security order those fronts will leave behind once the war has ended. If Iran’s actions and the threats issued by the forces aligned with it lead Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, and other countries to deepen their defence cooperation, increase international pressure on armed groups operating outside state authority, and reinforce domestic demands in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen for the monopoly of legitimate state institutions over decisions of war and peace, then Iran may ultimately discover that the very war through which it sought to demonstrate the reach of its influence has instead contributed to undermining the environment that made that influence possible. This possibility should not be underestimated. For Iran’s regional power has never rested solely on its missiles, its nuclear programme, or its conventional military capabilities. A crucial part of that power has depended on Tehran’s ability to operate within the grey zones of the Arab state: a state that exists without possessing a monopoly over force; a government that governs without exercising exclusive authority over military decision-making; internationally recognised borders that nevertheless fail to prevent the movement of weapons and the expansion of conflict. Should those grey zones begin to disappear, one of the principal foundations of Iran’s regional influence would face a profound challenge. Iran’s Wars and Those of Its Proxies: Who Will Pay the Price? The outcome of the current confrontation remains open to multiple scenarios. It is still impossible to determine with certainty what form the regional order that emerges from it will ultimately take. One reality, however, is already becoming unmistakably clear: a region subjected to such a degree of threat and instability will not simply return to the situation that existed before the war. States will reassess their alliances, their defence arrangements, their borders, and their relations with Iran. They will also rethink how they view armed groups capable of threatening them from the territory of other states. Iran’s allies themselves may then be compelled to confront a question even more important than that of victory or defeat in the present conflict: What will remain of them, and of their states, once the war is over? The Houthis may threaten Saudi Arabia, but Yemen will be the first to bear the consequences of another war. Iraqi armed factions may choose to engage in a wider regional confrontation, but it is Iraq that will bear its economic, security, and political costs. In Lebanon, an armed organisation may regard itself as part of a broader regional equation. Yet when the fighting ends, it will be the Lebanese people who are left to rebuild their economy, their state, and their institutions. As for Iran, it may broaden the theatres of confrontation and demonstrate its ability to strike its adversaries beyond its borders. But in doing so, it also risks transforming the fear generated by its influence into the very foundation of a new regional order designed precisely to contain it. Herein lies the central paradox. What Iran spent decades constructing as a source of strategic depth could, through the excessive use of that very instrument, become the principal reason why the region seeks to establish a new security architecture aimed at preventing any state or armed group from acquiring the power to determine the destiny of other states. The real question, therefore, is no longer whether Iran and its proxies are capable of opening new fronts. They have already demonstrated that they are. The more difficult question is whether they fully appreciate that each new front may accelerate the emergence of a Middle East no longer willing to accept the rules that allowed those proxies to emerge and endure. Iran’s wars may originate in Tehran’s strategic calculations. Yet it is often the states and peoples transformed into battlefields that will pay the highest price. And in the Middle East now taking shape, the state’s monopoly over the decision of war and peace may no longer be merely a matter of domestic sovereignty, but one of the fundamental conditions of any viable regional order.

Hold on tight! By bombing Iran for the umpteenth consecutive night, the United States would allegedly have been doing nothing more than trying to communicate with Tehran. Each strike on a military or civilian target — every radar destroyed, every launch pad taken out, every oil refinery hit — would count only as a message to the adversary. It would merely be a signal to resume or continue talks under certain conditions! Or so Thomas Schelling, winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics, would have argued. In his view, it is precisely when cannons roar and fire rains from the sky that belligerents exchange messages and communicate with one another — war being nothing more than a form of negotiation carried out by other means. The American swerve In his work The Strategy of Conflict , the American essayist draws a distinction between the strategy of deterrence (deterrence) and that of compellence (compellence) and pushes it to its furthest limits. Accordingly, the situation remained in the realm of deterrence as long as US aircraft carriers were parading through warm-water seas but refraining from pulling the trigger. Then came an escalation, followed by a ceasefire. Pakistani mediation would go on to define the contours of the now-famous MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) on June 17th. By general consensus, the skill and resilience of Iranian diplomacy had muddied the waters, forcing Trump to scale back his expectations: he would no longer demand regime change for the mullahs, but settle instead for free passage through the Strait of Hormuz. In the eyes of the world, the Americans had shown a lack of credibility and resolve in moving from deterrence to compellence, and then to negotiation. Yet Trump had not said his last word. Incensed by the maneuvering of the Persian negotiators and by their skewed reading of Article 5 of the MOU in question, he seized on the pretext of a minor provocation to put war back on the table. And so the Persian Gulf was once again subjected to relentless American firepower (1). The Vietnamese precedent Much has been made of the American president's erratic behavior, his shifting strategy, and the disjointed way he conducted operations — as though his objectives were never clearly defined! But was that not jumping too quickly to conclusions in order to pile on an unconventional president? Certainly, and unless cornered, the occupant of the White House has no appetite for armed force; he is no warmonger like Netanyahu, nor a hardliner like the Pasdaran. That said, he adapts to circumstances and can, like other political actors, turn a confrontation to his advantage — war being, by its very nature, a shape-shifting phenomenon. And if he sometimes appears to be pulling back, it is only to come back on the offensive when least expected. Besides, American history has given us at least one example of negotiations conducted under intense military pressure. Under Lyndon B. Johnson, the United States had become mired in the former French Indochina. In keeping with the theory of "containment" of the communist threat, American military involvement escalated from counterinsurgency to a war of attrition. Elected president, Richard Nixon had one overriding concern: bringing the boys home without losing too much face. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took charge of winding down that bloody legacy. In Paris, negotiations began between the parties involved, including the Americans and the North Vietnamese. But since the latter showed no sign of yielding to his arguments, "dear Henry" combined, with consummate skill, intensive negotiations with a fierce military escalation, "following the principle of coercive diplomacy (coercive diplomacy) and the madman theory (madman theory) already outlined by Richard Nixon" (2). The Paris Peace Accords were subsequently signed in January 1973. Hormuz and the Jabal Amel An identical pattern is now playing out around Hormuz, now that Trump has realized that deterrence alone is not enough to resolve the issue and that he cannot afford a war of attrition — the Iranian adversary having proven far tougher than he anticipated. Seasoned observers can take some comfort; from here on, it will be the logic of "compellence" that sets the tempo. The brute force the Americans have deployed over more than twelve consecutive nights is not aimed at destroying the Iranian armed forces, but at compelling Tehran to change its behavior. It is by making "the political, military, and economic cost of war sufficiently high" that the United States will pressure the land of the mullahs into showing reason at the negotiating table — negotiations that have not truly been suspended, despite all the declarations and bluster. In short, the airstrikes would serve as a diplomatic lever. The moral of the story In light of this framework, let us consider what lies ahead in southern Lebanon: Israel will continue its war of coercion for as long as Hezbollah has not capitulated. The scorched-earth policy and systematic destruction — a diplomatic lever like no other — will continue to unfold before our eyes. Faced with the inevitable, Arafat did withdraw from Beirut, arms and all — that was in 1982. At the request of Sunni notables, he chose not to turn our capital into another Stalingrad. Credit where credit is due! That said, can we hope for the same level of understanding from Tehran? That defiant capital, that laboratory of Khomeinist subversion, has other plans in mind: it intends to fight to the last Shiite. Lebanese, this is how the world works! And history will record that the Iranian showed none of the same empathy as the Palestinian! 1- As evidence of the relevance of the exchange theory, consider that US aircraft have been striking Iranian installations since July 7th, while Tehran has only retaliated by hitting Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Jordan, on the pretext that these countries host US bases. It is indeed striking to see exclusively American targets — such as aircraft carriers — spared so far. 2- The madman theory refers to a foreign policy approach conceived by President Richard Nixon. It was designed to suggest to adversaries that they were dealing with a leader whose behavior was unpredictable and who possessed an enormous capacity for destruction.

The war in Ukraine continues to be at the center of a wide-ranging debate, fueled in part by near-daily bombardments targeting key nerve centers on both sides, and more specifically the Russian and Ukrainian capitals. In order to better understand the various dimensions of this long-standing conflict, it is necessary to revisit the background and origins of what led to this (fratricidal?) war—by examining the motivations and aspirations of the different parties involved, including the West (the United States and Europe, extended to all NATO member states with the exception of Turkey), and by also recalling the early stages of the Russian offensive and the failed attempts to reach peace, or at least to open negotiations, bearing in mind that responsibility in this context is shared by many. To fully grasp the ins and outs of the various aspects of the war in Ukraine, some fundamental questions should be raised from the outset. What do Russia and Ukraine represent for the West? What could be the concrete implications of a clear-cut victory by either of the two protagonists? And by the same token, what would the consequences be for the West and the Middle East? In a series of five articles, Jean-Patrick Dayras , a rear admiral in the French Navy, sets out his vision and analysis of the issue. Ukraine could have been a state associated with Europe without being a member, or a candidate for membership, let alone belonging to NATO. In this regard, blame can be directed at the United States and Europe, not forgetting Great Britain. At the Ukrainian level, regrettable mistakes were made toward the Russian-speaking population and in the eastern regions. A firm stance that demonstrated a constructive approach toward Russia, along with a desire to maintain close ties with a country where many Ukrainians live, could have smoothed things over and led to a partnership with both Europe and Russia. This is not certain, but it should have been attempted. Europeans, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine all bear a share of the responsibility—and all have lost. Why could such an agreement not have succeeded? For the West, its posture has strengthened the BRICS+ and all the countries turning toward that association of states rather than toward the democracies seeking to forcibly impose their way of governing—and of governing the world. Over time, three points deserve to be highlighted on the list of faults (not mistakes, but faults—implying culpability): The Minsk 1 and 2 agreements, which were never implemented Angela Merkel and François Hollande bear a significant share of responsibility in this regard. Following the Russian invasion, both Angela Merkel and François Hollande stated in interviews that the Minsk agreements were never, in their view, intended to be implemented, but rather served to buy Ukraine time to strengthen its military. . These statements sparked considerable controversy. For Russia, they were presented as proof that the agreements had never been negotiated in good faith. Merkel and Hollande responded that their goal had been to prevent a broader war in 2014–2015, and that the strengthening of Ukrainian capabilities had become a consequence of the absence of a lasting settlement, not the sole purpose of the agreements. It is difficult to attribute the failure to implement Minsk solely to Hollande or Merkel. Their responsibility is generally analyzed as that of mediators who failed to ensure the agreements were upheld, rather than as primary decision-makers. The responsibilities most frequently highlighted concern the parties directly involved in the conflict—Ukraine, Russia, and the separatist authorities—who held incompatible interpretations of the order in which commitments were to be implemented. Historians and specialists do not all agree on the interpretation of these statements. However, they generally agree that the Minsk agreements were extremely difficult to get off the ground , because the two sides disagreed on the sequence of their implementation: Ukraine wanted security and border control first, while Russia insisted on political reforms and the status of Donbass first. Boris Johnson's conduct was not honorable Reassuring Ukrainians by guaranteeing them full support along with the supply of weapons and ammunition ensuring a swift victory is a culpable act — even a deadly one. Negotiation is far preferable to war, less costly in human lives, shattered lives, destruction, financial cost, and the fierce hatred that lingers between two closely connected peoples. This was foreseeable, as these consequences had already been clearly visible in the Balkans. Russia's strategic blunders . Russia clearly made what is known in geostrategic or war colleges as assumptions about the enemy — erroneous assumptions, in this case. The entry into Ukraine, without a declaration of war, rallied the entire Ukrainian people, whose response stands as an example to be admired. Putin presumably believed the government would be overthrown or collapse on its own, allowing him to turn Ukraine into another Belarus subservient to Moscow. Putin misread the nature of this war. It did not follow any sound military strategy. It was a political strategy — and a poor one — built on false assumptions: that a supposedly weak government, led by a man of communication with no great stature, would fall. Subsequent events proved that Zelensky was indeed firmly in American hands. On a tactical level, it was no more impressive. The massive deployment of tanks required fuel and ammunition resupply. Clearly, those needs were not met. This is the classic case of 'logistics will follow.' No — logistics must at least keep pace, and ideally lead the way. The United States understood this well and demonstrated it, notably during the liberation of Kuwait. The drone threat was underestimated, if not outright ignored. The Russians were fighting against a country that, though invaded, was highly industrialized, with skilled and resourceful people — as they proved. This was no longer the Great Patriotic War that had been widely publicized for decades and instilled in young Russians from the earliest age. It was a different kind of war, with nothing patriotic about it. For the Ukrainians, however, it was exactly that — a patriotic war: their country was invaded, their land occupied, their homes and cities destroyed, their women raped, wounded, or killed, as were their children. They were fighting on their own soil, for their homeland, their country, and their loved ones. The government did not fall; it is still in place, even if it is not best positioned to enter into peace negotiations. It may be time to consider bringing in a new leader and a new team for Ukraine, with a different vision for their future, while remaining firmly determined to negotiate hard against Putin. Preconditions for entering negotiations are very often guaranteed roadblocks leading to failure. This is indeed the case here. Other responsibilities contributing to the prolongation of the war : The highly (overly) active political maneuvering of the Baltic states and Poland in particular — even though the latter has recently been revising its position — directed at European countries and the European Commission under the "orders" of a woman who does not live up to expectations in her role: Mrs. Von der Leyen. The funding of Ukraine by the United States and Europe — some of which may be diverted from its intended purpose — and increasingly by Europe alone as the US steps back from resolving this conflict, is fueling the continuation of the war and Ukrainian resistance, and therefore Ukrainian demands. Mr. Zelensky tugs at European heads of state and government by the sleeve, sometimes in a threatening tone, to secure ever more costly handouts for Europe and for France. What is not being addressed: Politicians, in Europe as elsewhere, do not particularly appreciate having their weaknesses or their abuses of power and influence over their constituents' conscience called out. From Maidan onward, one was expected to support Ukraine — those poor Ukrainians suffering under the Russian yoke, especially the young. What a convenient sales pitch: to claim that young people are oppressed by a regime, as if being young automatically conferred intelligence and a clear understanding of the world. In France, we might recall the sorry and disheartening episode of May 1968, so heavy with consequences that persist to this day: the beginning of the erosion of the state, of authority — especially paternal authority — then of the family; of the school system, inevitably, and of the work ethic. Unfortunately, Western politicians, particularly in Western Europe, appeal to emotion and sentimentality. Everything that happens must be interpreted, seen, and judged through the lens of feelings. In 2014, even more so in 2022, and today more than ever, the mantra must be: 'I love Ukraine; I love Ukrainians. Russians are savages, rapists, killers.' As if all wars and all armies did not share similar traits, to varying degrees, of course. Are the French supposed to love Zelensky? They do, apparently. Politicians, television studio strategists, and mainstream media say so and repeat it endlessly. What exactly is so lovable about Mr. Zelensky? More so than Putin? No — one should love neither Mr. Putin (obviously) nor the Russians (but why are they to be shunned?). They are all corrupt. Need we be reminded that in 2014, Ukraine was considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world, and that this problem is far from having been eradicated? So we are supposed to love those whom the West enables to survive, yet who divert a portion of the aid. Others have emigrated to Europe and are waiting for hostilities to end before returning to Ukraine once peace is secured. The West conducts geopolitics through emotion — at least through the emotions of its population. But that is not a sound mode of reasoning, reflection, or analysis. That is not how relations between nations should be shaped. Countries have no friends, only interests. It is by that measure that our leaders must determine their positions and their relationships with their counterparts. The West conducts geopolitics through emotion. Putin certainly does not — nor, for that matter, does Zelensky. The latter has frequently behaved in an authoritarian and demanding manner toward Europe and its member states, who are expected to meet his every demand. Next article The impact of a Ukrainian or Russian victory (4/5) Also worth reading on the same topic How the West chose Ukraine (1/5) War in Ukraine: the failure of the first peace efforts (2/5)

The scene was impeccably choreographed in the Oval Office on Tuesday, July 21, 2026. On one side, Donald Trump, promising military aid and offering a spectacular economic opening by lifting a forty-year-old aviation embargo. On the other, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, brandishing an official document presented as the definitive roadmap for disarming Hezbollah. To Western observers, the trade-off looked perfect: an extension of Lebanese state sovereignty in exchange for American sponsorship to permanently drive Iranian influence out of the Levant. Yet behind the obligatory smiles, handshakes, embraces, and witty remarks, this summit — however promising — risks becoming yet another diplomatic illusion. The enthusiasm on display in Washington deliberately glosses over three structural blind spots that temper this optimism: the limits of American pressure on Israel; the Lebanese state's lack of credibility when it comes to touching the pro-Iranian militia's weapons; and the Iranian factor itself. The equation put forward by Joseph Aoun rests on a principle of strict conditionality — namely, that Hezbollah's disarmament is contingent on a full and permanent withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. This is a classic stance, one Aoun has announced on several occasions already, and making it at the White House helped calm the political storm in Beirut that preceded the summit — but Washington has limited leverage when it comes to Israeli security as seen through Israel's own lens. Donald Trump stated that Israel is "in the process of withdrawing," reflecting a flexible attitude toward both Tel Aviv and Beirut, yet no binding timeline was announced. The Israeli military answers only to its own national security doctrine, which demands the immediate right to monitor and intervene militarily in response to any perceived threat. This requirement for shared or violated sovereignty is fundamentally incompatible with the plan championed by the Lebanese presidency. The warning shots fired by Israeli forces at our army in Zawtar al-Gharbiya, just hours before the summit, served as a reminder that on the Blue Line, it is the Israeli military that sets the tempo — not State Department communiqués. Donald Trump, whose support for Israel remains the cornerstone of his Middle East policy, will never risk a frontal break with his ally. Without an absolute guarantee that Hezbollah's weapons will be eliminated, American pressure will remain superficial and the Israeli withdrawal will stall. On this same point, serious doubts hang over the credibility of the Lebanese executive. The international community places little faith in a disarmament plan that is essentially a repeat of the one drawn up in August 2025, when Israel withdrew from Lebanese territory except for five points adjacent to the border. Moreover, given the past twenty years, the universal political memory demands skepticism. From the hollow promises of the 2006 national dialogue to the Doha Accords of 2008, through the Baabda Declaration of 2012, and spanning the Israeli withdrawals of 2006 and 2025 under Resolution 1701 — every text ostensibly designed to place weapons under exclusive state control has ended up in the dustbin of history. The plan Aoun presented to Trump seems unlikely to escape that fate: it appears to have been drafted without the consent of the Shia armed factions — Hezbollah and Amal — which hold a significant share of political decision-making power in Beirut. Furthermore, President Aoun implied at the White House that Berri supports an end to the war — a statement that only deepens the diplomatic ambiguity. That said, this summit was more than necessary, not least because it keeps a process alive — the only one currently capable of maintaining a minimum of calm in the South. The Lebanese army, which Washington sees as a potential replacement force, is a respected institution — but it will not engage in a direct confrontation to seize Hezbollah's missiles north of the Litani River. This is clearly the intention of President Joseph Aoun, since his team's calculations suggest that such a move risks spiraling into socio-political instability — even though residents of the south are generally eager to see troops deployed in their villages, and even though Hezbollah is showing clear signs of weakening. As such, this Hezbollah disarmament plan leaked in Washington looks more like a communications strategy than a solid plan — or one that actually contributes to maintaining stability. Hezbollah, for its part, retains a capacity for disruption that it will not hesitate to exploit, despite its weakened state. The pro-Iranian militia, together with its ally Nabih Berri, can paralyze the state from within or engineer calculated armed incidents in the so-called "pilot zones" of the South — or beyond them — to provoke an Israeli response, thereby demonstrating to the world the impotence of the Lebanese army. Beyond the optimism generated by this summit — centered on Washington's support for the army and pressure to restore stability — and despite the significant obstacles facing Joseph Aoun's plan, the real surprise lies in the reopening of direct air routes with the United States. While the move offers an undeniable economic and psychological boost to the diaspora and the tourism sector, it should also be read as a political signal that Beirut's airport is now firmly under Lebanese army oversight — which is an extremely positive development. As for the rest, in the medium term, Lebanon's horizon through the end of 2026 is far from one of peaceful normalization or an orderly disarmament process. It is, rather, one of an armed status quo under international surveillance, with cautious hope that the pilot zones will serve as a springboard for broader measures. Lebanon will thus continue to navigate by sight, in a geopolitical environment undergoing profound change.

The escalation continues and intensifies on the Iranian front, particularly as the U.S. military has been bombing Revolutionary Guard positions and infrastructure across several regions of Iran for twelve consecutive days. The entry of Yemen's Houthis into the conflict is also being confirmed. Early Thursday, the pro-Iranian Houthi militia announced it had struck two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea, as part of what it claims is a maritime blockade it is imposing on Saudi Arabia. The activation of the Yemeni front did not go unanswered on the American side. President Donald Trump issued a stern warning to the Iranian regime and the Houthis. Condemning the attack on the two Saudi tankers, the U.S. president made it clear that if such aggression is repeated, he will hold the Islamic Republic responsible, "since it is the one pulling the Houthis' strings." Trump stressed that if such an attack happens again, he will inflict "severe punishment on Iran, as well as on the Houthis." For his part, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Thursday that the Houthis made the wrong choice by letting themselves be drawn into the ongoing conflict. With a hint of irony, he said they had been "played" when they decided to enter the war on Iran's side. The top U.S. diplomat added that the Iranian regime will continue to pay a heavy price — "which will be higher every night" — until it "comes to its senses." It is worth noting in this context that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, when asked in an interview about Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, stated that he had not met with him recently, indicating that very few people have access to him. Other troubling signs of escalation: the United Kingdom and France have closed their embassies in Tehran. Iranians have accused the British of allowing American B-1 bombers to take off from their bases to strike Iran. Meanwhile, U.S. lawmakers approved, by a narrow majority, a $95 billion plan to fund the war against Iran, though the bill still needs to go before the Senate for a vote. This vote comes as the price of oil has once again crossed the $100-per-barrel mark. Finally, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi visited Tehran on Thursday, where he was received by Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian. According to the Iranian news agency IRNA, "several bilateral agreements were signed." The young Iraqi politician, who had been received with great fanfare just days ago in Washington by Donald Trump and signed several agreements with the United States, appears to be seeking to maintain good relations with his neighbor, which remains powerful despite being weakened. The nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia The most significant development of Thursday was undoubtedly an announcement by U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright regarding a future agreement on civilian nuclear development in Saudi Arabia. According to AFP, the minister raised the possibility of exporting American technologies and creating jobs toward the construction of nuclear power plants to replace oil and gas facilities. It should be noted in this context that President Trump emphasized Thursday that the nuclear deal taking shape with Saudi Arabia "is tied to the recognition of Israel and the ratification of the Abraham Accords" — which several Gulf states, notably the United Arab Emirates, have already signed with Israel. Until now, Riyadh had refused to consider recognizing the Jewish state without the creation of a Palestinian state. While the Saudi response has been slow to come, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was quick to react following Trump's announcement. Netanyahu's office described a potential Saudi signing of the Abraham Accords as a "historic milestone." On the ground, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are escalating. Far-right minister Itamar Ben-Gvir made a highly controversial visit to the Temple Mount, greeting Jewish worshippers there. The visit drew widespread condemnation, particularly from Jordan, which has custodianship over this major Islamic holy site. Under the existing arrangement, Jews are permitted to visit the compound but not to pray there. Meanwhile, clashes between settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank continue: on Thursday, two Palestinians were stabbed to death during an altercation with a settler, who was also injured. In Lebanon, Hezbollah seethes In Lebanon, commentary is mounting over the outcome of President Joseph Aoun's visit to Washington and his meeting with President Trump on Tuesday. While much of the political class hailed the Washington visit as a success, Hezbollah launched a full-scale effort to discredit both the president and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. In a statement, the Hezbollah parliamentary bloc claimed that the presidential visit "failed to secure the fulfillment of even a single national sovereignty demand and yielded no American commitment regarding an Israeli withdrawal." The pro-Iranian group's statement argues that Lebanon's leaders are steering the country "toward a new form of foreign tutelage." It is worth noting that Parliament Speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berry — Hezbollah's main ally — called on the president upon his return to Baabda, even as relations between the two men had been rather cool in recent weeks.