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Having examined the emergence of the Maronite Church in the aftermath of the Council of Chalcedon, we must now turn to the role of language in the formation of the nation. It is particularly noteworthy how fully the Maronite ecclesiastical hierarchy grasped the importance of this issue and how deliberately it sought to act upon it. For the Maronite patriarchs, beginning with St. John Maron, language was the expression of their culture, spirituality, faith, and identity. This conviction found particularly clear expression in the seventeenth century through Patriarch Estephanos Douaihy. He referred to Syriac as la nostra lingua syriaca (“our Syriac language”) and attributed to it an almost mystical quality, comparable to the mysteries of the Christianity. By this, he meant that no translation could ever replace the Syriac original or fully convey its meaning. Words, after all, possess a memory of their own, and every culture establishes a unique relationship between the signifier and the signified. By the eighteenth century, as Syriac came under growing threat, the Maronite Synod convened at Louaizeh in 1736 found itself compelled to prohibit the translation of liturgical books into Arabic. Less than a decade later, in 1744, Maronite Patriarch Chémoun Awad convened another synod, which ruled that translating Maronite books into Arabic without the explicit authorization of the ecclesiastical authorities was strictly forbidden (1) . Even then, permission was granted only under two conditions: the Arabic text had to be printed in Syriac script – commonly known as Garshuni – and the Syriac original had to appear alongside the translation (2) . Patriarch Chémoun Awad reaffirmed these provisions at another synod held in 1755. The following year, the newly elected Patriarch Tobia Khazen incorporated them in their entirety into the synod he convened in 1756. More specifically, Article 10 of the 2005 Maronite Synod called for the preservation and revival of the Syriac language and culture in all Maronite schools and universities. The patriarch who devoted himself most resolutely to safeguarding the Syriac language was Antonios Pierre Arida. Confronted with the challenges facing the newly established State of Greater Lebanon, which had adopted Arabic as its national language, he insisted that Syriac remain part of the curriculum in all Christian schools. His letter of June 25, 1946, drafted by Father Raphaël Bar Armalet, clearly articulated his vision of modern Lebanon. The Worldview Language is a foundational element in the formation of a collective identity, as Johann Fichte argued. But above all, it carries a spiritual vision. As early as the eighteenth century, the philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder maintained that the spirit of a people finds expression through its language (3) . A culture can fully express itself only in its own language, whose vocabulary has been shaped by its historical experience and molded by its beliefs. The very word “culture” is etymologically derived from cult, around which a civilization’s modes of expression are organized: language, literature, writing, music, art, and architecture. “The nature of a civilization is what coalesces around a religion,” André Malraux wrote (4) . Language, therefore, is by no means merely a means of communication. It is the matrix through which the sociocultural paradigms from which it arose are transmitted. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity holds that the structure of a language shapes its speakers’ cognition and their relationship to the world (5) . Ludwig Wittgenstein expressed the same idea when he wrote, “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.” (6) Language thus shapes, in a reciprocal relationship, both one’s worldview and the way it is expressed. This sociolinguistic complementarity exists between the idea and its expression, between the signified and the signifier. From this perspective, Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote in 1820 that “the diversity of languages is not a diversity of sounds and signs, but a diversity of worldviews.” He further argued that every language embodies a distinct Weltansicht (worldview) (7) . Replacing a community’s language therefore means transforming the way it understands the world, perceives itself, and relates to the transcendent. Uprooting Through Linguicide “Language is the house of Being,” Martin Heidegger wrote (8) . When faith leaves its “house,” it becomes alien to itself. Language plays a central role in the transmission of cultural heritage. A faith rooted in a particular language preserves a symbolic richness, historical depth, and a fertile polysemy that opens up possibilities for interpretation, fruitful ambiguity, and hermeneutic depth. The language of one’s ancestors, especially when it is also a liturgical language, far exceeds the mere function of communication: it becomes an embodiment of faith and a mystery in itself. It is precisely this dimension that disappears through linguicide: mystery fades away as symbols and metaphors are forgotten. As Paul Ricoeur has shown, the symbol creates a space for interpretation (9) . Its disappearance results in the closure of meaning. The elimination of ambiguity and semantic richness requires a single, fixed reading. This process is characteristic of ideology, which favors literal reading, reduces the message to a slogan, suppresses interpretation, and imposes certainty. (1) – Ray Jabre Mouawad, “A Different Approach to the Arabic Language Among the Melkites and Maronites of Lebanon According to a Poem by Ibn al-Qala’i (15th Century),” in PDO , vol. 34, 2009, pp. 345–359. (2) – Ibid. (3) – Johann Gottfried von Herder, Treatise on the Origin of Language , 1772, and Treatise on the Origin of Languages , Allia, 2010. (4) – André Malraux, Notes on Islam , June 1956. (5) – Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality , MIT Press, 1956. (6) – Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , 1921; French edition, Paris, Gallimard, 2001. (7) – Wilhelm von Humboldt, On the Diversity of Human Language Construction , 1836, and Anne-Marie Chabrolle-Cerretini, Wilhelm von Humboldt’s Worldview , Lyon, ENS Éditions, 2007. (8) – Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (1927); French translation, Paris, Gallimard, 1986, §34. (9) – Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil , Paris, Aubier, 1960. Also read on the same subject The centrality of the Syriac language in the Maronite tradition (1/7)

In the NATO 3.0 framework that emerged from the Ankara summit (July 7-8), the Alliance has strengthened its ability to simultaneously address a continental threat in the East (Russia) and hybrid instability (terrorism, migration crises, military conflicts) on its Mediterranean and Middle Eastern flanks. For this second dimension, NATO is now relying on Ankara, which has not only become a major arms supplier to member states but has also established itself as a mediator between the West and the Moscow-Tehran axis. Turkey has refused to sever ties with Russia and Iran while containing the former in the Black Sea and the Caucasus, and the latter in Syria and Lebanon. The Riyadh Pact After several years of tensions with Riyadh, particularly following the Khashoggi affair, Turkey joined Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in establishing a Strategic Mutual Defense Pact, now described by some observers as a “Sunni NATO.” This bloc is emerging to counter both Iran’s remaining influence in Syria and Lebanon and Israeli power. The powerful symbol of this rapprochement is the Hejaz railway project. The railway line, which was first built in 1908 under Sultan Abdülhamid II, was a symbol of Ottoman power, linking Istanbul to Mecca until it was destroyed by the forces of the Arab Revolt led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca, with the support and guidance of British officers. From 1918 onward, these fighters systematically blew up tracks and bridges in order to disrupt the supply routes of Ottoman troops. The new railway project, approved last June, will link Istanbul to the Arabian Peninsula through Syria and Jordan, with a planned extension to Oman, creating a trade corridor connecting India and Southeast Asia to Istanbul. It represents a major economic strategy aimed, first, at bypassing the Strait of Hormuz and limiting the impact of Iranian pressure, and second, at reducing reliance on the port of Haifa, with the objective of marginalizing Israel’s commercial role in the region as Ankara’s relations with Tel Aviv reach their lowest point. The New Syria: The Heart of Turkish Influence The most important factor in this context is the consolidation of Turkish influence in Syria. Following the fall of the Assad regime, Ankara has actively supported the new administration led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. By becoming Syria’s main Sunni patron, Turkey has severed the former pro-Iranian land corridors to Lebanon, Jordan, and the West Bank. On the military front, Ankara has refused to withdraw its troops from northern Syria, using counterterrorism efforts as a justification. Its actual objective, however, is the elimination of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led force accused of being an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara and Washington classify as a terrorist organization. In addition, Syria participated for the first time in Turkey’s joint military exercises, known as EFES 2026, the latest edition of one of the largest multinational live-fire military drills organized every two years by the Turkish armed forces. The exercise took place between April and May 2026, primarily in the Izmir and Istanbul regions of Turkey. It involved more than 10,000 troops from fifty countries. Beyond its traditional NATO allies, such as the United States and France, Ankara invited the Syrian army to take part for the first time, marking a significant geopolitical development, as this represented Syria’s first official participation in an overseas military exercise since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Lebanon and the Strategic Awakening of the Turkish Sphinx Turkey, which has reasserted itself as NATO 3.0’s southern pivot, as a key player in the Middle East, and as a member of the Islamabad-Ankara-Riyadh defense pact, now wields considerable influence in Syria. In this regard, it shares certain affinities with some Lebanese Islamist movements, such as Jama’a Islamya. If Lebanon is to survive the regional chaos, it must learn to deal with this “Turkish pivot” on a state-to-state basis, not as a vassal, but as a strategic partner aware that the Middle East’s center of gravity has shifted northward. Between 2025 and 2026, Turkey intensified its hostile rhetoric toward Israel, calling for its destruction. In this context, Erdoğan indicated that Lebanon falls within Turkey’s security sphere of interest. “Turkey’s security does not begin at its borders, but in Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut,” he said, after making clear that he intended to counter Israeli expansionism in Lebanon. These statements carry considerable weight given the current geopolitical situation, even if they remain, for the most part and for the time being, verbal. Following the NATO summit, however, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that no open war with Israel was being sought, suggesting the influence of an American push for de-escalation. Lebanon’s official authorities have begun opening channels toward Ankara through several prime ministerial visits, the latest being that of Nawaf Salam a few days ago. President Joseph Aoun was also expected to travel to Ankara to consolidate this policy of engagement. However, strategic ties between the two countries remain below the required level and still need to be expanded. General Rodolphe Haykal’s visit to the SAHA defense exhibition in Istanbul (May 5-7, 2026) was intended to explore Turkish logistical support for the Lebanese army. Concrete cooperation between the two armed forces will nonetheless depend on US approval and on the Lebanese army’s ability to secure the Syrian border. Turkey can help contain instability emanating from Syria and a potential resurgence of ISIS, an enemy that Ankara closely monitors. Lebanese-Syrian Ties in Turkey’s Shadow Beirut stands to gain, in absolute terms, from consolidating its ties with Damascus by using the new Syrian regime as an opportunity to build mutual trust – while recognizing that tensions remain over former Assad regime officials currently in Lebanon, as well as over the Hezbollah issue in Syria. Lebanon also has an interest in contributing to a shared Ankara-Damascus-Beirut security framework, one that would provide reciprocal guarantees while preserving Lebanese political autonomy. In this context, diplomatic sources say that Lebanon was a top priority during the meeting between President Donald Trump and Ahmad al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara. The two presidents are concerned about Hezbollah’s clandestine supply networks running through Turkey and Syria into Lebanon and agreed on the need to intensify coordination on this issue along the Lebanese-Syrian border. The Multiplication of Regional and International Axes Lebanon’s security is now being negotiated as much in Ankara as in Washington, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, Paris, Damascus, and Tehran. Lebanon will therefore have to navigate this environment with pragmatism. This requires a coherent Lebanese strategy covering security, defense, the economy, and foreign policy – a strategy that has not yet taken shape. Is this strategy being developed within the Council of Ministers? Within the Higher Defense Council? Behind the scenes at the presidential palace? Is it being entrusted to experts (real ones)? Or does it remain nonexistent? Should such a strategy emerge, it will need to: 1 – preserve sovereignty, preventing Lebanon from becoming a mere pawn in the rivalry between Tehran and Tel Aviv, and between Ankara and Tel Aviv; 2 – maintain a minimum level of credibility to avoid being abandoned by Washington; 3 – take into account Europe’s growing role in the Middle East; and 4 – avoid falling back into Iran’s orbit.

History does not remember only the cities where wars came to an end. It remembers the cities where new political orders were born. That is why Rome may one day be remembered not merely as the city that hosted another round of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, but as the place where the process of reshaping Lebanon’s political and security architecture began after a war that profoundly altered the regional balance of power. The meetings scheduled in Rome are about far more than a ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal, or a prisoner exchange, important as those issues undoubtedly are. They form part of a broader process aimed at translating the outcome of the war into a new political reality capable of preventing any return to the pre-war status quo. International experience shows that the consequences of war do not truly end when the guns fall silent. They endure until a new political order is established, one capable of addressing the causes of conflict and preventing its recurrence. That appears to be precisely what the United States is seeking to achieve in Lebanon. From President Joseph Aoun’s visit to Washington, to the Framework Agreement, and now to the Rome meetings, the sequence appears increasingly coherent. Each step seems to belong to the same broader trajectory: moving from managing Lebanon’s recurring crises toward redefining the foundations of the Lebanese State. The first objective of this process is to establish a clear principle: one State, one army, and one security authority. The issue of the State’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force is no longer merely a Lebanese or international demand. It has become the cornerstone of rebuilding the State itself. No country can fully reclaim its role while decisions of war and peace remain outside its constitutional institutions. Reducing Lebanon’s crisis to the issue of weapons alone, however, would be an incomplete reading. The country’s predicament has never been limited to the existence of an armed force operating alongside the State. It also stems from the gradual weakening of state institutions under a political system that entrenched sectarian power-sharing and transformed public institutions into spheres of political patronage. It is within that context that Nabih Berri’s role must be understood. He has remained one of the longest-serving and most influential figures at the heart of Lebanon’s political establishment. Over the past decades, his influence has extended far beyond his position as Speaker of Parliament or his political alliance with Hezbollah. He has been one of the principal architects of the system of governance that emerged after the Taif Agreement. Just as Hezbollah helped entrench a parallel security structure by maintaining an armed force outside the State’s institutions, several political actors, with Berri among their foremost representatives, helped consolidate a system of governance based on sectarian quotas and political appointments, where loyalty too often outweighed competence. The result has been an overburdened state administration, a bloated public sector, widespread disguised unemployment, and a steady erosion of the ability of public institutions to perform their most basic functions. Rebuilding Lebanon, therefore, cannot be confined to resolving the issue of weapons. It also requires rebuilding the State itself: a modern public administration, an independent judiciary, effective institutions, and appointments based on merit rather than political allegiance. This is also the context in which the growing pressure surrounding Nabih Berri should be understood. So far, Washington has not targeted him personally. Instead, it has delivered clear political signals by increasing pressure on figures and networks associated with his political circle. The underlying message appears unmistakable: the next phase will not allow the old rules of the game to endure. The objective may not be to sideline Berri but rather to redefine his role. His political experience and extensive network make him a figure who cannot simply be ignored during any political transition. The question now is whether he will become a partner in building Lebanon’s new State or remain a defender of the system that led the country into its present crisis. Hezbollah, meanwhile, faces a different kind of historic test. The challenge is no longer simply to end military confrontation, but to redefine its place within the Lebanese State. It now faces a choice: evolve into a political party operating within the framework of the State, or continue confronting a domestic and international process aimed at restoring the State’s exclusive authority. Ultimately, Rome may prove to be far more than simply another venue for negotiations between Lebanon and Israel. It could mark the beginning of a much broader negotiation over Lebanon’s future. If the Taif Agreement brought the civil war to an end and reshaped the country’s political balance, the next phase may well redefine the very function of the Lebanese State: a State that holds the exclusive monopoly over arms, the sole authority to decide questions of war and peace, restores its place within the Arab world and the international community, and rebuilds an economy capable of sustained recovery. None of this, however, is guaranteed. The United States can facilitate agreements, Arab countries can help finance reconstruction, and the international community can provide political and economic support. But the task of building the State ultimately rests with the Lebanese themselves. The real question, therefore, is not simply what the Rome meetings will produce. Rather, it is whether Rome will open the road to Lebanon’s Third Republic. A republic defined not merely by the end of war, but by the determination to eliminate the structural causes that have prevented the emergence of a genuine State for decades. For Lebanon’s next battle will not simply be fought over borders. It will be fought over the very identity of the Lebanese State itself: will Lebanon remain a country divided among competing centers of power, or will it finally become a unified State, exercising sole authority over sovereign decision-making? That is where the next chapter of Lebanon’s history will be written.

US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a meeting on Tuesday that both sides described as "positive," reaffirming their shared commitment to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The two leaders, who have stood shoulder to shoulder in their campaign against the Islamic Republic, have nonetheless begun showing signs of divergence since last April. The White House occupant now favors a diplomatic solution to cut short a war that has dragged on longer than expected and risks becoming a political liability as the midterm elections approach. Conversely, the Israeli Prime Minister intends to see the confrontation through to the end in order to eliminate what he describes as the "existential" threat posed by Iran. In a video released after the meeting, Benjamin Netanyahu said he had "the best conversation" with Donald Trump, explaining that their talks had focused in part on their "shared goal: making sure Iran does not obtain nuclear weapons." Even so, the closed-door meeting — which lasted nearly an hour and a half and ended without either participant speaking to the press — does not fully dispel the impression of a rift between Washington and Jerusalem. It was their first face-to-face meeting since the outbreak of the regional war in the Middle East, and their eighth since Donald Trump's return to the White House. Washington says it wants to give diplomacy with Tehran another chance following two weeks of unprecedented bombing that preceded the April ceasefire. Mr. Netanyahu's visit comes at a "critical moment for the Middle East," as Iran continues, according to Israel, to "prioritize terrorism over negotiations" and maintains its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations Danny Danon said earlier on Tuesday. "A very difficult guy" Relations between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu had deteriorated sharply in April, during the early stages of ceasefire negotiations between Washington and Tehran. The US president had sharply criticized his Israeli ally at the time, accusing him of undermining diplomatic efforts. Donald Trump had notably described Benjamin Netanyahu as a "very difficult guy." The Israeli Prime Minister acknowledged "tactical disagreements" while insisting that he and his American counterpart shared the same strategic objectives. When asked on Tuesday morning about reports that Iran had been reinforcing facilities inside Mount Kolang ("pickaxe" in Persian), Donald Trump replied: "I don't need Bibi to tell me that. He's telling me because he wants me to stay involved." "I know exactly what's going on at Kolang. It's not a big deal. If we can't reach a deal, we'll destroy those facilities very easily," he said on Fox News ahead of the meeting. "The main point is to show the entire world — Iran, but also Lebanon and other countries in the region — that there is no break or major disagreement between the United States and Israel," Yonatan Freeman, an international relations scholar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, told AFP. In his view, any differences are more about means — the timing, intensity of military operations, or immediate objectives — than about ultimate goals. Iranian contacts with Riyadh and Muscat over Hormuz Meanwhile, Tehran continues to alternate between military operations and diplomatic overtures toward its Arab Gulf neighbors, blurring the traditional lines of the confrontation. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held separate phone calls with his Omani counterpart Badr al-Busaidi and his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan to discuss the Strait of Hormuz, according to Iranian state television. "They stressed the need to strengthen cooperation and advance diplomatic efforts to restore stability in the region and put an end to the insecurity imposed on the Strait of Hormuz by aggressive US actions," the same source reported. On Tuesday evening, Riyadh also announced that it had intercepted hundreds of Iranian drones during an attack targeting Aramco oil facilities in the kingdom's eastern region… Rome talks continue On the Lebanese front, the United States confirmed that new talks between Israel and Lebanon will be held in Rome from August 4 to 6, as part of the expansion of the "pilot zones" mechanism under Lebanese army supervision. These meetings, which are largely technical in nature, will focus on expanding the framework, resolving outstanding border issues, and working toward a comprehensive peace and security agreement, a US State Department official told Al-Hadath . "We are entering this new round of discussions between Lebanon and Israel with positive momentum following the success of the pilot zones," the official added, speaking on condition of anonymity. The diplomat also stated that the "fruitful meeting" between Presidents Donald Trump and Joseph Aoun had a positive impact on the Lebanese-Israeli discussions. Despite a relative lull in fighting, the Israeli military has continued to carry out targeted strikes in southern Lebanon. Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz even boasted on Tuesday of having destroyed 24 centuries-old Lebanese villages, adding that the Israeli army was applying the same tactics in Lebanon as in Gaza, where nearly 70% of the Palestinian coastal strip is said to have been destroyed since hostilities began in October 2024… In Houla… ammonium nitrate, again On the ground, UNIFIL announced on Tuesday that it had discovered approximately four tons of explosives in early July in Houla, a village in southern Lebanon located in an area under Israeli occupation. The peacekeepers "discovered 385 abandoned containers inside a building, containing approximately 4,000 kilograms of explosives, primarily ammonium nitrate-based compounds," the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon stated. UNIFIL specialists subsequently "neutralized the material to render it harmless and eliminate any risk," without specifying to whom the explosives belonged. Houla lies within a strip of Lebanese territory approximately ten kilometers deep along the border with Israel, which has been occupied by the Israeli military since the latest war launched in early March against Hezbollah. Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into the regional conflict on March 2 by attacking Israel in a show of support for Iran, triggering a sweeping Israeli military response by land and air. The discovery of these explosives inevitably revives the trauma of the Beirut port explosion on August 4, 2020. On that day, nearly 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate that had been stored carelessly for several years detonated, killing more than 220 people, injuring over 6,500, and devastating a large part of the capital. Six years on, the judicial investigations and scientific inquiries aimed at determining the causes of the disaster and establishing accountability continue to stall, with judges and experts facing intense political pressure. Many observers believe that Hezbollah bears significant responsibility for the storage of this explosive material, as the pro-Iranian group at the time exerted considerable influence over the port of Beirut — the main entry point for Iranian weapons and various smuggled goods used to fund the organization.

The war in Ukraine continues to be at the center of a wide-ranging debate, fueled in part by near-daily bombardments targeting key nerve centers on both sides, and more specifically the Russian and Ukrainian capitals. In order to better understand the various dimensions of this long-standing conflict, it is necessary to revisit the background and origins of what led to this (fratricidal?) war – by examining the motivations and aspirations of the different parties involved, including the West (the United States and Europe, extended to all NATO member states with the exception of Turkey), and by also recalling the early stages of the Russian offensive and the failed attempts to reach peace, or at least to open negotiations, bearing in mind that responsibility in this context is shared by many. To fully grasp the ins and outs of the various aspects of the war in Ukraine, some fundamental questions should be raised from the outset. What do Russia and Ukraine represent for the West? What could be the concrete implications of a clear-cut victory by either of the two protagonists? And by the same token, what would the consequences be for the West and the Middle East? In a series of five articles, Jean-Patrick Dayras , a rear admiral in the French Navy, sets out his vision and analysis of the issue. Looking ahead: What if... A – If Ukraine wins , recovering almost all of its territory For Ukraine, the consequences could include: – A significant strengthening of its international position. – Faster integration into the European Union, although full membership would still be a lengthy process. – Even closer military cooperation with NATO, whether or not Ukraine ultimately becomes a formal member. – A weakening of Russia’s influence in parts of Eastern Europe. For Russia, the consequences would depend on the scale of the defeat. However, several outcomes seem inevitable: – It would lose a substantial measure of its international standing. – It would bear lasting economic costs as a result of sanctions, reconstruction efforts, and the restoration of its military capabilities. – It would call the Kremlin’s policies into question, with their future direction depending on developments within Russia. – Russia’s long-standing policy in Africa, as well as in a number of BRICS+ member and associated states, would suffer as a result. Note: Chad has recently adopted a policy of closer ties with France, perhaps as a prelude to a shift in African geopolitics. This should be examined carefully before such a conclusion can be confirmed. That said, it is difficult to predict that a Russian defeat would automatically lead to regime change. History suggests that developments of this kind depend on a wide range of domestic factors. For Europe A Ukrainian victory could: – Strengthen the sense of security among the countries of Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe. – Keep defense spending at a high level. – Accelerate the energy diversification efforts already underway since 2022. For the United States Such an outcome could be presented as a success for the United States’ policy of supporting Ukraine and its alliances. However, it would not put an end to Washington’s other strategic challenges, including its rivalry with China and its difficult negotiations with Iran. For China Beijing would closely examine the lessons of the conflict, particularly with regard to the possibility of a forcible invasion of Taiwan. A Russian defeat could lead China to: – Further strengthen certain ties with Moscow in order to preserve a strategic partner, albeit from a position of dominance. – Reassess certain aspects of its foreign policy, particularly with regard to Iran, Taiwan, and the emerging alignment among Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. For International Organizations A Ukrainian victory would be interpreted as reinforcing the principle that borders must not be changed by force. It could strengthen the credibility of certain norms of international law, although their application would remain dependent on the balance of power among states. The Limits of This Scenario Even in the event of a Ukrainian military victory, several challenges would remain: – Rebuilding the country, at an estimated cost of several hundred billion euros, which would have to be borne by Russia. – The return of refugees (that is only the view of those who believe it will happen). – Clearing vast areas of landmines. – Legal proceedings relating to alleged war crimes (it remains to be seen whether Ukrainians, too, could be implicated in similar crimes). – Future relations among Russia, Ukraine, and the European countries. Such a victory would not erase geopolitical tensions. Even if Ukraine were to achieve its principal military objectives, relations between Russia and the West would likely remain marked by enduring mistrust, increased militarization in certain regions, and a reconfiguration of Europe’s security architecture. The consequences would also depend on the circumstances in which the conflict came to an end: a negotiated settlement, a lasting ceasefire, or a decisive military defeat would not have the same implications. B – Russia Wins, Ukraine Loses Everything would depend on what is meant by “Russia wins.” The consequences would be very different depending on whether this refers to limited territorial gains, the lasting control of part of Ukraine, or a change of government in Kyiv. A Ukrainian defeat could result in: – The lasting loss of all or part of the occupied territories. – Considerable human, economic, and demographic costs. – A slowdown in reconstruction efforts and investment. – The continuation of a significant refugee movement towards other European countries. Ukraine’s political future would depend on the conditions under which the conflict ends: a ceasefire, a peace treaty, or an imposed agreement would not have the same consequences. If Moscow were to achieve its main objectives, this could result in: – A strengthening of the Kremlin’s position domestically. – The presentation of the outcome as a strategic victory. – The preservation of its influence over part of Ukraine and its neighborhood, including Moldova. However, even in the event of military success, Russia could continue to face: – Western economic sanctions. – Increased dependence on certain partners such as China, India, or other non-Western states. – High costs linked to the reconstruction of the territories under its control and the maintenance of significant military forces. For Europe A Russian victory would likely lead to: – A lasting increase in European states’ defense spending. – A strengthening of NATO’s presence on its eastern flank (but with or without the United States?). – An acceleration of policies aimed at reducing energy dependence on Russia. Some also fear that Russia’s neighboring countries, particularly the Baltic states, would seek even stronger security guarantees. For the United States The United States could see its strategy in Ukraine called into question, potentially fueling a domestic debate over its foreign policy and the level of support it provides to its allies (including those in the Arab Gulf and on the Arabian Peninsula). For China A Russian victory could be interpreted in different ways: – Some would see it as proof that a major power can achieve certain objectives despite sanctions. – Others would highlight the conflict’s very high economic, human, and diplomatic costs, which could also serve as a warning. In any case, China would emerge as the country that allowed Russia to prevail through the support it provided. It would be the great winner. Russia would no longer be a giant standing before it. For International Law Many legal experts believe that the lasting acquisition of territories through the use of force would pose a major challenge to the principle of territorial integrity of states, enshrined in particular by the United Nations. Others point out that historical precedents are varied and that international reactions often depend on the balance of power. The United Nations Security Council would see its standing decline and could even face renewed calls to question its role. The Limits of This Scenario Even in the event of a Russian victory, several factors could limit the benefits it derives from it: – The long-term economic cost. – The management of potentially unstable territories. – Continued isolation from a significant part of Western countries. – The risk of insurgency or persistent instability, depending on the areas concerned. – The victory would be tarnished by disapproval because of the length of time required to achieve an objective that had initially been expected to be reached quickly, or even easily (a war lasting longer than the First World War). – Russia’s standing in Africa would undoubtedly suffer as well. In Summary The consequences of a Russian victory would depend on its scale and on the conditions under which the war ends. European security would remain profoundly transformed, relations between Russia and Western countries would remain deeply strained for a long time, and Europe’s security order would continue to be reshaped for many years to come. By contrast, the precise effects on Russian domestic politics, the global balance of power, or future alliances remain largely uncertain and continue to be debated among specialists. The Final Word The consequences outlined above highlight that this conflict will mark the disappearance of victory as understood within the Westphalian order and model. Next article Ukrainian or Russian Victory: Consequences for the Middle East (5/5) Also worth reading on the same topic How the West chose Ukraine (1/5) War in Ukraine: the failure of the first peace efforts (2/5) War in Ukraine: Russian Strategic Mistakes and Western Clumsiness (3/5)

While tensions have largely subsided in the Middle East regarding the Iranian conflict, it is the Yemeni front that appears most active this Monday, July 27, with new Houthi rebel attacks on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. In this context, the Saudi kingdom is currently being targeted by other pro-Iranian groups based in Iraq. The Saudis intercepted drones launched from Iraqi territory and, at the same time, called on Iraqi authorities to prevent such attacks carried out by these 'terrorist' groups — all the more so as the new government has expressed its willingness to better manage its internal situation. Once again, Iran is proving that it uses its proxies according to a well-oiled plan, likely taking advantage of American hesitation. But why target Saudi Arabia in particular at a time of relative calm? Other incidents have also been reported since the United States halted its strikes against Iran last Friday. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy announced on Monday that it had prevented six vessels from passing through the Strait of Hormuz, as they were attempting to 'transit via routes not authorized by Iranian authorities.' Earlier in the day, state television had reported an 'incident' involving a vessel, without providing further details, AFP noted. Meanwhile, the Israeli military announced it had intercepted two drones near the Jordanian border, before they could enter Israeli territory. In southern Lebanon, the Israeli army accused Hezbollah of launching at least one drone into the highly contested area of Ali el-Taher in an attempt to gather intelligence on its soldiers. Several security incidents were recorded in the area on Monday. The Shia party had not conducted any operations since the ceasefire announced in Islamabad. Netanyahu in Washington In the meantime, the West Bank continues to flare up with clashes between settlers and residents, and tensions are running extremely high. Another troubling incident in recent hours: the Ukrainian attack on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea, which resulted in casualties, continues to stir controversy in Iran. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi not only harshly criticized Kyiv in a post on X, but also accused Israel of having orchestrated the attack in order to draw Europe into the Iranian conflict. It is against this particularly tense backdrop that the Israeli Prime Minister was due to travel to Washington on Monday, where he is scheduled to meet with President Donald Trump on Tuesday. On the eve of that meeting, the Israeli newspaper Israel Hayom reported that Mr. Netanyahu is expected to firmly resist any American pressure for a withdrawal from Gaza, Syria, or southern Lebanon. According to the Israeli newspaper, the Prime Minister would make clear that Israel's security needs must take precedence over all other considerations, as the region continues to be shaken by overlapping conflicts and fragile diplomatic initiatives. This stance is likely to deepen the rift between the two leaders, as President Trump has already publicly called on Mr. Netanyahu to withdraw his troops from Lebanon and Syria. It would also undermine the ongoing negotiations with Lebanon, which are expected to lead to a gradual withdrawal of the Israeli army from southern Lebanon, in parallel with a deployment of the Lebanese army, on condition that Hezbollah is demilitarized in these so-called 'pilot' zones. The Lebanese army had already deployed in a southern village last Tuesday — Zawtar el-Gharbiya, in the Nabatiyeh region. For official Lebanon, represented by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who are pressing ahead with direct negotiations with Israel (the next round is scheduled for August 4 in Rome), certain hardline Israeli statements are damaging, even if they are part of the usual posturing driven by domestic (electoral) and international calculations. These extremist Israeli positions are all the more regrettable given that the framework agreement signed by the Lebanese and Israeli parties on June 26 continues to be targeted on the Lebanese domestic scene by campaigns waged by the Iranian axis. Beyond the usual criticism from Hezbollah, Parliament Speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berry issued a statement on Monday in which he reiterated his rejection of any direct negotiations with Israel, expressing pessimism about the framework agreement and stating that the initial deployment of the Lebanese army to Zawtar el-Gharbiya only deepens his pessimism. He called for American, Saudi, and Iranian sponsorship of the situation in Lebanon. The US-Iran negotiations Monday was also marked by a visit to Beirut by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, during which he stated that his office "has documented widespread violations of international law, some of which could constitute war crimes." Receiving Mr. Türk at Baabda, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun stressed that "the ongoing destruction being carried out by Israel in southern Lebanon risks undermining the implementation of the Lebanese-Israeli framework agreement." Finally, regarding the US-Iran negotiations, Iran — through its Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei — denied that any direct negotiations with the United States are currently underway, acknowledging only that messages have been exchanged through intermediaries. The Iranian official also took the opportunity to lash out at repeated American statements claiming that Iran is desperately seeking to return to the negotiating table. Reverting once again to its characteristic arrogance toward the United States, Iran's Foreign Ministry emphasized that "Iran will never allow the United States to decide the timing of war or peace"!