Washington Negotiations: Will Lebanon Break Its Shackles?

Since the emergence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon has strenuously sought to shield itself from falling entirely into the furnace of open-ended wars, adopting a policy built on two pillars: to be the last Arab State to sign a peace agreement with Israel, and to remain a “supporting State” for the Palestinian cause rather than a “frontline state” bearing the burden of war alone. This approach stemmed from Lebanon’s singular nature — its delicate balances and its political and social composition, which could not absorb protracted conflicts exceeding its capacities and resources.

Yet this equilibrium began to shift gradually with the rise of armed Palestinian fedayeen action, as vast areas of South Lebanon transformed into what became known as “Fatahland,” under the aegis of Islamic and leftist forces. Lebanon entered then a new phase of division, particularly as the Assad regime exploited this reality and channelled it to serve its regional projects, turning the country into an open stage for wars and external settlements.

Over the years, names and faces changed while the tableau remained the same; the Palestinian organizations departed, replaced by Iranian influence exercised through Hezbollah, and the Syrian role receded in favour of Tehran, which seized control of both political and military decision-making. The fundamental difference, however, lies in the nature of the bond between Iran and the Hezb: it was no longer a mere alliance of interests, but had become a deep doctrinal and organic attachment, making the decoupling of Lebanese decision-making from the Iranian project an extraordinarily complex undertaking.

The region is witnessing today major transformations that are redrawing its balances; with President Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the international equations have shifted. Domestically, the election of General Joseph Aoun as President of the Republic and the designation of Dr. Nawaf Salam to form the government have kindled hope for the restoration of State sovereignty after years of collapse and armed hegemony.

It is from this context that the project of dialogue with Israel was placed on the table, after Tehran had shut the doors to any solution and pushed the country to the brink of total implosion. It has become clear that the perpetuation of the status quo would mean Lebanon’s definitive and devastating isolation; accordingly, the new authority holds that salvation lies in consolidating State power, concentrating the decision over war and peace in the hands of legitimate institutions, and withdrawing the country from the game of regional axes.

This orientation, however, confronts internal obstacles; relations between Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri and the presidency are traversed by growing tension, with Ain al-Tineh sensing that the negotiating process is bypassing traditional understandings. The Hezbollah’s position appears still more complex since its sovereign decision-making power migrated to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which binds any internal dialogue to Tehran’s calculations and its negotiations with Washington.

Lebanon’s new authority today affirms its refusal to hitch the country’s future to the train of Iranian-American negotiation, convinced that Lebanon cannot continue to serve as an external “pressure card.” In what could lay the foundation for a new political trajectory, a meeting between Lebanese and Israeli delegations is expected in Washington, constituting a serious attempt to reclaim the status of a “normal State.”

Lebanon stands today at a historic crossroads: either a return to the logic of the State, sovereignty, and institutions, or continued captivity to arms and external axes that have bequeathed nothing to the Lebanese but destruction and collapse.

Will Lebanon break the shackles of the “arena” to enter the era of the “State”?