The Hezb, an armed wing of a decapitated body

Anyone examining Hezbollah's logo and the image it represents will note that, since its creation, this party has been an armed wing of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is no longer a simple symbolic representation, but a reality supported by facts: Hezbollah has supported Iran because it is its armed wing, and Iran has often boasted of controlling four Arab capitals, including Beirut.

The organic link between the 'head' and the 'armed wing' was confirmed by the ceasefires in Iran and Lebanon. The two agreements were inextricably linked; when an agreement wavered in Tehran, the other wavered in Beirut. So much so that some research and study centers claim that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), just as it controls the decision-making centers in Iran, also controls those of Hezbollah in Beirut. There are at least two pieces of evidence supporting this:

First, the assassination of a Revolutionary Guards commander who was alongside Hassan Nasrallah in the same room.

Second, the former Iranian ambassador to Beirut was the target of a pager attack, as he was using a device distributed to military and security officials of the party and the Revolutionary Guards.

The flag or emblem, as it appears in the image, represents an arm holding a rifle, with the inscription 'Hezbollah is victorious' above it. The Hezbollah flag thus appears as: an Iranian arm holding a rifle.

Describing Hezbollah as an 'Iranian arm' is no longer a simple political slogan chanted by its opponents. Over time, this assertion has turned into an interpretation supported by a series of historical and on-the-ground facts that reveal the deep and organic link between the party and the Revolutionary Guards. The relationship between the two is not based on a fleeting alliance or a passing convergence of interests, but rather on direct collaboration, continuous funding, and strategic support clearly manifest in times of both war and peace.

The former Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, was not bluffing when he stated: 'Our weapons and our money come from Iran,' going so far as to declare: 'I am proud to be a soldier in the army of Wilayat al-Faqih.'

Since its creation in late 1982, Hezbollah has never been a Lebanese project, but rather a concrete extension of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Revolutionary Guard Corps supervised the training of its first fighters in Baalbek and established its ideological framework on the basis of 'Wilayat al-Faqih'. The party therefore answers solely to the Iranian Supreme Leader. This point alone is enough to discredit any notion of independence, because an organization that derives its ideological legitimacy from an external leadership cannot be considered a fully sovereign Lebanese actor.

Moving from theory to practice, the picture becomes clearer. During the July 2006 war, the confrontation was not a simple local operation, but part of a complex regional context. This operation was part of the Iranian deterrence strategy against Israel and the United States.

The abduction of the two Israeli soldiers was carried out at Iran's request, as later leaked documents revealed. The military and logistical support provided to Hezbollah during this conflict was a crucial element in its ability to resist, reinforcing the hypothesis that the military decision was part of broader Iranian calculations.

This same pattern was repeated in the subsequent phases. Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian war was not motivated by internal Lebanese concerns, but was a direct response to the desire to protect Iran's influence in Damascus, its most important ally within the 'axis of resistance'. In this case, Hezbollah was no longer a mere beneficiary of support, but a field instrument at the service of implementing regional policies led by Tehran, thereby consolidating its status as a military force projected abroad.

In recent years, these indicators have become even more marked. The events following October 8, 2023, and what has been described as a 'war of support and harassment', revealed a series of coordinated operations that go beyond the purely Lebanese framework. Furthermore, the repeated rocket fire, including the six on March 2, testify to an involvement in a broader regional conflict, where the fronts, from Gaza to Lebanon via Yemen, converge within a single strategic framework steered by Iran.

Some might argue that Hezbollah retains a certain decision-making autonomy and takes into account the Lebanese context and its sectarian and political complexities. However, this argument clashes with the reality of funding, armament, and training, with the party relying almost entirely on Iran for these essential aspects. In political science, whoever holds the instruments of power has the greatest ability to influence decision-making. Therefore, speaking of independence is more a matter of theory than practice.

Even the visual symbolism of the party conveys connotations that go beyond the local framework. Its iconic logo, depicting a hand brandishing a rifle and the slogan 'Hezbollah is victorious', is not just a simple propaganda tool, but a reflection of the culture of the Islamic Revolution, which glorifies 'armed resistance' as an ideological instrument.

While the interpretation of the hand as the 'arm of the Revolutionary Guards' remains symbolic, it falls within the structural relationship uniting the two entities, with the symbol becoming the visual expression of an existing political and military function.

More importantly, the regional behavior of the party is almost entirely consistent with Iran's strategic priorities. It fights where Iran fights, de-escalates tensions when Iran de-escalates tensions, and intensifies them when deterrence is necessary. This synchronization cannot be explained by chance or a mere convergence of interests; rather, it indicates deep coordination, or even direct leadership in certain cases.

Ultimately, calling Hezbollah an 'Iranian armed wing' does not mean it is a mere instrument without a will of its own, but rather that its will is constrained by a strategic framework defined by Tehran.

The facts, from its foundation to its funding and military actions, clearly indicate that Hezbollah operates within an Iran-led system and constitutes one of its main proxies in the region.

Consequently, the debate is no longer about the existence of a link between Hezbollah and Iran, but rather about the extent and limits of this link. What remains certain, however, is that this connection is so deep that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to separate the Lebanese and Iranian decision-making processes regarding Hezbollah during major conflicts.