Levant Time logo

Articles

News feature image
Massive explosion caused by an Israeli strike near the town of Al-Mansouri in southern Lebanon. (AFP)
Weekly essentials
Author portrait
By LevantTime .
Published Sep 6, 2026 - 23:27
While the United States had appeared to be relying solely on economic warfare against Iran, the US military abruptly carried out strikes on Iranian territory on Tuesday in retaliation for attacks targeting oil tankers, setting off a spiral of violence over the course of the week. In Lebanon, Israel released several civilians held in its prisons, while its army seized the strategic Ali el-Taher hill and continued its heavy strikes in the area it controls in the south of the country. The week from August 31 to September 6 was marked by a sharp acceleration of events in the Middle East, after the previous one had seemed defined by relative stagnation. On the Iranian front, the US military carried out targeted strikes inside Iranian territory as early as Tuesday evening, the first in nearly a month. This screen grab, made on September 6, 2026 from undated video footage released the same day by US Central Command, shows what CENTCOM says is one of the Iranian oil tankers it destroyed in response to attempted missile attacks on naval vessels. (CENTCOM via AFP) However, the relatively limited pace of the strikes suggests that the US administration has opted for an escalation that remains controlled, while continuing its blockade and economic pressure on Tehran. Even so, tensions continued to rise throughout the week. Explosions were heard on Saturday on the highly strategic island of Kharg, through which most of Iran’s oil exports pass. US President Donald Trump, for his part, threatened to strike the Kuh-e Kolang nuclear site — “Pickaxe Mountain” in Persian — a heavily fortified facility located deep underground, not far from Natanz, Iran’s main uranium-enrichment site. Earlier in the week, he had enshrined the “tanker for tanker” equation, pledging to target an Iranian vessel every time the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struck an oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz. That is precisely what the US military did on Saturday, setting two Iranian vessels ablaze. Politically, Donald Trump further hardened his tone toward Tehran. After saying in an interview that talks had been permanently frozen “because an agreement with them is not worth the paper it is written on,” he said on Saturday that the “conflict” with Iran was not a “war,” but “something ordinary” for the United States. A way of rattling the Iranians while at the same time reassuring the US public ahead of the midterm elections. A port, along with storage facilities and warehouses, was damaged following a US military strike carried out on September 6, 2026 in Iran’s southern Hormozgan province, which borders the Strait of Hormuz. (AFP) At the same time, the US news outlet Axios published a report on Saturday suggesting that the United States is already looking beyond this conflict, which began on February 28. Citing US officials and other informed sources, the outlet said the Trump administration is developing a broader strategy for the post-war Middle East. According to the report, it would be based on creating a regional alignment aimed at containing Iran, bringing an end to the regional fallout from Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attacks in Gaza, and expanding the circle of normalization between Israel and countries in the region. The threat against Kuh-e Kolang, which brings the Iranian nuclear issue back to the fore, echoes an announcement by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which said on September 1 that Iran had still not reopened its sites to inspectors following the strikes of May 2025. It should be recalled that despite the scale of the Israeli-American offensive against Iranian sites, it is almost certain that the stockpile of enriched uranium remains intact and has been moved to a safe location by the Iranian authorities, which remain committed to what they consider their right to develop a nuclear program. Following the IAEA announcement, the United States, together with France, Britain and Germany, said they intended to submit a resolution to the UN Security Council condemning Iran’s failure to comply with its non-proliferation commitments. This display of unity stands in contrast to the chill that has prevailed between Washington and its European allies since the beginning of the conflict. For their part, the Iranians appear to be responding to the upheaval in much the same way as before: by striking neighboring countries, notably Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, without directly targeting Israel. Heavy strikes in southern Lebanon On the Lebanese front, Israel is intensifying its destruction operations in villages in the south, even using explosive barrels in some cases. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun urged Washington and the international community to “put an end” to Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory, which killed seven people on Sunday against the backdrop of a fragile truce. The strikes hit several localities in the Nabatiyeh region. Twenty people were also wounded, including children, according to the Health Ministry. One strike also destroyed the former Ghandour hospital, which had been out of service for years. Release of detainees and capture of Ali el-Taher But the major event of the week in the south was the Israeli capture of the strategic Ali el-Taher hill in the Nabatiyeh region. The site served as a major Hezbollah headquarters, consisting of an extensive network of tunnels from which fighters from the Shiite party operated, along with, according to some reports, Iranian fighters. On Thursday evening, the Israelis announced that they had taken control of the complex. On Sunday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said that tunnels still had to be blown up. This military “success” may not have come as a surprise after weeks of bombardment, but Hezbollah’s reaction was more unexpected. After long insisting that it would refuse to give up this strategic hill — as had the Iranians, who had also threatened to intervene — the Shiite party ultimately sought to play down the significance of the development through its media outlets and allied networks, without officially confirming the loss of the site, which it had refused to preserve by handing it over to the Lebanese army. The other major surprise of the week was Israel’s release of five Lebanese and Syrian civilians held in its prisons. The move came following a visit to Tel Aviv by US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa. According to the Israeli prime minister’s office, Thursday’s announcement “follows efforts by Israel and Lebanon to locate and repatriate the remains of leaders of the Jewish community who had been abducted and killed in Lebanon” between 1984 and 1986. Here too, Hezbollah’s reaction raises questions. While describing the move as positive but insufficient, the party once again turned on the Lebanese authorities, accusing them of “submission to the enemy” and holding them “responsible” for the disaster in the south. It even warned them against “internal conflicts.” Could the party’s military setbacks push it to turn increasingly toward the domestic front? Finally, the Israeli army made an important statement on Sunday, saying it was considering reducing its occupation zone in southern Lebanon, moving from the current “yellow zone” to a “grey zone.” Such a development would, according to this assessment, reflect a reduced threat from Hezbollah. The measure has not yet been approved by Israel’s political leadership. Yemen and Palestine The week was also particularly tense in Yemen, where clashes between Houthi rebels and government forces continued to intensify, culminating in an especially deadly Saturday in which more than 60 people were killed in a single day, bringing the death toll since Thursday to around 200. The Houthi offensive is aimed in particular at taking control of areas bordering the Bab el-Mandeb passage, which would give this Iranian ally additional leverage over another major strategic chokepoint after the Strait of Hormuz. In Palestine, particularly troubling comments by Israel Katz on Gaza marked the week. He claimed, without providing evidence, that most of the territory’s residents wanted to leave, stressing that Israel was “ready for such an evacuation” on a mass scale. A sign that the ordeal of Gaza’s residents may be far from over. Finally, it is worth noting that the IAEA announced on September 1 that facilities discovered in Deir el-Zor, Syria, indicate that Bashar al-Assad’s former regime had secretly been preparing an advanced nuclear program that could have led to the production of an atomic weapon with the help of North Korean experts.
Homage
Author portrait
By Michel Hajji Georgiou - Published Sep 6, 2026 - 13:31
News feature image
The Argentine player, who brought his international career to an end on August 31, 2026, was nothing less than a magician of the stadiums. His journey, made of wonders, falls and redemption, may tell us something about our undiminished need for enchantment in a world that nevertheless claims to have rid itself of it. Announced a few weeks after the 2026 World Cup final lost to Spain, Lionel Messi’s international retirement inevitably stirred an emotion for which it is difficult to find many equivalents in the recent history of football. One would probably have to go back to Maradona, or perhaps to Cruyff or Pelé, to recover that sense that, with the retirement of a player, something disappears that extends far beyond the sport itself, as though a certain way of inhabiting football, perhaps even of believing in it, were also coming to an end. Far from the glacis of reason Enough of the endless statistics and the unbearable, tedious and sterile quarrels over “who is the greatest of all time.” The author of these lines has never been a fanatic of the round ball, nor, for that matter, of vertical rankings or hierarchies of merit in general, and consequently appreciates the talent of each player with the same sense of wonder as an eleven-year-old child. Besides, this particularly contemporary obsession with numbers ruins all the pleasure of the spectacle. And with good reason: the approach that consists in adding up goals, assists, Ballons d’Or, Champions Leagues, Copa América titles, World Cups… can only be reductive. On another register, it is not entirely unrelated to German-American philosopher Eric Voegelin’s critique of the modern Gnostic temptation: that of a form of knowledge convinced that it can imprison reality within a system and abolish whatever resists it. Records are probably one indicator of Lionel Messi’s genius. Yet so many other great players who made stadiums and hearts tremble, without achieving half of what he did, nevertheless remain eternal in our memories. What made them truly singular lies elsewhere, far from the glacis of reason. Something else was at work around them. Something belonging to a certain profound sense of transcendence that understanding can never fully grasp. This has been true of Lionel Messi for more than twenty years, since the day when, under the gaze of the “icon” Diego Maradona, he made his first appearance, in June 2006, on the World Cup stage in the colors of the Albiceleste against Serbia and Montenegro. That ineffable element that constitutes Messi’s genius, as it does that of others, may indeed touch upon one of modernity’s strangest paradoxes: the persistence of magic in a world that has constructed itself precisely against it. The disenchanted world Max Weber used the expression “disenchantment of the world” to describe the slow process by which Western modernity gradually subjected existence to rationalization, calculation, predictability and causal explanation. The world was no longer supposed to be traversed by obscure powers, signs, supernatural interventions or invisible wills; it was, at least in principle, to become intelligible. Unfortunately, modern sport, and more broadly the modern world inherited from globalization, fits perfectly within this dynamic. Today’s football, and not football alone, is probably one of the most quantified objects imaginable. The slightest gesture is measured, and everything is carefully calculated and modeled. From mathematics to artificial intelligence, raw talent now depends more on science than on enchantment. What is human in its spontaneous, even wild, relationship with the invisible that springs from the heart is disappearing before our eyes, in favor of the squaring of the VAR circle. It is, in a sense, the murder of sport in the name of greater rigor and fairness… even though the euthanasia of this share of sublime spontaneity ultimately produces glaring injustices of its own. One need only revisit some of the controversial decisions of the 2026 World Cup to see it. Paradox of paradoxes, Lionel Messi was himself, at the outset, a child of this technical modernity, to which he certainly owes part of his exceptional career. His body, too small by expected standards, was corrected through hormone treatment. Identified very early, his talent was taken in hand by an institution that organized his training, nutrition, physical development and integration into an already globalized sporting machine. Nothing, in appearance, could have been further removed from the old heroic narrative. At first sight, the story seems closer to dystopias in the vein of Gattaca than to myths and messianic narratives. And yet the old narrative did indeed return, and with an almost embarrassing insistence. Since the beginning of his career, Lionel Messi has been placed under the microscope. But the more people labored to explain and demystify him, the less they succeeded in entirely dissipating the impression produced by some of his gestures. The man simply cannot be circumscribed and reduced to an accumulation of data. At an age when most great players retreat into the shadows, he continues to surprise. To astonish, even, by bringing to sport that element of the senseless which escapes the quasi-robotic hypersystematization of the world. It is probably there that one must seek this elsewhere that characterizes Messi. In the survival of magic at a time when even the spaces that once allowed the positive expression of a humanity made of flesh and blood are gradually being “disciplined” by the hypnotic attraction of a new puritanical Gnosis in the name of modernity. The Messiah made by the machine Although he emerged, in a sense, from the machinery of the Matrix, Lionel Messi constitutes in himself a challenge to this ready-to-wear model. A kind of alter ego of Neo from The Matrix, thrown into a simulation governed by parameters that claim to calculate everything. The Argentine’s destiny gradually took on, almost despite himself, the form of a messianic narrative. The pun on his name would be too easy had it not been ceaselessly revived by his own story: that of the fragile child whose body seemed intent on denying him the fulfillment to which his talent destined him. Then that of exile at a very young age to Barcelona, adoption by a foreign city, an almost unreal ascent, worldwide recognition, followed by this strange difficulty in being recognized by his own… For a long time, Argentina maintained a relationship of hainamoration with its prodigal child. His results, his talent, his brilliance mattered little… he still had to answer one merciless question: why wasn’t he Maradona? The comparison was admittedly inevitable, but it was also profoundly unfair. Everything separated the two men in their way of being in the world. Maradona carried Argentina with everything in it that was passionate, contradictory, excessive and theatrical. He spoke, provoked, fought, fell, returned, mingled football with his private life, his anger, his political commitments… all the way to his own destruction. His very body seemed to become one of the places where the contradictions of his country were played out. Maradona was the very incarnation of what the world expected from football: a rebellious soul, sometimes pushing the game to the point of immorality, but within a kind of footballing gigantomachy. Maradona was epic. And, above all, he had placed his country at the summit of world football in 1986. Messi offered none of that. He was silent, at times almost absent from the story others were constructing around him, an absence long interpreted as a flaw. Almost erased, devoid of personality. That, moreover, was what the two giants Maradona and Pelé reproached him for: a lack of leadership, being too smooth. A kind of miracle test-tube baby of the stadiums. The boy from Rosario was also criticized for not singing the anthem loudly enough, for not being Argentine enough, for having been “manufactured” by Barcelona, and then, naturally, for failing to win with the national team what he won almost continuously with his club. The unfulfilled prophecy The dramatic loss to Germany in the 2014 World Cup final, followed by the Copa América finals of 2015 and 2016, had gradually transformed that suspicion into an accusation. When he missed his penalty against Chile in 2016 and subsequently announced that he was leaving the national team, he was nevertheless already one of the greatest players in football history. Yet his story remained strangely unfinished. The sense of incompletion had little to do with his honors. It concerned instead that quasi-archaic necessity continually imposed upon modern heroes: to bring their initiatory journey to completion. In Argentina’s colors, Messi shone, then fell heavily. But he did not rise again. He did not fulfill the prophecy. And, in the eyes of his people, this reinforced the sense of hainamoration: a fallen god remains a god, after all. But with the added burden of what his worshippers regard as an intolerable substratum of humanity and, therefore, something perfectly detestable: his flaws, his weaknesses. Argentines loved Maradona despite his spectacular downfall and his fallible humanity. But that was because he had “earned” the right to such a downfall, because it had somehow become acceptable after Mexico 1986. Messi, by contrast, did not yet have the right to fall, because he had not yet reached the summit. No, the prophecy had not been fulfilled. It was even becoming a caricature. So Messi returned. But he still had to wait for his redemption. It took the 2021 Copa América at the Maracanã for this relationship of suspicion, expectation and disappointment with his public and his people truly to begin changing. And above all it took the 2022 World Cup for the story to acquire that almost excessively perfect form that no one would have dared write without appearing to indulge in a screenwriter’s contrivance. Strangely, Maradona had died in 2020. It was as though a kind of oppressive national curse had been lifted. At the same time, the Argentine people needed a substitute father figure, and the pressure was thereby only redoubled. But perhaps mixed with a little tenderness this time? What happened in Qatar in 2022 is all the more interesting because Messi himself appeared slightly different. He protested more, answered provocations, lost his temper, spoke with a violence of which few had thought him capable, and even let slip that now famous “¿Qué mirás, bobo?” at the Dutch, to Argentina’s amusement. Buenos Aires finally discovered, belatedly, what it had always expected from him. A little Maradona in a great deal of Messi. But Messi did not become Maradona. And perhaps that was precisely where the true reconciliation occurred: Argentina stopped asking him to be. From 2022 onward, Messi no longer needed to embody another model of national genius. For his country too, he could finally become what he had already been everywhere else: Messi. Simply. The final act of the prophecy Granted, the triumph of 2022 could have constituted a perfect ending. But, as with Maradona, the final act of heroic prophecy is the fall. No one really expected anything extraordinary from Messi anymore in 2026. At 39, he was widely regarded as one of the “tired heroes.” The fall from the Capitol had come with the bitter episode of his departure from FC Barcelona and his misadventure at PSG. He was now playing only in the American league, in Miami’s colors… on the periphery of the footballing world, in the distant lands of soccer. And the new generation was already there, ready to send its ancestors off to Bicêtre. Yet this 2026 World Cup, which seemed destined to be nothing more than an epilogue, turned into one last sensational blaze of glory. Argentina reached the final once again, with Messi, at 39, restored as its “historic leader” and its recourse in decisive moments, achieving something not unlike what Roberto Baggio had done for Italy in 1994, at… 27: a perpetual deus ex machina. Baggio failed at the gates of triumph against Brazil after practically carrying Italy all the way to Pasadena. His penalty, sent over the crossbar, would leave behind one of the cruelest images in World Cup history: a man standing motionless, head bowed, hands on his hips, while Brazil celebrated its victory. The man who had “died standing.” The Italian imp never knew apotheosis. Yet this symbolic death, far from erasing his tournament, eventually became part of his legend. History was kinder to Messi, despite a campaign of hatred directed at him, mixed with accusations of cheating and favoritism, against a backdrop of controversial refereeing decisions and acts of unsporting conduct by his team, just as it had once been with Maradona. Kinder still, in fact. A final in a sixth World Cup on the verge of retirement, capped by an outstanding individual performance? That is precisely where the magic of the Messi phenomenon lies, and where it defies reason and its avalanche of statistics. Genius cannot be imprisoned within a sum of parameters and variables. Even optimal physical condition cannot by itself explain what the entire world witnessed. And what does it matter if his story reminds us that the hero, however mythical, cannot abolish the sinister influence of Saturn. The re-enchantment of the world For beyond the prophecy fulfilled, from ascent to fall, with its share of happiness and misfortune, the Argentine offered the world one final lap that belongs to art, if not to a form of Homeric poetry. With Lionel Messi’s withdrawal from the international stage, a little of the world’s magic disappears… until another providential hero returns to enchant the stadiums. For more than twenty years, Messi embodied the coexistence of two worlds we had thought incompatible: that of the extreme rationalization of modern sport and that, far older, of the hero, the sign, expectation and enchantment. When Messi leaves, something of this contradiction suddenly becomes visible. Other prodigies have already emerged, but perhaps, at the very moment when one of its last great representatives leaves the stage, we discover just how much we continue to need transcendence. The modern world has therefore probably not abolished enchantment. It has merely displaced it. For ninety minutes at a time, this man called Lionel Messi, who embodied it on football pitches, now leaves after having accomplished everything. And even more.
Analyze

Have We Become Stupider?

Or Are We Experiencing a Transformation in the Structure of Knowledge?
Author portrait
By Mona Fayad - Published Sep 5, 2026 - 20:01
News feature image
The question “Has the world become stupider?” frequently returns in contemporary debates about digital media, search engines, and social networks. On the surface, it seems simple. Yet behind it lies a deeper issue concerning the very nature of knowledge: how it is produced, how it is transmitted, and how it is consumed. Perhaps “Have we become stupider?” is not the most accurate question. A better one might be: Is knowledge still being transmitted in a way that allows it to be understood and made productive? Do most readers still go back to the original texts? Or do they turn instead to summaries and to what is said about those texts through material circulating among readers? One key to understanding this phenomenon lies in the work of British psychologist Frederic Bartlett, who conducted a series of experiments in the 1930s on what he called “serial reproduction.” In these experiments, one person would be asked to hear a story and then retell it to someone else, who would in turn retell it to a third person, and so on. The results were striking: with each new transmission, the story was not conveyed as it had originally been told, but was reformulated. Some details were omitted, others were exaggerated, and still others were replaced by elements that better suited the recipient’s background, experience, and culture. By the time the chain had passed through enough people, the original story had become something entirely different. This simple model reveals a fundamental truth: memory is not a neutral container, but a mechanism of reconstruction. When knowledge passes through multiple intermediaries, it is not “preserved” but “reproduced.” Here we begin to see the resemblance to our contemporary world, and with it the fear that we may be becoming stupider. In the age of digital media, knowledge no longer travels through oral transmission, but through chains of mediation: an article is summarized, then quoted, then reposted as a short post, before being further reduced to a sentence or a headline. In this context, we might borrow a metaphor that appeared in a journalistic text: a library whose books are gradually replaced by summaries, then by summaries of summaries, until the reader is left facing layer upon layer of reduction. We might call this the “raccoon chain”: the raccoon does not read the original, but rummages through what remains of it. It is worth clarifying that the choice of the “raccoon” is not arbitrary. The metaphor symbolically condenses a cognitive condition that is becoming increasingly entrenched. This animal, which lives on the fringes of cities and rummages through garbage bins, does not produce its own food but feeds on the leftovers of what others have produced. Despite its practical intelligence and its ability to pry things apart, pick through them, and seize what is useful, it does not understand what lies before it. It treats things simply as material available for immediate use. This is what knowledge begins to look like in an age of serial reduction: texts are shortened, then shortened again, until all that remains are scraps of meaning, rearranged and circulated without any genuine connection to their source. At that point, we have not merely moved away from the original. We have entered a new phase in the production of information or knowledge, in which the cognitive actor is no longer a reader or a thinker, but a collector of fragments of meaning who redistributes them in forms designed for rapid consumption. “Raccoon culture,” then, is not merely a description of superficiality. It is an accurate description of the degradation of the knowledge chain itself: from creation to summary, from understanding to formal processing, from ideas to something resembling only their faded trace. Yet this phenomenon cannot be understood apart from the technological structure that governs it. Here Marshall McLuhan becomes relevant, with his famous formulation: “The medium is the message.” The problem lies not only in content, but also in the form through which that content is transmitted. Contemporary digital media do not simply convey information. They reshape it according to the logic of speed, condensation, and fragmentation. Long texts become unsuitable for consumption, while an idea becomes acceptable only if it can be compressed into a few shareable lines. This transformation produces a striking paradox: we live in a time when access to knowledge is no longer difficult. It is excessively easy. And with that excessive ease comes what might be called a “cognitive illusion”: reading a brief passage or a quick summary can be enough to make a person feel that they have grasped an idea. Yet this feeling of possession is not necessarily accompanied by deep understanding, or by the ability to reconstruct or critique that knowledge. This is where we encounter what might be called the “semi-educated”: people who possess the signs of knowledge but not its structure, its vocabulary but not its internal logic. The problem becomes even more complex when viewed through the lens of attention. Instead of remaining in a state of sustained concentration, as in traditional reading or prolonged reflection, the mind now exists under continuous informational bombardment: notifications, clips, headlines, and successive waves of content. This does not merely fragment attention. It reshapes it according to a logic of constant jumping between short units of meaning, rather than the gradual and cumulative construction of an idea. I am reminded here of a joke that we used to tell and that was widely circulated during the days of popular demonstrations. It vividly illustrates the process of reduction and reshaping of content. After the occupation of Palestine, many popular demonstrations took to the streets chanting, “Down with the Balfour Declaration!” The joke was that by the end of the demonstration, the slogan had become, in Arabic, “Let one fall from above,” a completely different phrase that retained something of the original slogan’s rhythm and sound. This image may help bring us closer to what happens in everyday language when knowledge is transformed into short messages that are collectively repeated. A demonstration begins with a precise political slogan. Through repetition, collective immersion, and sonic rhythm, it gradually turns into a completely different formula. The new version may preserve the rhythm and emotional charge of the original, while losing its meaning and original significance. What remains is no longer the meaning, but the emotional energy of the phrase. Here, in another form, we encounter what Bartlett observed: what matters is not merely what was said, but how it was retold and how it was reinterpreted within a changing social context. If we bring these strands together, we might say that what we are experiencing today is not so much a “collapse of intelligence” as a transformation in the conditions under which intelligence operates. The human mind has not changed radically, but the environment in which it functions has changed profoundly: from an environment that allowed slow accumulation to one that imposes the rapid and fragmented reproduction of knowledge. This transformation creates a permanent tension between two kinds of thinking: reflective thought, which requires time, and rapid thought, which demands an immediate response. Seen in this light, the question “Have we become stupider?” is partly misleading. It may be more accurate to say that we are increasingly exposed to conditions that make deep thinking less stable, or less possible, and knowledge more vulnerable to fragmentation and recycling. As for stupidity, if the term can be used, it may not be a quality of the mind at all, but rather a side effect and a characteristic of the cultural structure that has emerged. It is a technology that reshapes our relationship with the world. Thus, rather than seeing this as a decline in human capacities, we might understand it as a transformation in the “knowledge environment”: an environment in which it has become easy to know something, but harder to truly understand it in depth.
More Articles
Sort By: NewestOldest
Two Hotspots to Watch: West Bekaa and Isfahan

Two strategically significant regions took center stage in overnight military operations from Monday, March 30, to Tuesday, March 31, amid the ongoing Middle East conflict that began on February 28: Isfahan in Iran and West Bekaa in Lebanon. In the overnight hours of Monday, U.S. air forces carried out particularly intense raids on Isfahan, targeting major weapons and ammunition depots belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. U.S. sources reported Tuesday morning that large bunker-busting bombs, each weighing over a ton, were used to destroy deep underground weapons caches. Video footage released Tuesday morning, following a night of devastation in the Isfahan region, captures scenes of apocalyptic explosions and towering columns of dense flames rising from the sites struck by American aircraft. These intensive raids on the Isfahan area are particularly significant due to the presence of energy, nuclear, industrial, and military facilities operated by the Pasdaran. The escalation of U.S. airstrikes in such a strategic hotspot like Ispahan is likely motivated by the Trump administration’s clear intent to inflict heavy losses on the mollah’s regime, pressuring them to comply militarily with the conditions set out in Washington’s 15-point plan to end the war. In this context, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth echoed, on Tuesday, President Donald Trump’s reference to a “new power” in Tehran, urging it to exercise “wisdom.” Like the president, he stressed that strikes against the regime would intensify if Tehran refused to endorse the agreement proposed by the U.S. administration. Analysts interpret these statements as confirming that the intense bombings in Isfahan during the night of Monday were meant to give the mollahs a stark “preview” of the consequences of rejecting the American plan. There is growing speculation that a U.S. commando operation could be launched to seize and remove from Iranian territory the 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent currently held by the Pasdaran. A ground assault to take control of the strategic Kharg Island is also reportedly under consideration. As the course of military operations continues to unfold, nearly 2,500 Marines arrived in the region earlier this week. They are expected to be joined shortly by several thousand additional paratroopers and Marines, who would be deployed in preparation for potential targeted missions inside Iranian territory. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force has intensified its raids against military and industrial infrastructure. An IDF source told on Tuesday that, in the past 24 hours alone, airstrikes have struck nearly 250 sites, including missile launch ramps. West Bekaa The second “hotspot” in the ongoing military operations is West Bekaa. During the night of Monday, the Israeli Air Force carried out a series of intensive air raids on several localities in West Bekaa, notably Yohmor, Sehmor, and surrounding villages. The strikes aimed to isolate West Bekaa from southern Lebanon by rendering the main roads connecting the two regions impassable. The Bekaa and Baalbek areas have drawn particular attention from analysts because of the risk of escalation in these regions, as Hezbollah reportedly uses the region to launch missiles toward Israel. Lebanese Army Withdrawal The most significant development on the ground on Tuesday was the Lebanese army’s decision to withdraw from the Bint Jbeil area, specially from the Christian border villages of Debel and Rmeich. This retreat could signal the beginning of a battle centered around the town of Bint Jbeil. On the diplomatic front, the UN Security Council held an emergency session on Tuesday evening (Beirut time) at France’s request to discuss the situation created by recent attacks on UNIFIL, which left three peacekeepers dead. Beyond the formal statements, the session was notable for an intervention by Lebanon’s permanent UN representative, who strongly condemned Hezbollah for dragging the country into a war against the government’s will. In a related move, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Lebanese UN mission instructing it to inform UN bodies that the Cabinet has decided to consider any military or security presence of Hezbollah in Lebanon as illegal.

Tel Aviv–Tehran: Bloody Mimicry and "Double Enemy" (2/2)

Lebanon has for years been subjected to this dual logic of violence and exclusion, that famous “escalation to extremes” — to borrow René Girard's expression, itself drawn from Clausewitz — punctuated by moments of objective collusion and a measured relaxation of hostility. It is the only country paying the price of a confrontation with Israel, no longer even in the service of an Arab cause, the just and legitimate Palestinian cause, but for the greater glory of the mullahs of Tehran. In that sense, Hezbollah's behaviour — having triggered three devastating wars in 2006, 2024 and 2026 — cannot be justified by any purported concern for confronting the Jewish state. Certain voices will invoke the villages of Shebaa and the Kfar Shouba hills to justify the continuation of the resistance, but that argument has been dismantled, maps in hand, since 2006, exposed as a fabrication designed to legitimise the continuation of the Hezbollah project and, at the time, as a pretext for justifying the perpetuation of Syrian occupation — namely, the struggle against Israel. The reality is bitter, but it must be spoken plainly: if Hezbollah's fighters are battling on Lebanese soil, and if they are themselves Lebanese through and through, they fight for and on the orders of Iran. Their party has triggered three wars at Tehran's instigation, on command. In the name of a manufactured will to resist Israel, Hezbollah has literally invited the Israelis to occupy Lebanon. Not that they needed a pretext — but why hand them one freely? Why strew the road to Jerusalem with Israeli checkpoints on Lebanese territory? Why contribute, paradoxically, to giving life to Greater Israel? Called upon to restore to the state its legitimate monopoly on force, its Iranian mother-house under attack, its marjaa assassinated, the party chose the path of suicidal escalation. The Lebanese state cannot be held responsible for that choice. Besides, Hezbollah never sought its opinion before taking its decisions for war. The height of the absurdity is that the state should bear, in every way and on every occasion, the weight of Iran's strategic manipulations on the backs of the Lebanese, with Hezbollah's foot soldiers serving, each time, as pawns. A peace of the vanquished Lebanon does not want this war, despite the frenzied enthusiasm of various parties eager to use it for settling scores on the domestic scene. This is, once again, a war between Israel and Iran being fought on its territory. There are no 'good' and 'bad' actors here — only two occupiers who must cease instrumentalising Lebanon, recognise its sovereignty and return within their own borders, and a militia that must surrender its weapons to the Lebanese state and cease suiciding its own community by transforming it into cannon fodder through voluntary servitude. Iran handed Israel the opportunity to complete its destruction of the Palestinian cause through Hamas's folly, and now the same scenario is playing out with Hezbollah. Neither project has any use for Lebanon as a sovereign and independent country. An Israeli victory would impose upon Lebanon a peace of the vanquished. A Hezbollah victory, even obtained by default, would produce a new episode of vengeance against the Lebanese state — and against those Lebanese who reject this war and oppose its project. Those who wish to fight and settle accounts by supporting one or the other side, with that delicious and insufferable outbidding from the depths of their salon armchairs in North America or Europe, are contributing to Lebanon's destruction, willingly or not. Whatever the outcome of the conflict, Lebanon is not an end in itself for either party. The settlement will be made at its expense, in the international sphere, because it has once again consented — through a mixture of decisional incompetence and impotence — to being transformed into a battleground. But the Lebanese are not without the capacity to weigh meaningfully on the outcome of a conflict that surpasses them. They can, and must, rally behind Lebanese legality — provided that legality continues to take itself seriously. Now more than ever. It is the only remaining possibility of saving Lebanon. Iran first It is time for the hardliners of every community who support Hezbollah to understand that the party fights neither for the banner of Palestine, nor for the honour of the Shia community, nor for the South, the Beqaa and the rest of Lebanese territory, but for Iran, Iran first, and Iran alone. The “resistance to Israel” as conducted by Hezbollah has transformed Lebanon into a field of ruins without advancing the Palestinian cause by a single iota. On the contrary, the gains of the liberation of 2000 have been squandered and reversed for the greater glory of Tehran. Lebanon is, once again, nothing more than a vast field of ruins, of displaced persons and the dispossessed. The camp opposed to Hezbollah must understand, for its part, that the Shia community is not responsible for the Hezbollah tumour — which is the product of cumulative factors — and that one cannot ask intellectuals and unarmed forces to stage an intra-muros democratic intifada against a militia armed to the teeth, moreover under cannon fire, or to form some equivalent of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering to delegitimise Hezbollah. The Qornet Shehwan example is particularly impossible to replicate: that gathering had a patron, namely the Maronite Church under the aegis of Nasrallah Sfeir and Youssef Béchara, capable of bringing together Christian political forces that otherwise refused to sit and converse. Who is the Shia authority — spiritual or temporal — capable of uniting the Shia opposition, at a moment when the Supreme Islamic Council has itself been absorbed by the militia? No. The political solution to the Hezbollah problem is Lebanese, not Shia. It lies in the formation of a coalition of representative forces from all communities, including Shia figures, committed on one hand to preserving the idea of the state and reinforcing its decisional capacity in the coming phase, and on the other to putting an end to the logic of violence and exclusion, and to championing a culture of connection, neutrality and peace. Without this, Lebanon is inexorably doomed to disappear. And everyone will bear responsibility for that — not only Hezbollah, and certainly not the Shia community and its valiant democrats.

Tel Aviv–Tehran: Bloody Mimicry and "Double Enemy" (1/2)

The current conflict unfolding before our eyes in Lebanon is indeed a confrontation between Israel and Iran, and more specifically between Israel and Hezbollah. Setting aside any desire to demonise Hezbollah — and yet there is no shortage of valid reasons to do so, from political assassinations, kidnappings, extrajudicial executions, militia coups de force, humiliations of the army, the transformation of Lebanon into a regional hub for money laundering and drug trafficking, to massive contribution to corruption, and the list goes on — Hezbollah is, by its very nature, a branch of Iran's Revolutionary Guards grafted, since 1982, onto a marginalised Shia community abandoned by the Lebanese state. In so doing, it took root in the South of Lebanon, filling the vacuum left by the Lebanese state during the war, before becoming the cherished protégé of the Syrian occupier. This implantation proceeded first through the proliferation of ideological Islamist social organisations that compensated for the absence of state institutions and thereby secured the allegiance of part of the population, then through a form of legitimacy grounded in the discourse of resistance to Israel and its proxies in the South. But it also proceeded through force: the assassination of cadres from the leftist resistance, the 'Brothers' War' with the Amal movement, the protection of the Assad regime in the aftermath of those fratricidal clashes, and above all through the terrorisation of non-Hezbollah Shia opponents, from threats to violence to outright assassination. War, admittedly, presupposes by definition, from the perspective of its protagonists, a binary logic of confrontation between good and evil, friend and enemy. This is not merely the particular preserve of war; it is one of the fundamental axioms of the political. War, specifically, has no use for nuance where politics calls for it. Yet the 'friend-enemy' dyad proper to Carl Schmitt and Julien Freund, however theoretically tempting, cannot serve to analyse the current conflict. A more adequate framework would be that of the 'double enemy,' developed by Jacques Beauchard and better suited to fragile states incapable of influencing disputes provoked by third-party, para-state actors. 'The enemy of one's enemy remains an enemy,' says Beauchard. It is a fact difficult to contest that neither Hezbollah nor, naturally, Israel acts in Lebanon's interest. And what is more, one is compelled to note the near-total mimicry that exists between the two. A state of martial vigilance Since 1948, the State of Israel has found itself in permanent war, seeking to consolidate a legitimacy founded on the erasure of an indigenous people who inhabited the land it now occupies — whatever the ideological pretexts advanced by the Zionists to justify that occupation historically. The logic of the Israeli regime, from Ben Gurion to Netanyahu, has been to remain in a state of martial vigilance against its enemies, in the name of an existential threat it has, moreover, often cultivated — not only to mobilise the Israeli esprit de corps, but to better divide the ranks of its adversaries: the creation of Hamas to counter Fatah; the long toleration of Iranian influence in the region under the banner of the so-called 'alliance of minorities,' with the aim of weakening Arab regimes and perpetuating a state of Sunni-Shia conflict. This logic, with the sole exception of the Oslo interlude — annihilated by the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 — was founded on hatred, exclusion and violence towards the Palestinians, whose abandonment and silent extermination were the sine qua non of peace with the Arab states. Israel thus plays the role of regional gendarme in the Middle East with total impunity, while the myth of Greater Israel continues to titillate the Israeli far right, as recent declarations by certain Israeli and American officials attest. Nor can one overlook, in practice, the annexationist behaviour in Syria and, now, potentially, in Lebanon, facilitated by the current war. Netanyahu himself is a figure in whom galloping megalomania combines with political realism against a backdrop of manifest corruption. Iran's theocratic hegemony On its side, Iran has likewise found itself in a state of permanent war since the advent of the mullahs, and especially of Khomeini in 1979. The project of the wilayat el-faqih is that of a transnational theocratic hegemony, legitimised through those within the Shia community who choose to adhere to it. The Iranian supreme guide is its Leviathan, its hegemon , its dictator. The export of the Islamic revolution has been the daawa — in the Khaldounian sense, the political discourse elaborated to conquer power — of Khomeinist Iran since its earliest days, and Iran has never renounced it. All its militia offshoots, Hezbollah first among them, were created to that end. Hezbollah did, admittedly, transform itself — more through realism and opportunism than through conviction or reform — into a political party, in pursuit of entrism within the Lebanese political system. But its command remained miliciano-religious, entirely subordinated in its decision-making to the Pasdaran. Its project, consequently, has no concern for the Lebanese perimeter, as Nasrallah's speeches made plain: they typically reserved only a small portion for the Lebanese situation, at the tail end of interminable analyses of regional affairs through an Iranian lens. The 'Open Letter to the Oppressed' remains Hezbollah's political document, notwithstanding its cosmetic enterprise of 'softening' its face through political opportunism. To legitimise its existence, Hezbollah adopted the daawa of resistance to Israel, after having systematically liquidated the cadres of the national resistance formed by the left — notably the Lebanese Communist Party. Part of the left was subsequently placed under Syrian tutelage and brought to heel by Assad, then financially and politically absorbed by Iran. Moderate, Lebanese-oriented leaderships were marginalised — even Nabih Berri reduced gradually, especially after the end of Syrian tutelage, to the rank of politico-institutional screen serving Hezbollah's purposes. This tribunician function of resistance to Israel did not, however, prevent Hezbollah from implicitly playing the role of border guard for the Jewish state following the Israeli withdrawal of 2000, with Tel Aviv's tacit approval. Israel's paramount objective was to be done with the Palestinian cause, Hezbollah serving, in that framework, as an objective ally on Lebanese territory, the very antithesis of its rhetoric of 'liberating Palestine.' Iran thus laid its hands on the Palestinian cause, via Hamas and Hezbollah — a genuine windfall for Tel Aviv, which could thereby justify a permanent escalation against Islamist actors, impossible to legitimise in the eyes of the international community, rather than against moderate political actors such as Fatah or the left. This objective alliance collided sporadically with Iranian ambitions to maximise pressure on Israel through its proxies, in the context of regional negotiations with the West. The tacit entente was thus shaken in 2006 by the July War. But, paradoxically, that war — and the adoption of Resolution 1701, which temporarily pushed Hezbollah back from the southern border — proved a golden opportunity for the party, marginalised on the Lebanese scene and starved of legitimacy since its assassination of Rafic Hariri in February 2005, to restore its image by draping itself in a Pyrrhic 'divine victory.' After 2006, it therefore devoted itself to its initial and fundamental objective: seizing power in Beirut on Tehran's behalf. This enterprise had begun with the arrangements of April 1996 and the campaign against Rafic Hariri, aimed at hollowing out the Lebanese state and transforming it economically and politically into an emaciated skeleton, to the benefit of the viable mini-state it had built for itself. In the same spirit, it blocked in 1993 the army's deployment to the South, intervening with Damascus to annul the decision taken in that direction by Hariri. After the July 2006 war, it again prevented the troops from deploying to the South in accordance with Resolution 1701, while multiplying attacks against UNIFIL. Hariri's assassination was likewise inscribed in this broader project of sapping the state. The occupation of downtown Beirut after the 2006 war as an act of vengeance against the Lebanese state and the March 14 camp, then the siege of the Grand Sérail to force the fall of the Siniora cabinet, the coup de force of 7 May 2008, the obtaining at Doha of the blocking third within the government, the disintegration of March 14 under the obsessive power-seeking of its various components, and the accession of Michel Aoun to the presidency — all of these brought this process to completion. The Lebanese state has been in Hezbollah's crosshairs from the outset. The party lost its grip on it with the collapse of the Iranian empire following 7 October 2023 and its catastrophic war in support of Gaza, and it is on that state that it will potentially unleash itself once the current war is over. The work has already begun: it has turned its fury on Nawaf Salam as it did in 2006 against Fouad Siniora — who had, it should be recalled, halted the war and the destruction in Rome, saving the pro-Iranian party from a far grimmer fate. The Lebanese state is now seeking to stop the war, and yet it is on that very state that Hezbollah vents its rage — even though it is the party that, once again, has landed itself, and Lebanon with it, in this predicament. Finally, the paroxysm of mimicry: the imperialist project of Greater Israel, driven by a fundamentalist and sectarian logic, finds its perfect mirror in the imperialist project of Greater Persia, realised on the ground after the 2015 nuclear agreement through Iran's grip on Damascus, Beirut, Sanaa and Baghdad — propelled by another megalomaniac, opportunist and corrupt figure, the late Khamenei. Both forces are animated by a nostalgia for a golden age, rooted in religious myths and a shared millenarian and eschatological vision. In sum: enemies, yes. But also two sides of the same coin — and two calamities for Lebanon.

The Choice of the Fear of Choice
By
Akram Nehmé
Published

Lebanon lives under pressure, caught between what strikes it from without and what holds it back from within, and with time, what was once exceptional has become almost normal. The real problem is no longer merely what comes from elsewhere; it lies in this incapacity to cut through, in this suspended moment where the State sees perfectly clearly what must be done and yet cannot bring itself to take the step. It is not a failure of understanding. It is a fear that has settled in slowly, fed by a history in which every internal confrontation has left scars too deep to be ignored. When a country has known war, it develops not only reflexes but carries traumas, deep-rooted fears, survival mechanisms that push it to avoid, to circumvent, to defer, even when that very flight becomes a danger in itself. And so one speaks, one explains, one evades, one does not act. This is no longer caution. It is paralysis. That is where the paradox takes hold. The clearer the situation, the less it is addressed, as though seeing more sharply made every decision harder to face. Reassuring names are given to this deadlock — one speaks of prudence, of realism, one dresses inaction in acceptable words, when at bottom what is involved is an inability to follow through on what one already knows. One clings to intermediate solutions, to fragile equilibria, to compromises that give the illusion of holding things together, when in fact they do nothing but delay the inevitable, and this time gained serves not the country but what is blocking it. One reassures oneself by speaking of stability, and in reality one lies to oneself, believing oneself more cunning than reality, as though putting off a decision were the same as mastering it. But these half-measures stabilize nothing. They embed the problem, they anchor it, they render it more legitimate with time, and above all more difficult to correct. What was meant to be temporary takes root, what was meant to be an exception becomes a rule, and what was meant to be contested ends up imposing itself. Meanwhile the balance of forces does not weaken; it consolidates, it organizes, it normalizes, and what was still possible yesterday becomes risky today, almost impossible tomorrow. The choice never disappears. It degrades, it hardens, it grows more costly, until the moment when refusing to decide amounts to accepting what one claims to be avoiding. Lebanon does not lack lucidity. It lacks a State capable of shouldering the decisions it knows to be necessary. This is not a situation without an exit. The way out exists, but it demands a price that one still refuses to pay. It is not the enemy's bombs that bring down a State. It is the day a State accepts that it is no longer the one who decides.

The Martyrdom of Nicolas Kluiters SJ, in Lebanon: Confronting Evil (2/3)

The feast of Saint Joseph (March 19), patron of the university that bears his name, brought to the mind of its new rector, Father François Boëdec, SJ, the memory of Alban de Jerphanion, the first Jesuit martyr of the seemingly endless war that erupted in Lebanon in 1975 – whose latest chapter, hoped to be the last, began unfolding in early March. Five other martyrs of that conflict fell after Father de Jerphanion. In tribute to their sacrifice, and with the publication of a new biography devoted to one of their holiest figures – the Dutch priest Nicolas Kluiters, whose cause for beatification is under way – this work is presented here, revealing previously unpublished details about the motivations of those who killed Father Nicolas. At the same time, it sheds light on the broader meaning of the gift he made to Lebanon, so that the country might endure as a model of “freedom and pluralism” for both East and West, at a moment when a heavily militarized nation threatens to strip it of a vital part of its territory, marked by the memory of Christ’s passage. The insertion of a thoroughly Dutch man into a Lebanese environment did not come easily. It required a substantial degree of adaptation and renunciation. Gifted in the arts, Nicolas Kluiters had initially set his sights on painting before discovering a calling as an apostle. The contrast was stark: a refined sensibility set against the harshness of the human landscape around him. He also consciously turned away from a West whose achievements, wealth – and, perhaps, illusions – were admired by his new parishioners. In his journal, his biographer notes, he wrote: “I am convinced that Western culture is in full decline in all areas of its expression. Its scientific achievements and knowledge amount to a practical waste of strength and energy. (…) The present greatness of the West is founded on military and economic supremacy, not at all on spiritual greatness.” He had to convey his convictions to men and women who saw him both as an “outsider” – his Arabic pronunciation was at first barely intelligible – and as a brother. At times, he was troubled by the language barrier, watching Maronite priests administer the sacraments to people who were meant to be his own parishioners. Within him, an apostolic vocation and social resistance were in constant tension. Moreover, his ministry brought him into contact with a form of clericalism for which he, at times, felt “a deep repugnance.” So much so that, a few months before his martyrdom, he considered devoting himself to poorer communities and even contemplated going to Sudan, believing he was no longer of use in Barqa. Father Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, however, took a different view, judging that the Sisters of the Sacred Hearts still needed his presence. The priority, therefore, was to consolidate his work, despite the danger. He resumed his mission. Tortured and Killed Upright, direct, and at times impulsive – he occasionally slapped students in class before correcting himself – Father Nicolas established himself in Barqa as an indispensable authority in both spiritual and civic affairs. Yet his life was not as austere as the Lebanese thistle, nor was he an unknowing stoic. A sensitive man, he formed closed friendships and, like any ordinary person, drew admiring glances, which he met with quiet reserve. He became widely popular. It was this, ultimately, that cost him his life. “See how the people follow him,” his enemies are said to have remarked. He came to be regarded as “undesirable” by Syrian and by rising Shiite groups which, according to his biographer, sought to “empty the Bekaa of its Christians.” An opportunity to eliminate him was actively sought. He was even warned directly by one or two Syrian soldiers he had picked up while hitchhiking. On March 14, 1985, the opportunity arose. After visiting the Hermel region, where he had celebrated Mass for a group of nuns, he set off in haste to return to Barqa, taking the road through the mixed villages of Nabha and Qaddâm – a route he usually advised visitors to avoid. It was on that road that he fell into an ambush, was arrested, tortured, and killed. Even forty years later, readers of the biography may find the account shocking. After days of searching, his body – already in an advanced state of decomposition – was recovered from a ravine in the area, where it had been lowered after death, hands bound with a rope. The medical examiner determined that he had died on March 14, the day of his disappearance. His funeral was held on April 3, 1985, at the Jesuit fathers’ convent in Taanayel. He is buried in the convent cemetery. Hell at Work The sadism of his torturers and killers was proof enough that it was not only men at work, but that hell itself seemed to have joined in. In his pastoral work, Father Nicolas occasionally discerned anomalies he attributed to “impure spirits.” For example, he recounted that during a baptism, the glass of a window had shattered from a sudden gust of wind “just as he had commanded Satan to depart.” Two or three times in his life, Father Nicolas experienced a vague, overwhelming dread, as if he were being swallowed by a chasm. He is no longer here to speak of it, yet the fact that his body was later recovered from a ravine is unlikely to be mere coincidence. Every Christian life carries its share of spiritual struggle against the Adversary, its own agony, its own Garden of Olives. We have, on this subject, an extraordinary testimony from the renowned French war correspondent Jean-Claude Guillebaud. In his book How I Became a Christian Again , he recounts how, while covering the war in Lebanon, he was confronted with “the question of Evil” (his capitalization) because of the “funeral procession of massacres” that accompanied the conflict. To him, these massacres were evidence of a “barbaric jubilation that could not be explained solely by ideological or religious passion.” Father Kluiters’ body was officially identified by his dentist, Dr. Sleïman Khnaisser, who recognized him by the dental work he had performed on his lower jaw. The medical examiner declared that in his entire career, he had never seen a body “so horrifically treated.” Beyond the blows, he noted signs of strangulation and throat-slitting. The ruthless treatment of Father Nicolas Kluiters’ body stands as a striking example of the demonic horrors that marked Lebanon’s civil war. Next Article: The Troubling Testament of Ghassibé Keyrouz, Right-Hand Man of Father Nicolas Kluiters, SJ Read More on the Same Topic: “He Died So That Lebanon Might Live,” the Ultimate Sacrifice of Father Nicolas Kluiters, SJ

Is the "New Iranian Regime" Invoked by Trump Really "Cartesian"?

We are witnessing a new kind of war, one that has pitted the American and Israeli armies against the Islamic Republic of Iran since February 28. To reduce it to its barest outline, we might say that what confronts us is a conflict that blends, in the popular idiom, “the stick and the carrot” in so entangled a fashion that it becomes difficult to read between the lines and discern the share and degree of truth, of manoeuvre, of outright falsehood, or of deliberate concealment on the part of each belligerent. Monday, March 30, 2026, illustrated this complexity in all its dimensions. President Donald Trump returned to the subject in an interview with the New York Post , noting the presence in Tehran of a “new regime that is proving Cartesian and rational” in its conduct, one that is “more flexible than the leaders who were eliminated” at the outset of the war. Trump maintained that talks with this “new regime” are proceeding in the right direction, while simultaneously acknowledging that he is “not certain” any agreement can be reached, going so far as to suggest that “in all likelihood, there will be no deal.” Declining to identify the senior Iranian official with whom Washington is in negotiations, he confined himself to noting that he might reveal his identity within “a week.” The elementary question this raises is twofold: does a genuine “new power” actually exist in Tehran, and if so, is it truly “more Cartesian and rational” than its predecessor, as President Trump has repeatedly claimed? If this new Iranian interlocutor, assuming he exists, is as Cartesian as the American president contends, what evidence do Washington’s leaders have that his posture really reflects a new mode of thinking in Tehran? Past experience has shown that the mullahs’ regime, from whose ranks this mysterious “new interlocutor” necessarily emerges, has become a consummate practitioner of taqiyya , the concealment of the real thinking of the person or party in question, while waiting for the storm to subside and the geostrategic circumstances to shift in a more favourable direction, in this precise case toward the Islamic Republic. Given this well-established fact, can one genuinely place trust in a personality or a faction drawn from the ranks of a regime that spent 47 years constructing its power on a theocratic, totalitarian, and obscurantist ideology, profoundly anti-Western in its orientation, on terrorism, bloody repression, and above all taqiyya ? President Trump underscored on Monday, in one of his statements, his determination to exact retribution for every act of aggression perpetrated by the mullahs’ regime over 47 years against the American military, notably in Beirut in 1983, and against American nationals in Lebanon as well. Can one simply wipe the slate clean on nearly half a century of belligerence, by taking the same actors and naively starting over? The Iranian position All these questions, or rather these unknowns, press with even greater urgency given that they are confirmed by the public stances displayed by official Iranian sources (which do not necessarily reflect reality, taqiyya being what it is). Those sources again denied on Monday that any talks are underway with the Trump administration, stating only, as they have done in preceding days, that what exists is an “exchange of messages” through intermediaries, presumably Pakistani. In any event, the same sources reaffirm that the 15-point plan proposed by the United States is unacceptable to the Islamic Republic. Trump denied this on Monday, in his New York Post interview, asserting that the “new power” has accepted “most of the 15 points.” The military data Faced with the shadows enveloping the positions of each side, and while waiting for the situation to clarify, observers have nothing left, in this Holy Week, but to adopt the stance once taken by Saint Thomas, grounding themselves in real and tangible facts. The American administration thus displays the will to engage in direct talks toward a comprehensive agreement ending the current conflict, while simultaneously routing significant reinforcements into the region, among them the aircraft carrier George Bush, as well as detachments of thousands of Marines, paratroopers, and elite units. There is persistent talk in this context of targeted commando operations on land and of a landing on Kharg Island that would allow the United States to control Iranian oil production and exports, a strategic factor of the highest order that could well rank among Washington’s objectives. Moreover, even as constructive talks with the “new Iranian interlocutors” are said to be ongoing, American and Israeli air strikes against the full range of Iranian military, industrial, and strategic installations have continued at an intensive pace around Tehran and Isfahan, extending on Monday, for the second time, to the Caspian Sea zone in Iran’s far north, in proximity to the Russian border. On the Lebanese front, Monday morning was marked by several strikes against the southern suburbs of Beirut, where a senior Hezbollah military commander was killed, while in South Lebanon the Israeli army pressed its systematic encroachment on further stretches of Lebanese territory, reaching, according to Lebanese sources, the Litani River, with advances penetrating 14 kilometres from the border between the two countries. These military developments unfolded as a summit was convening in Saudi Arabia, bringing together Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and King Abdullah of Jordan.