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The Iranian mullah regime, and more specifically the radical faction represented by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, continues to seek control over the Strait of Hormuz crisis by dictating its own terms and sidelining the United States from ongoing negotiations—indeed, outright denying Washington any role in the emerging solution. To achieve this goal, Tehran's decision-makers negotiated the proposed settlement exclusively with the Sultanate of Oman, taking care to insist that no dialogue is taking place with the US. Even more strikingly, pushing its arrogance and open contempt for the American president even further, the Iranian regime declared on Wednesday morning that 'the agreement with Oman has been postponed due to threats made by the United States.' Tehran is thus dealing with the US Administration as a 'victor'—not only seeking to impose its own rules of the game, but deliberately treating its 'enemy' in a humiliating manner, interpreting President Donald Trump's hesitations and wavering as a sign of weakness it intends to exploit. In this context, the local outlet al-Janoubiya , which reflects the Lebanese Shia opposition movement hostile to Hezbollah, is reporting information drawn from the Iranian press that once again confirms the existence of a rift within the Iranian regime—and, more notably, reveals that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has been sidelined from the ongoing negotiations. Indeed, a senior source at Iran's Foreign Ministry stated on Wednesday that 'no visit by the Foreign Minister or the Speaker of Parliament (the principal Iranian negotiators) is planned to Pakistan or Qatar' (the main mediators between the US and Iran). At the same time, al-Janoubiya also reports that a senior figure within the regime's radical wing allegedly declared that if Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian submits his resignation once again, it will be accepted immediately. This atmosphere within Iran surrounding the negotiations over the management of the Strait of Hormuz, and Tehran's stubborn insistence on keeping the US out of any solution, cast serious doubt on the solidity and credibility of the agreement the regime has negotiated with Oman. An authorized Iranian source stressed on Wednesday evening that the Iran-Oman agreement 'does not mean the Strait of Hormuz will become safe' and 'does not mean the strait will be fully reopened'! In practical terms, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi indicated that evening that the agreement negotiated with Oman involves 'a different management model from the one that has been in place for sixty years.' The spokesman further specified that, at Tehran's request, the Sultanate is prepared to change 'the entry and exit corridors for commercial vessels.' The question now is whether President Trump will accept the rules of the game as defined by the regime's radical wing—especially given that, at the same time, the Houthis, the Pasdaran's Yemeni allies, continue to escalate their campaign in the Red Sea against Saudi Arabia. The Houthi spokesman announced on Wednesday evening that the militia had targeted 'a Saudi oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden with a ballistic missile.' Earlier in the day, a British source had also reported an attack off the coast of Yemen against a commercial vessel. These attacks came after President Trump had declared in the afternoon that he would hold Iran responsible for any Houthi attack against Saudi ships. In any case, Minister Araghchi stressed, in the context of the talks with Oman, that any agreement with the sultanate regarding the Strait of Hormuz will need to be approved by Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. Yet the Iranian president declared late in the evening that "contact with the Supreme Leader is extremely difficult at this stage"… The Lebanese file It was against this particularly murky backdrop, fraught with unpredictable consequences, that the second day of the seventh round of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel took place on Wednesday, in a more positive atmosphere than the day before. This was announced late in the day by sources close to Baabda, who indicated that the discussions had resulted in the formation of three committees tasked with political, military, and border demarcation issues between the two countries. It is on this last point that the most notable progress has been recorded. The Baabda sources noted that the Lebanese delegation presented a detailed and well-documented study on the subject, and the American representative paid tribute to the position put forward by the Lebanese side in this regard. The other subject discussed between the Lebanese and Israeli delegations was the identification of a third party that would be responsible for ensuring the absence of any Hezbollah militia presence in the pilot zones evacuated by the IDF and taken over by the Lebanese army. Israel is said to oppose a role for France in this regard. However, observers note that the Italian Foreign Minister held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart, and separately, a senior Italian officer met in Beirut with the chief of staff of the Lebanese army — fueling speculation that Italy could be chosen as the third party tasked with ensuring strict compliance with the terms of the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel. In any case, Wednesday afternoon's session was adjourned ahead of schedule, at the request of the American delegation, "due to developments on the ground," a State Department official said early in the evening. Bkerké backs negotiations with Israel To close this diplomatic chapter, it should be noted that following its monthly meeting held at Bkerké — as customary, every first Wednesday of the month — the assembly of Maronite bishops issued a communiqué in which the prelates expressed their full support for the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, under American auspices, with the aim of achieving a "full withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon and the return of residents to their villages (…)". Significantly, the Bkerké communiqué explicitly stresses that the path of negotiations with Israel being pursued by the Lebanese authorities must continue "away from attempts to tie this process to foreign agendas" — a barely veiled allusion to the Iranian regime's desire to take control of the South Lebanon card. On the ground in South Lebanon, Wednesday, August 6, 2026 was a deadly day. It began with the explosion of an improvised device in the village of Majdel Zoun, in the Tyre district. The blast killed two and wounded seven in the ranks of the Israeli army, one of them critically. Following this explosion, the IDF issued a communiqué strongly accusing Hezbollah of having violated the ceasefire in Lebanon and announcing that retaliatory strikes would be carried out in the South. In fact, a drone attack was carried out against the town of Tebnine, killing one person and wounding 12 others. At the same time, the forces of the Hebrew State announced that they had destroyed an underground infrastructure belonging to Hezbollah in the village of Srebbine (Bint Jbeil district), where significant quantities of weapons and ammunition were seized.

Escalating tensions in the Gulf are heightening global concerns over a new disruption to navigation in the Red Sea. Such a development would impose new constraints on an already costly global maritime trade network while triggering another supply crisis in areas close to the conflict zones surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and the geopolitical risks associated with them in the Middle East, should the conflict drag on. The same scenario has repeated itself so often that it has become almost predictable. President Donald Trump has raised his threats to their highest level. Washington is openly discussing the possibility of a large-scale strike, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio speaks of alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz. Markets have begun pricing in the prospect of a regional war. Oil prices surge, stock markets retreat, and the region slips deeper into uncertainty. Political leaders, meanwhile, view the crisis through their own respective lenses. Some are guided by the calculations of upcoming elections, others by shifting balances of power and influence. Lobbying groups and major corporations, for their part, continue to operate according to the logic of interests and profits, at times benefiting from the very market volatility created by the crises themselves. Financial markets no longer regard this pattern as an exception but as a recurring reality. Every escalation pushes oil prices higher over fears of disruptions to energy supplies. As soon as signs of de-escalation emerge, prices begin to fall once again. The same dynamic affects financial markets, which react sharply to every new threat before recovering part of their losses whenever the prospect of an agreement reappears. Despite this, concerns continue to mount over further disruptions to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, as container shipping activity across the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Suez Canal has already declined sharply. More than fifty countries have been affected so far. In several African nations, including Nigeria, the ongoing conflict has worsened poverty and child hunger. In Germany, production at Tesla factories has slowed after more than eighteen international shipping companies rerouted their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, delaying the delivery of industrial raw materials. The Japanese shipping giant NYK has also suspended its operations through the Red Sea. This diversion has quadrupled shipping costs because of the much longer route along the African coastline. It has also disrupted global supply chains and delayed the delivery of industrial and technological components from China, Taiwan, and other East Asian economies. Over recent months, a growing number of commercial vessels have abandoned their traditional route through the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal in both directions. These waterways previously handled nearly 20,000 cargo ships each year out of a global merchant fleet of approximately 105,000 vessels, which transported nearly 15 billion tons of goods and raw materials by sea in 2024. The return of inflation has become one of the greatest challenges facing governments worldwide, even after they had partially adapted to the economic consequences of disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz. The situation revives memories of the imbalances that marked the global economy in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. Europe is increasingly concerned about rising oil prices and the possibility of a broader conflict across the Middle East. European Union economies continue to bear the heavy costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Any shift in U.S. strategy would usher in a new economic reality for Europe, marked by widening disparities in growth and an increasingly uneven competitive landscape. European leaders appear deeply unsettled and must make decisions quickly. They are ill-equipped to withstand another economic shock combining inflation, unemployment, and climate-related disasters, while the European Union continues searching for alternative energy suppliers located much farther away. By contrast, during the months of the American war against Iran, the U.S. economy, driven primarily by domestic demand, remained relatively resilient. At the same time, U.S. trade with North American partners and ASEAN countries expanded to around $1.2 trillion, while maritime trade routes increasingly shifted toward the Pacific Ocean. China’s trade, meanwhile, reached approximately $800 billion. The exploration of the seas ranks among humanity’s greatest adventures. It transformed the Mediterranean, with all its trade and wealth, into a vast arena of exchange linking the ancient Phoenicians, Greeks, Egyptians, North Africa, Southern Europe, and India. Rome laid the foundations of its commercial and military sea routes there. The voyages of Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama, the Silk Road journeys associated with Marco Polo, and Admiral Ferdinand Magellan’s circumnavigation of the globe all contributed to opening new maritime routes for international trade. Yet the sea serves far more than a single purpose. More than one million people earn their living in the maritime sector, whether aboard ships or on docks and in ports. Beyond them lie entire industries built around shipbuilding, fishing, recreational boating, and maritime tourism. The maritime economy also supports development strategies by stimulating numerous industrial sectors, including steel, aluminum, cable manufacturing, and fiberglass production. Any expansion of maritime conflicts, from Bab el-Mandeb to the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan, at a time when the global economy is growing by barely 3% , would generate further political and economic repercussions. Its economic and psychological consequences would continue to weigh heavily on the lives of millions of people. Financial analysts estimate that goods worth no less than $3 trillion pass through the Red Sea every year, accounting for roughly 13% of global trade, a figure projected to rise to $5 trillion by 2050. Despite the strategic importance of this global trade corridor, the Red Sea route still lacks many essential maritime services and infrastructures. These include shipyards, maintenance facilities, maritime industries, and institutions responsible for ensuring the free flow of international trade. It also lacks the broader logistics ecosystem required to support international shipping, including the movement of nearly 80% of globally traded food products, particularly grains and palm oil. There are also growing concerns that regional transport and supply routes could be redrawn at the expense of Egypt and several African countries. Egypt stands to lose the most, as revenues from the Suez Canal, estimated at around $11 billion annually, remain under pressure. Approximately 15% of global trade, 30% of worldwide container traffic, and 8% of global crude oil shipments pass through the canal. Meanwhile, Israel has established its largest military observation post and most important strategic platform in Eritrea, overlooking the Strait of Tiran. Its confrontation with Iran is fueling tensions that could escalate into broader regional and international violence while encouraging piracy and identity-driven violence, with potentially serious consequences for Arab national security. Yet the Arab world still lacks a comprehensive common strategy to secure this vital maritime passage and build an effective framework for collective Arab security. Such a vacuum risks undermining the role of regional states, weakening their political independence, and eroding their strategic vitality. Thus, oil prices may decline after President Trump announces the postponement of any military strike, and stock markets may rally on reports of an imminent agreement. Yet none of this means that peace has been achieved or that the underlying causes of tension have disappeared. The Middle East is living through neither an open war nor a stable peace. Instead, it exists in a gray zone between the two, where the instruments of confrontation constantly evolve while their economic and psychological consequences continue to shape the lives of millions of people. Any new escalation would affect everyone. It would weigh on global growth, fuel inflation, drive up the cost of gasoline, electronic devices, and insurance premiums, and accelerate the search for alternative shipping routes, including the development of “green maritime corridors” discussed at the Glasgow Conference. It would also encourage investment in port infrastructure, the liberalization of the maritime sector in Morocco and across Africa, advances in technology, logistics services, and digital connectivity, as well as the expansion of offshore industries, maritime simulators, and maritime academies. This recurring cycle of crises does not suggest that the region is moving toward peace. On the contrary, it reveals a different reality: neither all-out war nor genuine stability, but the permanent management of crises. Escalation has become a negotiating tool, threats have become instruments of political leverage, and negotiations increasingly serve to postpone confrontation rather than resolve it. Yet amid this political and strategic confrontation, only one party continues to pay the real price: the people. Will Arab states recognize the importance of developing strategies to protect their “oil sea”, the maritime space that remains one of the central pillars of global trade?

Before anything else, Sheikh Naim, you must understand that all Lebanese are paying today for your political recklessness, your blind submission to Iran, and your unilateral decisions that dragged Lebanon into wars neither its people nor its State chose or approved. Those who brought the country to this tragic reality and allowed the Israeli occupation to return to parts of Southern Lebanon are not those striving today to save the country. They are those who submitted to Iran’s orders and unilaterally declared war, outside the framework of the State, its institutions, and its sovereign decision-making. Those who threw the South into an open confrontation and exposed the Lebanese people to destruction and displacement are the ones who dragged Lebanon into a war serving the Iranian project, not those who are now working to pull the country out of its crisis and restore its institutions. Those striving to save what remains of the homeland are President General Joseph Aoun and the Prime Minister, who are working to restore the State’s sovereign authority over national decision-making and to pull Lebanon out of the cycle of wars. A clear example is the President’s proposal to place the Ali al-Taher hill under the control of the Lebanese Army, a proposal that you rejected even though it had been accepted by the Israeli side. The question today is not about the strategic importance of the hill, as that is beyond dispute. The real question is why you refuse to hand it over to the Lebanese Army. Is it because it constitutes the highest observation point overlooking vast areas of Southern Lebanon, giving whoever controls it a decisive advantage in surveillance and the direction of fire? Is it because its military infrastructure, fortifications, and tunnel network represent years of strategic investment, making its transfer to the Lebanese Army the loss of one of your most important assets on the battlefield? Or is the real reason that handing it over to the Lebanese Army would, in practice, amount to acknowledging the principle that the State alone should possess arms, and that military decision-making belongs exclusively to the legitimate authorities? Whatever the answer, the paradox remains striking. If the choice is between handing the site over to the Lebanese Army or seeing it destroyed by Israel, how can the Israeli option be regarded as the lesser evil? And how can the destruction of a Lebanese position by the enemy be preferable to placing it under the authority of the Lebanese Army? You should not lose sight of one fundamental fact, Sheikh Naim: you lead an armed militia operating outside the framework of the Lebanese State’s legitimacy. No speech and no campaign of accusations of treason can alter that reality. The State’s exclusive right to bear arms is not merely a political slogan. It is a sovereign and constitutional principle from which there can be no turning back, and it will ultimately be implemented, however long it takes. Finally, the direct negotiations undertaken by the Lebanese State, in accordance with its sovereignty and national interest, are not a concession. They are an instrument for restoring rights and the least costly path toward liberating territory, securing the release of prisoners, and rebuilding what the wars imposed on Lebanon in the service of projects unrelated to the national interest have destroyed.

Six years after the catastrophic explosion at the Port of Beirut, at a time when it is more than likely that Hezbollah, with the complicity of others, shielded the stockpiling of ammonium nitrate, Lebanon is still struggling against its internal enemy. That enemy is embodied by Hezbollah’s weapons, which have been used both inside Lebanon and beyond its borders, particularly in Syria, long before the so-called “war in support of Gaza”, a war that ultimately brought disaster upon Lebanon’s Shiite community and, above all, a national calamity for the country itself. The latest remarks by Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem are further proof of this reality. He accused the Lebanese authorities of having “helped Israel instead of helping Lebanon,” adding that “President Joseph Aoun has become a party to the conflict and a source of division, which is incompatible with the role he is supposed to play.” These statements are merely another chapter in Iran’s ongoing war against the Lebanese State and all its institutions. Fortunately, arrogance cannot conceal defeat. What Lebanon is facing today is a defeat brought about by Hezbollah. Because of that defeat, for which Hezbollah, in other words Iran, bears responsibility, Lebanon now finds itself forced to fight on two fronts under exceptionally difficult circumstances. The first is Iran’s war against the Lebanese State. The second is the struggle to end the Israeli occupation so that displaced residents can finally return to their towns and villages. Difficult negotiations with Israel recently took place in Rome with the aim of bringing that occupation to an end. Everything Hezbollah, backed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, is doing today serves only to reinforce Israel’s position. How can the Lebanese negotiator respond when the Israeli side points out that Hezbollah’s weapons were used to threaten Israeli communities in the Galilee? It was from this perspective that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam replied with remarkable clarity to Hezbollah’s Secretary General, without mentioning him by name: “Today, some accuse the political authorities of helping Israel instead of defending Lebanon’s sovereignty, then call for dialogue and unity as though the Lebanese had no memory. The greatest service ever rendered to Israel came from those who single handedly dragged Lebanon into the reckless adventures of the so called ‘support wars,’ providing Israel with every pretext to attack our country, trample its sovereignty, destroy its towns and villages, kill its people, and displace hundreds of thousands of them. Those who monopolized the decision of war, who still seek to confiscate the State’s authority and bind Lebanon to foreign agendas and regional axes while disregarding the interests of both their own community and the Lebanese people as a whole, have no standing to lecture anyone about patriotism, let alone sovereignty. Lebanon’s sovereignty can exist only through a single, independent national decision exercised by a State with one army that alone extends its authority across the entire national territory. As for dialogue and unity, they can be built only through the courage to acknowledge the facts, however painful they may be, and to assume responsibility for reckless choices whose heavy cost the Lebanese people continue to bear.” Naim Qassem’s accusations are thus fully answered. He urged the Lebanese authorities to “protect national sovereignty, strengthen the Lebanese Army, secure the withdrawal of the Israeli enemy, rebuild the country, and uncover the truth about the port.” He further claimed that “direct negotiations have brought Lebanon nothing but shame, humiliation, disappointment, and one concession after another.” He even went so far as to assert that “every attack against Lebanon was carried out under American supervision, American management, and with American approval,” while calling on the Lebanese authorities to “stop making free concessions, engage in dialogue with the Resistance, restore Lebanon’s domestic stability, and safeguard sovereignty.” Nor did he forget to praise Iran, claiming that it “ensured that Lebanon was placed at the top of the memorandum of understanding with the United States and insisted on ending the aggression and securing an Israeli withdrawal.” The Hezbollah Secretary General concluded by declaring that “it is the course set by the memorandum of understanding that will bring about Israel’s withdrawal, and without the Resistance’s resilience, nothing would have been achieved.” He added: “We are committed to national unity. The great unity between Hezbollah and Amal has formed an impregnable barrier against Israeli American aggression and against the minor players. Together, as people, Resistance, future, and life, we will continue on our path.” The least one can say about this address, which defies all logic, is that Naim Qassem appears convinced that the Lebanese people have no memory. That includes the memory of the assassination of Rafik Hariri, his companions, many of Lebanon’s finest figures, and ultimately Lokman Slim. He also seems to believe that the Lebanese do not know who opened the southern front without the slightest regard for Lebanon’s sovereignty, even in its most basic sense. It has become abundantly clear that Hezbollah’s Secretary General regards the Lebanese people as a flock incapable of subjecting his positions to the slightest critical scrutiny. He expects the Lebanese State to bear the consequences of the crimes committed by his party against the country, including the return of the Israeli occupation. Naim Qassem’s statements can be explained only by his contempt for the intelligence of the Lebanese people and by Iran’s total domination over Hezbollah. The question therefore remains: how can Lebanon emerge from this crisis? Must it wait for a profound change in Iran? The answer is simple. Lebanon is capable of doing so, provided it understands that true humiliation lies in invoking occupation to justify the continued existence of illegal weapons on its soil. It also lies in refusing to acknowledge that no occupation can be ended without direct negotiations with the occupying power. There is a price that must inevitably be paid. Those who refuse to pay it seek only to continue exploiting southern Lebanon and its people indefinitely, while waiting for the Day of Judgment in the Islamic Republic. In other words, they are waiting for the day when Iran once again becomes a normal State, nothing more, a State that no longer needs to resort to arrogance in order to justify its defeat.

This series of articles aims to provide a clearer understanding of the current situation on the Lebanese scene, viewed through the lens of history and free from passionate, ideological, or romanticized narratives that miss the realities on the ground — leaving readers to draw their own conclusions. The previous thirteen installments offered a reexamination of the events surrounding Hezbollah's rise to power, from the Taif Agreement through the incomplete implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in 2006. Since the end of the 33-day war with Israel in 2006, Hezbollah has worked to rebuild itself in terms of weaponry, reorganization, and redeployment. In short, it took a serious blow during that war, yet surprised Israel with its military capabilities. Over the following two years, it grew into a genuine armed force of regional stature, thanks to four key factors: battlefield experience; Iranian support; the Syrian land bridge (under the Assad regime) linking Tehran to Beirut; and the understanding between its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Lebanese President Emile Lahoud at the time. As a result, the logistical supply corridors from Syria were reactivated, triggering both a quantitative and qualitative leap in the pro-Iranian militia's arsenal. Some estimates suggest its rocket stockpile increased tenfold, rising from roughly 15,000 in 2006 to more than 150,000 projectiles by 2018. This included not only rockets in the traditional sense, but also new longer-range missiles it had not previously possessed — among them precision missiles, notably the Fateh-110, manufactured locally by converting older Zelzal models through the addition of in-flight guidance systems and the replacement of fixed fins with movable ones. It also acquired precise, long-range anti-ship missiles such as the Chinese Silkworm and its Iranian copies, and even Russian Yakhont missiles with a range of 300 km. Added to this arsenal were suicide drones, missile-launching drones, reconnaissance drones, and more — as well as portable surface-to-air missiles of the MANPAD type. In terms of redeployment, the Shia militia shifted its military infrastructure into the urban fabric and within populated areas. The Shia towns and villages of the south and Beirut's southern suburbs were transformed into complex, carefully concealed military-urban fortresses, where civilians and fighters are intertwined in a web that is difficult to unravel — making it virtually impossible to draw a clear line between combatants and non-combatants. Hezbollah also made increasing use of civilian front organizations to carry out civilian surveillance patrols, the most well-known of which is "Green Without Borders," registered as an NGO dedicated to environmental protection and reforestation. The outposts and nurseries of this NGO, located along the Blue Line, long served to conceal Hezbollah's military infrastructure, ammunition depots, and combat tunnels. Furthermore, under the pretext of protecting private property or reforestation zones, its members routinely blocked UNIFIL inspectors from gaining access throughout the two decades following the 2006 war. Finally, Hezbollah fighters maintained a plainclothes presence at the entrances to camouflaged positions and underground installations. The constraints faced by UNIFIL UNIFIL in its new, reinforced form under Resolution 1701 never offered, from the outset, a genuine solution to the disarmament of Hezbollah. This is because it is not a combat force — operating as it does under Chapter 6 rather than Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. Its European contributors, particularly France, Italy, Spain, and Germany, refused to allow their Blue Helmets to act in place of the State in carrying out coercive disarmament. Moreover, the UN mandate did not permit systematic search operations. This situation led UNIFIL to coexist with Hezbollah, not without indirect contacts between the two parties through Lebanese intelligence services, and through mayors and NGOs affiliated with Hezbollah — especially after the start of the war in Syria and the proliferation of Islamist fighters on both sides of the Lebanese-Syrian border. In this context, UNIFIL suffered at least three attacks in 2011, leaving 16 members of the Italian and French contingents wounded. The perpetrators were militiamen linked to Al-Qaeda, notably the Palestinian Abdallah Azzam Brigades, operating out of Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon. The political aftermath of the 2006 war On the political front, the pressure exerted by Hezbollah, the Amal movement, and their ally Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement — just three months after the 33-day war — took the form of an institutional blockade aimed at durably weakening the executive branch. As early as November 2006, five Shia ministers from Hezbollah and Amal, along with Christian minister Yaacoub Sarraf, a close ally of President Emile Lahoud, resigned. They denounced the absence of a "blocking third" (1) in their favor within the Council of Ministers and declared the government illegitimate. This undermined the legitimacy of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and forced him to govern from a position of weakness. From December 2006 onward, a massive sit-in in downtown Beirut surrounding the Grand Serail, combined with Nabih Berri's decision not to convene Parliament, paralyzed legislative activity and prevented the presidential election — scheduled for September–October 2007 — from taking place, thereby deepening the political deadlock. At the same time, the government's inability to dismantle Hezbollah's private telecommunications network — deemed illegal — turned what was meant to be an assertion of state sovereignty into a casus belli. The government's decision to delegitimize that network on May 5, 2008, triggered a military response from Hezbollah on May 7, 2008. The May 7 power grab On May 7 and 8, 2008, Hezbollah seized control of large swaths of West Beirut, attacked the offices of the Future Movement, and once again besieged Prime Minister Fouad Siniora by force of arms at the government palace — demonstrating that any attempt to militarily weaken the pro-Iranian militia would lead to the collapse of public order. Faced with the specter of all-out war and state collapse, Siniora — in agreement with the very ministers who had called for the dismantling of Hezbollah's clandestine network — rescinded the decrees targeting that network and accepted, under Qatari mediation, the Doha Agreement of May 21, 2008. The Doha Agreement In the wake of the May 7, 2008 power grab, Qatar — having positioned itself as a mediator in Arab and Middle Eastern disputes and asserting its soft power — summoned Lebanon's leaders to Doha. The efforts of its emir ultimately led to an agreement that imposed the formation of a national unity government granting Hezbollah a "blocking third" (1), or veto power, within the Council of Ministers. The same agreement prohibited the use of weapons to settle internal disputes — a clause that had been repeated in every Lebanese inter-factional agreement since 1975 and had long since become little more than a formality. Nevertheless, the status of the pro-Iranian party's weapons was enshrined and protected under the pretext of "confronting Israel," effectively making the issue untouchable. Ultimately, this "compromise" had not been a simple tactical choice but was rather the result of an entanglement of military and political imperatives, among them the need to break a constitutional deadlock, ensure security stability, and preserve the (apparent) national unity that was, in reality, non-existent in practice. Thus, the first sovereignist government after the end of the Syrian occupation was forced to bow to the realities and the facts on the ground. As a result, Hezbollah continued to wield the "resistance" argument for one single purpose: to intimidate its opponents and maintain, at minimal cost, its grip over political decision-making in Lebanon. (1) The "blocking third" (or guarantee third) within the Lebanese government stems from a contested interpretation of the Lebanese Constitution as amended in 1990 by the Taif Agreement. The phrase "blocking third" does not appear verbatim in the text, but rests on two major constitutional pillars. On one hand, Article 65 stipulates that decisions on 14 "fundamental" matters — such as the electoral law or constitutional amendments — require a mandatory two-thirds majority of cabinet members, which automatically grants veto power to any coalition holding one third of ministers plus one. On the other hand, Article 69 provides for the automatic resignation of the entire executive if more than one third of its members resign. This institutional mechanism, originally designed to safeguard the communal coexistence pact, was politically enshrined in the Doha Agreement of May 2008, elevating this mathematical quota into a sine qua non condition for government formation, thereby granting Hezbollah veto power in every government formed from 2008 through 2025.

The seventh round of direct Lebanese-Israeli talks got underway Tuesday in Rome at the U.S. Embassy. The negotiations, described as difficult, are set to continue over three days, during which the Lebanese and Israeli delegations are expected to agree on the next stage of the mechanism envisaged for the gradual withdrawal of Tel Aviv’s forces and the deployment of the Lebanese Army. Beirut has made this issue a particular priority, while Israel remains chiefly focused on Lebanon’s mechanism envisaged for Hezbollah’s disarmament. The Iran-backed group returned to the offensive on Tuesday, lashing out at the Lebanese authorities and taking particular aim at President Joseph Aoun. Breaking nearly a month of silence, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem accused the president of being “biased” and of playing into Israel’s hands. He denounced what he described as a policy that “consists (according to him) of making free concessions to Israel and serving the interests of that state rather than those of Lebanon.” This speech could easily have been headlined, The Lebanese-Israeli Talks Through Tehran’s Eyes – especially as he took the opportunity to pay tribute to Iran. In his view, Lebanon’s salvation can come only through an Iranian-American memorandum of understanding, which, in practical terms, means that Lebanon should remain under the control of the mullahs’ regime. That prospect remains out of the question for the Lebanese authorities, which are instead fully committed to a process aimed at freeing the country from all forms of external tutelage and restoring the state’s authority and standing. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, moreover, echoed that longstanding Lebanese position in a forceful response to Iran’s spokesman in Lebanon, putting him firmly in his place by stressing in a post on his X account that “a group that has usurped the state’s authority over decisions of war and peace for the benefit of a foreign axis (to which it belongs) is the last one entitled to lecture others on patriotism.” For the prime minister, if anyone has done Israel a service, it is Hezbollah. Mr. Salam pointed in this regard to the “absurd” wars into which the group dragged the country “unilaterally,” disregarding the national interest and thereby giving Israel “a pretext to attack Lebanon, destroy its villages, kill and displace its population, and violate its sovereignty.” A New Chapter With Syria Naim Qassem’s speech was nevertheless notable for announcing Hezbollah’s willingness to open a new chapter with the regime of Ahmad al-Sharaa in Syria, even though his group had fought against it alongside Bashar al-Assad’s forces during the 2011 war. This tactical opening can only be explained by the weakening and isolation of Hezbollah, which appears ready to do whatever it takes to survive. Unfortunately for Hezbollah, events on the ground on Tuesday showed that the Iran-backed group is seeking to preserve its supply corridor with Iran through Syria. While Naim Qassem was praising the opening of a new chapter between his movement and Damascus, the Lebanese Army announced the seizure of Grad-type rockets intended for Hezbollah in the border area near Ersal, in the Bekaa Valley, which had been smuggled in from Syria. This was the latest in a long series of weapons seizures involving supplies headed to the Iran-backed group, alongside the discovery of tunnels and illegal border routes, all serving the same purpose: arms and drug trafficking. The August 4 Commemoration Another stroke of bad luck for Hezbollah: the seizure coincided with the sixth anniversary of the apocalyptic Beirut port explosion, on August 4, 2020, where hundreds of tons of ammonium nitrate had been stored. By announcing on July 28, 2026, the discovery of nearly 4,000 tons of the same explosive material near the village of Houla in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL reinforced suspicions that had been fueled for years of links between Hezbollah and the highly murky affair involving the storage of 2,700 tons of ammonium nitrate at the Beirut port (which was controlled by Hezbollah at the time), only a few hundred tons of which exploded on August 4, 2020. The indictment that Tarek Bitar, the investigating judge at the Judicial Council, is expected to issue by December, according to Beirut Bar Association President Imad Martinos, should shed light on this case, which many officials under former President Michel Aoun sought to suppress by every possible means. His successor, Joseph Aoun, has taken the opposite approach, urging the judge to make public as soon as possible the indictment submitted to Cassation Prosecutor General Mohammed Saab. The latter must issue his written opinion after reviewing the document, examining the charges, and assessing the next steps in the proceedings, before returning it to Tarek Bitar. Since Joseph Aoun took over as head of state and Nawaf Salam was appointed to lead the government, the investigation into the August 4 explosion has followed a normal judicial course. Will it mark the end of impunity in Lebanon? Many hope it will. In any case, the authorities’ conduct reflects a serious commitment to pursuing the case. A national day of mourning was declared across the country, with flags lowered to half-mast, particularly at the presidential palace, while ministers took part in gatherings held in memory of the victims. At the gathering held late in the afternoon near the port, at the time of day when the explosion occurred, the victims’ families announced that they would continue their campaign until the full truth about the case was uncovered and those responsible were punished. A deal over the Strait of Hormuz? On the regional front, the day was marked by a sense of déjà vu, with the announcement of an imminent agreement on the Strait of Hormuz, even as all previous agreements concluded and signed between the United States and Iran have failed to be honored by the Iranian regime. It was in this context that the Qatari and Pakistani mediators reported “ongoing efforts” to resume dialogue between Washington and Tehran, while the United States announced an upcoming agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which has been at the heart of renewed hostilities between in recent weeks. The agreement could be reached “Tuesday or Wednesday,” according to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was expected to confirm it shortly afterward. According to Qatar, these efforts are being pursued without any direct talks scheduled between the two sides. Whatever happens, tensions remain high in the region, where Yemen’s Houthis targeted Najran Airport in Saudi Arabia. Overnight Monday into Tuesday, a cargo ship attempting to cross the Strait of Hormuz was struck by a projectile that triggered a fire. One crew member is missing, according to British security company Vanguard.