Articles

Over the past decades, and even more clearly in recent years, Israel has demonstrated the extent of its formidable military power. It has managed to strike its adversaries on multiple fronts, use its intelligence, technological and military superiority to impose new realities, and establish itself as one of the region’s strongest military powers. But this is where the great paradox emerges: what has Israel gained, strategically, from all these victories? A military victory becomes a historic victory only when it produces a reality that is safer and more stable than the one that preceded it. The problem is that the project of “Fortress Israel,” or “Israel as a military empire,” may achieve successive victories on the battlefield while simultaneously accumulating ever greater levels of rejection, hostility and isolation around Israel.

To follow and understand the war—or rather, wars—in the Middle East during the week of September 21–27, 2026, one had to look instead… to New York. Regional conflicts heavily shaped some of the most closely watched speeches at the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly, including those by U.S. President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (speaking remotely). Beyond the speeches, the plenary assembly provided an opportunity for important bilateral meetings, two of which stand out: a U.S.-Iranian meeting that failed to produce the hoped-for results, and a Lebanese-Iranian meeting that, according to various sources, turned sour.

The Hashd al-Shaabi emerged under circumstances different from Lebanon’s, at a moment of severe security collapse as ISIS expanded in 2014. It would therefore be wrong to draw a simplistic equivalence between the Hashd and Hezbollah. But the Iraqi experience offers an extremely important lesson about the idea of integrating armed organizations into the state. In 2016, the Iraqi parliament recognized the Hashd as an independent military formation within the armed forces and linked to the commander-in-chief. In theory, this was supposed to place armed forces under the authority and command of the state. But specialized studies found that many networks and factions retained their own leaderships, interests, and political and economic ties, and that the formal framework was not sufficient to produce a unified chain of command and loyalty.

At this time every year, New York City hosts the largest gathering of elites devoted to discussing issues of world peace and the future of life on this planet. Something akin to a political-media fever takes hold, as the question of the role and function of the United Nations rises in intensity, along with the extent of its ability and authority to fulfill the primary mission assigned to it at the time of its founding. Visible signs of age and deterioration can also be seen in its headquarters, which are in need of renovation. Some, however, believe the building needs to be demolished and comprehensively rebuilt, a necessity imposed by the sweeping transformations the world has undergone over the past eight decades. These developments have left the “Security Council” unable to guarantee world peace, just as it has proved unable to enforce its own resolutions.

France plans to send troops, radar systems and air defenses to Saudi Arabia to protect energy infrastructure at the Red Sea port of Yanbu. The assistance is intended to secure a site that has become crucial to the kingdom's oil exports, as attacks by the Houthis and other Iranian-backed militias threaten its supply routes. President Emmanuel Macron said France did not intend to take part in the conflict and that the deployment had been agreed with Riyadh. He did not rule out further assistance depending on how the situation develops. Why Yanbu? Since the start of the military campaign waged by the United States and Israel against Iran, the Yanbu site has become highly strategic: its port allows Saudi Arabia to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, which has been blocked by Tehran.

Prime Minister Nawaf Salam went to the United Nations and spoke at length about sovereignty. He called for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese territory, reaffirmed the state’s exclusive authority over weapons and the decision of war and peace, and insisted that no one has the right to negotiate on Lebanon’s behalf. These are all principles that a Lebanese prime minister should defend. But there was one remarkable omission from his speech: Hezbollah. Not once did Salam name the organization whose weapons make the very principle he was defending necessary. He spoke of “arms outside the state,” of wars Lebanon did not choose, and of the need to restore national decision-making. Yet the actor that possesses those arms, has repeatedly made decisions of war and peace outside the state, and has tied Lebanon’s security to Iran’s regional strategy remained unnamed.