Fares Souaid

There has been much talk, of late, about the necessity of changing the system of the Lebanese formula, described as a “crisis-generator”, and some speak lightly of an “other” Lebanon at a moment of extreme complexity through which the region is passing. Some have held, since 1989, that the Taif Accord is an accord of “necessity” — meaning that it “does not please us”, but necessity has its own imperatives: – the necessity of putting an end to the war, – the necessity of moving from war to peace, – the necessity of ridding oneself of an internal adversary, – the necessity of holding fast to this accord in the face of Hezbollah's weapons.

If I write these words today, it is not out of ethics, friendship, or politeness, but out of the immense respect I hold for a man who gave so much to Lebanon and who remained an unknown soldier. This man's name is Mohammed Hussein Shamseddine, and from 1992 to 2026 he thought and drafted the majority of the political literature that formed the cornerstone upon which we built the narrative of this country's sovereignty and independence. For Mohammed Hussein Shamseddine, sovereignty and independence were always bound to national unity, upon which they directly depended. And whenever that national unity was broken, whatever the reason, it inevitably brought with it a rupture in the country's independence and sovereignty.