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This first article in a four-part series on the Mecca Pact explores how Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan converged and crossed a major strategic threshold by signing the Mecca Pact on August 7, 2026. Born out of rising regional tensions and the erosion of American security guarantees, this collective defense agreement could mark the emergence of a new autonomous security architecture at the heart of the Sunni world. Mecca is, without question, a highly symbolic venue for the signing of a pact. On August 7, 2026, the Al-Safa Palace in Mecca became the stage for a historic event whose shockwaves are reshaping regional and Asian geopolitics. Beneath the ceilings of this residence overlooking the Kaaba, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif sealed an alliance that has come to be known as the Mecca Pact. The choice of this deeply symbolic sanctuary goes far beyond mere religious staging. By uniting their military capabilities in principle at the very cradle of Islam, Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad are sending a clear political message: this alliance transcends geographical distances and ethnic divides, positioning itself as the new guarantor of stability in the Sunni world. Three weeks on, this mutual defense treaty has proven to be far more than a diplomatic statement of intent or a conventional bilateral cooperation agreement—especially in light of the recent trilateral meeting in Istanbul and the establishment of a secretariat. It is, in fact, a binding collective defense mechanism modeled on NATO's Article 5, stipulating that an armed attack against any one of the signatories constitutes a direct attack against all three. This commitment was born out of the pressing need to respond to the crises that have continued to shake the world throughout 2026. Since February, the broader military escalation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran has plunged the Middle East and its maritime routes into critical vulnerability, forcing regional powers to revisit their past security doctrines and rely increasingly on themselves in a rapidly shifting global environment—particularly as new military technologies proliferate and are no longer the exclusive domain of major powers. Moving to action: the establishment of a secretariat On August 31, a trilateral summit was held in Istanbul bringing together the defense ministers, foreign ministers, and chiefs of staff of the Turkish, Pakistani, and Saudi armed forces—the first such meeting since the signing of the Pact. During the summit, the three countries took a decisive step toward making the alliance fully operational. With the goal of institutionalizing the agreement and affirming the commitment to making it a pillar of regional stability, senior officials from all three countries formally announced the creation of a permanent secretariat, to be based in Riyadh. The first Secretary-General, a Pakistani national, will be appointed for a three-year term. He will be tasked with coordinating the interoperable capabilities of the three countries' armed forces in real time, while diplomatic protocols will be activated to reassure international powers of the alliance's strictly defensive nature. Among the concrete measures endorsed, the alliance's foreign ministers, defense ministers, and chiefs of staff approved operational mechanisms aimed at strengthening counterterrorism efforts, developing joint weapons production, and promoting military technology transfers and collective mutual deterrence. First pooling of military resources Pakistan has confirmed the operational deployment of a conventional military contingent of 8,000 soldiers in Saudi Arabia under the auspices of the new collective security framework formalized by the Mecca Defense Agreement. In addition to these 8,000 troops, several thousand other Pakistani soldiers have already been stationed in the Kingdom for decades under longstanding bilateral assistance and training protocols. The precise troop numbers of this longstanding permanent force are classified by both Defense Ministries. This new deployment represents a major evolution in the bloc's defense posture, strengthening overall deterrence against regional threats through strictly conventional means. Pakistan retains exclusive sovereign control over its nuclear arsenal, with the agreement ruling out any extension of its strategic umbrella or the integration of its strategic forces into a joint command structure. The deployed Pakistani force includes an air defense and tactical support component. It consists of a squadron of 16 Chinese-made JF-17 Thunder supersonic fighter jets stationed at King Abdulaziz Air Base in Dhahran, located in the Kingdom's most vulnerable energy corridor, just minutes away from Saudi Aramco's infrastructure. These aircraft carry out air defense and surveillance missions against Iranian or other missile and drone threats. In addition to this air component, Islamabad has also deployed in the Dhahran region two squadrons of reconnaissance and attack drones, along with a battery of HQ-9 long- and medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, funded by Riyadh and operated by Pakistani personnel. Since spring 2026, Pakistan has stationed on Saudi soil two squadrons of Shahpar-II and Shahpar-III surveillance drones, interconnected with the HQ-9 air defense batteries, as well as long-range kamikaze drones such as the D-248. The HQ-9 system — or "Red Flag-9" — developed by China, comprises long- and medium-range, high- and low-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Designed to intercept multiple aerial targets simultaneously, it is China's equivalent of the Russian S-300/S-400 systems and employs the same guidance technologies as the American Patriot missiles. It is equipped with several types of radars, including high- and low-altitude surveillance, target acquisition, and missile guidance radars. These Pakistani units operate in synergy with Saudi forces to monitor Saudi airspace in real time and counter missile and drone threats. Beyond these already pooled capabilities, many others could be added, turning the Mecca Pact into an integrated military entity capable of responding instantly to any aggression against its members. By combining Gulf capital, Turkish technological expertise, the defense industries of all three countries, and Pakistan's strike power, this coalition is radically reshaping the regional geopolitical balance — drastically reducing dependence on extra-regional powers while establishing credible deterrence against the persistent tensions gripping the Middle East. However, two observations are worth making: the first is that all three signatories are allies of the United States, which remains indispensable to each of them individually; the second is that each faces its own specific challenges — Pakistan, for instance, has a deeply fraught dispute with India, and the two countries have come dangerously close to all-out war on several occasions. What, then, would the Mecca Pact do if a conflict were to erupt between Islamabad and New Delhi? Turkey, in the current context, is far from being attacked by anyone, but its support for Hamas – which Riyadh views with great suspicion – its involvement in Central Asia, Cyprus, and Libya, its age-old conflict with Greece, and its naval military presence in Qatar are all factors that could one day prove embarrassing for one or both of the other members of the alliance. (to be continued)

Levant Time received the following statement from the family of the late former minister and MP Hassan Rifaï, who passed away on September 3, 2025. We reproduce it in full: On the first anniversary of Hassan Rifaï’s passing, a man who devoted most of his life to defending Greater Lebanon, and at a time when debate is intensifying over the need to amend Lebanon’s political system, it is important to recall some of his reflections and positions on the Taif Agreement and the constitutional amendments that stemmed from it. 1. The Taif Agreement is a Syrian-American agreement concluded under an Arab umbrella, in terms that were for the most part Lebanese. (1989) 2. If the Taif “reforms” are implemented, they will be a disaster; if they are not, a catastrophe. (1989) 3. The Taif Agreement transformed the exercise of power in Lebanon from a two-headed conflict into a multi-headed war that paralyses and nullifies the exercise of power, against a backdrop of confusion and overlapping prerogatives. This is why, even before its adoption, Hassan Rifaï had called for Taif to be reconsidered, so as not to bequeath to future generations the worst of political systems. (1989-1990) 4. The Taif Agreement was concluded in 1989 under the pressure of internal wars and Syrian bombardment. Any new revision of the Constitution must not take place under similar circumstances, under the pressure of internal conflict or an external war. 5. The provisions of the National Accord Document (“Taif”) that were not formally enshrined in constitutional provisions have no binding legal or constitutional force and remain mere recommendations. 6. It is incorrect to claim that executive power was vested in the President of the Republic and that the Taif Agreement stripped him of it. Since 1943, presidential practice had rested on a transgression of the conventions of the democratic parliamentary system. 7. “Where responsibility lies, there lies power” (Léon Duguit). Since the President of the Republic is not politically responsible (Article 60 of the Constitution), responsibility rests with the government, its president and its ministers, who fall if they lose the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies or under pressure from the street. 8. Before the Taif Agreement, Presidents of the Council sought to accommodate Presidents of the Republic who exercised prerogatives that were not theirs. The Presidents of the Republic gained nothing from this; Lebanon, however, lost. Those who surrendered some of their prerogatives also lost, and Lebanon with them. (1988) 9. There is no legal definition of the formula “Any authority that contradicts the pact of communal coexistence is illegitimate,” set forth in paragraph (j) of the Preamble to the Constitution, which now serves as a pretext for the heresy of a spurious and wholly fabricated “mithaqiyya.” 10. The monopoly on legitimate violence belongs to the State. It constitutes the very foundation of any State. There is no need to invoke the provisions of the Taif Agreement to justify this principle. 11. Neither today nor in the foreseeable future can there be any question of contemplating the abolition of political confessionalism. 12. The Senate was introduced into the Taif Agreement to satisfy the Druze community. Yet its creation would impede the legislative process and serve no useful purpose. (1989) 13. Administrative decentralisation cannot be contemplated before a strong central State has been established, failing which the country would fragment into antagonistic cantons. (1981) 14. For our republican, democratic and parliamentary system to function properly, it needs an electoral law reflecting the nature of the Lebanese people: small constituencies and a majoritarian voting system, given the absence of genuine political parties. 15. By virtue of his election to a fixed four-year term, the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies has departed from the impartiality inherent in his office; likewise, the heresy of “mithaqiyya” has enabled him to interfere in the functioning of the executive branch. 16. The constitutional amendments made no mention of decentralisation. Paragraph (g) of the Preamble to the Constitution, however, provides that “the balanced development of the regions, culturally, socially and economically, is a fundamental pillar of the unity of the State and the stability of the system.” In other words, the failure to develop the regions threatens the stability of the country. (1968-1981) 17. The Taif Agreement does not require national unity cabinets bringing together all opposing parties. Nor does it impose a consensual democracy requiring agreement among them, at the risk of undermining the proper functioning of democratic life. 18. The authorship of the “blocking third” in the Constitution resulting from the Taif Agreement belongs to a Lebanese faction that sought to prevent the Council of Ministers from adopting decisions unacceptable to the President of the Republic. 19. Article 95 of the Constitution resulting from the Taif Agreement provides that the abolition of confessionalism in the civil service, for categories below the first category, must respect the “requirements of national accord.” This vague formula made it possible to paralyse the “transitional period” provided for in that same article. 20. The “blocking third” rests on four mechanisms: the quorum for meetings of the Council of Ministers, which requires the presence of two-thirds of the ministers; fundamental decisions, whose adoption requires two-thirds of the ministers; the government, which is deemed to have resigned when more than one-third of its members resign; the dismissal of a minister, which must be decided by two-thirds of the ministers rather than by the President of the Republic and the President of the Council who appointed him. 21. Even before 1943, most political leaders were beholden to foreign States and their diplomatic missions, thereby inviting foreign intervention in all our national affairs. This remains the case today. 22. After seventy-five years of public life, Hassan Rifaï reached this conclusion: the problem lies with politicians; the solution lies with statesmen, of whom the country is today bereft. (2018)

Since the American strikes against Iran on Tuesday night—the first in roughly a month—tensions between the warring parties have reached a breaking point. Iran has continued its strikes throughout Tuesday night and into Wednesday, targeting neighboring countries, as it typically does whenever it comes under attack. Jordan said it had shot down several drones. In Kuwait, a fire broke out following a drone attack, and the Iranians themselves claimed to have targeted the Al Dhafra and Al Minhad bases in the United Arab Emirates. Later in the day, the Revolutionary Guards announced they had struck American targets in Erbil, in Iraqi Kurdistan. The United States, which had not carried out any new strikes as of Wednesday afternoon, once again urged its nationals in the region to remain vigilant. The American strikes from the previous evening and overnight have nonetheless left their mark. Iran reported at least eleven deaths as a result of these strikes: four at a wedding in the southeast of the country, where around fifty people were also wounded, and seven in the Khuzestan region, in missile attacks that left eight more injured. The Revolutionary Guards themselves acknowledged the deaths of four of their own members in the strikes, along with three Basij members—the notorious morality police. Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the strikes as a "war crime." The U.S. military, while declining to comment on the matter directly, simply stated that it "never targets civilians." However, the most striking remarks came from the Speaker of Parliament and Iran's chief negotiator with the Americans during the Islamabad talks, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. In a highly significant return to the vocabulary of the early days of the Islamic Revolution, the former Revolutionary Guard member labeled the United States the "Great Satan" for its attack on the wedding on Tuesday, drawing comparisons to other strikes, such as the one on a school in Minab on the first day of the war, which claimed dozens of young schoolgirls as victims. He even took a swipe at the Israelis, claiming that this Great Satan is shielding a "lesser" one. The Israelis, who are not directly targeted in these latest strikes against Iran, nonetheless made their voice heard on Wednesday. Defense Minister Israel Katz hinted that the Israeli state has intelligence suggesting Iran is preparing to attack its territory. He assured that fighter jets are ready to scramble at the slightest Iranian provocation. Xi's "foreign interference" In any case, the war of words is at its peak. While the Revolutionary Guards warn their attackers of a "new strategy" aimed at "breaking the foundations of the enemy," an American official quoted by Axios has coined a new phrase to describe what the war in the Middle East has become: tanker versus tanker. Indeed, on Wednesday, U.S. armed forces targeted an Iranian oil tanker, after two vessels caught fire after striking mines. The Strait of Hormuz remains at the heart of this conflict. And the American president, who has shown a growing habit of renaming places, has proposed calling it the "Trump Strait"… Meanwhile, with diplomacy at a standstill, one visit drew considerable attention: Chinese President Xi Jinping's trip to Egypt on Wednesday, where he was received with great fanfare by his counterpart Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Mr. Xi, who had previously defended China's ties with the Islamic Republic, addressed the conflict during his visit, calling for a fight against "foreign interference" in the region—a barely veiled reference to the United States. Together with the Egyptian president, they called for "diplomatic solutions." The Chinese president also expressed his readiness to help ensure freedom of navigation in the region. An Assad lieutenant arrested in Lebanon On the other front of this war, in southern Lebanon, Israeli strikes show no sign of letting up, particularly around the strategic hill of Ali el-Taher. Once again, on Wednesday the Israeli army justified its strikes by citing a booby-trapped drone attack it attributes to Hezbollah — one of whose members was killed — with the group remaining silent, as it has been for several weeks now. Lebanon was also the scene of another development on Wednesday, signaling a rapprochement between Lebanese officials and their Syrian counterparts, and the weakening of Iran's influence in the country. Authorities arrested a former colonel from Bashar al-Assad's fallen Syrian regime, a Lebanese judicial official told AFP. He had been plotting against Syria's current authorities from Beirut. Weapons were seized from him and his accomplices. Finally, in the Palestinian territories, the situation continues to deteriorate, and Israeli statements are growing increasingly uninhibited as October's parliamentary elections approach. The Defense Minister proposed relocating the entire population out of the Gaza Strip, claiming that Israelis "are well organized to do so." Echoing those remarks, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that his army "will not withdraw" from Gaza.

Lebanon is taking an important step toward safeguarding the individual right to life by abolishing the death penalty, at a time when the region lives to the rhythm of news of war, death and destruction, in a reality that at times resembles the collective execution of human beings. The abolition of the death penalty is not merely a legal amendment or a legislative measure. It is a human-rights act that places the right to life above the state’s right to punish and sides with the individual against the power to inflict death. From this perspective, Lebanon’s decision to embark on this path carries significance beyond the legal text itself by strengthening the protection of the individual. Abolishing the death penalty thus amounts to recognizing that the state should not kill in the name of the law, even as wars, conflicts and political and social collapse turn death into a daily practice both within and outside the law. This is where the significance of Lebanon’s move becomes clear, following a de facto moratorium on executions in place since 2004, in a region where human rights are rarely respected. Lebanese Justice Minister Adel Nassar described the abolition of capital punishment as “an essential message in favor of fundamental rights.” Among the member states of the Arab League, Djibouti removed the death penalty from its Penal Code in 1995, although the country is located in the Horn of Africa. In the Middle East, Israel abolished capital punishment for ordinary crimes in 1954, while retaining it for a number of exceptional offenses, including treason in wartime, genocide, crimes against humanity and crimes against the Jewish people. Last March, the Israeli Knesset adopted a law imposing the death penalty for certain murders classified as terrorist offenses committed by residents of the West Bank, while excluding Israeli citizens and residents of Israel, with the possibility, under certain exceptional circumstances defined by the military courts, of replacing it with life imprisonment. Promoted by the far right, this policy regained political momentum after the war that followed October 7, 2023. In practice, its application is aimed primarily at Palestinians subject to military courts. Israeli and international human-rights organizations have criticized the measure, arguing that it entrenches a two-tier justice system. This is not merely a philosophy rooted in the defense of human rights. It is also an assertion that human life does not lose its value because of a crime, because of a person’s identity, or because of their political, sectarian, geographical or ethnic position. In a region where human beings are often reduced to numbers in casualty tolls running into the thousands, defending the individual right to life becomes a political position in the fullest sense. The paradox, however, is that the abolition of the death penalty is taking place in a regional environment where death is inflicted on a massive scale. The shift from individual execution carried out by the state pursuant to a judicial ruling to collective execution produced by war and violence is one of the contradictions that most starkly reveals the crisis of a violent Middle East. The abolition of capital punishment should therefore not be regarded as the end of the debate, but as the beginning of a larger question: how can the right to life be transformed from a legal principle that protects the individual from the state into a political and moral value capable of protecting human beings from war, violence, authoritarianism and the collapse of the state? This is the geopolitical ambiguity of death. In Syria, death sentences in absentia have been issued against former President Bashar al-Assad on charges of premeditated murder, torture, arbitrary detention and crimes against humanity, among other accusations related to the war he waged against his own people for nearly fourteen years. Alongside him, senior figures of his regime involved in mass killings, forced displacement and the torture of prisoners have also been convicted, in the context of a deeply ambiguous political transition in which the concept of justice becomes entangled with the imperatives of political revenge and the settling of scores. In Israel, death takes another form. Violence is exercised in contexts described as terrorism, while the killing of the Palestinian human being becomes an instrument in an existential and security conflict. All of this makes the issue more complex still, as death and execution take different forms once death itself becomes a political instrument. Yet the human being remains, in the end, the weakest link. While Lebanon moves toward abolishing capital punishment, killings, executions and bombings continue around it and on its own territory, outside the logic of state sovereignty and the law, or under various political and security labels. Yet the principle of civilization presupposes that no one can claim such a right in absolute terms. But what does justice mean in times of war and upheaval? And what form of accountability can truly be achieved while crimes and political and financial settlements continue? The abolition of the death penalty nevertheless opens new horizons for justice. Lebanon can now renew its request for the extradition of Igor Grechushkin, a Russian-Cypriot national who operated the Rhosus , the vessel that transported the ammonium nitrate linked to the August 2020 Beirut port explosion. A Bulgarian court had refused his extradition after deeming Lebanon’s assurances that he would not face the death penalty insufficient. With the abolition of capital punishment, one of the main legal obstacles to a renewed extradition request has been removed. In the hope of becoming a regional example, Lebanon is also considering whether to refuse the extradition to Syria of former regime officials who would be tried before courts that continue to issue death sentences, if it is able to do so given the scale of foreign interference. From this perspective, abolishing the death penalty is no longer merely a criminal-justice matter. It becomes a coherent position against a political culture that turns death into a means of reproducing power or eliminating opponents. The difference between execution and political violence does not always lie in the outcome, but in the authority that grants itself the legitimacy to carry it out. Capital punishment disappears from the law while surviving within a geopolitical landscape in which it is practiced in other forms. In principle, abolishing the death penalty is a democratic and legal act, and it also falls within the principle of mercy embraced by most revealed religions. But this alone is no longer sufficient for it to be described as a democratic act. Democracy is not measured only by what the state does inside parliament or inside the courtroom that replaces a death sentence with life imprisonment, but also by its ability to protect life beyond those walls. Democracy does not consist only in preventing the state from executing an individual pursuant to a judicial ruling. It also requires the creation of political, social and economic conditions that effectively protect human life from war, poverty, famine, explosions, collapse and displacement. The challenge is therefore no longer limited to abolishing capital punishment. It also lies in abolishing the conditions that make death ordinary, repetitive and acceptable, as though it were a natural part of political life. In the conflicts of the Horn of Africa, in the wars of the Middle East and Ukraine, and amid mass or increasingly frequent executions in Iran, the gap between the legal right to life and human reality continues to widen. This is where the crisis of the state itself is exposed. What value does recognition of the human right to life have if politics is incapable of protecting people from every form of political, military, social and economic killing? Death is no longer an exception in this geography. It is present in war, terrorism, famine, poverty, displacement and economic collapse, in societies exposed to every form of violation. Defending life therefore becomes more than defending a legal right. It becomes a defense of the very possibility that human beings may live ordinary lives, without war, without fear, without hunger and without constantly awaiting death when they leave their country to escape it, only to find themselves facing the sea, borders, detention centers, prisons or barbed wire that follows them from one capital to another. Migration itself thus becomes part of the democratic question. A person who leaves their country in search of life is supposed to enter a safer space, yet may instead find themselves trapped within a system of closed borders, detention, deportation and exploitation. Their right to life becomes suspended between two states: the one that drove them to leave and the one that refuses to receive them. Death is no longer an exception. It is war, execution, terrorism, famine, poverty, collapse, fires and floods. Even those who flee death do not necessarily escape its geography. They may move from war to the sea, from the sea to a border, from a border to a detention center, and from a detention center to another prison, as in cases involving radical Islamist prisoners transferred by air from Germany to Syrian prisons where they were tortured. It is as though prisons themselves are no longer always fixed places. They have become moving trajectories in which geography changes while the human condition does not. The issue, therefore, is no longer simply the abolition of the death penalty. It is the restoration of normal life itself: enabling human beings to live, to move, to cross borders, to dissent, to protest and to rise up without any of these acts becoming a potential path to death.

Some people spend their lives accepting their lot, while others take their destiny into their own hands. This is all the more difficult for a woman living in a man’s world. And yet… some women chose to fight, succeeding in breaking the taboos of their time. Whether they wielded a brush, a pen, scientific instruments, or their voices, they made their mark on their century with a boldness that at times bordered on scandal. From Artemisia Gentileschi, defying Italian society and the courts five centuries ago, to George Sand, who traded the corset for the freedom to write; from Camille Claudel, the deeply wounded artist, to the rigor and genius of Marie Curie, and the universal voice of Oum Kalthoum… these women succeeded in overcoming social prejudice. In a series of articles, we invite you on a journey through time to meet these rebellious women. Oum Kalthoum maintained a strict boundary between her career and her personal life, which made her the target of the wildest rumors. She married for the first time when she had to leave her native village for Cairo. But this was merely a formality to enable her to travel to the capital, as unmarried women were not allowed to travel at the time. She divorced soon after arriving in Cairo. She married for real in 1954, to Dr. Hassan El-Hefnawy, who was an important source of support throughout her life, particularly when she had to face illness. They never had children and, unusually for the time, she held the ‘eesmat , the right to initiate divorce - a right that, under Islamic legal tradition, was normally granted to the husband by default. The Fourth Pyramid Oum Kalthoum inspired people not only through her music, but also through her patriotic commitment. Yet, her relationship with the “Free Officers”, including Gamal Abdel Nasser, was difficult at first, following the 1952 coup d’état. When they overthrew King Farouk, Oum Kalthoum was seen as a figure of the old regime, and her songs were banned from the radio. It took Nasser’s personal – and furious – intervention to restore her to favor. He reportedly told the Free Officers: “Are you crazy? Do you want Egypt to turn against us?” She then became the voice of modern Egypt and Arab unity, speaking as an equal with presidents and monarchs, with Nasser’s support, who saw her as a loyal friend and an invaluable political ally. The Trauma of 1967 Following Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War, Oum Kalthoum embarked on a major international tour, donating all of her proceeds to the Egyptian government to help rebuild the army. Legend has it that she demanded 2 million francs from Bruno Coquatrix for her concert at the Olympia – more than Edith Piaf was paid at the time. When Coquatrix asked her how many songs she intended to perform, her terse reply left him speechless: Two or three! The concert went on until 4 a.m. The cream of French chanson and an audience from across the Middle East attended, including Sephardic Jews wearing kippahs. Emancipation Through Excellence Oum Kalthoum’s rebellion asserted itself both on stage and behind the scenes of power. By refusing to submit to the role expected of women from her background, she forged an unprecedented path. When she died in 1975, she was given a funeral worthy of a head of state. Millions flooded the streets of Cairo to bid farewell to their beloved icon. It is even said that her funeral surpassed that of Nasser, her lifelong friend, who had died a few years earlier. She never allowed life’s storms to break her. With every challenge, she adapted her strategy, turning her own weaknesses, as well as those of the country, into opportunities. She remains forever the Star of the East, the shining star of a region so full of contradictions yet so endearing. Ultimately, one question remains: can one sing of love with such sensitivity without having experienced it in the very depths of one’s being? Beneath her flawless mask of a powerful woman, did the woman who sang of love throughout her life ever know the torments of passion? To whom was she speaking when she sang, “Enta omri li btadi bnouraq sabahou”? Was she a woman in love, singing from the depths of her soul, or simply an extraordinary performer whose talent alone was enough to spellbind millions of fans? It is the eternal, unanswered question of the relationship between reality and the talent of great artists…

The United States launched major strikes against Iran on Tuesday night for the second time in a matter of days, with CENTCOM announcing that it had "begun operations against targets belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps." U.S. President Donald Trump went so far as to threaten an even more devastating future attack: "If the failing nation of Iran retaliates against this perfectly justified attack, it will be struck again, far harder," he wrote on his Truth Social platform. Despite the American warning, Tehran in turn announced a "decisive" response, directly threatening U.S. interests: "American bases and interests in the region are being targeted by Iranian missiles and drones." The U.S. strikes began shortly after Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian called for a revival of diplomacy, which has now reached a complete standstill. Urging the United States to honor a compromise signed in June that almost immediately fell apart, he stated: "If the United States returns to its commitments under the memorandum of understanding (...), the Islamic Republic of Iran will immediately take reciprocal measures." But on Fox News, President Trump quickly fired back, noting that "the deal with the Iranians isn't even worth the paper it was written on," before adding: "We gave them many chances." The Iranian president was speaking at a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia, which was also attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping — two major allies of the Islamic Republic whom Washington suspects of violating the economic and military embargo imposed on Tehran. IAEA reveals Assad regime's secret nuclear activities On a separate matter, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed yesterday, in a confidential report, that Syrian authorities under Assad had been conducting undeclared nuclear activities. Infrastructure discovered in Deir Ezzor, Syria, is "consistent with that of a nuclear reactor," the IAEA stated, emphasizing that these activities carried out under Bashar al-Assad's regime had never been declared. IAEA inspectors visited two sites last month — one in Deir Ezzor and another at a second location linked to nuclear materials identified by Syria's new authorities. In addition to the "nuclear reactor under construction," the IAEA identified a factory for manufacturing nuclear fuel intended for the reactor, as well as a storage site and uranium waste. On August 18, the IAEA and Syrian authorities announced the discovery of "several tons of nuclear materials" at an "undeclared" site, described as a "legacy of the former regime" and reported in July by the Damascus authorities. In its report reviewed on Tuesday, the IAEA said it found approximately 73 tons of natural uranium, including 55 tons in the form of fuel rods, with the remainder consisting of waste. Israel acknowledged in 2018 that it had bombed the site eleven years earlier, claiming to have targeted a nuclear reactor under construction. In 2008, less than a year after the strike, U.S. officials accused Syria of having sought to build a secret nuclear reactor with North Korea's assistance, stating that Israel had destroyed it during the raid. European advisers for the Lebanese army On the local front, the European Union will launch a Lebanese army training mission in the coming months, without replacing the current United Nations mission, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas announced on Tuesday. "The ministers discussed our plans for a new EU mission to advise and train the country's armed forces, particularly in the areas of border security and maritime security," she said following a meeting of EU Defence Ministers in Wicklow, near Dublin. Israel faces threat of British sanctions It should also be noted that the United Kingdom announced on Tuesday that it would take action in the coming weeks in response to the "horrific" attacks by settlers in the occupied West Bank, a subject that is causing growing outrage across European countries. Israel, for its part, warned that it would retaliate. Alongside Israel's war in Gaza, launched in retaliation for the unprecedented Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, settler violence has intensified over the past three years. Condemning what he called "absolutely horrific acts of settler terrorism," the new British Foreign Secretary, Ed Miliband, himself from a Jewish family, promised to unveil "a comprehensive package of measures" shortly. Violence carried out by Israeli settlers in the West Bank, a territory occupied by the Israeli military since 1967, has drawn sharp criticism from European countries as well as from the United States, Israel's staunch ally.